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Army Shows Mobile Print.   Graphic Arts Monthly 76:21 October 2004.
This article highlights the participation of the U.S. Army at the Graph Expo and Converting Expo in Chicago, Illinois in October 2004. It is showcasing its mobile printing capacity at the expo. A 2,400-square-foot educational display features a U.S. Army Psychological Operations mobile printing team, using a system known as the Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC). The DPPC consists of a work shelter mounted on a Humvee, which tows an equipment trailer. The center is used to print psychological operations leaflets, flyers, and other communications for foreign audiences in the field. The army most recently used these capabilities in Iraq. According to show managers, the exhibit enables visitors to see an area of military service that does not get a lot of attention, showing that printing is still a key communications tool globally.

Iran Says US Launches "Psychological Warfare."  International CustomWire January 20, 2005.

King, Sara B.  PSYOP and Persuasion:  Applying Social Psychology and Becoming an Informed CitizenTeaching of Psychology 31:27-31 Winter 2004.
This project teaches students about persuasion techniques, especially as governments use them. Most projects examples came form the work of the U.S. military's modern Psychological Operations division. social psychology students (a) reviewed influence techniques; (b) examined posters, leaflets, and other persuasion tools used in World War II, the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan; (c) pondered legal and ethical issues related to persuasion campaigns; and (d) considered the differences between persuasion and propaganda. Finally, students considered ways to inoculate themselves against unwanted influence attempts. [Abstact from author]

Schleifer, Ron.  Democracies, Limited War and Psychological OperationsReview of International Affairs 2:41-54 Spring 2003.
Democracies generally abstain from using psychological operations (PSYOP) as they perceive propaganda to be a totalitarian political tool. Whilst in (conventional) war they use it reluctantly, in small wars they hardly make use of it at all. The nature of small wars makes their handling more difficult for a democracy because it does not undergo the psychological process of mobilization. In contrast, the insurgents make vast use of PSYOP as they realize that the media can be easily exploited through the public's thirst for information. This essay outlines the weakness of democracies in their handling of the struggle over the hearts and minds of the public and proposes changes within democracies to employ effectively psychological warfare. [Abstact from author]


Goldstein, Frank L. and Findley, Benjamin F.  Psychological Operations:  Principles and Case Studies.  Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1996.  364 p.


Barucky, Jerry et al.  Evaluation of Cross-Cultural Models for Psychological Operations:  Test of a Decision Modeling Approach.   Mesa, AZ, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness Directorate, Warfighter Training Research Division, 2001.  69 p.

Black, Lawrence L. et al.  Information Operations and Psychological Operations in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility.  Ft. Bragg, NC Strategic Studies Detachment SOUTHCOM, 4TH Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), 1998.  20 P.

Blakely, James F.  Terrorism and the Role of Information:  Building Relationships On-LineMonterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003.  101 p.

Burkett, Wendy H.  Assessing the Results of Effects-Based Operations (EBO):  The Relationship Between Effects-Based Operations and the Psychological Dimension of Warfare.   Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 2003.  34 p.
Knowledge of the opposition can be used to create a psychological effect that assists in the attainment of the overall objective. How can this psychological effect be incorporated into strategic, operational and tactical planning? This paper argues that the psychological dimension of warfare has a profound correlation to effects-based operations, both for the opposition as well as for our own national strategy and how this nation can plan and better use all elements of our national power to perhaps avoid the next conflict, but if we must, be better prepared.

Clapp, Anthony J.  Information Operations and Joint Vision 2020:  Ready to Accept the ChallengeNewport, RI, Naval War College, 2002.  unpaged.
"Ever increasing in importance to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is the still evolving role of Information Operations (IO). Properly executed, IO will start during peacetime and play significant role in diffusing potential crisis situations. In times of crisis, IO will be a significant contributor to accomplishing the JFC's objectives and then will enable a smooth transition to a return to peace. However, it is currently not possible for the JFC to fully exploit all aspects of IO in order to gain and maintain an advantage over the adversary. Doctrinal shortcomings such as IO cell leadership and the IO organizational structure are the main obstacles preventing joint forces from reaping the benefits of fully integrated and synchronized IO. Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) poses a challenge to the operational commander by stating the pace of change in the information environment dictates that we explore broader information operations strategies and concepts. Joint forces should be prepared to accept this challenge, but must first change the way they employ IO if they expect to achieve the JFC's objectives. Implementation of a Joint Forces Information Operations Component Commander (JFIOCC), led by the current Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Commander is the first step towards a synergistic approach to the employment of IO."

Curtis, Glenn.  An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)Washington, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, October 1989.  36 p.

Fleri, Edgar L.  PSYOP and Airpower:  Tools to Encourage Surrender.   Maxwell AFB, AL, Air Command and Staff College, 2003.  38 leaves.

Gough, Susan L.  The Evolution of Strategic Influence.  Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 2003.  54 p.
This paper will examine the evolution of how the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense have organized to conduct strategic influence as an instrument of national power from the Psychological Warfare Division of World War II through the Psychological Strategy Board and Operations Coordinating Board of the early Cold War through the Vietnam years to today. Are they organized effectively today to meet the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century, and what can history teach us about organizing for strategic influence?

Isler, Matthew C.  Beyond Attrition:  Integrating Psychological Effects into USAF Counterair Doctrine.  Maxwell AFB, AL, Air command and Staff College, 2004.

Leyda, Christopher L.  Joint Doctrine to Integrate3 Theater Strategic Psychological Operations at the National Level:  Searching for Needles in a Haystack.  Newport, RI, Naval War College, 2002. 20 p.
"Current joint doctrine clearly defines how a combatant commander can develop plans, organize forces, and conduct psychological operations within operational and tactical realms. However, joint doctrine stops short of providing solid mechanisms and procedures to integrate theater strategic psychological operations at the national level and with other governmental agencies responsible for information activities. A revision of joint publications: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (JP 3-08); Joint Information Operation (JP 3-13); and Psychological Operations (JP 3-53) must occur to clearly define a coordination mechanism to integrate theater strategic psychological operations initiatives at the national level."

Mateer, Shawn M.  Influence Management:  A Tool for the War on Terrorism.   Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 2002.  25 p.
This paper explores the use of influence management, at the strategic level, defeat terrorism. It examines how the U.S. government must use one of the elements of national power, information, to both protect the friendly center of gravity and should be used to attack decisive points to topple the enemy's center of gravity.

Noll, James P.  The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW) During Mobilization, Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Demobilization.  Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War college, 1993.  164 p.

Pugmire, Brian M.  Psychological Operations:  Will the Real Approval Authority Please Stand Up?  Newport, RI, Naval War College, 2002.
"The only organic tool the combatant commander has in his arsenal to communicate with enemy forces or civilians in his theater is Psychological Operations. Accordingly, when the Psychological Operations effort is well coordinated, it can aid significantly in the success of the commander's mission. To be most effective Psychological Operations must be timely. Psychological Operations are most responsive when the theater level commander retains the approval authority for Psychological Operations products. The approval process begins, however, at levels well above the combatant commander. The Psychological Operations plan must be approved at the Secretary of Defense level via the Joint Staff. Considering the degree of technological advances in the information arena to which the world is now exposed, this process must have interagency coordination for a truly synchronized effort. It is imperative that during peace and war the office responsible for approving Psychological Operations plans and products be defined clearly and supported by all agencies and organizations responsible for information activities. Unfortunately, in practice, this is not always the case."

Sammons, David H.  PSYOP and the Problem of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the Combatant Commander.  Newport, RI, Naval War college, 2004.  22 p.
"Perhaps the greatest psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign is the one in which the PSYOP community has exalted the effectiveness of their trade as a combat multiplier and peacetime contributor in the pursuit of national and military objectives. This often one-sided viewpoint dismisses the difficulty of PSYOP assessment and only exacerbates the key problem of which the total PSYOP program suffers. The Combatant Commander needs full disclosure of the facts based on the PSYOP principle of truthfulness. The reader is introduced to the doctrinal definitions of PSYOP and Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) and examples of PSYOP used in Operations ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. The thesis for this research paper is that PSYOP measures of effectiveness (MOE) are a significant problem that the Combatant Commander will need to address in planning and the actual conduct of war. The purpose of this paper is to assist the Combatant Commander in gaining a greater understanding of PSYOP MOE by exploring: 1) the scope of the problem, 2) the methods and procedures used to address the problem, and 3) four broad recommendations. "

Sova, Robert J.  Information Operations/Information Warfare:  A Joint Plan?   Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 2004.  21 p.

Summe, Jack N.  Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, and a Policy for the Future.  Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 1999.  43 p.

Tanous, Stephen M.  Building a Psychological Strategy for the U.S.:  Leveraging the Informational Element of National Power.  Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 2003.  45 p.
The keys to successful implementation of a national psychological strategy are integration of public diplomacy, public affairs, international military information and coercive diplomacy, supported by the means to understand and communicate with foreign audiences and gauge both domestic and foreign reaction to U.S. plans, policies, and actions. The nation has the resources and expertise to execute an effective psychological strategy which will make the difference for the U.S. in the 21st century.

Ward, Brad M.  Strategic Influence Operations:  The Information Connection.   Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, 2003.  33 p.
This paper will conduct a comparative analysis of the fundamental approaches that the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), and the National Security Council/White House (NSC/WH) utilize internationally, and provide recommendations that magnifies informational techniques to further U.S. strategic objectives.


Bloom, Bradley.  Information Operations in Support of Special OperationsMilitary Review 84:45-49 January-February 2004.
Discusses the need for information operations (IO) support to special operations (SO) of the U.S. Army. Benefits from IO; Things that the SO community must do in order to enhance effective IO support to SO forces; Definition of IO according to the Information Operations Roadmap of the U.S. Department of Defense; Purpose of the Roadmap; Details of integrated IO functions; Discussion on IO support to SO at the strategic level.

Breen, Tom.  Bad News:  Should Media Manipulation be a Tool of War?  Armed Forces Journal 142 24-26+ February 2005.

Briscoe, C. H.  Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP (Psychological Operations) Teams in Afghanistan.  Special Warfare 15:36-38 September 2002.

Briscoe, C. H.  Wanted Dead or Alive:  Psychological Operations During Balikatan 02-1.   Special Warfare 17:26-29 September 2004.

Brooks, Paul R. M.  A Vision for PSYOP (Psychological Operations) in the Information Age.   Special Warfare 13:20-24 Winter 2000.

Brown, David.  SpecOps Chief Wants More Active PSYOPS, Civil Affairs Companies.  Air Force Times 63:22 March 24, 2003.
Reports on the decision of U.S. Air Force General Charles Holland to increase the number of active-duty soldiers in civil affairs and psychological operations (psyops) units. Percentage of civil affairs teams and psyops who are reservists; Function of both teams; Expected number of billets by which the end strength for the command is expected to increase through 2008.

Burger, Kim et al.  Analysis:  Iraq.  Jane's Defence Weekly 39:20-25 April 30, 2003.

Burger, Timothy J. and Ware, Michael.  The Secret Collaborators.  Time 162:30-36 October 20, 2003.
The articles discusses assistance given to the United States by the Iraqi underground to take down Saddam Hussein. Hussein didn't want to believe what his intelligence networks were saying. Before the war last spring, says a former colonel in the Iraqi intelligence service, Saddam's analysts presented him with classified reports predicting a decisive U.S. victory. Before a shot was fired, the U.S. recruited and dispatched Iraqi collaborators to uncover Saddam's plans and capabilities, and hobble them. In a West European capital, Abu Ranin, underground operative of the Iraqi National Congress (I.N.C.) says he found several weak links in the Iraqi hierarchy and exploited them to collect evidence to aid in the ousting of Hussein.

Desert DJ Plays for Iraqi POWs.   Army Reserve Magazine 49:30 Fall 2003.
Focuses on U.S. Army Reserve soldier and disc jockey Ben Watkins' mission to record simple instructional messages to enemy prisoners of war during the 2003 Iraq war. Recording of Watkins' voice in Arabic telling the prisoners what to do; Importance of Watkins' skills in psychological operations; Watkins' experiences in theater and audio technology.

Emery, NormanInformation Operations in Iraq.  Military Review 84:11-14   May-June 2004
Focuses on the information operations of the U.S. Army in Iraq. Factors that affects the ability of the U.S. Army to win the counter-insurgency battle; Description of information operations; Information advantages of guerillas.

Everything's A-OK.   New Internationalist 361:8 October 2003.
Reports on the use of the 'Sesame Street' theme song to torture Iraqi prisoners by the U.S. Army. Objectives of the U.S. psychological operations; Source of anti-Americanism; Promotion of learning via the American kid's television program.

Freeburg, John and Todd, Jess T.  The 101st Airborne Division in Iraq:  Televising Freedom.  Military Review 84:39-42 November-December 2004.
Cites the efforts of the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division to manage psychological operations during the 2003 Iraq War. Location of its operational assignment; Sources of information in Iraq; Coalition messages that were broadcasted on local television and radio stations in the area; Television programs that were launched by the Army division.

Infowarriors Ensure Local Citizenry Gets the MessageSignal 56:20-21 March 2002.

Freeburg, John//Todd, Jess T.  The 101st Airborne Division in Iraq:  Televising Freedom.  Military Review 84:39-42 November/December 2004.
Cites the efforts of the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division to manage psychological operations during the 2003 Iraq War. Location of its operational assignment; Sources of information in Iraq; Coalition messages that were broadcasted on local television and radio stations in the area; Television programs that were launched by the Army division.

Goldmann, Jeanne and Landy, Fran.  Officer Professional Development: Psychological Operations Functional Area.  Special Warfare 16:13-17 February 2004.
Provides information on the required professional development of U.S. army officers in the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Functional Area. Qualities and capabilities of the active-component Army officer in the said area; Services being offered by the FA 37A officers; Core competencies for all officers in Army special-operations forces; Requirements for PSYOP officers in able for them to provide scientifically based measures of effectiveness and skills; Criteria for lieutenant colonels and majors to access into FA 37A.

Goodman, Glenn W.  The Power of the Word:  US Special Operations Forces Used Leaflets and Radio Broadcasts to Sway Afghans.  Armed Forces Journal International 139:30-31 February 2002.

Guevin, Paul R.  Psychological Operations.  Air & Space Power Journal 18:30 Summer 2004.
Psychological operations (PSYOP) is defined as planned operations which are used to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP played a significant role in recent operations such as Enduring Freedom, in which air-mobility missions delivered humanitarian rations at the same time air-combat sorties struck militarily significant targets in other parts of Afghanistan.

Guy, Jack C. and Collins, Steven.  Current Challenges and Possible Roles for Army Reserve PSYOP (Psychological Operations) Forces. Special Warfare 13:28-35 Summer 2000.

Houchin, Mitch.  Get Serious about Tactical Information OpsProceedings of the United States Naval Institute 129:77-80 October 2003.
Information operations (IO) described in the U.S. joint doctrine as disciplines of electronic warfare, operations security, military deception, computer network operations, psychological operations, physical destruction, civil affairs and public affairs, is in its infancy. The Navy is just forging the concept of tactical operations for an information warfare commander (IWC) as part of the composite warfare commander construct. The limited offensive information warfare tools currently available are not enough to warrant the assignment of a battle group information warfare commander, but there is a need for an IW coordinator. Fleet Information Warfare Command provides doctrine, IO applications and four-member staffs to deploying battle groups but has little authority to decide how IO will be instituted.

Kellogg, Robert H.  Evaluating Psychological Operations:  Planning Measures of Effectiveness.  Special Warfare 16:32-37 May 2004.

Kiper, Richard L.  'Of Vital Importance':  The 4th PSYOP (Psychological Operations) Group.  Special Warfare 15:19-21 September 2002.

Kiper, Richard L.  To Educate and to Motivate:  The 345th PSYOP (Psychological Operations) CompanySpecial Warfare 15:32-33 September 2002.

Knights, Michael.  PSYOPS (Psychological Operations) Comes Into Play Against Saddam.   Jane's Intelligence Review 15 52-53 February 2003.

Knights, Michael.  US PSYOPS (Psychological Operations) Escalate Against IraqDefense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 31:11+ 2003.

Koch, Andrew.  Briefing:  Psychological Operations.  Jane's Defence Weekly 36:22-26 August 15, 2001.

Koch, Andrew.  Information War Played Major Role in Iraq.  Jane's Defence Weekly 40:5 July 23, 2003.

Koch, Andrew.  Information Warfare Tools Rolled Out in Iraq.  Jane's Defence Weekly 40:7 August 6, 2003.

Koch, Andrew.  US Air Force Refines Information OperationsJane's Defence Weekly 41:10 June 2, 2004.
Reports on the U.S. Air Force is refining its information operations. Integration of computer network and electronic attack and psychological operations into its warfighting activities; Increasing role of information operations in actual combat.

Koch, Andrew.  US Eyes Improved Psyops DeliveryJane's Defence Weekly 42:11 February 16, 2005.
Reports on the modernization of the U.S. psychological operations distribution capabilities which began with the procurement of the CQ-10A Snow Goose Wind Supported Air Delivery System intended for use with special operations forces. Launch of of the Psyops Global Reach program designed to develop and field systems capable of sending radio and television signals deep into enemy territory; Improvement of ground-based psyops dissemination abilities through the long-range broadcast system.

Koch, Andrew.  U.S. Media Battle Takes on Added Importance.  Jane's Defence Weekly 36:2 October 24, 2001.

Litt, David.  Special Ops Forces are 'Tool of Choice.National Defense 87:20-22 February 2003.

Maiers, Mark W. and Rahn, Timothy L.  Information Operations and Millennium Challenge.   JFQ:  Joint Force Quarterly 35:83-88 Autumn 2004.
This article focuses on Millennium Challenge, a joint exercise hosted by U.S. Joint Forces Command in summer 2002. One goal was to develop recommendations on doctrine, organization, training, manpower, logistics, personnel, and facilities. From the outset of the exercise it was apparent that information operations could produce decisive effects in the fight. These efforts integrate military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, operational security, and computer network operations.

Mills, John.  PSYOP (Psychological Operations) Radio Operations in Bosnia:  A Steady, Positive DrumbeatSpecial Warfare 14:30-39 Fall 2001.

Paschall, Joseph F.  Tactical Information Operations in Operation Iraqi FreedomMarine Corps Gazette 88:56-59 March 2004.

Puckett, Amee.  PSYOP (Psychological Operations) Battalions Send Afghans Message of 'Truth.'  Army Times 62:18 December 17, 2001.

Tanner, Marisa A.  U.S. Psychological Operations in the 1991 Gulf WarDefense Intelligence Journal 12:41-65 2003.
Provides information on how the use Psychological Operations (PSYOP) by the government of former U.S. President George H.W. Bush helped win the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq. Discussion on the need of the commander to communicate with the enemy; Definition of the psychological operations by the U.S. Army; Objectives of the Strategic PSYOP.

Waller, Douglas and Donnelly, Sally B.  Still Short in Iraq.  Time 165:13 March 14, 2005.
Reports on the shortcomings of the U.S. Army's civil-affairs and psychological-operations units. crucial role of the civil-affairs unit, which rebuilds utilities and civilian services, in the building of war-torn nations; Shortfall of qualified reservists needed to rebuild Iraq.

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