Far-Right and Islamist Radicalisation

Remy Maduit | Authors published

Far-Right and Islamist Radicalisation in an Age of Austerity
A Review of Sociological Trends and Implications for Policy

Tahir Abbas is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University in The Hague, Netherlands.

Setting the Scene
This Policy Brief is a sociological perspective on the reciprocity between violent Islamist and far-right groups in Western Europe in recent years and the implications it raises for social policy in this area. The paper argues that both sets of groups make claims to notions of purity, exclusivity, and omnipotence. However, crucially, they engage in configurations of reciprocal hate, demonization, and violence because of the structural dynamics of economic, political, and social division, where notions of collective intra-ethnic identities are undermined by widening structural and cultural fissures across society. 

While interest in radicalization has grown exponentially since the events of 9/11, much of the focus has been on Islamist extremism. However, since this time, a range of other extremists have come to the fore. Examples of this include the idea of reciprocal radicalization when elements of the far-right rally around a certain ‘counter-jihad’ sentiment. The English Defence League in the UK, Pegida in Germany, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands all exhibit anti-Islam rhetoric—all of which loosely relate to the idea of protecting the nation from further apparent encroachment by ‘Muslim others’. Such sentiment has been growing in Western Europe since the events of 9/11, but specifically since the late-2000s when austerity gripped many of the nations of the EU. [i] 

For this discussion, radicalization refers to both the processes and outcomes of violent extremism, but no two countries define ‘radicalization’ in the same way. For some, violence is the primary concern. For others, an ideology that may or may not lead to violence is the primary focus, and much of the academic research since the events of 9/11 focuses on the ‘pull’ of ideology as the driving force in radicalization. [ii] All definitions recognize the notion as being both a highly individualized and unpredictable process. [iii] Thus, radicalization is a complex notion, with a range of variables vital in determining the radicalized, but in other cases, a single trigger is a reason for the tipping point to radicalization. As new tribalisms emerge, radicalized groups develop a core narrative at the heart of their newfound identities. [iv] Inclusion into this new tribe is determined by the membership of the group. But, it is also aspirational, as members of the group instrumentalize their positions as a way in which to show solidarity within the group. In today’s climate, much of these processes occur virtually, shaped by young people whose radicalizations occur predominantly on the internet. [v] 

The difference between reciprocal and cumulative radicalization, however, also needs clarification. For the arguments put forward in this paper, the idea of cumulative radicalization suggests that groups are responding to what they see as the problems of growing Muslim populations in urban areas and the potential it has to encroach on their lives and social norms. This builds on fear of immigration, xenophobia, and anti-Muslim hostility that has grown in the light of politics and policy over the last decade or so, especially in the Western European context. Reciprocal radicalization suggests a more evenly balanced relationship between how groups feel and express hate and indignation for each other in different social contexts, leading to incremental growth in radicalization on both sides of this constricted divide. It ratcheted disdain and hate up in every interaction. This occurs in widening political and economic polarization, leading to a sense of permanent enmity that has no outlet. These are theoretical conceptualizations based on observations by the author over a two-decade period, reflecting on the change and continuity relating to economic and urban social policy and the effects it has on the community and social relations. Over the following pages, they advance several arguments to explain the reciprocal radicalization phenomenon. 

In the proceeding pages, this paper argues the following. First, the problems of growing inequality exacerbated by the post-2008 economic crash policies of austerity have led to downward social mobility affecting both indigenous majorities and Muslim minority groups, in particular in urban post-industrial localities. This increases tensions to identity, citizenship, and belonging—especially in those parts of Western European countries where the industrial cities have faced decline and eventual restructuring, for example, Birmingham, Aarhus, and Lyon. Second, some contend wider transformations to local economies have led to a crisis of masculinity, where traditional practices of patriarchy are being challenged by the liberalization and casualization of labor markets compounded by questions of inter-generational disconnect. Third, these concerns affect uncertainties over identity, in particular, notions of citizenship, belonging, and the nature of religion-ethnic group mobilizations. Fourth, the impact of these wider structural and cultural realignments has led to divergent group actions, with far-right groups aiming to ‘get their country back’ based on claims to local area social geographies and the apparent risks posed by diversity and multiculturalism. [vi] 

Concurrently, historical and ongoing patterns of withdrawal, alienation, and marginalization encourage radical Islamists to allude to a global inward-looking identity politics that focuses on its variations of exclusivity. These structural factors encourage the cementing of supra-national bonds that appeal because of their politico-ideological associations with an absolutist utopian vision. They reveal local area tensions about space, place, and identity, in particular in areas of existing ethnic and Muslim minority concentration; such is the contestation over questions of belonging and citizenship affecting all groups facing limitations to equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. [vii]

‘Othering’ as Radicalisation

Unquestionably, a historical process of the ‘othering’ of groups has developed, which includes an increase in the dichotomization of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ and, the intensification of separating these ‘othered’ groups from what is perceived as the main or dominant culture in several Western Europeans nation-states, in particular, parts of ‘Old Europe’. [viii]

For majority groups, to ‘other’ is a process of objectification based on notions of structural and cultural racism, ethnic nationalism, exclusivity, and exceptionalism. In the twentieth century alone, this has included Jews, African Caribbean groups as part of the Windrush Generation, and East African Asians in the early 1970s to today with the catchall term Muslims. Although its intensification has transformed during this time, the ‘self’ (the nation) has remained consistent in its approach, with notions rarely shifting away from the idea of immigrants as being problematic per se. [ix] Structural and cultural racism continues to reinvent itself, even as diversity naturally develops through globalization and the internationalization of capital and labor. These pockets of resistance help to undermine racism and radicalization, the dominant political climate, however, is increasingly exclusivist, exceptionalist, and elitist, exhibiting a gradual but sustained shift to the political right and the authoritarian, repressive, and exclusive strains of thought and praxis it brings in reality. [x] 

As the specter of right-wing populism and ethnic nationalism takes an ever-greater hold in Western European societies, there is also a growing problem of a general yet persistent move to the right in mainstream politics in contemporary Europe, [xi] with the speeches of far-right political leaders supporting a wider transnational far-right discourse. [xii] This is the case not only in developed Western democracies such as the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, but also in newer liberal states such as Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. [xiii] 

The end of the Cold War is a useful starting point for appreciating this development. Here, the long-standing post-war order changed irrevocably, leading to a period of centrist politics between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the start of the ‘war on terror’ over a decade later. From the grassroots of these societies, a range of social movements emerged—including fascist groups that carried out an ‘ideological facelift’ in the 1990s, with each successively problematizing the issues of Muslims. [xiv] Until recently, the electoral successes of the right have been negligible, leading to a sense of political disenchantment. [xv] This was the case until the Brexit vote in the UK, the result of which was partly motivated by negative discourses on immigration, refugees, and questions of national political identity. [xvi] In the Netherlands, electoral support for Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom and the more recently established Forum for Democracy continues, showing that right-wing politicians continue to attract up to one-fifth of the voting-age population. [xvii] The Alternative for the German Party has been gaining momentum in recent years, helping to shift the rhetoric in the country to anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiment.

A shift within broader right-wing extremism is emerging, with many groups and individuals—including terrorists such as Anders Breivik—condemning Nazism, fascism, and anti-Semitism but defining their cause as a defense against the perceived threat from Islam. [xviii] The March 2019 attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, aptly illustrates this shift among right-wing extremists to a defense against the perceived threat posed by Islam. The primary suspect was a self-identified white supremacist who viewed the world in Manichean terms, regarding Islam as a movement and its people, not merely as a blot on the landscape, but as deserving of depopulation. This is because they somehow present a risk to the survival of the white nation itself. However, there is no perspective on this whiteness. Its internal diversity or the historical legacies of class formation, colonialism, orientalism, or Eugenicism have defined the space occupied by whiteness. This perspective also oddly combines the palpable fear presented with the ‘other’, whose motivations are to ‘take over’ through ‘population expansion’. There is a decrying of these ‘others’ for their primitive, backward, and hateful natures, thus legitimizing ethnic nationalism and white supremacism as espoused by right-wing sympathizers, extremists, and terrorists. 

It is apparent, therefore, that an anti-Muslim outlook plays a part in the broader radicalization of far-right extremists. [xix] In Britain, the English Defence League historically operated as an ethnic nationalist group with links to the British National Party and football hooliganism. [xx] It exposes the wider notion of ‘reactive co-radicalization’ [xxi] or ‘cumulative extremism’ [xxii], which is a response on the parts of states, organizations, groups, and individuals to the apparent threat of ‘Muslim others’. These sentiments have also become a defining feature of current forms of Islamophobia, [xxiii] much of which also show a correlation with rising populism and nationalism. [xxiv] Because of these recent developments, research on extremist identity politics in Western Europe is increasingly focused on the intersection of violent radical Islamism and far-right extremism among young men. Both extremisms often emerge locally due to narrow definitions of citizenship, belonging, and nationhood, where sharp political polarisations exacerbate existing ethnic and class struggles. [xxv] Space and place can compound existing exclusionary discourses on differences based on ethnicity, religious identity, socioeconomic status, and politics. In local urban areas, deep-rooted contestations can exist over the struggle for hegemony based on a hyper-imagined ‘them’ and ‘us’. [xxvi] 

Economy and Society Transformed

Various Western European societies and economies were transformed profoundly since the deregulation of the financial sector and the dominance of privatization of public utilities and economic neoliberalism that began in the 1980s. [xxvii] This has had repercussions on youth identities, particularly in urban spheres. [xxviii] Men who experienced their rite of passage from young people to adults in the workplaces of factories and plants, increasingly face the reality of unemployment or under-employment because of the decline of industry and manufacturing compounded by an inability to upskill for a service sector economy. These downward social pressures exacerbate existing problems, especially in the inner cities, which are oft-forgotten by urban planners and policymakers until the deleterious conditions facing disadvantaged ‘underclass’ groups cannot be neglected any further. They are also sites of diverse communities. [xxix] Here, residential concentration, for majorities and minorities, emerges through a lack of choice. [xxx]  

Post-war ethnic minorities cluster in specific urban areas to use social, economic, and cultural capital for group survival. Simultaneously, the spatial concentration of deprived marginalized majorities is also an opportunity to protect the norms and values associated with the group identity, which, in the light of present politics, perceives as a threat from the dominant ‘in-group’. Neighborhoods such as parts of inner-city Birmingham in the UK or Molenbeek in Brussels suggest danger and menace when in fact the reality is more about poverty and housing policy. [xxxi] The general overriding discourse, however, is to present ‘self-styled segregation’ among Muslim minorities as a self-induced rejection of integration. This discourse, though, is harmful to many who are on the receiving end of vilification, alienation, and discrimination. [xxxii] It is also devoid of historical context to the effects of transformations on the economy and the role of housing policy during this period. [xxxiii] 

We cannot underestimate the importance of the economic context. The transformations occurring within local economies have also led to a crisis of masculinity, where traditional practices of patriarchy—such as authoritarianism within the domestic sphere—are being challenged by the liberalization and casualization of labor markets that are compounded by questions of inter-generational disconnect, combined with economic insecurity. [xxxiv] A crisis of masculinity is at the center of many of the predicaments facing marginalized communities, underpinned by a lack of social mobility, persistent unemployment, and political disenfranchisement. Since the global financial crash of 2008, growing inequality exacerbated by the policies of austerity has led to downward social mobility affecting both indigenous majorities and Muslim minority groups, in particular in post-industrial urban localities. [xxxv] Post-industrialisation and globalization affect Muslim minority groups in the inner cities of Britain, but these concerns also affect majority groups who can turn to far-right political views for solace. [xxxvi] The majority of white communities can suffer the economic and sociological predicaments that can lead to extremism, radicalization, and violence, but media and political discourses concentrate less on such groups, markedly skewing the debate. [xxxvii] 

The combination of these imbalanced discourses on the social and economic disadvantages of both groups and the importance that identity formations have at the local and global levels leads to an intense struggle for the crumbs of society. Sometimes, the effects are anger, fear, loathing, intimidation, and violence. Islamist radicals are anti-globalization, while far-right extremists are pro-localization, but both are totalitarian. These groups wish to instill a sense of purist identity politics and both have a utopian vision of society. Both have a narrowly defined vision of the self, which is exclusive to the other. With far-right groups, much of their motivation stems from a counter-jihadist discourse. Here, radical Islamists experience status inconsistency along with their far-right extremist counterparts. Both groups are structural and cultural outsiders of society and are directly opposed to each other. These two sets of ‘left behind’ groups are in direct competition with each other, one racialized and alienated and the other marginalized and alienated, but both emerge in neoliberalism and economic restructuring in post-industrial urban settings. 

Race is the signifier here, but an imagined race, as is perennially the case with ethnic nationalism. [xxxviii] In both cases, apprehensions arise from multiculturalism, dislocation, and identity conflict. A lack of hope leads to psychological conundrums, leaving countless young men vulnerable and then pliable to external influences. [xxxix] With limited educational and employment opportunities because of entrenched patterns of discrimination and disadvantage (ethnic and class), the uncertain futures facing various young men in inner-city areas, minority and majority, create challenges with limited opportunities. [xl] 

Britain First, the English Defence League, and organizations such as AlMuhajiroun and Islam4UK comprised young men with limited education, employment, or social status. The spiritual or material challenges of their existence are outraged and simultaneously embittered the men who join such organizations. Many of the recruits to the Islamic State heralded from the inner cities of Western Europe displayed similar anxieties and aspirations. Thus, inter-generational disconnect and the importance of the socio-economic and socio-cultural context are critical considerations in the experiences of both ‘white’ majorities and Muslim minorities. A broad sense of alienation transpires among a wide range of communities because of the political, religious, and cultural transformations of the social milieu. 

But—during material challenges facing young men (and women) in Western European and North American societies—particular concerns arise over hyper-masculinity and hypersexuality (an over-concentration of sexual activity). [xli] This apprehension refers to unrealistic expectations placed upon young people. Such expectations create fear, anger, and anguish—impairing the smooth transition from youth to adulthood. Hyper-masculinity diminishes the confidence of young men. The consequences are that some young people become encouraged to prove themselves — to seek recognition, to become somebody—and, by using any means necessary. The question of the associations between two sets of social and economic similar experiences points to local area considerations. The failure of the government to introduce policies that bring about equality and fairness to limit the deleterious consequences of neoliberalism is clear. This disappointment is also about the loss of the imagination of the nation in a global climate of inequality and competition, where national elites hold on to an imagined notion of the nation and its people. [xlii]

Rethinking Deradicalization Policy

Both social structure and identity politics are essential to consider in the radicalization and extremism of far-right extremists and those drawn to Islamist extremism. Understanding radicalization is all about appreciating context and perspective. However, while radicalization refers to both pathways and outcomes, radicalization does not always equate with terrorism. [xliii] This lack of clarity over what is radicalization distorts the insights into violent extremism, in particular where there is confusion over clearly problematic social outcomes that are high-priority security threats. [xliv]

Supporters of far-right political agendas founded on ethnoreligious uniformity face targeting by sections of the left based on historical associations with fascism and racism. While space matters for identity formations and a sense of conflict towards the immediate and most differentiated ‘other’, the question of ideology is a weighty consideration. In an ironic twist, far-right thinking wants to reclaim and reshape local territory in its image, whereas radical Islamists have abandoned the local in preference for the global, or rather the idealized notion of the caliphate, which is conceptual and mostly illusory. Pitted against each other in the most difficult of social and political conditions, leading to a sense of enmity in the most extended terms, they are fighting for different political outcomes. For example, both groups project resistance against aspects of left-liberalism such as is found in the pages of The Guardian, the alleged pro-government bias presented in the BBC, resistance against the LGBT, or a misogynist attitude towards women per se. Yet, what is clear is a sense of personal grievance that leads to hate supported by an ideology, which is then wrapped around a doomsday scenario. For radical Islamists, it is the end of times and for far-right groups, it is the idea of a race war, with both sets of groups as somehow victims in their respective shadowy scenarios. 

Over time, the consistent theme is that what ‘we’ must resist most is that which is far away from who ‘we’ do not see ourselves as, while ‘we’ are an indivisible unitary whole facing further pressure because of localization, globalization, neoliberalism and the backlash against diversity. In considering local area concerns, the local and global intersect at the point at which groups are furthest apart culturally, socially, and politically—but closest together economically. These points to wider issues of economic inequality, social immobility, structural marginalization, and patterns of discrimination in the labor market that affect the former white working classes and visible minorities, namely Muslim groups. 

It is crucial not to rely solely on deep theory or emotional responses to this malaise. Arguably, this has been part of the problem all along. Virtually all the young people who variously enter the theatre of radicalization and violence do so because of emotional, psychological, ideological, and sociological factors. Measures targeting such acts of crime must recognize the multi-layered nature of the processes involved in radicalization, and hence introduce more joined-up policy thinking at a much earlier stage of the process. It is thus vital to acknowledge the intersecting paths towards radicalization affecting far-right and Islamist extremists to achieve an impact on research, policy, and practice. They need to appreciate the dynamics of radicalization as embedded in social processes at the structural level, where identity concerns, belonging, and self-realization remain fundamental. 

Invariably, critical thinking and the need to prevent the dehumanization of the ‘other’ are valuable solutions, particularly in the crucial area of mentoring and support for vulnerable young men at the heart of the de-radicalization policy. Research on reciprocal radicalization confirms that processes of ‘othering’ exist in the minds of young, angry, and disillusioned young men suffering the consequences of the decline of masculinities in an age of globalization. [xlv] However, instances of mental illness, psychological breakdown, and issues concerning self-actualization and self-realization are also of importance.

Concluding Thoughts

In conclusion, both the far-right and Islamist extremist groups feed off the ‘authorization’ of groups presented as oppositional to their local and global identity formations. Far-right groups want to reclaim particular locales as part of a process of ‘taking back’ ‘their country’, whereas Islamists have little or no claim on the local, focusing their attention on globalized identity politics. Both groups are experiencing the fragmentation of masculinities, where men—displaced because of the shifting economic contours of post-industrial societies and the impact of deindustrialization upon traditional labor market practices, as well as the withering of national identities because of neoliberal globalization — are retreating into violent hegemony as solutions to their malaise. The response by the state is to reinforce a narrow historical reading of society relating to diversity, inclusion, and multiculturalism rather than to focus on equality, integration, and social interdependence in the light of widening inequalities, a decline in political trust, and increasing cultural division. 

Young people aged 18 to 24 are susceptible to many challenges, but while hate crimes spike because of acts of violence after various terrorist events, this loathing does not abate. This suggests that something far more fundamental is going on to the deeper problems of structural and cultural racism and exclusion. Implications for further research include ensuring that far-right and Islamist extremists are regarded as similarly problematic, and ensuring that researchers in this area remain cognizant that the path towards radicalization is often local and urban in both nature and outcome. There is a need to recognize that these kinds of extremisms are two sides of the same coin, where limiting one will invariably reduce the other. Both extremisms feed off each other’s rhetoric, compounded by an elite discourse that seeks to maintain a divide and rule approach to dealing with differences in society. It is combined with the diminished status of the privileges of whiteness for many facing downward pressures on social mobility. 

This Policy Brief has argued that issues of social structure and identity politics are crucial to take into consideration when attempting to appreciate the nature of radicalization and extremism among those who engage in far-right extremism and those drawn to Islamist extremism. It is also essential to examine how identifying these concepts can determine how best they can feed into policy development. The approach needs to engage with extremism as a wider societal issue, not simply as a task for particular communities. It ultimately places accountability on the government and authorities to take greater responsibility for the problems and the solutions to violent extremism. In the current political climate, violent radical Islamism is seen as a function of Muslim communities, in which lie all the problems and all the solutions. Further research is required to recognize the intersections of these variables in specific situations.

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