EU-Japan Connectivity Promises

Marie Söderberg is a Professor at the European Institute of Japanese Studies and an Adjunct Professor
at the Stockholm School of Economics. She is also a Chairperson of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden.

Söderberg, Marie (2021/22) EU-Japan Connectivity Promises, Policy Brief, Global Governance Programme, EU-Asia Project, DOI: 10.2870/62514

Volume I, Issue 1
Editor, Remy Mauduit

ABSTRACT
A strategic approach is now being taken toward EU-Japan cooperation in the fields of politics, development, strategy, and security. Despite diverse political and administrative cultures that have slowed the process, it is moving forward. COVID-19 and the impossibility of meeting face-to-face has impaired communication but generous economic stimulation packages should help allay the difficulties this created. In addition, the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure was signed between the EU and Japan in September 2019. This Partnership Agreement, also designed to encourage projects in third countries, covers sectors from transport to digital industries. It calls for ‘transparent procurement practices, assurance of debt sustainability and the high standards of economic, fiscal, financial, social and environmental sustainability’. Coupled with ODA (Official Development Assistance), which would be necessary for its implementation in the developing world, this partnership can make a difference. Keywords: Japan, EU, partnership, Cooperation, Projects

A strategic approach is now being taken toward EU-Japan cooperation in politics, development, strategy, and security. Despite diverse political and administrative cultures that have slowed the process, it is moving forward. COVID-19 and the impossibility of meeting face-to-face have impaired communication but, provisions to cope with the negative economic impact of the virus have led to record-high government budgets and stimulus packages. Financial resources that can be used for new Japanese and EU projects and ideas are thus available. A Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure was signed between the EU and Japan in September 2019. This Partnership Agreement, which is also designed to encourage projects in other countries, covers sectors from transport and energy to digital industries. It calls for ‘transparent procurement practices, assurance of debt sustainability and high standards of economic, fiscal, financial, social and environmental sustainability’. Coupled with ODA (Official Development Assistance), which would be necessary for its implementation in the developing world, this partnership can make a difference. Our paper will begin by presenting a short historical background of EU-Japan relations. This will be followed by an account of the development of recent years and finally, by a focus on the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure. The meaning of Infrastructure Connectivity both for the EU and Japan, as well as for China, will be analyzed. Then we will venture into the implementation phase of the Partnership and finally, we will offer policy advice.

Several forces are driving the process of further EU-Japan cooperation. One has to do with geopolitical changes and the rise of China. While the EU-Japan partnership agreement does not mention China by name, it is crafted with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in mind. Over 150 countries have endorsed this giant Chinese project, including more than half of the 27 EU member states. The need for infrastructure, in Asia in particular, is huge: they estimated the required development funds to reach US$6 trillion by 2030. Chinese contribution is welcome, but there is a fear among traditional donors that they may not offer it in a fair way and with transparency. The EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure is an attempt to remedy that and provide an alternative source of financing.

A second reason for EU-Japan cooperation is the decline of liberalism worldwide. With the outcome of Brexit and the refugee crises in Europe, the liberal world order is being questioned. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to greater concerns regarding security. They couple this with a weakening role for the US. Former President Donald Trump’s policy of ‘America first’ further challenged the liberal world order. America’s two main liberal partners (the EU and Japan) were made aware that multilateralism was no longer a priority. These regions remained the two main powers left to defend the liberal world order. With the Biden administration now in place, there has been a reversal that implies more cooperation from the US. President Joe Biden has announced that the US will join the Paris (Climate) Agreement. Yet it is becoming more unlikely that the country will rejoin the Iran nuclear deal. At the Munich security conference on transatlantic relations on Feb 19, 2021, Biden strongly emphasized that ‘America is back’. [i] Although this was highly appreciated, by both the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French president Emmanuel Macron, neither leader seems to view this as a solution to the world’s problems: they seem to have learned a lesson from the years with Trump. The world has changed, and the US might have different priorities, as President Macron put it. [ii]

The fact is that the US might have a hard time getting back again. A geopolitical power shift is ongoing; last year China overtook the US as Europe’s largest trading partner. [iii] The EU and China have recently concluded, in principle, the negotiations for a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Recent figures also show that China is now the country that receives the most foreign direct investment. [iv] The Chinese economy was the only major economy that showed substantial growth during 2020.

Besides all the death and human suffering caused by COVID-19, measures to ensure it does not spread further mean profound changes to the way we live our lives and how business and the international order are set up. An effective response to COVID-19 requires multilateral actions. It has reduced travel, communication, and trade, as countries have closed their borders to prevent the virus from spreading. EU and Japanese companies have seen distortion to their supply chains and are hedging against such negative alterations in the future. But it is not only the companies experiencing difficulties. The EU and Japanese governments seem to hedge against distortions in other fields. The current pandemic strengthens the political motivation for cooperation between the EU and Japan. They share a mutual goal of promoting a liberal world order built on values such as transparency, sustainability, democracy, and human rights. Collaboration is likely to increase between the EU and Japan at a multilateral level and when third countries are involved. There are also security reasons for working together. Neither Japan nor the EU wants to let an intensely powerful China dominate world affairs, nor do they want to be caught up in a US trade confrontation with China, nor find that Russia is teaming up with China. European countries and Japan are, of course, heavily dependent on the US in security but, they are not likely to accept a system of US divide and rule. In the future, they will probably hedge their bets.

After decades of talk about cooperation, the EU and Japan have finally started concrete actions. This paper will recount developments in recent years, including the conclusion of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), and finally, the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure. We will analyze the meaning of connectivity for the EU and Japan, as well as what this concept means for China. The strategic cooperative approach taken by the EU and Japan today will be presented. Finally, advice will be given on effective implementation, one that will make a difference.

Historical background to EU-Japan relations

Following its defeat in 1945, Japan became an occupied country. SCAP initiated a program of ‘demilitarization’ and ‘democratization’ (the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). Although the Occupation was termed ‘Allied’, European leaders took little interest in Japanese affairs since most of the running of SCAP was in the hands of the American military. European countries also had more pressing issues to contend with, such as economic collapse and identity crises at home. The US came to play an important role in the rebuilding, not only in Japan but also in parts of Europe.

Diplomatic relations were resumed between Japan and various West European countries when Japan gained independence in 1952, but US dominance impeded any form of substantive bilateral dialogue. Only with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War were political relations ready to take off. The Hague Declaration of 1991 led to the initiation of policy dialogues between Japan and the EC and relations became institutionalized, with regular official political dialogue at various levels covering a range of issues.

For much of the Cold War period, China was not a central player in global politics. Largely isolated from the Western world by the US policy of non-recognition (including no economic contact), China did not affect the EU or even Japan. The main communist threat felt by both Japan and the EU was from the Soviet Union. China’s international role and its impact became more salient with Nixon’s announcement in 1971 that he would go to China. A Japanese agreement with Beijing to normalize relations (1972) quickly followed this. China remained an extremely weak economic power, with nearly 25 percent of the world’s population, but only just over 2 percent of the global GDP. Market reforms and opening to global trade and investment transformed China from the end of the 1970s, leading to the country’s rise, first as a regional, and then as a global economic power.

Following its admission to the WTO in 2001, China became an important issue in EU–Japan and even trans-Atlantic relations for the first time in 2004. The EU identified China as a strategic partner in 2003. Yet EU proposals to lift the arms embargo imposed on China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident provoked Japanese and US opposition. By 2010, China overtook Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy. China’s rise posed a distinctive challenge to the liberal international order led by the US and supported by the EU and Japan, because of the country’s presence as a non-liberal power with an authoritarian political system. Today’s so-called ‘Beijing Consensus’ sees China promoting a model of authoritarian-led economic development, challenging Western models. China’s economic rise arguably helped to undermine the fortunes of working classes in Western countries, while the country’s political rise itself seemed to challenge the dominance of the Western liberal order and liberalism as promoted by the US, the EU, and Japan.

China’s rise thus appears to be one factor driving the spread of illiberalism globally and even within the Western world, where growing domestic economic inequalities are increasing. The influence of an illiberal and revanchist Russia, plus other factors such as technological change; massive refugee flows created by the Arab Spring, especially the civil war in Syria; the rise of radical politicized Islam, and perhaps even the balkanizing effects of the spread of social media on news and the lack of objective recognition of facts, have all contributed to the decline of liberalism. This spread of illiberalism is a challenge facing the EU and Japan alike. Even inside the EU and Japan, we can see the potentially menacing growth of illiberalism.

In the US, still the global liberal hegemony, we also see the rise of illiberalism. This phenomenon had already begun in the first few years of the 21st century, well before the political rise of Donald Trump. The decline of human rights included a willingness to engage in torture, indefinite detention of suspects without trial, increasing surveillance of citizens, and a disregard for international institutions.

By signing an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and a binding Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in 2018, the EU and Japan planned to lead developments back to a fuller liberal order. That the two concluded a free trade agreement covering 30 percent of the world’s GDP is partly a result of the changing power structure in the 21st century. The EPA provides the basis for streamlining conditions for a fair and free trade policy and signals a commitment to that. The SPA, signed, does not have a firm roadmap. Shared values and principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms underpin it. Based on the principles of mutual respect, equal partnership, and respect for international law, Japan, the EU, and the Member States have agreed to cooperate in and coordinate policies in over 40 different areas. A Joint Committee has been assigned to supervise the implementation of this.

The move in 2015 from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has changed the perception of what development cooperation should look like. Over ten times as much money will be needed to achieve the SDGs. Meanwhile, the contribution of Official Development Assistance (government aid) as a percentage of total flows to developing countries is shrinking. Private institutions and businesses are now being actively encouraged to assist with funding. Development cooperation is no longer only about poverty reduction but also about climate change, decent work and economic growth, clean water, affordable and clean energy, and the development of industry, innovation, and infrastructure. It has also become a political tool, used for security reasons. Both the EU and Japan are champions of development cooperation. They have the financial resources and knowledge to assist other countries, both for humanitarian reasons and for their own sake.

The Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure

Connectivity is not politically neutral, and this agreement is part of an effort by both (the EU and Japan) to revive multilateralism. Sustainable connectivity has become a buzzword in EU politics and quality infrastructure is something that Japan has been heavily promoting. Let us consider whether these concepts mean the same thing for both.

In a paper titled ‘Learning from the Competition–China’s, Japan’s and the EU’s Infrastructure Connectivity Rule Setting in Asia’ [v] authors Caixia Mao and Lukas Maximilian Müller compare China, Japan, and EU development assistance on infrastructure connectivity based on the following dimensions: (1) the breadth of their infrastructure support (2) the comparative advantage the support is based on; (3) the character of resources provided; and (4) bilateralism/multilateralism. What emerges are three quite distinct ways of seeing infrastructure connectivity.

The authors conclude that the Chinese perspective lacks clarity and has a ‘win-win’; the basis for economic prosperity, the Japanese perspective defines it as an international public good and a basis for economic prosperity. The EU perspective views it as sustainable infrastructure, emphasizing physical links as the basis for economic prosperity. The comparative advantages are also very different. China, with its own development experience and rapid build-up of physical links, has flexibility and pragmatism and financial, material, and labor resources. Japan, with technological leadership, has economic efficiency and low lifecycle costs and represents operational safety, resilience against natural disasters, consideration of environmental and social impacts, and high contribution to local society and economy. The EU’s comparative advantage is common market experience, multi-modal transport networks, and environmental and social sustainability. Concerning the character of resources, the Chinese approach is state-led, encompassing financial and labor resources, the Japanese approach is private sector-driven, encompassing financial and technological aspects and the EU approach is also private sector-led, often encompassing technical cooperation and regional-level cooperation. Multilateralism featured more prominently in Japan and the EU, although the Chinese pattern is moving in this direction.

This comparison clearly shows that infrastructure connectivity can mean different things. Though more closely aligned, EU and Japanese visions are not necessarily the same either, which is likely to lead to different priorities for projects, with type and geographical location. This may well cause challenges for further cooperation.

The EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure, however, is a wider concept that not only covers physical infrastructure but cuts across all aspects of living conditions. There are four basic fields:

Diversified trade and travel routes linking existing and future transport networks. In Japan, this is referred to as quality infrastructure development. Strategic investment in critical infrastructure creates economic and political interdependencies, both hard and soft ones.

Energy platforms are interconnected regionally, with modern energy systems, and environmentally friendly solutions.

Digital – Increased access to digital services that maintain a high level of protection for consumer and personal data.

Human dimension-advanced cooperation in education, research and innovation, culture, and tourism

The need for infrastructure regarding trade and travel transport, in Asia in particular, is huge. Chinese contribution is welcome, but there is a fear among traditional donors that they may not offer it in a fair way and without transparency, as mentioned earlier. On the second point, energy platforms and environmentally friendly solutions are fields of great interest to the EU (with its new Green Deal) and Japan. Both regions signed the Paris (climate) Agreement and have adhered to it. Digital cooperation, which encompasses several regulatory reforms, is on its way, but some hurdles still must be passed to exchange as well as protect data on both company and personal levels. The prevention of free movement of people because of the COVID-19 has made the digital connection even more important. In the human dimension, the virus and attempts to control its spread show that there must be multilateral solutions to solve health issues. The virus is creating a lot of human suffering. A global vaccine might lessen suffering, but COVID-19 has already brought big changes and our societies are not likely to go back to the way they formerly functioned before the crisis. The world is changing, and the question is how to move forward. The EU and Japan share the same liberal values; they are cooperating to build a sustainable future world.

The EU is strongly advocating cooperation with Asia in sustainable connectivity. This connectivity and infrastructure drive is part of a wider push by the EU to transform itself from ‘payer to player,’ where trade, aid, and investments should be used together to achieve strategic foreign policy goals. This involves EU plans to deploy 60 billion euros to leverage investment many times that value to improve ties between Europe and Asia. Quality infrastructure was a concept launched by Japan, partly to distinguish its foreign development cooperation actions from China’s infrastructure drive. The EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure Agreement combine the aspirations of both the EU and Japan. It was signed in Brussels on 27 September 2019. One day before this, a cooperation agreement was signed between the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Such agreements between the EIB and the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), as well as with Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, were already in place before the explosive outbreak of COVID-19.

Infrastructure Connectivity at Present

Since March 2020, COVID-19 has dominated the news and the political scene both in the EU and Japan. Despite this unrest, EU-Japan political and strategic cooperation has been ongoing, under the radar. Development Cooperation is one such area. As mentioned above, all UN members adopted a move from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. There are new goals, leading to a new aid architecture or rather, an international partnership architecture that implies wider and deeper cooperation with nonmembers of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and with other sources such as private industry and various NGOs.

Japan used to be considered the odd man out in development cooperation. Although it has been a DAC member since the start of that organization in 1964 and, during the 1990s, was the world’s largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the Japanese aid approach has always been different from other DAC donors in the heavy emphasis on economic infrastructure and loan aid. Because of the shift from the MDGs to the SDGs many other donors, including the EU, are now following in Japan’s footsteps. This implies an emphasis on economic infrastructure: buildings, roads, railways, and ports, categorized as transport in the EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure. Historically, Japanese assistance has close cooperation with Japanese private companies, a fact which has not been well-regarded by other DAC donors but is now promoted because they need such huge sums to achieve the SDGs. There is a yearly Development Dialogue ongoing between the EU and Japan. In February 2021, they listed examples to illustrate Japan-EU synergies and complementarity in sustainable connectivity and quality infrastructure. This became quite a long list (see BOX at the end of the article) proving that cooperation in infrastructure is already established and that implementing the connectivity and infrastructure agreement is progressing.

In connection with the SPA, the EU also created a special support facility to assist EU-Japan cooperation in various areas. Last year they conducted a series of nine webinars with European and Japanese experts on COVID-19 exploring various themes such as green recovery, business, and digitalization and culminating with a webinar on connectivity. The EU has taken a rather structural approach to finding out where and how EU-Japan cooperation can be implemented. An EU-Japan Joint Study on Connectivity Cooperation is now being undertaken. The first objective of this study is to identify flagship projects, sectors, and countries in the regions of the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. A second objective is to promote private investment and facilitate the financing of sustainable connectivity, including possible joint projects with the engagement of the private sector. They have commissioned three EU and three Japanese experts to conduct the study.

Starting with one of the focus areas, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe announced the ‘Western Balkans (WB) Cooperation Initiative’ in January 2018, to support socio-economic reforms and facilitate ethnic reconciliation there. They also announced an EU WB strategy in 2018 to reinforce cooperation, addressing the specific challenges the WB faces, in particular, the need for fundamental reforms and good neighborly relations. The EU’s credible enlargement perspective requires sustained efforts and irreversible reforms. These two initiatives were partly a response to the Chinese–Central, and Eastern (CEE) initiative (the 17+1) in which China has set up a special fund of 10 billion euros to increase trade and investment with the WB.[vi]

Three countries, namely Serbia, Bosnia, and Albania, have been targeted for further studies of local needs; the EU and Japan have existing projects and projects in the pipeline, backed by financial resources. Interviews have already been held with EU and Japanese stakeholders, such as directorates, ministries, financial institutions, and businesses. Most of these have been conducted over the web because of COVID-19. The original aim was to send out a mutual EU-Japan mission to gather research on local needs and create a field report, but COVID-19 prevented that. In April 2021, local experts conducted interviews instead to assess local needs.

In Eastern Europe (EE) the EU-Japanese expert team will focus on Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Of importance here is implementing power generation and road repair rather than digital and human connectivity. Business interests are substantial in Azerbaijan and the aim is to provide private capital. Ukraine is the largest country in the region with strategic importance and a long border with the EU. This country would offer the biggest possibilities for public and private connectivity projects. As in the WB, they mapped local needs in April. To find so-called blue-sky projects of joint EU-Japan connectivity cooperation with a high potential impact is another aim of the joint study team. Here, Ukraine might be an optimal focus country. In Central Asia (CA) the EU-Japanese Study team will focus on Uzbekistan where the potential for public and private projects is considered large.

The ambassadors in these countries have been asked to support the study. Its final report will be finished in May 2021. Because the view of the local needs, which is extremely important, is still missing because of the difficulties of traveling because of COVID-19, it is very hard to pinpoint where and what kind of cooperation on connectivity EU and Japan would want to promote at this stage. Some reflections on what they have learned so far are available. Even if specific countries are selected, the EU wants a regional approach, while Japan seems more interested in concrete projects. The two have very different procurement rules and this makes it difficult to cooperate on bigger projects in the transport and energy sector, even if both sides, in principle, are interested in cooperation. Regulation will also determine how concrete project proposals can be. According to EU sources, the Japanese side has a more nationalistic approach, which does not promote cooperation. One way of resolving this might be to split projects into parts where the regions would each finance one part. Another way of resolving this would be to create a new fund with new rules that promote cooperation. The EU side can be very split, with different member countries wanting different things, making consensus difficult. Minor and less fancy projects like road rehabilitation and weighing equipment for trucks provide an easier focus for cooperation. Another area for collaboration would be mutual roadshows and business events.

In the digital field, which, after COVID-19, has gained further importance, the focus is often on the treatment of data, privacy issues, regulations, and what needs to be done so that some countries can enter existing frameworks. Artificial Intelligence is also being studied. In people-to-people cooperation, there is more flexibility and less money involved. Here, it could be possible to find quite visible projects in the fields of education, research, innovation, culture, and sport, for instance. These are easy picks for showcasing EU-Japan connectivity cooperation. Another geographical area that EU-Japan cooperation on quality infrastructure can target is India, where the EU is planning for a new connectivity agreement in May.

On February 26, 2021, during the third meeting of the Joint Committee under the EU-Japan SPA (which was held virtually), ‘the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between Japan and the EU’ was discussed. Japan and the EU shared the view to continue enhancing cooperation in such fields as multilateralism, sustainable connectivity, quality infrastructure, and global issues, including climate change and other environmental issues and security policy. The EU and Japan affirmed their commitment to strengthening multilateralism, democracy, and the rules-based international order. They underscored their efforts to protect lives and mitigate the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as to contribute as closely-aligned partners to global public policy in key fora such as the G7, G20, and the United Nations system. The EU and Japan exchanged views on their respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific region. This included a discussion on the ongoing implementation of the EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure there.

What is clear from the above is that the EU and Japan are currently taking a systematic approach to implementing the Partnership. They are conducting mutual hearings on the needs of third countries and turning over several stones to find cooperation projects in the fields of connectivity and infrastructure. COVID-19 has, to a certain extent, slowed the process, but it has also allowed the EU and Japan to increase cooperation as old structures change. Both regions are determined to rebuild more sustainable, inclusive, and resilient economies and societies. The EU’s Green Deal and Japan’s commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050 offer promising new opportunities for a stronger alliance for cooperation on climate change and other environmental issues. In these very turbulent times, people are ready and expecting a change. Health has become a top issue and COVID-19 has made it obvious that multilateral solutions are needed. Sustainable connectivity built on Japanese and EU shared norms and standard settings can create a better world.

Proposals for Further Cooperation in Connectivity and Infrastructure

Listen to the needs of developing countries and select a few flagship projects that the EU and Japan cooperate on. Be sure to make these visible to the world. It could be carbon-neutral power plants, electric buses, windmills, or solar energy parks. Why not let nurses or military medical personnel provide Covid vaccine stations and, with their flags raised, offer free vaccinations to poor people?

COVID-19 has forced governments to provide huge extra budgets. Financial resources are available. This is not ODA money only but also finances from loans for public-private cooperation in various fields of infrastructure development. Different rules and regulations should not be allowed to prevent the co-financing of EU-Japan projects. Unconventional financial solutions should be found. Divide projects or create new mutual funds if necessary.

Source private companies are interested in cooperation and create incentives for them to do so. Why not make a competition for ‘The EU-Japan cooperation project of the year’? Winners should be awarded and made visible.

Work on media. Organize mutual study tours for cooperation projects.

Rely on civil society to a much larger extent, especially when it comes to human connectivity. Many people are eager to assist in protecting biodiversity, for example. Let JICA and DG INTPA [vii] create projects which civil society can participate.

Use the internet and create various programs where EU and Japanese people can connect. Create special ones with sustainability education for schoolchildren. Let them learn solutions from each other.

This list of proposals should be made much longer. The EU and Japan have the knowledge, education, experience, and economic resources to play center stage and contribute strongly to sustainable world order. Connectivity is the glue that can drive the process forward. Success will depend on the broad-mindedness of the people involved, as well as the will of politicians to implement unconventional ideas.

BOX

Cooperation on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure [viii]

In Southeast Asia’s Mekong region, both Japan and the EU support water resource management and sustainable development of the Mekong River as Development Partners of the Mekong River Commission (MRC), and provide funding programs for the Lower Mekong Region. Both Japan and the EU support ASEAN in disaster management by providing funds to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). Both sides also work on enhancing the capacity building of the regional ASEAN-Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT). In the Pacific region, they support maritime resources management, waste management, and sustainable energy. The EU established the Maritime Technology Cooperation Centre (MTCC-Pacific) and Japan will dispatch a regional advisor for port operation, maintenance, and policy to the MTCC-Pacific. The EU established the Pacific-European Union Marine Partnership Programme, and Japan implements the Capacity Enhancement Project for the Sustainable Development and Sound Management in Fisheries. The EU finances the Pacific-EU Waste Management Programme (PacWaste Plus), and Japan conducts technical cooperation on the Promotion of Regional Initiatives on Solid Waste Management in Pacific Island Countries. Both programs support the implementation of the Cleaner Pacific 2025 Strategy by the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). Japan implements the Project for introducing Hybrid Power Generation System in the Pacific Island Countries, and the EU implements the European Union-Pacific Technical and Vocational Training on Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Adaptation. In Central Asia, both Japan and the EU support the border management between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. At a border crossing point in Dehkonkhona, the EU funded the facilities on the Afghan side and Japan on the Tajik side. Japan and the EU contribute to infrastructure development in Africa in line with the Programme for Infrastructure Development for Africa (PIDA) 2021-2030. In Mozambique, they support the road construction of the Nacala Corridor and co-finance the rehabilitation of the Nampula-Cuamba Road. In Burkina Faso, they support the Burkina Faso-Niger Corridor Road Rehabilitation Project. Japan and the EU fund various projects in the West Africa Growth Ring Corridor Master Plan. They also support the improvement of the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor (one of the major target corridors of the West Africa Growth Ring Master Plan), as well as market integration and enhancing customs administration capacity in the region, including Cote d’Ivoire. In Uganda, they support the improvement of the Northern Corridor, which connects Uganda with Kenya and Rwanda. Japan supports the enhancement of power transmission and distribution capacity through the improvement of electricity transmission grids in Kampala, while the EU supports the development of a hydroelectric facility and the construction of transmission lines in Bujagali.

[i] 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9HZ6rcW9KI&feature=youtu.be&ab_channel=MunichSecurityConference (February 19 2020)

[ii] Id.

[iii] https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf

[iv] https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55791634

[v] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342065144 or https://www.southeastasianstudies.uni-freiburg.de/documents/occasional-paper/op45.pdf

[vi] Werner Pascha, Belts, Roads and Regions: The Dynamics of Chinese and Japanese Connectivity Initiatives and Europe’s Responses, ADBI Working Paper Series, No 1114, April 2020

[vii] Japan-EU Development Cooperation, Factsheet made by Japan (MOFA) and DG INTPA on Feb 5 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100146628. pdf

[viii] Japan-EU Development Cooperation, Factsheet made by Japan (MOFA) and DG INTPA on Feb 5 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100146628. pdf