Can the EU’s Global Strategy Make a Difference?

Remy Maduit | Authors published

Can the EU’s New Global Strategy Make a Difference?
Strengthening Resilience in the Eastern Partnership Countries

Kornely Kakachia is a Professor of Political Science at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, and
Director of a Tbilisi-based think tank, Georgian Institute of Politics, Georgia.
Agnieszka Legucka is a Senior Research Fellow in Russia in the Eastern Europe Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) & Associate Professor in Security Studies at the Faculty of Business and International Relations at the Academy of Finance and Business Vistula
in Warsaw, Poland.
Bidzina Lebanidze is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of Slavic Languages and Caucasus Studies at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena & Associate Professor of International Relations at the Ilia State University & a Senior Analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics, Georgia.

This article seeks to explore the extent to which the European Union (EU) and its member states (i) promote societal resilience in two Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries: Georgia and Ukraine. Both countries suffer from a presence of areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO) and are exposed to various domestic and external risks. To help its neighborhood countries cope with risks, the EU recently shifted its attention towards building and supporting the societal resilience of these states. [ii] In the article, we seek to answer the following questions: What are the major risks affecting Georgia and Ukraine? How strong is societal resilience in Georgia and Ukraine? To what extent has the EU been successful in mitigating risks and strengthening sources of societal resilience in Georgia and Ukraine?

The article builds on a new conceptual framework developed by Stollenwerk, Börzel, and Risse (see the introduction to this special issue) to understand how societal resilience can help fend off risks and prevent governance breakdown/violent conflict. First, we consider the ALS and CO as default context conditions[iii] of both Georgia and Ukraine. According to Stollenwerk, Börzel, and Risse, in those countries, ALS occurs as territorial conflicts, and CO can take various forms from minor societal and political splits to violent protests. [iv]

While the EU does not have a clear vision of how to strengthen security in this fragile region, it recently focused more on the state and societal resilience of its neighboring states so that they can successfully cope with risks. The European Commission (EC) defines resilience as “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”. [v] Resilience is considered a domestic process with external actors supporting or spoiling the process of resilience-building. [vi] For strong societal resilience to existing, three major sources should be in place: social trust, legitimacy of governance actors, and effective design of governance institutions. [vii] We assume that the EU and other external actors can promote societal resilience and prevent governance breakdowns and violent conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine in two ways: by boosting sources of resilience or mitigating the negative impacts of risks.

Based on our empirical results on the reciprocal interaction between resilience, risks, and the role of external actors in Georgia and Ukraine, we draw two broad conclusions: first, both Georgia and Ukraine show a basic quality of domestic resilience able to withhold against some risks and prevent the emergence of violent conflicts or governance breakdown. However, the two countries, because of their economic, social, and security- and stateness-related vulnerabilities, on their own cannot cope with all risks they face, especially those associated with the external environment. Second, the EU has a mixed record of external resilience-building in Georgia and Ukraine. While the Union strengthened sources of resilience and mitigate domestic risks, it mostly failed to tackle the negative impacts of global and diffuse risks. Some most serious risks, mostly related to the role of Russia, remain partly unresolved by the EU and by Georgia and Ukraine themselves, leaving the possibility of new violent conflicts of governance breakdowns.

The article is built on a critical analysis of academic literature and official documents from the EU, Ukraine, and Georgia concerned with resilience, as well as on expert interviews gathered during the study trips to Ukraine and Georgia within the EU-LISTCO project (November 2018–December 2019). In terms of theoretical framework, while we follow the conceptual framework of this special issue, we employ several theoretical models and concepts from the Europeanization and external governance literature to assess the EU’s performance in promoting societal resilience in Georgia and Ukraine. They include the EU’s usage of democratic conditionality, socialization, capacity building, and a spoiling role of “Black Knights”. [viii] The current article is thought to be a heuristic exercise. We acknowledge the temporal limitation of the study subject since only three years have passed since the inception of resilience as a guiding principle of the EU foreign policy. Known for being a slow animal, it will take more time until the EU’s discursive change towards resilience becomes part of the Union’s actual policy and delivers tangible outputs. Yet, at this early stage, we seek to identify some trends in the EU’s general efforts to promote resilience in Georgia and Ukraine.

We structure the remainder of this paper as follows. In the next section, we first flesh out CO and ALS in Ukraine and Georgia that pose risks to the EU’s stability and security. In the second part, we explore the local dimension of resilience-building in Georgia and Ukraine by looking at three sources of resilience: social trust, the legitimacy of governance actors, and the design of governance institutions. We attempt to underline the overall resilience of the two EaP countries. In the third part, we elaborate on the role of external actors, particularly the EU, and assess its potential to strengthen the sources of societal resilience and mitigate risks in Georgia and Ukraine. We conclude with empirical and conceptual insights.

Areas of limited statehood and order contestation: risks to resilience in Georgia and Ukraine

We start from the assumption that both Georgia and Ukraine are characterized by ALS and CO. Areas of limited statehood are territorial, policy, or social areas in which central government authorities and institutions are too weak to set and enforce rules and/or do not control the monopoly over the means of violence. [ix] Order contestations occur were situations in which state and non-state actors challenge the norms, principles, and rules according to which societies and political systems are or should be organized. [x] In Georgia and Ukraine, ALS takes the form of unresolved territorial conflicts (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Donbas region, and Crimea in Ukraine) which, if exacerbated, can cause a new violent conflict (eastern Ukraine since 2014) or a full-scale war (the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008). [xi] Order contestation often plays out in a political and socio-cultural arena among different political, economic, and societal actors and with frequent involvement of external powers. The range and severity of governance problems produced by a CO can vary from total governance breakdown (Georgia in the 1990s) to violent protests (Ukraine in 2014, and Georgia in 2008, 2011, and 2020) or peaceful electoral revolutions (Ukraine in 2004 and Georgia in 2003). [xii]

ALS and CO in the EU’s neighborhood countries pose a serious risk to the EU’s security and internal stability, but only if they deteriorate and turn into violent conflict and/or governance breakdown do they become immediate threats. [xiii] We provide a brief mapping of the most significant domestic and external risks which may contribute to the deterioration of ALS and CO and the emergence of new conflicts or governance breakdowns in Georgia and Ukraine. We further suggest for each risk category-specific “tipping points” or the threshold at which risks turn into threats,[xiv] i.e. when ALS and CO turn into governance breakdown and/or violent conflicts.

Factors related to bad governance and socio-economic underdevelopment dominate domestic risks in Georgia and Ukraine. State capture and/or informal power-grab by rent-seeking business-political elites has been a serious destabilization risk in both countries. [xv] Suboptimal democratic institutional designs can further exacerbate them, which may include distorted checks and balances between different branches of power, a politicized judiciary, or a deficient electoral code that favors incumbent candidates. [xvi] Under conditions of state capture, contested elections or other events with polarizing effects can radicalize societies and act as tipping points leading to violent conflict or governance breakdown. Examples from the recent past include many post-elections or otherwise political protests such as electoral revolutions (in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004), [xvii] Euromaidan protests, and near governance breakdown in Ukraine in 2013–2014, [xviii] and many political crises in Georgia. [xix]

Another domestic risk that may lead to violence or governance breakdown is related to socio-economic underdevelopment. Elevated levels of social inequality coupled with widespread poverty, high unemployment (11% in Ukraine in 2020 and 11.6% in Georgia in 2019) [xx], and rent-seeking elites create conditions for social and political radicalization. Under these conditions, any major socio-economic shock can function as a tipping point, leading to violent protests or governance breakdowns.

Next to domestic risks, many global and diffuse risks can harm societies and trigger governance breakdown or violent conflict in Georgia and Ukraine. [xxi] Many are associated with Russia’s heavy presence in these two countries. Russia is seen as responsible for the continuing presence of four ALS (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Donbas) in Georgia and Ukraine. [xxii] Currently, the Donbas region in Ukraine represents the most dangerous conflict scene in which military skirmishes between Ukrainian armed forces and Russia-backed separatists have never fully stopped since 2014. Russia’s “borderization policy”, which refers to a unilateral border demarcation policy alongside administrative boundary lines between Georgia and South Ossetia, in Georgia can act as a potential tipping point for a new violent conflict between Georgia and Russia. [xxiii] Russia has also been heavily involved in order contestation in both countries. [xxiv] The Kremlin has been using its soft power (including the Russian Orthodox Church and pro-Kremlin organizations) [xxv] to spread social-conservative, anti-liberal, and Eurosceptic narratives. [xxvi]

Georgia and Ukraine are also exposed to other global and diffuse risks including global financial and economic risks (world financial crises or regional currency fluctuations), biological and environmental risks (SARS-CoV-2, grain market crisis, droughts, and floods), and demographic and uncontrolled migration risks (problems related to brain drain and a high number of Internally Displaced People (IDP)). [xxvii] If accumulated and strengthened by a low level of resilience, these risks can have a severe impact on Georgia and Ukraine and could even lead to new violent conflicts of governance breakdowns.

How to mitigate risks: major sources of resilience in Georgia and Ukraine

In this part of the article, we analyze key sources of societal resilience, which is a major factor in preventing risks and stopping ALS and CO from turning into violent conflict or governance breakdown. As Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse argue (see the introduction to this special issue), [xxviii] “building resilience is largely a domestic process where local state and non-state actors take center stage”. [xxix] Hence, before exploring the role of the EU as a resilience-builder in Georgia and Ukraine, we take stock of the different domestic/local sources of resilience in Georgia and Ukraine and the external assistance those countries need. Following Stollenwerk, Börzel, and Risse, we look at the most important sources of resilience: social trust, legitimacy of governance actors, and governance institutions.

Social trust

Social trust refers to “a cooperative attitude towards other people based on the optimistic expectation that others are likely to respect one’s interests.” [xxx] It comprises three dimensions: personal, group-based, and generalized trust. Georgia and Ukraine show contrasting pictures of the level of social trust. While individual and group-level trust is high in both societies, generalized trust is rather low (see Table 1). While generalized trust seems to have a greater impact on societal resilience, group-based trust has often functioned as an important source of resilience in both countries. Group-based trust was of utmost importance during the initial phase of Russian aggression in Ukraine, when volunteer movements provided finances for the basic needs of the armed forces and volunteer battalions operating on the frontline and, therefore, provided military capacity in the absence of effective state mechanisms. [xxxi] Both the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity proved the high capacity of Ukrainian society for self-organization, which made up for the distrust in state institutions. [xxxii] Between 2014 and 2016, building upon the existing capacities of Facebook, thousands of Ukrainian civilians engaged to provide ordnance and supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces, preventing the violent conflict from spreading further into Ukrainian territory.[xxxiii]

Table 1. Social trust in Georgia and Ukraine.

                                                                                                                  Georgia | Ukraine

Personal trust: trust in “People you know personally”                       78.5%      85.5%

[sum of two responses: trust completely & trust somewhat]

Group-based trust: trust in “your neighborhood”                                85.7%      77.9%

[sum of two responses: trust completely & trust somewhat]

Generalized trust: “Most people can be trusted”                                   8.8%       23.1%

[sum of positive responses]

Generalized trust is very low in both countries (see Table 1) and has been on the decline since the dissolution of the USSR. [xxxiv] A slightly better position of Ukraine in this respect came from the level of poverty in both countries (in Ukraine 3% of the population is living below the poverty line [xxxv] while in Georgia this number is around 20%) [xxxvi], as a worse economic situation leads to less generalized trust among society. [xxxvii]

Lack of generalized trust is also related to doubts about the procedural fairness of public services. One survey conducted in Ukraine showed that 84% of the population believed that good connections in the professional sphere were necessary to get public services. [xxxviii] On the societal level, Georgia remains a conservative and traditional country, and institutions are often secondary to informal networks and bonds such as clan, kinship, and family that, in a broad sense, are not limited to the closest relatives. [xxxix] Other reasons behind low generalized trust include negative experiences of economic and political turbulence after the collapse of the USSR, low level of socio-economic and human development, [xl] high degrees of inequality, and underperformance of public services.

To sum up, while generalized trust is low in both countries, group-based trust often acts as a source of societal resilience, helping Ukrainian and Georgian societies to survive in times of crisis and prevent full governance breakdown. Supplementing group-based trust with generalized trust in post-socialist transitional societies has been difficult. It requires addressing several long-term socio-political issues, which are necessary conditions for high social trust. They include a high density of civil society and voluntary associations, [xli] low degrees of corruption, [xlii] honest and transparent governments, [xliii] procedural fairness in public institutions, [xliv] fair distribution of resources, [xlv] universal social policies, economic equality, and equality of opportunities. [xlvi]

The empirical legitimacy of governance actors

Another source of societal resilience is the legitimacy of governance actors. This refers to “the social acceptance they enjoy among the governed population”, which “leads to voluntary compliance and cooperation”. [xlvii] Both in Georgia and Ukraine, surveys show relatively low levels of legitimacy and social acceptance towards public institutions and political/societal actors. According to the EU Neighbourhood Barometer Survey, political parties are the least trusted actors in both countries: only 25% of Georgians and 13% of Ukrainians trust them (see Table 2). The level of trust in both countries is also below 50% towards government, parliament, and regional and local public authorities (see Table 2). The only institutions that scored relatively well both in Georgia and Ukraine were religious as non-state actors (see Table 2).

Table 2. Trust in national institutions by country.

Please tell us your level of trust for the following institutions (percentage of the population who answered “Tend to trust”)

                    | Government | Parliament |  Regional & local public authorities | political parties | Religious Authority |

Georgia       |  44%             |  37%          |                          45%                          |          26%         |            68%               |

Ukraine       |  30%             |  23%          |                          41%                           |          18%         |            52%               |

EaP Total    |  41%             |  32%          |                          43%                          |          24%         |            52%               |

Source: Ecorys, “Annual Survey Report: Regional Overview (5th Wave)”.

Both in Georgia and Ukraine, the low level of trust in state institutions is informed mostly by past experiences, including power abuse, corruption, and state capture during Soviet and post-Soviet times. The political process in both countries has been fractured and accompanied by high informality, state capture, disproportional enrichment of business-political elites, and continuous socio-economic hardship for most of the population. [xlviii] There are, however, a few notable exceptions for both countries. In Georgia, trust in the police and army increased significantly after both institutions were reformed and got rid of petty corruption from 2003 onward. [xlix] Newly established public service halls also enjoy high popular support. [l] In Ukraine, lower legitimacy towards public institutions is determined by continuously high levels of corruption. However, after the start of the military conflict in 2014, trust in the military and volunteers has improved because of their vigilance during the conflict. [li]

Among the non-state actors, the Orthodox churches enjoy high legitimacy in both countries. [lii] The Orthodox churches in both countries are often considered a social glue that holds societies together and prevents violent order contestation in highly polarized Georgian and Ukrainian societies. They can also act as spoilers of resilience when they challenge certain liberal norms or promote polarizing or discriminatory narratives. [liii] The recent schism in Ukraine’s Orthodox Church, which left part of the church and clergy under the influence of Moscow’s Patriarchate, also weakens Ukraine’s societal resilience. Allegedly, there have been cases of priests from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate advocating against the Ukrainian state and siding openly with Russian-backed separatist Ukraine. [liv] Next to churches, civil society actors (CSO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and new grassroots movements are the most significant non-state actors in both countries. However, while their impact on political processes is huge, the legitimacy of local NGOs is low (in Georgia 18%, in Ukraine 22%). [lv] The reason behind the low legitimacy could be their lack of societal embeddedness. Most CSOs and NGOs do not rely on membership funding and are accountable to the donor community for their activities, [lvi] which often leaves the impression of the following donor agendas.

Finally, among international actors, Ukrainian and Georgian citizens view Russia as a threat, but they have a favorable view of the EU and NATO. [lvii] Although, they differ in the support for the EU and NATO membership (in Georgia it varies around 50%, [lviii] in Ukraine; it varies around 80%). [lix]

To sum up, with a few notable exceptions, the legitimacy of governance actors in both countries is low. Among the domestic non-state actors, the legitimacy of the Orthodox churches is the highest in both countries. NGOs and CSOs play an important role in political life, but they do not enjoy high legitimacy within the population. Few overarching ideational constructs act as societal glue in both countries. They include the idea of European integration, which enjoys strong support and boosts the EU’s legitimacy among Georgian and Ukrainian citizens.

Governance institutions

Some of the most severe domestic risks in Georgia and Ukraine are related to the design of governance institutions in the two states. We focus on state and non-state and domestic and international governance institutions, and the extent to which they are “fit for purpose and able to help ensure effective governance”. [lx]

For state institutions, both Georgia and Ukraine have functioning governance systems and nominally democratic constitutions. However, public institutional settings produce severe governance problems. Both countries suffer from high elite corruption, politicized and corrupt judiciaries, and oligarchic state capture. [lxi] Formal institutions are often infiltrated and overshadowed by informal governance practices and personalized politics. [lxii] Deficient electoral legislation modeled on the winner-takes-all principle often led to highly polarized and violent political contests and produced governments with too much power and weak opposition. [lxiii] Georgia achieved more progress in terms of public administration reforms, including the police, education, fighting petty corruption, and the provision of public services. [lxiv] However, the pace and substance of further institutional reforms in both countries are often slowed down or sabotaged by entrenched political interests.

Next to state institutions, non-state actors also play a significant part in governance in both countries. For instance, civil society actors, especially NGOs, have become important agents of democratic reforms and political transformation in both countries. [lxv] As one example, youth grassroots movements in Georgia organized a series of protests throughout 2019–2020 and successfully forced the government to make several political concessions, including the adoption of a more democratic electoral legislation.

Civil society actors strengthen resilience against disinformation. [lxvi] Ukrainian and Georgian NGOs, whose researchers take active measures to check information content, are having a positive impact on the fight against propaganda. There are several such organizations in Georgia (for example, the Georgian Charter of Journalists Ethics (GCJE) and Myth detector). [lxvii] In Ukraine, positive results are seen in volunteer initiatives and restrictions on media outlets promoting Russian propaganda. Ukrainian society has organized more such projects, such as StopFake, established by Kyiv Mohyla Academy. [lxviii] This non-affiliated website focused on debunking Russian disinformation. A group of volunteers named Group #IPSO #Trollbusters started its activity on Facebook by revealing the botnets used by the Kremlin. [lxix]

Yet the effectiveness of NGOs is limited because of various structural problems, including donor dependency, underdeveloped membership structures, and difficulty bonding with the population. [lxx] Other non-state actors, such as trade unions and various professional organizations, is weakly developed in Georgia and Ukraine and do not play any significant role.

Among the external actors, the EU and the US are the key players who take part in the governance of Georgia and Ukraine. They co-shape the evolution of institutional designs and reform agendas of the two countries. They provide advisory and financial support and various capacity-building measures, and function as “disciplinary powers” [lxxi] to ensure the democratic quality of institutions and prevent autocratic rollback. To conclude, the design of governance institutions in both countries is only partly fit to produce effective governance to some extent. Georgia is slightly more advanced in some areas when compared to Ukraine, including reforms in public services, but both countries encounter similar challenges. State institutions are being slowly reformed but remain vulnerable to corruption and informal governance. Non-state actors, including churches, NGOs, and grassroots movements, have emerged as significant players, but they often lack the institutional capacity to shape public policy.

The EU’s resilience-building in Georgia and Ukraine

In this part of the article, we explore the extent to which the EU has been successful in mitigating risks and strengthening sources of societal resilience in Georgia and Ukraine. External resilience-building can follow two approaches: strengthening the three sources of societal resilience or preventing risks from occurring to help societies avoid their negative impacts.

Strengthening sources of resilience

Since the inception of resilience as a guiding principle for the EU’s foreign and security policy, the EU’s record of external resilience-building in the EaP countries has been rather mixed. The EU’s engagement with Georgia and Ukraine involves instruments that can conceptually be linked to the aims of strengthening the sources of resilience in the two countries, but their actual impact remains to be seen. The EU has been streamlining its support to Georgia and Ukraine through two major reform-inducing strategic platforms: Association Agendas, which oversees the implementation of AAs, and the 20 Deliverables for 2020 (20for2020) platform. The latter was introduced in 2017 and was aimed at “improving the lives of the people” through extensive reform packages in various policy areas. [lxxii] Both platforms attempted to strengthen the three sources of resilience in Georgia and Ukraine in various ways.

Regarding social trust, the major challenge remains how to improve the degree of generalized trust, which is very low in both societies. Börzel and Risse identify two causal mechanisms for improving it: “generalization of group-based trust through the inclusiveness of social identities” and “building generalized trust through the impartiality of institutions”. [lxxiii] Concerning the first mechanism, the EU recently cooperated closely [lxxiv] with the Georgian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, which are highly trusted institutions and “the bearer of national identity” [lxxv] in their respective countries. Cooperation includes frequent visits to Brussels by clergy, educational activities, and enhanced communication. [lxxvi] By drawing both Orthodox churches closer to themselves, the EU may ease both churches’ “conservative identity politics”, [lxxvii] ensure their commitment to European integration and overcome the normative frictions in both societies between conservative and liberal scripts. Doing so would make the construction of national identities in Georgia and Ukraine around the idea of European integration socially more inclusive, also contributing to increased generalized trust.

The EU-induced public administration and decentralization reforms also contributed to the improvement of generalized trust through the impartiality of institutions. Both the AAs and the 20for2020 provided the impetus for public administration reforms. Within the 20for2020 platform, Georgia and Ukraine took steps to improve public services and local self-governance bodies. Georgia established country-wide community centers and public Service Halls–effective single-window systems which unified “over 300 different services under a single roof”. [lxxviii] The latter are among the most trusted institutions in Georgia, and their proliferation in the regions could also improve generalized trust through the increased perception of procedural fairness and impartiality of public institutions. The same applies to Ukraine, where EU-supported and funded [lxxix] decentralization reform has been underway since 2015. Ukraine’s decentralization reforms resulted in improvements in “governance at the municipal level” and also promoted local democracy, [lxxx] leading to the improved trust of Ukrainians in local public institutions. [lxxxi] To conclude, the success of the EU-inspired decentralization reforms in Georgia and Ukraine may lead to the improvement of both generalized social trust among citizens and the empirical legitimacy of local governance institutions. Initial data shows a positive change in public attitudes towards the reforms and increased legitimacy of reformed public institutions in both countries. [lxxxii]

Since the inception of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016, the EU also contributed to an improvement in the legitimacy of governance actors and the quality of institutional design in Georgia and Ukraine. Over the last few years, the EU changed its state-centric approach and stepped up its financial and advisory support to CSOs in Georgia and Ukraine. Also, through political empowerment, the EU contributed to CSOs and newly emerged grassroots movements to become influential parts of institutional design and impact policy outcomes in both countries. For instance, the EU’s political support for a recent series of peaceful protests in Georgia organized by grassroots movements and CSOs significantly changed the political balance of power in the country. [lxxxiii] It strengthened the empirical legitimacy of civil society actors and improved the institutional design of the country by forcing the state authorities to embark on democratic reforms, including a highly contested reform of the electoral system.

Mitigation of risks

The second approach of external societal resilience-building lies in the mitigation of risks that negatively affect resilience in third countries. Here again, the EU has a mixed record. While it has eased domestic risks, it has failed to reduce the probability of external risks turning into threats.

Since the inception of the ENP, the EU has been actively pushing Georgia and Ukraine towards inclusive and transparent political processes by using a mix of positive and negative conditionality against political regimes in both countries. [lxxxiv] In doing so, the EU limited the extent of state capture by rent-seeking elites and reduced the probability of order contestation turning into violent conflicts or governance breakdown a few times. For instance, in 2012, the EU, together with the United States, persuaded the Georgian government to undergo a peaceful electoral power transfer, which probably halted a violent post-election crisis. [lxxxv] The EU has not always been successful, however. Two years later, its involvement was not enough to avoid violent conflict and partial governance breakdown in Ukraine. After 2015, the EU further stepped up its conditionality-based engagement in both countries. For instance, during 2019–2020, the EU and the US facilitated political dialogue between Georgia’s opposing political camps and persuaded the ruling party to adopt a more liberal electoral code. [lxxxvi] This was an important step that reduced the risk of post-election processes turning into violent order contestation between competing parties in the 2020 parliamentary elections. Because of the EU’s active involvement, the radicalization of post-election processes in Georgia was limited but not contained entirely since the opposition contested the election results and boycotted the parliament. Overall, the conditionality-based empowerment of democratic actors by the EU underlines the difference between supporting societal resilience and state resilience or regime stability. We can see it as an attempt by the EU to strengthen societal resilience against the predatory behavior of incumbent regimes and other illiberal political actors.

Unlike domestic risks, the EU’s record has been more moderate in the mitigation of external risks, which is partly related to its diminished image as a security actor. The EU had few instruments to prevent military conflicts in the EaP area, i.e. the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, and the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014.

So far, the EU’s conflict management approach has mostly been confined to stabilizing conflict areas and providing diplomatic support to Georgia and Ukraine. [lxxxvii] The establishment of the European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM) and the launch of peace initiatives within the Minsk process and the Normandy Format in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia provide certain protections against the outbreak of new full-scale conflicts. [lxxxviii] However, despite remaining security challenges, the latest EU documents show Brussels does not intend to step up its engagement to mitigate security-related risks shortly. [lxxxix] The recent communication by the EC, which discusses the future of EaP policy beyond 2020, devoted only a few sentences to issues of conflict management and security. [xc] The document focuses on cooperation in multiple sectoral areas which may contribute to strengthening the sources of resilience but cannot mitigate the most severe security risks, which may lead to new violent conflicts or governance breakdowns in the EaP area.

While criticism of the EU for its neglect of security issues is often justified, over the past two decades, the Union has silently become a major Western security actor in the region with predominantly civilian and soft security components. [xci] Deployment of civilian monitoring missions, diplomatic initiatives, sanctions against Russia, as well as financial and political help give enough boost to Georgia’s and Ukraine’s resilience to survive under the shadow of existential geopolitical risks. [xcii] Therefore, perhaps counterfactually, without the EU’s security governance mix, both Georgia and Ukraine would be worse off and the EU’s eastern neighborhood would be even more unstable. The EU could or could have done more to boost resilience in its eastern neighborhood without risking a military confrontation with Russia. Concrete steps could include extending the EU’s disinformation framework to Georgia and Ukraine, [xciii] more effective targeted sanctions against Russia, [xciv] abandonment of conceptual ambiguity [xcv], and improvement of strategic messaging with the EaP countries even if below the NATO/EU membership, strengthening defense capabilities and help in security sector reforms. [xcvi]

Conclusions

This article analyzed the major risks and sources of societal resilience in Georgia and Ukraine and explored the impacts of the EU as a major external resilience-building actor. We draw several conclusions from our study and answer our research questions. First, Georgia and Ukraine are to a similar extent [xcvii] affected by various risks, both domestic and external, which may cause governance breakdown or new violent conflicts. Hence, both countries should remain on the radar of the EU and its new resilience approach that acts as a cornerstone to the new integrated crisis management agenda. [xcviii]

Second, in terms of endogenous factors, both Georgia and Ukraine possess a certain degree of societal resilience. Both countries have functioning state and non-state institutions and high individual and group-based social trust. The generalized social trust and the legitimacy of most state institutions are quite low, and many structural and political deficiencies undermine the effectiveness of governance institutions. Both countries need support from the international community to strengthen their societal resilience and mitigate the negative impacts of domestic and external risks.

Third, the EU as an external resilience-builder has been moderately successful in strengthening societal resilience in Georgia and Ukraine. It has been more effective in helping the EaP countries to strengthen sources of resilience and mitigate domestic risks, but less so in helping against external (global) risks. On the one hand, the EU’s policy instruments, comprising financial and advisory help, democratic conditionality, and structural cooperation mechanisms, have played a significant role in inducing democratic reforms in both countries. The EU has been only moderately successful in mitigating global risks related to the geopolitical rivalry with Russia, even though perhaps, without the EU’s presence, the situation of Georgia and Ukraine would be much worse for both countries.

Finally, the EU can also function as a resilience spoiler when its policies result in negative unintended effects or are too cost-intensive or politically sensitive to local actors to implement. Recent works on the EU’s external resilience-building see resilience intricately connected to local ownership and they consider the EU’s lack of embracing the latter behind its failure at building resilience in its neighborhood. [xcix] However, our empirical insights from Ukraine and Georgia show that, while the EU neglected local ownership, it still strengthened the sources of resilience in the two countries. Less local ownership helped the EU to apply stricter conditionality when it was due. [c] Hence, the causality between local ownership and resilience-building needs to be further evaluated through empirical research.

Future research needs to provide a more accurate assessment of the impact of the EU’s external resilience-building on the sources of resilience in the EU’s neighborhood countries. Only three years have passed since the Union formally introduced resilience as a guiding principle for its foreign policy. Strengthening sources of resilience is a lengthy process. While we can observe some EU-induced positive changes in the resilience of Ukraine and Georgia, more time is necessary to assess to what extent these changes translate into higher resilience, eventually. The EU needs to step up its game in terms of risk mitigation techniques. More focus on cooperation in a security area with the neighborhood countries, even if below military commitments, and careful consideration of the role of external resilience spoilers can cause a more resilient and stable neighborhood.

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[i] The paper mostly focuses on the EU institutions, but it also includes the EU member states in the analysis.
[ii] EEAS. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And. EEAS. Accessed February 27, 2018. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. 
[iii] Stollenwerk, Eric, Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse. “Theorizing Resilience-Building in the EU’s Neighborhood: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Democratization. forthcoming.
[iv] Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse, “Introduction to this Special Issue.” The same applies to the other neighborhood regions of the EU. For the analysis of the Western Balkan region, see:
Bargues-Pedreny, Pol, and Pol Morillas. “From Democratization to Fostering Resilience: EU Intervention and the Challenges of Building Institutions, Social Trust and Legitimacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Democratization. Forthcoming. 
[v] EEAS. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And, 23. EEAS. Accessed February 27, 2018. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. 
[vi] Stollenwerk, Eric, Tanja A. Botzel, and Thomas Risse. “Theorizing Resilience-Building in the EU’s Neighborhood: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Democratization. Forthcoming.
[vii] Id.
[viii] Tolstrup, Jakob. “Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in the Post-Soviet States.” European Journal of Political Research 54, no. 4 (2015): 673–690. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12079.
[ix] Stollenwerk, Eric, Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse. “Theorizing Resilience-Building in the EU’s Neighborhood: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Democratization. forthcoming.
[x] Id
[xi] Ademmer, Esther, Laure Delcour, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Beyond Geopolitics: Exploring the Impact of the EU and Russia in the ‘Contested Neighborhood’.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 57, no. 1 (2016): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2016.1183221
[xii] Bouchet, Nicolas. “Russia’s ‘Militarization’ of Colour Revolutions.” CSS Policy Perspectives 4, no. 2 (2016). https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010682969. 
[xiii] Stollenwerk, Eric, Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse. “Theorizing Resilience-Building in the EU’s Neighborhood: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Democratization. forthcoming. (THIS SPECIAL ISSUE). 
[xiv]Id.
[xv] Cenusa, Denis, Wojciech Konończuk, and Kornely Kakachia. Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as key obstacles to reforms. 3DCFTAs. May 24, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2021. https://3dcftas.eu/publications/oligarchs-in-ua-mo-and-ge-as-key-obstacles-to-reforms. 
[xvi] Lebanidze, Bidzina. Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft Ser. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019. 
[xvii] Kuzio, Taras. Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution. London, New York: Routledge, 2009. 
[xviii] Hale, Henry., and Robert W. Orttung, eds. Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016.
[xix] Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2020. Georgia Country Report. Freedom House. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/nations-transit/2020.
[xx] IMF. World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Asce. IMF, October 2020. Accessed October 30, 2020. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-october-2020. 
[xxi] We conceptualize and operationalize global and diffuse risks based on typology by Magen, Richemond-Barak, and Stav. The authors identify six clusters of global and diffuse risks: geopolitical rivalry and risks of major conflict; unconventional security risks; environmental; demography and uncontrolled migration; global financial and economic risks; technology-driven disruption. Magen, Richemond-Barak, and Stav, Taking Global And Diffuse Risks Seriously. Whereas all six clusters are present in both Georgia and Ukraine, we focus in this article on risks that are supposed to have the most detrimental impact on the two countries.
[xxii] Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Changed the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010
[xxiii] Kakachia, Kornely. How the West Should Respond to Russia’s “Borderization” in Georgia. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 523 (2018).
[xxiv] Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization? Russia’s Role in Georgia and Ukraine.” Democratization 22, no. 3 (2015): 459–478. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.996135. 
[xxv] Curanović, Alicja. “Russia’s Mission in the World: The Perspective of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Problems of Post-Communism 66, no. 4 (2019): 253–267.https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1530940. 
[xxvi] Richey, Mason. “Contemporary Russian Revisionism: Understanding the Kremlin’s Hybrid Warfare and the Strategic and Tactical Deployment of Disinformation.” Asia Europe Journal 16, no. 1 (2018): 101–113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-017-0482-5. 
[xxvii] Kakachia, Kornely, and Bidzina Lebanidze. Global and Diffuse Risks in the Eastern Partnership Countries: Impacts on EU Security. EU-LISTCO Working Paper Series 6, June 2020. Accessed January 20, 2021. https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/eu_listco/global_and_diffuse_risks_in_the_eastern_partnership_countries_potential_impacts_on_eu_security. 
[xxviii] Stollenwerk, Eric, Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse. “Theorizing Resilience-Building in the EU’s Neighborhood: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Democratization. forthcoming. (THIS SPECIAL ISSUE). 
[xxix] About fostering resilience from the EU perspective, see
Bressan, Sarah, and Aurora Bergmaier. “From Conflict Early Warning to Fostering Resilience? Chasing Convergence in EU Foreign Policy.” Democratization. Forthcoming.
Ozcurumez, Saime. “The EU’s Effectiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean Migration Quandary: Challenges to Building Societal Resilience.” Democratization. Forthcoming.
[xxx] Draude, Anke, Lasse Hölck, and Dietlind Stolle. “Social Trust.” In The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood, edited by Anke Draude, Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse, 353–374. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198797203.013.17. 
[xxxi] Worschech, Susann. “New Civic Activism in Ukraine: Building Society from Scratch?” Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal 3 (2017): 23–45. https://doi.org/10.18523/kmlpj119984.2017-3.23-45. 
[xxxii] Zarembo, Kateryna. “Substituting for the State: The Role of Volunteers in Defense Reform in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine.” Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal 3 (2017): 47–70. https://doi.org/10.18523/kmlpj119985.2017-3.47-70. 
[xxxiii] Boulègue, Mathieu, and Orysia Lutsevych. Resilient Ukraine Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression. Chatham House, Research Paper, June 11, 2020. Accessed August 9, 2020.https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/06/resilient-ukraine. 
[xxxiv] Wike, Richard. “Where Trust is High, Crime and Corruption are Low.” Pew Research Center, April 15, 2008. Accessed August 9, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2008/04/15/where-trust-is-high-crime-and-corruption-are-low/. 
[xxxv] World Bank. Ukraine. Accessed September 29, 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine. 
[xxxvi] World Bank. Georgia. Accessed September 29, 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/country/georgia. 
[xxxvii] Graafland, Johan, and Bjorn Lous. “Income Inequality, Life Satisfaction Inequality and Trust: A Cross Country Panel Analysis.” Journal of Happiness Studies 20, no. 20 (2019): 1717–1737. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-018-0021-0. 
[xxxviii] Polese, Abel, and Tetiana Stepurko. “In Connections We Trust.” Transitions Online, April 13, 2016. Accessed August 9, 2020. https://tol.org/client/article/25784-in-connections-we-trust.html. 
[xxxix] Caucasus Barometer. Cross-Country and Time-Series Datasets by Caucasus Research Resource Center. Accessed March 7, 2021. http://www.crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer.
[xl] Algan, Yann, and Pierre Cahuc. Trust, Growth and Well-being: New Evidence and Policy Implications. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper 7464, June 2019. http://repec.iza.org/dp7464.pdf. 
[xli] Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
[xlii] Rothstein, Bo, and Eric M. Uslaner. “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust.” World Politics 58 (2005): 41–72. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0022. 
[xliii] Id.
[xliv] Tyler, Tom R. “Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 45, no. 4 (1997): 871–904. https://doi.org/10.2307/841024. 
[xlv] Rothstein, Bo, and Eric M. Uslaner. “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust.” World Politics 58 (2005): 41–72. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0022. 
[xlvi] Id.
[xlvii] Risse, Thomas, and Eric Stollenwerk. “Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood.” Annual Review of Political Science 21 (2018): 403–418. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-023610. 
[xlviii] Cenusa, Denis, Wojciech Konończuk, and Kornely Kakachia. Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as key obstacles to reforms. 3DCFTAs. May 24, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2021. https://3dcftas.eu/publications/oligarchs-in-ua-mo-and-ge-as-key-obstacles-to-reforms. 
[xlix] “Public Attitudes, Political Ratings in NDI-commissioned Survey.” Civil Georgia, January 1, 2020. Accessed August 9, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/334775. 
[l] Id.
[li] Kyivpost. “Poll Says Ukrainians’ Trust in Volunteers Rises Again.” Interfax-Ukraine, Kyivpost, April 16. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/poll-says-ukrainians-trust-in-volunteers-rises-again.html. 
[lii] According to the EU Neighborhood Barometer it is 69% in Georgia and 43% in Ukraine. National surveys indicate even higher support. See: Promote Ukraine. Ukrainian Trust in Authorities Decreases. https://www.promoteukraine.org/ukrainian-trust-in-authorities-decreases/ (accessed September 29, 2020).
[liii] Kakachia, Kornely. “Is Georgia’s Orthodox Church an Obstacle to European Values?” Ponars Eurasia, June 10, 2014. Accessed August 10, 2020. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/georgia%E2%80%99s-orthodox-church-obstacle-european-values. 
[liv] Higgins, Andrew. “As Ukraine and Russia Battle Over Orthodoxy, Schism Looms.” The New York Times, December 31, 2018. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/world/europe/ukraine-russia-orthodox-church-schism.html. 
[lv] Lutsevych, Orysia. How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Chatham House Briefing Paper, January 2013. Accessed February 6, 2016. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113bp_lutsevych.pdf. 
[lvi] Puig, Gemma P. Situation Analysis of Civil Society in Georgia (Full Report). Europe Foundation. Full Report, 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. http://www.epfound.ge/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Situation-Analysis-of-CSOs-in-Georgia.pdf. 
[lvii] “IRI-Commissioned Poll says Mood Somber in Georgia.” Civil Georgia, July 22, 2019. Accessed August 9, 2020. https://civil.ge/archives/314050. 
[lviii] IRI. Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine. May 26-June 10, 2018. Accessed October 30, 2020. https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/june_2018_national_survey.pdf. 
[lix] “Public Attitudes, Political Ratings in NDI-commissioned Survey.” Civil Georgia, January 1, 2020. Accessed August 9, 2020. https://civil.ge/archives/334775. 
[lx] Eickhoff, Karoline, and Eric Stollenwerk. Strengthening Resilience in the EU’s Neighbourhood. EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series 1. June 13, 2019. https://www.eu-listco.net/publications/strengthening-resilience. 
[lxi] Cenusa, Denis, Wojciech Konończuk, and Kornely Kakachia. Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as key obstacles to reforms. 3DCFTAs. May 24, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2021. https://3dcftas.eu/publications/oligarchs-in-ua-mo-and-ge-as-key-obstacles-to-reforms. 
[lxii] Lebanidze, Bidzina, and Kornely Kakachia. “Informal Governance & Electorate Perceptions in Hybrid Regimes: The 2016 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 25, no. 4 (2017): 529–549. Accessed March 10, 2021. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/675786#info_wrap. 
[lxiii] Bader, Max. “Party Politics in Georgia and Ukraine and the Failure of Western Assistance.” Democratization 17, no. 6 (2010): 1085–1107. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2010.525857. 
[lxiv] World Bank. Fighting Corruption in Public Services: Chronicling Georgia’s Reforms. Directions in Development. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2012. 
[lxv] Falkenhain, Mariella, and Iryna Solonenko. “The EU and Civil Society in Eastern Europe: Partners in the Pursuit of Policy Change?” In Policy Change in the EU’s Immediate Neighbourhood, a Sectoral Approach, edited by Tanja Börzel, and Katrin Böttger, 56–76. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012. 
[lxvi] Damarad, Volha, and Andrei Yeliseyeu. “Forward.” In Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Andrei Yeliseyeu, and Volha Damarad, 5–13. Kyiv, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2021. http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf 
[lxvii] Myth Detector. “‘Connect to Real Opposition!’ – FB Accounts with Close Links to Alliance of Patriots and Other Anti-Western Groups.” Myth Detector, March 16, 2020. Accessed August 13, 2020. http://mythdetector.ge/en/myth/connect-real-opposition-fb-accounts-close-links-alliance-patriots-and-other-anti-western). 
[lxviii] Khaldarova, Irina, and Mervi Pantti. “Fake News: The Narrative Battle Over the Ukrainian Conflict.” Journalism Practice 10, no. 7 (2016): 891–901. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2016.1163237. 
[lxix] Maksak, Hennadiy, and Sergiy Gerasymchuk. Ukraine: Disinformation Resilience Index. Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”, July 31, 2018. Accessed October 31, 2020. http://prismua.org/en/english-ukraine-disinformation-resilience-index/. 
[lxx] Lutsevych, Orysia. How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Chatham House Briefing Paper, January 2013. Accessed February 6, 2016. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113bp_lutsevych.pdf. 
[lxxi] Joseph, Jonathan. “Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach.”Resilience 1, no. 1 (2013): 38–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2013.765741. 
[lxxii] European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020 Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnership that Delivers for All. European Commission, SWD (2020) 56 final. Accessed January 20, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/1_en_act_part1_v6.pdf. 
[lxxiii] Börzel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse. Conceptual Framework: Fostering Resilience in Areas of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders. EU-LISTCO Working Paper, no. 1. September 2018. Accessed August 9, 2020. https://www.eu-listco.net/publications/conceptual-framework-fostering-resilience-in-areas-of-limited-statehood-and-contested-orders. 
[lxxiv] Edilashvili, “Georgia: Project Aims to Boost Orthodox Church’s Support for EU Integration;” Kakachia, “Is Georgia’s Orthodox Church an Obstacle to European Values?”
[lxxv] Liik, Kadri, Momchil Metodiev, and Nicu Popescu. Defender of the faith? How Ukraine’s Orthodox split threatens Russia. ECFR Policy Brief, May 30, 2019. Accessed August 10, 2020. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/defender_of_the_faith_how_ukraines_orthodox_split_threatens_russia. 
[lxxvi] Delegation of the European Union to Georgia. Georgian Orthodox Church visits EU institutions in Brussels. EEAS. November 11, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2020. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/14633/node/14633_ro.
[lxxvii] Liik, Kadri, Momchil Metodiev, and Nicu Popescu. Defender of the faith? How Ukraine’s Orthodox split threatens Russia. ECFR Policy Brief, May 30, 2019. Accessed August 10, 2020. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/defender_of_the_faith_how_ukraines_orthodox_split_threatens
[lxxviii] Bolkvadze, Ketevan. “Hitting the Saturation Point: Unpacking the Politics of Bureaucratic Reforms in Hybrid Regimes.” Democratization 24, no. 4 (2017): 751–769. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1247808. 
[lxxix] Romanova, Valentyna, and Andreas Umland. Ukraine’s Decentralization Reforms Since 2014 Initial Achievements and Future Challenges. Chatham House, Research Paper. September 25, 2019. Accessed August 11, 2020. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/09/ukraines-decentralization-reforms-2014. 
[lxxx] Id., 21.
[lxxxi] Council of Europe. Reports: Annual National Opinion Polls on Decentralisation and Local Self-Government Reform. Council of Europe. March 4, 2019. Accessed August 11, 2020. http://www.slg-coe.org.ua/p16423/?lang=en. 
[lxxxii] Romanova and Umland, Ukraine’s Decentralization Reforms; Georgian Institute of Politics, Georgia’s Implementation of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020.
[lxxxiii] News Wires. 2019. “US, EU Back Georgia Protesters After Thousands Rally Outside Parliament.” France 24, November 18. https://www.france24.com/en/20191118-us-eu-back-georgia-protesters-after-thousands-rally-outside-parliament.
[lxxxiv] Lebanidze, Bidzina. Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft Ser. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019.
[lxxxv] Lebanidze, Bidzina. “What Makes Authoritarian Regimes Sweat? Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in Post-Soviet South Caucasus.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 14, no. 2 (2014): 199–218. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.905040. 
[lxxxvi] Krastev, Ivan. “Electoral Reform–the Good News we Missed from Georgia.” Euractiv, June 22, 2020. Accessed October 30, 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/section/eastern-europe/opinion/electoral-reform-the-good-news-we-missed-from-georgia/. 
[lxxxvii] Legucka, Agnieszka, and Arkadiusz Legieć. Protracted Conflicts In The EU’s Neighbourhood: Does Resilience Apply? EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series 1. June 6, 2020. Accessed August 14, 2020. https://www.eu-listco.net/publications/protracted-conflicts-in-the-eus-neighbourhood-does-resilience-apply. 
[lxxxviii] Litra, Leonid, Ivan Medynskyi, and Kateryna Zarembo. Assessing the EU’s Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Ukraine. Institute for World Policy, Kiev, Ukraine, March 23, 2017. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/142333/2917118/Assessing%20EU%20Conflict%20Prevention%20in%20Ukraine.pdf. 
[lxxxix] European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020 Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnership that Delivers for All. European Commission, SWD (2020) 56 final. Accessed January 20, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/1_en_act_part1_v6.pdf. 
[xc] Id.
[xci] Litra, Leonid, Ivan Medynskyi, and Kateryna Zarembo. Assessing the EU’s Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Ukraine. Institute for World Policy, Kyiv, Ukraine, March 23, 2017. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/142333/2917118/Assessing%20EU%20Conflict%20Prevention%20in%20Ukraine.pdf. 
[xcii] Lebanidze, Bidzina. Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft Ser. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019. 
[xciii] Pamment, James. The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Crafting A Disinformation Framework. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Future Threats, Future Solutions 2. September 2020. Accessed September 29, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/24/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-crafting-disinformation-framework-pub-82720. 
[xciv] Mikhelidze, Nona, and Nathalie Tocci. “Europe’s Russia sanctions are not working. Clash in the Sea of Azov Shows Needs for New Approach to Moscow.” Politico, November 29, 2018. Accessed September 29, 2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-sanctions-are-not-working-ukraine-azov-sea-kerch-strait-vladimir-putin/. 
[xcv] European Commission. Theorizing the European Neighborhood Policy: Speech by Johannes Hahn. College of Europe. September 18, 2015. Accessed February 27, 2019. https://www.coleurope.eu/international-conference-theorizing-european-neighbourhood-policy. 
[xcvi] Lavrelashvili, Teona. “Resilience-Building in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine: Towards a Tailored Regional Approach from the EU.” European View 17, no. 2 (2018): 189–196. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1781685818805680. 
[xcvii] From the comparative angle, both countries show similar qualities in sources of resilience and exposure to domestic and external risks. There are some differences in terms of socio-political structures and structural characteristics of the two countries which generate some qualitative differences in sources of resilience (Ukraine having more social trust but less empirical legitimacy) and risk mitigation capacities (with Georgia being more vulnerable to external risks due to its smaller size and more vulnerable location). However, overall two countries show more similarities than differences–perhaps making it easier for the external actors to design resilience-strengthening policies.
[xcviii] EEAS. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And. EEAS. Accessed February 27, 2018. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. 
[xcix] Korosteleva, Elena A. “Reclaiming Resilience Back: A Local Turn in EU External Governance.” Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 2 (2020): 241–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1685316. 
[c] Petrova, Irina, and Laure Delcour. “From Principle to Practice? The Resilience–Local Ownership Nexus in the EU Eastern Partnership Policy.” Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 2 (2020): 336–360. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678280. 

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