The births of International Studies in China

The Births of International Studies in China

Yih-Jye Hwang is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Leiden University, Netherlands.

International Relations (IR) as a discipline developed over the twentieth century to predominantly focus on the concerns of powerful Western states and to elaborate conceptual frameworks that could be applied elsewhere. [i] One important critique of this Western-centric nature of IR is that it privileges Western thought over all other forms of thought and makes Western reason the sole criterion for ‘correct’ and ‘universal’ knowledge. Mainstream IR scholarship thus reflects the identity and interests of the West—specifically the Anglo-American world—by encouraging its scholars to exclude non-Western systems of thought and using its theoretical perspectives to justify and perpetuate Western hegemony. [ii] The non-Western world’s subjectivity is often missing or ignored. Hence, over the past two decades, there has been an emerging post-Western quest in IR that urges IR scholars to ‘re-world’ the subaltern voice. [iii] One of the primary goals of this quest has been to rediscover the lost historical and contemporary voices of the subalterns. Post-Western IR scholarship urges IR scholars to ‘re-world’ subaltern sites by examining how Western discourses on IR have been interpreted and appropriated on each site. The quest for post-Western IR accordingly attends predominantly to the rediscovering of agency at the subaltern site for adaptation, feedback, and reconstruction of the Western influence encountered. [iv]

A rising China has inspired great interest in the studies of International Relations from the Chinese perspective. Plural Chinese scholars in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have argued there should be a Chinese School of IR Theory, and there have been various attempts to establish the Chinese theory of International Relations over the past decades. [v] Despite different focuses on the methods, concepts, and approaches that characterize the Chinese School, all of them have tried to de-peripheralize China in the world of theory. By incorporating China’s historical experiences and ideas—derived from indigenous traditional philosophies and traditions—scholars attempt to understand, explain, and interpret world politics in a distinctively Chinese way. The potential for a Chinese understanding of international relations is not taking hold in the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan), which is also deeply influenced by traditional Chinese culture. [vi] They remain far more receptive to Anglo-centric/Western IR. Although there seem to be some efforts by Taiwanese scholars to go beyond Western approaches, [vii] they have a relatively low voice throughout Taiwan’s IR community. As Shih observed, ‘Taiwan’s’ mainstream IR at all times mimics the development of American IR.’ [viii]

Why do the academic circles of the PRC and Taiwan embark on these two completely different routes? To answer this question, it is necessary to look into how International Studies developed as a field of study in Modern China, including the Qing Dynasty, the Republic in Beijing and Nanjing, and contemporary China and Taiwan. Thus, this article aims to look to the Chinese site for an origin of non-Western sources upon which the site could improvise a composite and hybrid kind of global IR. It will explore how International Studies as a scientific discipline emerged and developed in modern China, against the background of a Sinocentric world order that had predominated in East Asia for a long time. Specifically, it will address the following questions. First, how did the ideas of the ‘international’ travel to China, through what channels and how were they initially received in China? SeSecondhow did people, ideas, and institutions come together to form a distinct scientific discipline of International Studies in China? And finally, combining these two, what are the legacies of the development of International Studies in PRC and Taiwan? By ‘International Studies’ as a scientific discipline I am referring to a field of study in which intellectuals and experts—practitioners, translators, historians, legal scholars, political theorists/scientists—are sustained by institutionalization in their pursuit of systematic knowledge on world politics.

The traces of the development of the disciplinary institutionalization and professional affiliation of their subjects in China resonate with the call for a better understanding of how IR arrived and developed in the non-Western world. In IR historiography, Western-centric disciplinary narratives of IR cause a ‘selective amnesia about IR’s past’. [ix] For instance, the mainstream narrative of I’s disciplinary history completely evades the fact that some of the earliest debates in the nascent field of IR were not about idealism vis-à-vis realism but imperialism vis-à-vis internationalism; they were not about ‘peace and war’ but ‘race and empire’. [x] They further noted that there is still very little knowledge about how IR arrived and developed in the non-Western world. Thus, one could say that the field of IR historiography today has yet to appreciate how key processes that shape the knowledge and practice of international relations elsewhere can tell us more about world politics.

The argument of this article is threefold. First, many ideas and theories had traveled to China before International Studies was recognized as a discipline. In the beginning, Chinese intellectuals did not recognize International Studies as a coherent discipline. The discipline relied heavily on historical, legal, and political studies and placed a heavy focus on the investigation of China’s integration into the Westphalian system. As time went by, the discipline was gradually understood as an independent discipline. The transplanted ideas and theories represented various genealogical lines of discourse and they inevitably constitute the multiple origins of International Studies in China. Second, studies of International Relations were grounded in a problem-solving approach to various issues China was facing at various times in modernization. This approach is inherited from the Confucian ideal of statecraft pragmatism (jīngshì zhìyòng), which can be traced back to the Utilitarian School of Confucianism during the Song Dynasty (960–1279). [xi] Scholars, thinkers, and practitioners under the Imperial Qing, Republican, and Communist regimes all upheld the ideal of statecraft pragmatism. [xii] As a scholar, their academic thinking was always inseparable from the current reality. To paraphrase Robert Cox’s renowned statement—‘International Studies as a field of study is always for someone and some purpose’—Chinese IR is always for the Chinese nation, state, and its regimes. As a result, International Studies as a discipline aimed at theoretically and empirically understanding international relations from the Chinese perspective. Third, this article will further suggest that the historical development of International Studies in China has had a profound impact on the current IR scholarship in both the PRC and Taiwan, including the recent surge of the attempts to establish the Chinese School of IR Theory in China and the voluntary acceptance of Western IR in Taiwan.

In what follows, this article will first discuss the development of diplomatic thought in China in the late nineteenth century amid the collapse of the Chinese traditional world order. Subsequently, it will explore how International Studies were developed in the fields of international jurisprudence, diplomatic history, and IR, respectively. In conclusion, the article will suggest that there is still an indigenous Chinese site of agency regarding developing IR and IR Theory even though, in the course of the disciplinary institutionalization, Chinese scholars have largely absorbed Western IR. My coverage of International Studies writings is not exhaustive, however, I have endeavored to capture the overall tendency of the development of the discipline by focusing on a few key individuals and their works.

The collapse of Chinese traditional world order and the development of diplomatic thoughts in the Qing Empire

For China, the concept of ‘international’ is a Western introduction. [xiii] The ideas and theories, such as sovereignty, were transplanted to China sporadically via periodicals and translation practices. That does not mean that China had no form of international studies. Various traditional schools of thought, such as Confucianism, are all concerned about China’s relations with the outside world, though they differ from modern Western International Relations and are mainly preoccupied with Chinese traditional world order. [xiv] This section will first introduce China’s idea of ‘international’ from a Sinocentric perspective and its fall. It will then explain various diplomatic thoughts developed in China in the late nineteenth century in response to Western encroachment.

The so-called Chinese world order is built upon the establishment of a Sinocentric hierarchy in the tributary system. For the tributary states, China did not interfere in their internal and external affairs, as long as they agreed with the Sinocentric order and practiced its ceremonies and rituals. As Sinologist Yang Lien-sheng notes, [xv] ‘ [i] n theory, it should have been hierarchical in at least three ways, China being internal, large, and high and the barbarians being external, small, and low’. Its external relations are always reflected in its domestic social and political order and are manifested in the Chinese notion of legitimacy, which is grounded in the pre-modern political idea–of the mandate of heaven. [xvi]

The mandate of heaven ties in with the propriety of the ruler, or the ruler’s virtue. It is important to note that the idea of a ruler’s virtue was not merely an ideological construct, but required actual material benefits for the populace. [xvii] The way for rulers to secure the ‘hearts of the people’ was not only to possess ‘benevolence’ but also to perform their duties well by assuring people’s welfare. The legitimacy of rulers was thus, to a large extent, performance-based. The ‘benevolence’ performed by the rulers (that is, emperors) not only refers to the imperial subjects (that is, the Chinese people) but also to ‘foreigners’—that is, tributary states and people living beyond the circle of tributary states. It signified an ‘attraction’ of the outer fringes of Chinese civilization to become part of the Sinocentric system. Chinese emperors were considered to be ‘Sons of Heaven’, governing not just China but ‘all under heaven’. Foreign countries that wished to have relations with China were expected—and when possible—obliged to be integrated into this system and became tributary states, and the trading system was used to maintain this patriarchal relationship. [xviii] In such a way, China’s external order was perceived as part of its internal order. As a result, the traditional Chinese world order cannot be called ‘international’. [xix]

Does that mean the Chinese did not know about other civilized peoples in the world at all? As Yang noted, [xx] it is inaccurate to claim so. China knew ‘international’ before 1800. [xxi] first, the term wai-guo, literally meaning ‘foreign countries’, does not originate from the nineteenth century but had a long history and can be traced back to the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). In the Song dynasty (960–1279), the term ‘waiguo liechuan’, literally means ‘accounts of foreign countries’, and was one category in historical writing. Second, the concept of guo, literally meaning ‘countries or states’, also had a long history going back to the Zhou dynasty (c. 1046 BC–256 BC). According to Mencius, we can identify the three treasures of a state ruler as land, people, and government, which is in practice defining what the state was. Third, Sinocentricism does not mean that the concept of boundary or border did not exist. As Yang explained, Chinese historical writing records many cases of territorial dispute and settlement between China and its neighbors, though the boundary need not always be a line. ‘It might be a belt of land in which both sides refrained from occupancy and cultivation or a zone in which the people belonged to both countries or a buffer state.’ [xxii] It’s safe to assume that the idea of ‘international’ in the Western sense does not exist in China’s theory of Sinocentricism, ‘because the Son of Heaven was superior to all rulers and peoples and their status, therefore, might easily shift back and forth through various degrees of proximity to his central authority’. [xxiii]

As a result, there was no centralized institution similar to the modern Western institution of a foreign ministry before the second half of the nineteenth century. [xxiv] The emperor to local officials in Chin’s borderlands on an ad hoc basis, where foreign affairs occurred with the neighboring countries allowed the foreign affairs service. General Heilongjiang (or the Amur), for instance, was involved in matters such as business with Russia. They were also scattered in some departments in the central government office, following their respective administrative responsibilities. For example, the Board of Ceremonies (libu) is involved in the reception of tributary envoys. The Court of Colonial Affairs (lifan yan) involved the communication with Russia. The Board of War (bingbu) was involved in the security of tributary envoys. The Board of Revenue (hubu) handled the trade with tributary states in the designated areas in China. [xxv] It was not until 1861 after the defeat in the Second Opium War, that the Qing Empire established a government office, Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen (or Zongli Yamen)–meaning ‘office in charge of the affairs of the various nations’—that was in charge of foreign affairs. [xxvi] The establishment of the Zongli Yamen and foreign legations in Beijing signified the victory of expanding the Westphalian system in the East. By the mid-1870s, China started sending its diplomatic envoys abroad and trained its Western-style diplomats, and established its professional diplomatic education in the late Qing Dynasty. [xxvii]

A line of thinking that sees power as an irreducible element of the political sphere, similar to realist thinking, influenced the responses of the Qing Empire. As Hsu observed: 
Historically, the Chinese had always felt that external troubles were a manifestation of internal weakness. If China was strong, barbarian problems would be solved before they arose. Self-strengthening was therefore a more important and basic solution to the barbarian problem. [xxviii]

In the 1860s, China began its Self-Strengthening Movement, which started introducing Western technologies and ideas domestically on a large scale. It also put efforts into the training of foreign affairs talents. The Tongwen Guan (or the School of Combined Learning) was established in Beijing in 1862, [xxix] an official school that aimed to teach Western languages and knowledge. The Qing Court also regularly sent Chinese students and officials abroad. [xxx] However, the principle behind the Movement is the idea of ‘Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application’ (zhōngtǐ xīyòng). [xxxi] Feng Guifen initially proposed this idea in 1861, who argued for China’s self-strengthening and industrialization by using Western technology and military systems while retaining core Confucian principles. Therefore, all Western learning in this vein was merely a means of learning merits from the foreign to conquer the foreign and not passively absorb Western knowledge.

During that period, China’s mainstream diplomatic thought was based on the balance of power, alliance formation, and the activutilization of international law to protect China’s ‘national interests. [xxxii] For instance, the main diplomatic tactic of Li Hongzhang—one of the main foreign policy decision-makers in the late Qing Empire—is twofold. [xxxiii] The first one is the tactic of ‘yiyi zhiyi’—literarily meaning ‘using one foreigner to constrain another foreigner’. [xxxiv] The ways to maintain peace can be through manipulating the power balance among foreign powers in China, dividing them, and using the contradiction of their interests to secure China’s interests. For instance, Li persuaded Korea to sign trade contracts with Western countries to constrain Japan’s ambition, and persuaded Vietnam to sign a trade contract with Britain and Germany to counterbalance France. [xxxv] The second one is to abide by international law and international treaties, avoiding a unilateral breach of international law and international treaties so that foreign powers could not take opportunities to take advantage of China. [xxxvi] Li’s diplomatic tactic was the most representative of diplomatic thinking in China during that period. However, whether such diplomatic tactics could be successfully implemented depends on whether the external environment was beneficial to China and whether China can provide sufficient incentives for other countries to intervene. Both the situation and the intervention were beyond the control of China, and the result was often the loss of more rights and interests. For this reason, the conventional wisdom of Chinese diplomacy was also challenged and criticized. Yuan Shikai’s diplomatic thoughts represent the main alternative to Li. Yuan was a Chinese military and government official who rose to power during the late Qing Dynasty. He was a key advocate for modernization projects. He became the first official president of the Republic of China in 1912.

At first glance, Yuan’s diplomatic thought is like Li’s, though closer inspection reveals some fundamental differences. First, while Li’s compliance with international law and international treaties is to avoid causing troubles on China’s end, Yuan believes China can actively enter and abide by the treaties and use international law to maintain order and protect its interests. Second, Yuan did not believe in the importance of public international law, the balance of power, and the concept of alliances. Yuan stated in his memorial to the Qing Court that when the countries’ powers were similar, they could start speaking of international law; when countries could peacefully coexist, they could begin relying on the statute; and when countries could offer something, they could rely on their allies. [xxxvii] After the defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War, these conditions did not exist according to Yuan. Therefore, public international law, treaties, and alliances could not assure China’s security. In his view, China could no longer use the tactic of ‘yiyi zhiyi’. Instead, only large amounts of wealth and powerful armies could improve the predicament China was facing. However, Yuan also realized that China could not become a rich country with powerful armies in the short term. Therefore, especially after the Boxer Rebellion, Yuan also upheld a pragmatic view of public international law and treaties.

In short, other diplomatic practitioners echoed Yuan’s view of international law. Many of them observed that Western countries rarely abide by international law and do their best to benefit from it. They, therefore, concluded that when China was weak, to avoid incessant harm, they should use tactically international law to protect national interests. However, when China established itself as a powerful state, it would not need to conform to international law. [xxxviii]

The introduction of international law to China and its receptions

Modern international law developed as part of the emergence of the European states’ system from the seventeenth century onwards. When the Western system of international law—with its ideas of sovereignty and sovereign equality—was introduced to China after the 1840s, it represented a severe challenge to the Sinocentric world order. However, just like the idea of ‘international’ discussed in the previous section, there were also codes of conduct in the interstate relations that formed in ancient China. During the spring and autumn of and Warring States Periods, for instance, some diplomatic etiquettes and diplomatic rules were observed in the interaction among states. Despite that, China was indeed not aware of the existence of modern international law before Western missionaries introduced it to China in the late Qing Dynasty. They regarded it as a branch of xixue—a broad term meaning Western learning—that also included Western natural and social sciences.

In 1839, the American missionary Peter Parker, at the request of Lin Zexu (1785–1850), translated some chapters of Swiss legal scholar Emer de Vattel’s 1758 work The Laws of Nations into Chinese. [xxxix] As Hsu noted, [xl] ‘the translation was not literal but paraphrastic, and the translator’s comments were in a labored and unliterary style’. Parker’s translation undoubtedly influenced Li’s decision-making when dealing with the British government over opium. Lin later acted along the lines discussed in the text. He first declared opium contraband in 1839 and demanded the British government order the cessation of the opium trade. After these measures failed, he turned to the use of force. Lin believed his actions were morally and legally correct, even in Western international law. [xli]

With the dismissal of Lin in 1840 and the end of the Opium War in 1842, the Chinese interest in international law faded. It was not until twenty years later, when China was defeated during the Second Opium War and signed the Convention of Beijing in 1860, that the Chinese realized the necessity of having some knowledge of international law when dealing with the West. After that time, the number of international legal texts translated by Western missionaries increased. [xlii] Among others, American missionary A. T. William Martin’s translation of the book Law of Nations (1894) was the first complete translation of international law work in China. He was convinced that he was dedicating the best achievements of European civilization to China, and through his work, the Chinese government could be taken one step closer to Christianity. [xliii] Martin later also served as the President and Professor of International Law at Tongwen Guan in Beijing from 1868 to 1894, and the first chancellor at the Imperial University of Beijing from 1898 to 1900. During his time at Tongwen Guan, Martin, together with his students, translated and published several other works on international law. [xliv]

Entering the twentieth century, with an increasing number of law students from China who studied abroad from the late Qing Dynasty, as well as the Western powers’ promise of removing the system of extraterritorial legal power in China when the modern legal system of China became more sound, introducing international law to China was further speeded up. [xlv] By 1949, 1,045 translations and textbooks of international law were published in China, though this did not yet include various international conventions and bilateral treaties, United Nations conference documents, reports, proposals, agreements, etc. [xlvi] In addition, during this period, about 540 papers on international law were published in Chinese academia. [xlvii] Meanwhile, in higher education, studies of international law were significantly advanced and became a model subject that drove education in other disciplines concerning international relations. As early as 1867, William Martin taught a course titled ‘Public Law of the Nations’ at the Imperial University of Beijing. Later, international law was also a major subject in the courses offered by the Imperial School of Law (jīngshī fǎlǜ xuétáng), founded in 1906 during the New Policies of the late Qing Dynasty (1901–12). [xlviii]

With the efforts mostly made by traditional scholars and missionaries in the late Qing Dynasty, studies of international law became more and more popular in China. After they established the Republic in 1912, a group of scholars tried to make international law a professional discipline. They aimed to establish a Western-style academic discipline in Chinese higher education. Among others, the founding of the Association for International Law Studies (guójìfǎ yánjiū huì), started by Lu Zhengxiang (1871–1949) was one of the most important efforts. As early as 1898, some reform-minded literati founded the Public Law Society (gōngfǎ xuéhuì) in Hunan. However, they faced opposition from the conservative faction led by Empress Dowager Cixi. As the Reform Movement of 1898 failed, the Public Law Society came to an abrupt halt. [xlix] More than ten years later, Lu took another initiative, trying to open up another path to the scientization and professionalization of the studies of international law in China.

Lu graduated from Tongwen Guan in 1892 and immediately went to St Petersburg to work as an interpreter for the Chinese Embassy. Since then, he spent most of his time in Europe. After Yuan Shikai became the President of the Republic in 1912, Lu returned to China and took charge of the Republic’s diplomatic affairs. In mid-August 1912, because of the fierce political dispute between Yuan and Sun Yet-sen’s Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang, KMT), Lu resigned as prime minister and left the Beijing government. Afterward, Lu, with the help of Zhang Qing, the leader of the constitutional movement in the late Qing Dynasty, established the ‘Association of International Law Studies’ (guójìfǎ yánjiūhuì) that aimed to promote research on international law in China. [l]

In Article 2 of its draft constitution, they stated that the purpose of the association was to promote international peace and international law studies. [li] Article 3 proposed a more detailed research agenda for the association, which included studies of public and private international law, China and international treaties, international treaties, China’s disputes with foreign countries, and issues in international relations. As Feng argued, [lii] this research agenda broke down China’s foreign relations into the following four categories: (1) the code of conduct that China and other countries must abide by; (2) the international treaties signed by China (the unequal treaty system); (3) how to handle foreign affairs; and (4) the international situation facing China. The constitution stipulated two qualifications for membership: the first is those ‘relevant in diplomatic circles’, and the second is those ‘specialized in law and politics at universities in China and abroad’. All those who wished to join the association had to be introduced by two members of the association and approved by the association. From this stipulation, one can discern that Lu aims to establish the association as a specialized group with academic goals. [liii]

It should, however, be noted that for Lu, academic research was both an end and a means. [liv] The establishment of the association coincided with the founding of the Republic. While the new Republic was just being established, Lu tried to further advance the process of Westernisation, as well as the adoption of the Westphalian system in the newly formed Republican government. To Lu, international law extends the Westphalian system. The purpose of setting up such an academic association in China was to place China in a Western-dominated international political landscape and study China’s foreign relations from the perspective of the Westphalian system. The association was an attempt by Lu to transplant the Westphalian discourse system to China via academic research. The purpose of researching international relations in China is therefore instrumental. As Feng argues, [lv] Lu also gave the association a deeper meaning: the pursuit of civilization. Lu urged China to follow European and American civilization norms. Only by accelerating the process of its citizens could China get equal relations with foreign countries and change the constraints of the inequality inherited from the late Qing Dynasty. The association should therefore be placed in China’s modernization and its pursuit of equal relations with the West.

The association had a brief life. It was incorporated into the ‘Chinese Society of Society and Politics’ in 1916. [lvi] Lu was the chairperson of both associations. Yet, with the joint efforts of the academic community, modern international jurisprudence emerged and grow from then on. By the end of the 1930s, they fully established the discipline in China. Most research areas and topics in the discipline were extensively studied, with a considerable number of published. [lvii] In short, it was a long period from the time when the Qing government came across Western international law for the first time to the time when China finally accepted the Westphalian system. The birth and growth of China’s modern international jurisprudence followed a path of transplanting Western international jurisprudence that then became increasingly localized and academic. China’s modern international jurisprudence was grounded in a problem-solving approach to various issues China was facing in the course of its modernization.

Studies of diplomatic history in China

They formed the idea of national history in the first ten years of the twentieth century, along with China’s process of integration into the nation-state system. [lviii] The concept of ‘Chinese history’ as national history did not exist in premodern China. There was only the history of dynasties rather than the history of the nation. [lix] Many historical materials were compiled during that time and published in the 1930s.

Among others, Jiang Tingfu is one of the most important scholars in modern Chinese diplomatic history. Jiang was born in China in 1895. They sent him to study in the United States in 1911 at 16, where he attended the Park Academy, Oberlin College, and Columbia University. He received a doctorate in philosophy at Columbia University in 1923. Subsequently, Jiang returned to China and went to Nankai University, teaching Western history, and the modern history of Chinese diplomacy, and served as chair of the Department of History for six years. In 1929, Jiang moved to Tsinghua University. Meanwhile, at the invitation of Hu Shi, he lectured on the ʻHistory of China’s International Relations at Peking University. In the autumn of 1934, Jiang was supposed to take a year of sabbatical and planned to go abroad to collect diplomatic materials about China from the archives of various countries in Europe. Chiang Kai-shek invited him to research Soviet issues for the government and explore the possibility of improving Sino-Soviet relations. He, therefore, went to the Soviet Union, and later to Germany, Britain, and other countries in Europe. As a result, he left Tsinghua University and began his political and diplomatic career. He first went to Nanjing in 1935 to serve as the Chief of Administration of the Executive Yuan. Afterward, he was appointed the Ambassador to the Soviet Union on the eve of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. [lx]

Jiang’s research on the history of modern foreign relations in China during his six years at Nankai University made him an expert in this field. Between 1929 and 1931, Jiang copied the diplomatic archives of the Grand Council (or junjichu) of the Qing Dynasty, and published two volumes of historical materials, ‘Collection of Materials on Modern Chinese Diplomatic History’ (jìndài zhōngguó wàijiāoshǐ zīliào jíyào, or CMMCDH) in 1931 and 1934, respectively. In these two volumes, Jiang set the agenda for studies of the modern diplomatic history of China. In the ‘introduction’ to each chapter of these historical archives, Jiang briefly commented on the theme of each chapter, which reflects his view of modern Chinese diplomatic history. Through studying these documents, Jiang aimed to explore Chinese diplomacy in the late Qing Empire and the reasons it prevented China from adapting to the modern Westphalian system. To Jiang, the publication of this material rectified the then studies of Chinese diplomatic history that were largely dominated by the Western perspective. [lxi]

It was noted in the 1920s and the 1930s that must-read works for studying China’s diplomatic history and history of China’s international politics were three volumes of The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, written by Hosea Ballou Morse (1910–18). Although Morse’s works were mainly based on British archives as the only available information, they provided most scholars—including both Western and Chinese scholars—with a research framework for studies of the diplomatic history of China. And looking at China from a Western perspective, the most important issues were all related to the issues of trade and the spread of Christianity. Jiang instead craved the establishment of archives on the Chinese side. Jiang’s two volumes of CMMCDH are the first diplomatic history material compiled from a Chinese perspective, which had an enormous impact on Fairbank’s research. Fairbank came to China in 1932 and visited Jiang at Tsinghua University. Jiang prepared a set of historical materials from the Chinese perspective for Fairbank. As Fairbank recalled, after twenty years, he was still studying these documents and teaching his students how to use them. [lxii]

On the one hand, empirical research and positivism influenced Jiang’s approach to history. In the preface to the first volume of CMMCDH, Jiang stated that his motivation for editing that book was not to explain how foreign countries ‘bully’ China and how unequal treaties we should abolish. Rather, his motivation was to study China’s diplomatic history and academicize Chinese diplomacy. [lxiii] In his article ‘Diplomatic History and Historical Materials’, [lxiv] Jiang further noted that: The world we are in now does not allow us not to do diplomacy. But we remember that studying the history of diplomacy is not doing diplomacy and is not doing propaganda. It is studying and learning. The two must not be mixed.

Many scholars in China published many empirical works on the history of Chinese diplomacy, and the mushrooming of empirical research was mainly because of the publication of those historical materials compiled by Jiang. This trend continued even after Jiang left academia and devoted himself to politics.

Jiang pointed out the cultural background of studies of diplomacy. He believed that natural science may be universal, but because of regional and cultural differences, Western social sciences are not suitable for explaining China’s problems. In the ‘Introduction’ of the second volume of CMMCDH, he asked what the relationship is between diplomacy and culture. As he noted: There is an era of diplomacy in every age. Studies of diplomacy need to reflect the times and spaces. Each country has a country diplomacy, not only because of the unique status of each country but also because each country has its own specific culture. [lxv]

We should note that in the 1930s, a considerable number of Chinese scholars who studied abroad returned to China and taught at universities. According to Jiang, those scholars simply duplicated courses from European and American universities, introducing and copying Western theories they learned while studying abroad, and did not make substantial contributions to China’s political, economic, social, and historical problems. This made social science in China an extension of Western academic circles, lacking its subjectivity. [lxvi] Jiang was very dissatisfied with this and called on his colleagues to study China’s politics, economy, society, and history so that China’s social science could establish a systematic theoretical explanation for China and provide China’s problems—the necessity and importance of China’s modernization. To Jiang, modern China has only one issue: whether and how can China be modernized. [lxvii]

From this perspective, the rise of Chinese nationalism influenced Jiang’s view on the studies of Chinese diplomatic history. Take Jiang himself as an example. When the Versailles Peace Treaty handed over German privileges in Shandong to Japan in 1919, Jiang traveled around the United States and gave speeches on various occasions to protest against the decision. [lxviii] In 1928, he translated his Ph.D. supervisor Carlton J. H. Hayes’ work ‘Essays on Nationalism’ with a group of his students. In the preface, Jiang said: Hayes’ attitude towards nationalism is reserved, critical, and even opposing my attitude is roughly the same as Hayes but slightly different. Although I know the shortcomings of nationalism, I think Chinese people’s political psychology can only be cured by nationalism… [If] China is not baptized by nationalism rapidly… China itself will become the second place in the Balkans, and it will become the object of militarism and imperialism. [lxix] 

Jiang contributed to China’s diplomatic historiography and social science significantly in his limited academic career. When Western knowledge was widely introduced to and institutionalized in China, he raised the Sinicisation of diplomatic historiography and social science in China. He believed China should not uncritically imitate Western knowledge and must pursue Chinese knowledge that can provide explanations for Chinese problems (that is, modernization). Interestingly, this position is mirrored by a group of contemporary IR scholars in the PRC who advocate for the establishment of the Chinese Schools, which will be discussed in the following section. Jiang himself did not return to academia. After the Second Sino-Japanese War, he was the ROC’s Representative to the United Nations and the Ambassador to the United States. He died in New York in 1965. However, the empirical tradition of diplomatic history research Jiang created and scholars in Taiwan inherited his view on the Sinicisation of social science. The historian Guo Tingyi of the Institute of Modern History in Academia Sinica used the archives transferred to the institute for research—including those from ‘The Zongli Yamen Archive’ and ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives’—to conduct a series of research projects on China’s diplomatic history. [lxx] More recently, several important works are being produced by historians in Taiwan, including Li Enhan, who studies ‘revolutionary diplomacy’, Zhang Qixiong, who investigates the ‘principle of the Chinese world order’, Zhang Li, who explores Chinese diplomacy in the League of Nations, etc., and Tang Qihua, who researches the Beijing government during the early years of the Republic.

In addition, a group of social scientists from the Academia Sinica in the 1980s also reflected on the question of what the Sinicisation of social science meant for Taiwan. They held an interdisciplinary conference on the Sinicisation of social and behavioral science research in 1980 and subsequently published a collection of essays in 1982. [lxxi] This conference is marked as the beginning of Taiwan’s social science indigenization movement. The purpose of the conference, according to the organizers’ Yang Kuo-shu and Wen Chung-i, is to study the important and unique issues of Chinese society based on China’s history, culture, and social characteristics, to make a breakthrough in the problems, theories, and methods of social science research in Taiwan, as well as to escape its periphery status to American social science. [lxxii] However, after Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s, the term ‘Sinicisation’ has been gradually replaced by the term ‘indigenization’ or ‘Taiwanization’. It even ironically turned to the trend of ‘anti-Sinicisation’ or ‘de-Sinicisation’, [lxxiii] given that Taiwan’s subjectivity after the oppositional relationship between Taiwan and China has highlighted democratization. The connotation of academic indigenization has converted from getting rid of the over-dependence on the West to breaking free of ‘China’. We can observe this transformation in the works of Hsiun-Huang Michael Hsiao, a prominent sociologist who has spared no effort in promoting the academic indigenization of social science research in Taiwan. In Hsiao’s contribution to Yang and Wen’s 1982 edited volume, he mentioned that Taiwan’s social science research is too Westernised and therefore needs to be ‘Sinicised’. [lxxiv] However, when he compiled an article in 2013 on the development of indigenization of sociology in Taiwan,[lxxv] the term ‘Sinicisation’ completely disappeared, and was superseded by the term ‘ indigenization with liberalization’. And interestingly, Hsiao uses the term ‘liberalization’ in the sense of liberalization of the Sinocentric ideology of the KMT regime. Both indigenization movements (that is, Sinicisation and Taiwanisation) are pursuing the academic subjectivity of Taiwan’s social science research, but the ‘subjectivities’ pursued by both movements are mutually exclusive.

Compared to Taiwan, the study of Chinese diplomatic history in the PRC was not so much a legacy of Jiang but more based on the CPC’s narrative of anti-imperialism and socialist inevitability. [lxxvi] In a nutshell, it was strongly ‘ideology oriented’. [lxxvii] For example, in the study of Sino-Soviet relations, Peng Ming’s History of Sino-Soviet Friendship, published in 1957, [lxxviii] described the relationship between the two countries under the name of ‘friendship’. However, after the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the narrative changed. The book History of Russia’s Invasion of China, edited by the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, positioned the Soviet Union as an aggressor. [lxxix] Since the late 1980s, with the deepening of China’s relations with the outside world, as well as the academic exchanges between China and foreign countries, research on the history of China’s foreign relations has flourished. In particular, the funding provided by the Ford and Asia Foundation plays an influential role in facilitating the scholarly exchange between China and the United States.

In short, the research agenda of the studies of the diplomatic history of modern China in the Republic was very much influenced by Jiang, who regarded history as the pool of resources for China’s endeavor for modernization to survive in international relations. The research orientations of the historical studies in the PRC were strongly consistent with CPC’s ideology. Overall, the pragmatic needs of China again motivated the field of modern diplomatic history in modernization, albeit with different imaginations of ‘modernity’.

Studies of political science in China and the establishment of the Academic Institute of International Relations in Taiwan and the PRC

The concept of Political Science was introduced to China in the late nineteenth century when a group of reform-minded literati such as Zheng Guanying and Kang Youwei tried to transplant a body of Western governmental knowledge so that the Qing Court could replicate the Western political institutions to solve China’s problems. [lxxx] In the late nineteenth century, a series of reform efforts took place to modernize the imperial institutions. One reform included the abolishment of the traditional civil service examination and replacing it with a Western-style higher educational system. This change led to the establishment of Imperial Peking University in 1898. The university offered courses on Western governmental knowledge, which marked the origins of Political Science in China. [lxxxi] Political Science as a discipline was thus a by-product of this pragmatic response to China’s needs during modernization. The discipline was further institutionalized and gained robust momentum to grow during the Republican regime. By 1936, 31 universities/colleges out of 108 institutions of higher education in China had a Political Science department. [lxxxii]

The discipline of Political Science had a much narrower range and did not include studies of International Relations, since the discipline analyzed ‘the natural and man-made things within the sovereign boundaries of the state, compare various cases, and plan the generalizations of governmental phenomena’ scientifically. [lxxxiii] According to Feng Ziyou, one of the major advocates of the discipline of Political Science was a field of study of ‘the nature and functions of the state’; it was ‘an amalgamation of different sciences, including geography, ethnology, economics’. [lxxxiv] The studies in the discipline did not increase in the early years of the Republican period. In 1935, when Tao Xisheng—a political scientist and a member of the KMT—wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, he said:  The Political Science Department at Peking University is now studying three themes: (1) The organization and administrative procedure in each ministry of the central government after the Qing Dynasty was established… (2) The organization, status, and jurisdiction of the provincial government… (3) The study of the magistrate government after the Qing Dynasty. [lxxxv]

They ground the professionalization and institutionalization of International Studies in social sciences and its merging into Political Science in a problem-solving approach to the issues China and the KMT regime were facing at various times. In the 1930s, several intelligence units advised diplomacy on the government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. However, they were mostly a mix of domestic and international intelligence. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, intelligence gathering about Japan became highly urgent. Therefore, in early 1938, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the establishment of the ‘Institute of International Studies’ (guójì wèntí yánjiūsuǒ), mainly conducting intelligence work against Japan. [lxxxvi] The institute was directly under the Military Commission and chaired by a Japanese expert, Wang Jisheng. It was mainly engaged in Japan’s domestic affairs and military and intelligence and counter-intelligence work, foreign affairs, and international economy. During the eight years of the war, the institute extensively collected information on enemies and allies, analyzed the international situation, made assessments, and provided information on major events such as the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The institute was, however, a temporary institute responding to the country’s crisis. They established it because of the war with Japan, and Japan’s surrender also meant that the institute was no longer needed. They officially disbanded it in 1946. [lxxxvii]

After the Second World War, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA defeated the KMT government) and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. In 1953, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the establishment of the ‘Policy Research Office’ (Zhèngcè yánjiūshì) under the Presidential Office’s Information Team. [lxxxviii] The office intended to re-establish and reorganize the intelligence work related to the situation in mainland China and international relations. It was under the directorship of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek. Its primary task was to collect and analyze intelligence information, making policy recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek. The office did not disclose its activities to the public; it only published periodicals titled Issues and Studies (Wèntí yŭ yánjiū) and Communist Banditry Monthly (Fěiqíng yuèkān), which were circulated internally. [lxxxix] To hide its intelligence service’s role, at the beginning of its establishment, the office used the name ‘International Relations Research Society’ (Guójì guānxì yánjiū huì) to the public. By 1958, the Office was registered with the Ministry of the Interior as a people’s organization to invite experts and scholars to take part in the seminar organized by the office. After 1961, the office was expanded and became an academic institution under the name ‘The Institute of International Relations (IIR), registered under the Ministry of Education.

According to the website of the IIR, [xc] the original task of this institute was: (1) to provide information for enacting the political and security strategy; (2) to provide timely research reports and recommendations on major events that occurred at the time in the international relations and mainland China; and (3) to enhance the understanding and support of the international community on the ROC through research. As Liu noted, [xci] Chiang Kai-shek initially hoped that this institute would not only provide a professional analysis of his enemy (that is, CPC), but also require research quality, academic exchange with foreign scholars, and publishing of influential international journals to enhance Taiwan’s international publicity.

Although one of its goals was to improve international publicity and information exchange with the international community, when the Policy Research Office was established in 1953, the office devoted most of its time and energy to the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the CPC, as well as the long-range strategic plan for reuniting with mainland China. Therefore, it was a consulting unit of internal security and foreign policy. However, as Chiang’s government was incorporated into the Western camp led by the United States, and as Beijing’s diplomatic offensive increased in strength, Chiang increasingly paid attention to the functions of international communication and publicity of the office. Chiang and his son in the 1960s repeatedly urged the office (and the subsequent IIR) to liaise with international academic institutions and experts and scholars to convince the world that the ROC represented the only legitimate government of China. In the end, this desire unintentionally led to the academisation of International Studies.

In the process of academisation, the publication of an influential international journal was the most important. In 1961, the Chinese version of Issues and Studies and Communist Banditry Monthly, at the request of Chiang Ching-kuo, came available to the public. Since the 1960s, the English version of both journals was published. [xcii] besides the publication of the academic journal, the then director of the IIR, Wu Juncai also believed that Taiwan should hold international conferences on mainland China issues, inviting well-known scholars from the West (especially the United States) to merge the existing relationship with American academia and policymakers. [xciii] The Sino-US ‘China Mainland Symposium’, which is still held today, was held in Taipei for the first time in 1970. About sixty Chinese and foreign scholars, including many influential American scholars, attended the conference.

The Cold War structure made the KMT government’s diplomatic efforts possible. The antagonism of the Cold War ideology caused the PRC to be excluded and isolated from the Western camp of the international community. Beijing also severely restricted the exchanges between the Chinese mainland and the Western world, with the consequence that Western governments, scholars, and experts lacked a more direct and comprehensive understanding of the situation in mainland China. Contrarily, Taiwan still maintained its intelligence network in mainland China and therefore could provide more insightful analysis and prospect assessments of mainland China. By providing reliable, confidential, and authoritative intelligence analysis on the CPC to specific Western experts and scholars, Taiwan could dominate the information and its interpretation. Through controlling the content of Chinese intelligence and knowledge, as Chen argued, [xciv] Taiwan believed it could control the perception of China in the international community, ensuring the ROC as the international community recognizes a sovereign state. The well-designed academic exchanges could improve the legitimacy of the KMT regime.

With these strategic and diplomatic needs, the IIR embarked on a journey of institutional transformation and functional expansion after the mid-1960s. Beginning in the late 1960s, Chinese experts and scholars in Western countries visited the Institute regularly. [xcv] They inspected the CPC archives at the institute and exchanged ideas with the staff from the institute. This academic exchange and cooperation were mutually beneficial: while Western scholars could get CPC intelligence and knowledge that was not available to the outside world, Taiwanese scholars learned how to use new social science research methods and apply them to the Chinese context. The institute cooperated with many renowned academic institutions in the world, including the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, Harvard Yenching Library, Kyoto University of Japan, etc. [xcvi] The IIR undoubtedly became one of the most important centers for China Studies.

From the mid-1970s, the institute lost its significance rapidly. First, Western countries changed their views on China, especially after H. Kissinger’s and R. Nixon’s visit to mainland China in the early 1970s. [xcvii] Second, because PRC was gradually opening up, the information once exclusive to Taiwan became available internationally. Beijing gradually allowed Western scholars to enter mainland China for fieldwork after the mid-1970s. After Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s, the institute needed to be further reformed. They completely merged it into the management of National Chengchi University in 1996.

The academisation of International Studies has developed differently in PRC, albeit also largely facilitated by pragmatic needs. [xcviii] In the early years of the PRC, large-scale adjustments were made to its higher education. This led to the official abolishment of Political Science in 1952, as they regarded the subject as the pseudo-ideology of the bourgeois. [xcix] Individual courses from the field of Political Science that were believed to be of value were merged into the Department of Law and History. [c] Compared with other branches of Political Science, International Studies was valued from the beginning after the founding of the PRC. [ci] The PRC established the Institute of International Relations (guójì guānxì xuéyuàn) in 1949 to train its cadres in foreign languages and foreign affairs. [cii] At the beginning of the establishment of the Renmin University of China (RUC) in 1950, the Department of Diplomacy was also established, offering nearly thirty courses in International Relations, international law, Chinese diplomatic history, PRC’s foreign policy, etc. [ciii] The department expanded in 1955 and became an independent university, named ‘The China Foreign Affairs University’ (wàijiāo xuéyuàn, CFAU).

The CFAU is the most important academic institution for the teaching and research of International Studies in the early period of the PRC. It has been under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) since its establishment. On 2 June 1953, the MOFA drafted ‘Several Recommendations on the Training of Diplomatic Cadres in the Future’, under the instructions of Premier Zhou Enlai, and proposed to establish an independent college for training diplomatic cadres for the first time. In 1955, CFAU was formally established. They transferred most of the staff members and students from the Department of Diplomacy of the RUC to the CFAU. According to some biographies and memoirs by Chinese diplomats and officials, [civ] the establishment of the CFAU was carried out under the instruction and specific leadership of several officials of the CPC, including Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Zhang Wentian, etc. Among them, Zhang Wentian is the most important.

Zhang joined the CPC in 1925, and afterward, he went to the Soviet Union to study. He returned to China in 1930. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Zhang served as Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Academy of Marxism–Leninism in Yan’an. After the founding of the PRC, Zhang was mainly engaged in diplomatic work and was the Ambassador of the PRC to the Soviet Union. In 1955, he became the Deputy Minister of MOFA, wherein he prepared for establishing the CFAU. [cv] Zhang’s overall vision of the CFAU was manifested in his remarks at the ministerial meeting of the MOFA on 3 February 1956, wherein he suggested that the plan for training diplomatic cadres should include: (1) training a group of talents to become experts who are proficient in international issues; and (2) training another batch to be capable diplomatic and administrative staff. To him, diplomatic work needs the support of an entire discipline of International Studies and other related fields. [cvi] Therefore, Zhang paid great attention to the discipline construction within the framework of the CFAU.

Along with the CFAU, Zhang also suggested the establishment of a research institute for International Studies. Zhang had first considered setting up the institute under the CFAU. [cvii] Later, it was envisaged that ‘the institute should be on the campus of CFAU to facilitate cooperation in the training of diplomatic cadres and scientific research. [cviii] In 1956, the Institute of International Relations of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (zhōngguó kēxuéyuàn guójì guānxì yánjiū suǒ) was officially established. In 1958, they decoupled it from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and renamed ‘The Institute of International Relations (guójì guānxì yánjiū suǒ). [cix] The institute aims to conduct mid-and long-term strategic research on foreign affairs and provide real-time analyses, opinions, and suggestions for the MOFA. [cx] In May 1959, the institute published the monthly journal ‘International Studies’ (Guójì wèntí yánjiū) under the suggestion of Zhang, which is China’s first academic journal.

The ten-year Cultural Revolution caused serious harm to China’s International Studies research. At the start of the Cultural Revolution, they forced the normal teaching of the CFAU to suspend. Zhang himself was persecuted, under house arrest, and died during the Cultural Revolution. In the spring of 1979, Deng Xiaoping was faced with a China that was stagnating in related academic fields. Therefore, he noted that the research work in International Studies and Political Science needed to make up the time lag as soon as possible. Since then, International Studies have mushroomed in China to the point ‘where only the United States matches China in terms of the size of IR research and education’. [cxi] Besides the reinstatement of the CFAU, and the Department of International Politics at Peking University, Renmin University, and Fudan University, which were built in the early 1960s, many other national and local universities have also set up related courses. Also, all major IR works in the West have been translated into the Chinese language, which has made China’s IR research absorb a lot of Westerns political philosophy, IR theories, and research methodology. [cxii]

This is also a period where the Chinese IR academic community has reached a basic consensus on the establishment of the Chinese School of IR Theory. In August 1987, at the First National Congress of International Relations Theory held in Shanghai, the establishment of China’s theoretical system of International Relations became the core issue of the meeting. From this point, the call for IR theories with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese perspective, and the Chinese School have appeared one after another. For these advocates, the Chinese IR community needs not only to develop a set of epistemological systems in understanding international relations from the Chinese perspective but also involve what kind of world order China wants. [cxiii] For them, the core of constructing the Chinese School is to examine IR theories through Chinese experiences and incorporate more Chinese perspectives and traditional thinking—including the Confucian worldview, the practice of the tributary system, modern revolutionary thought and practice, reform and opening up, etc. [cxiv] As Pan Wei noted, [cxv] ‘the Chinese School is not a school of the Chinese people and is not limited to the contributions of Chinese scholars, but it must require a deep understanding of Chinese particularities’.

To sum up, the history of the early development of the IIR and CFAU clearly shows that International Studies were the product of the pragmatic needs of state leaders in Taipei and Beijing. While Chinese IR scholars have nowadays moved from simply introducing Western theories to China to innovating theories from the Chinese perspective, Taiwan’s IR still follows the trends of the West closely because they need to use a specific set of IR knowledge as an international communication channel to gain the support from the West.

Conclusion

In 1981, Robert Cox in his seminal article ‘Social Forces, States, and World Order’ famously noted that ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, which leads him to distinguish between ‘problem-solving theory’ and ‘critical theory’. [cxvi] To Cox, problem-solving theory is ‘status quo orientated’. Critical Theory focuses on the possibilities of social change. Cox believes that the mainstream IR theories are to solve various problems facing the West. They are to maintain the world power system dominated by the West and make it run smoothly and effectively. While criticizing mainstream IR theories, Cox hopes to establish a theory that aims at liberating humanity and solving the problems of the capitalist system. As this article has shown, studies of International Relations were largely grounded in a problem-solving approach to various issues China and its regimes faced at various times. They inherited this approach from the Confucian ideal of statecraft pragmatism, in particular during the Imperial Qing and the early Republic. With this attitude and through academic activities and knowledge production, they actively promoted modernization, enlightened the people, and uphold China as a nation and/or state. They all wanted to extend their discursive power from the academic community to the governments. Entering the Cold War, they still perceived IR knowledge as instrumental. The government elites in Taiwan used IR research as an international communication channel to maintain the survival of the ROC and the international legitimacy of the KMT regime. In the PRC, they mainly established the discipline of IR for training foreign affairs experts to provide real-time analyses, opinions, and suggestions for the government’s decision-making reference. Chinese IR has always been for the Chinese nation, state, and its regimes. Is Chinese IR scholarship ‘status quo orientated’ in a Coxian sense, [cxvii] aiming to legitimize prevailing social and political structures?

Certainly not. When Cox stated that ‘[t]here is no such thing as a theory divorced from a standpoint in time and space’, [cxviii] he rightly pointed out that the problematic—a historically conditioned awareness of problems and issues–generates theory is temporal and spatial. The recognition and cognition of the ‘problem’ are necessarily adopted and adapted to a specific social, cultural, geographical, and temporal perspective. Arguably, the problematic (that is, the capitalism system) behind his critical theory and the ‘social change’ he would like to bring about is also in specific time and space. As Yaqing Qin noted,[cxix] distinct problems come from different perspectives, and different perspectives come from specific representation systems of time and space. From this point of view, modern China must have its particularistic worldviews and historical experiences, which affect the awareness of their ‘problems’. Therefore, as far as the development of the IR discipline is concerned, the problematic they generate must differ from the Western experience. Whether in the PRC or Taiwan, they must aim to meet the challenges they face at different times in modernization, focusing on their interests and needs for their relations with the outside world. Indeed, problem-solving is a key determinant of international studies research in different regimes of modern China, and yet it does not mean that they legitimize prevailing social and political structures. Rather, they provided ‘similar but different’ imaginations of (the path to) modernity. The process of problematic formation is also the process of subject construction. Hence, even though the general development of international studies in China is very much one of the Chinese/Taiwanese scholars absorbing Western theories, this does not mean that there is no indigenous site of agency.

The possibility of the antithesis of mainstream IR theorizing is crystal clear with the PRC. While the Chinese School of IR has, to a large extent, replicated Western IR, albeit, for specifically Chinese reasons, there have been creative adaptations of Western IR where a Chinese agential input can be discerned. As I discussed elsewhere, while Chinese School scholars also use, or ‘mimic’ the same ‘vocabulary’ and the same ‘categories’ (that is, realism, liberalism, and constructivism) as the mainstream IR theorists use, their respective drawing on and mimicking different theoretical perspectives of the mainstream IR also disturb and undermine the mainstream IR scholarship by alternating the original connotations of the concepts, ideas, and tenets mainstream IR scholars are using, such as ‘power’, ‘relationality’, ‘globalism’. Thus, those various attempts to establish the Chinese School of IR can be interpreted as a continuation of a constant process of restructuring knowledge in IR, characterized by the use of Chinese history, culture, and philosophy in developing theories that fit China’s traditional worldview and political system. Whether in support or opposition, mainstream (Western) scholarship has been forced to respond to various ideas, concepts, and approaches to world politics and the study of it proposed by Chinese School scholars.

The mimicking of Western knowledge is observable in IR scholarship in Taiwan. To gain support from the West, ‘they’ need to speak Western ‘languages’, while retaining core problematics/problems Taiwan is facing at various times. In some ways, we may interpret this trend as an implementation of ‘Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application’, the principle behind the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s, as discussed earlier. ‘Taiwanese problem as substance, Western knowledge for application.’ As shown earlier, Taiwan’s social science indigenization movement is looking for—and integrating—Taiwan’s subjectivity in different historical periods, combining the social science research they construct with the actual reality that Taiwan faces, knows, and experiences. Just as scholars of the Chinese Schools in the PRC believe that Western IR theories cannot explain the spatially different ‘Chinese’ international relations, so do scholars in Taiwan. Taiwan’s IR scholars may believe that the ‘Sinicised’ theory of IR cannot fully explain the peculiarities of Taiwan after its long-term separation from China and rapid changes in Taiwan’s politics and international relations. Western IR in this vein has turned into a potential comrade-in-arms in Taiwan’s pursuit of its subjectivity of international studies research, defined in terms of the de-Sinicisation or anti-Sinicisation.

As Helen Louise Turton and Lucas G. Freire noted, [cxx] non-Western peripheral scholars can still make novel and innovative contributions to the literature of IR through hybridization, mimicry, and the modification of the initial notions (or the denationalization of ideas). Thus, the arguments of peripheral scholarship are ‘similar but different’ from the mainstream IR scholarship. It is those tactics of hybridity, mimicry, and the modification of ideas that could elicit dialogue, conversation, and exchange of ideas with IR scholars from the core. Chinese IR is a clear case that can be read as an example of hybridity and mimicry, ‘a feature that, once noticed, helps us identify diversity on the periphery and the agency in marginal theory-making and theory-testing. [cxxi] International Studies research in China also verified that the European experience is also a local experience. To conclude, by tracing the historical development of international studies in China, the article wishes to rediscover the agency at the Chinese site for adaptation, feedback, and reconstruction of Western influence.

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[i] See Smith, Steve, ‘The United States and the discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic country, hegemonic discipline’, International Studies Review, 4:2 (2002), pp. 67–85; Wæver, Ole, ‘The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in International Relations, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 687–727.

[ii] See Hobson, John M., The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Seth, Sanjay, ‘Postcolonial theory and the critique of International Relations’, Millennium, 40 (2011), pp. 167–83.

[iii] See Tickner, Arlene B. and Blaney, David L. (eds), Thinking International Relations Differently (London: Routledge, 2012); Nayak, Meghana and Selbin, Eric, Decentering International Relations (London: Zen Books, 2010); Ling, L. H. M., Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

[iv] Shih, Chih-yu and Hwang, Yih-jye, ‘Re-worlding the “West” in post-Western IR: The “theory migrant” of Sun Zi’s the Art of War in the Anglosphere’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 18:3 (2018), pp. 421–48.

[v] Among others, Yan Xuetong’s moral realism, Zhao Tingyang’s conception of the Tianxia system, and Qin Yaqing’s relational theory of world politics are the most representative and influential.

[vi] Some even argue that Confucian legacy is considerably better preserved in Taiwan in comparison to China’s. See Hwang, Chun-chieh, Confucianism and Modern Taiwan (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 2001).

[vii] Shih Chih-yu is the most prominent scholars who constantly challenge the mainstream IR. He has proposed the ‘balance of relations’ theory to impugn the long-standing classic idea of ‘balance of power’ in Western IRT. See Shih, Chih-yu et al. China and International Theory: The Balance of Relationships (London: Routledge, 2019).

[viii] Shih, Chih-yu, ‘China rise syndromes? Drafting national schools of International Relations in Asia’, Intercultural Communication Studies, XXII:1 (2013), pp. 9–25.

[ix] Thakur, Vineet and Vale, Peter, ‘The empty neighbourhood: Race and disciplinary silence’, in Edkins, Jenny (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Critical International Relations (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 34–48; Vitalis, Robert, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception.

[x] Thakur and Vale, ‘The empty neighbourhood’; Long, David and Schmidt, Brian C. (eds), Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (New York: SUNY, 2005).

[xi] In the Confucian Classics, no Confucian could be a truly superior man, or jūnzǐ, without carrying out the complementarity of both ‘self-cultivation’ (xiūshēn) and ‘the ordering of the world’ (zhìguó píngtiānxià). The superior man can achieve completeness only if he cultivates himself to serve the public. However, in real practice, different camps of Confucians emphasized the primacy of one side over the other. During the Song dynasty, some utilitarian Confucians advocated political reforms and insisted that their reforms embodied the realization of ‘the ordering of the world’. Their opponents often criticized them as ignoring ‘self-cultivation’. At the beginning of the Qing Dynasty (1636–1912), a group of intellectuals represented by Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi and others, after experiencing the collapse of the Ming Dynasty (1638–1644), wanted to focus on practical uses of knowledge to improve ‘the ordering of society’, ‘protecting the country and enriching the people’. Schwartz, Benjamin I., ‘Some polarities in Confucian thought’, in Wright, Arthur F. (ed.), Confucianism and Chinese Civilization (New York: Atheneum, 1964) Google Scholar; Tillman, Hoyt C., Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

[xii] Elman, Benjamin A., Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Chang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Hao, Chang, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911 (California: University of California Press, 1987).

[xiii] Zhang, Yongjin, ‘China’s entry into international society: Beyond the standard of “civilization”’, Review of International Studies, 17:1 (1991), pp. 3–16; Gong, Gerrit W., ‘China’s entry into international society’, in Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

[xiv] Walker, Richard Louis, The Multi-State System of Ancient China (Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press, 1954).

[xv] Yang, Lien-shen, ‘Historical notes on the Chinese world order’, in Fairbank, John King (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 20.

[xvi] Zhao, Dingxin, ‘The mandate of Heaven and performance legitimation in historical and contemporary China’, American Behavioural Scientist, 53:3 (2009), pp. 416–33.

[xvii] de Bary, Wm. Theodore, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[xviii] Fairbank, John King, ‘Introduction’, in Fairbank, John King (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 4.

[xix] Fairbank, ‘Introduction’.

[xx] Yang, ‘Historical notes’, pp. 20–2.

[xxi] Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio and Lai, David, ‘War and politics in Ancient China, 2700 B.C. to 722 B.C.: Measurement and comparative analysis’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:3 (1995), pp. 467–94.

[xxii] Yang, ‘Historical notes’, p. 22.

[xxiii] Fairbank, ‘Introduction’, p. 13.

[xxiv] Liao, Minshu, A New Aspect of China’s Foreign Relations in the Qing Dynasty (Taipei: National Chengchi University Press, 2013.

[xxv] For an analysis of the division of labour and operating mechanisms of central and local diplomacy in the Qing Dynasty, see ibid.

[xxvi] Rudolph, James, Negotiating Power in Late Imperial China: The Zongli Yamen and the Politics of Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2008).

[xxvii] Li, The Emergence of the Modern Chinese Diplomats.

[xxviii] Hsu, Immanuel C. Y., China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 144.

[xxix] Mouat, Melissa, ‘The establishment of the Tongwen Guan and the fragile Sino-British peace of the 1860s’, Journal of World History, 26:4 (2016), pp. 733–55.

[xxx] Day, Jenny Huangfu, Qing Travellers to the Far West: Diplomacy and the Information Order in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[xxxi] The concept was widespread among intellectuals in China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. See Rošker, Jana S., ‘Modernization of Confucian ontology in Taiwan and mainland China’, Asian Philosophy, 29:2 (2019), pp. 160–76.

[xxxii] Pomerantz-Zhang, Linda, Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992).

[xxxiii] While serving as Governor of Zhili for 25 years since 1870, Li was the de facto minister of foreign affairs of the Qin Empire.

[xxxiv] Wang, Chengren and Liu, Tiejun, Research on Li Hongzhang’s Thought System (Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 1998).

[xxxv] Park, Seo-Hyun, ‘Changing definitions of sovereignty in nineteenth-century East Asia: Japan and Korea between China and the West’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 13:2 (2013), pp. 281–307.

[xxxvi] Wang and Liu, Research on Li Hongzhang’s Thought System.

[xxxvii] Lu, Shenhua, Research on Yuan Shikai’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Late Qing Dynasty (I) (Taipei: Hua Mulan Culture Press, 2011).

[xxxviii] Xue Fucheng (1838–1894), for instance. See Liu, Yuebin, Research on Xue Fucheng’s Diplomatic Thought (Beijing: Xueyuan Press, 2011); Ding, Fenglin, Biography of Xue Fucheng (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1998).

[xxxix] For the introduction and translation of international law in the late Qing period, see Svarverud, Rune, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847–1911 (Leiden: Brill, 2007

[xl] Hsu, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations, p. 123.

[xli] Id., p. 125.
Id.

[xlii] Svarverud, International Law as World Order.

[xliii] Hsu, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations, p. 126.

[xliv] He, Qinhua, ‘Birth and growth of modern Chinese international law’, The Jurist, 4 (2004), p. 50.

[xlv] For a review of the development of international law during the Republic, see He, ‘Birth and growth’; Wang, Dong, China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005).

[xlvi] He, ‘Birth and growth’, p. 53.

[xlvii] Id.

[xlviii] The New Policies were a series of cultural, economic, educational, military, and political reforms that were implemented in the last decade of the Qing dynasty after the Boxer Rebellion. Among them, education reform was the most extensive and in-depth one. Chinese imperial examinations system was abolished in 1905 and replaced by the Western educational system that aims to promote and teach ‘Western learning’. The Qing Court particularly promoted the modern legal and political education.

[xlix] Feng, John Hsien-hsiang, ‘A preliminary study of the International Law Association and its history (1912–1916)’, Journal of History of the National Chengchi University, 51 (2019), pp. 58–9.

[l] Id., pp. 55–82

[li] Id., p. 60.

[lii] Id., pp. 60–1.

[liii] Id., pp. 64–7.

[liv] Id., pp. 55–82.

[lv] Ibid., pp. 71–3.

[lvi] Id., p. 73.

[lvii] He, ‘Birth and growth.’

[lviii] Kawasaki, Shin, ‘Research on Chinese diplomatic history since the 20th century: A Japanese perspective’, Social Science Research, 1 (2011), p. 13.

[lix] Dynastic history is the most commonly used method by Chinese historians in ancient times. They are all monarchy-based polities.

[lx] See Jiang, Ting-fu, Memoirs of Jiang Tingfu (Changsha: Yuelu Books, 2003).

[lxi] Li, Jianjun, ‘Jiang Tingfu’s perspective on diplomatic history’, Anhui Historiography, 3 (2000), p. 81.

[lxii] Zhang, Zhiyun, Hou, Yanbo, and Fan, Yìjūn, ‘Understanding the key historical materials of Chinese-Western interactions: The compilation and distribution of “Chóubàn yí wù shǐmò”’, Ancient and Modern Essays, 24 (2013), p. 88.

[lxiii] Jiang, Ting-fu, Collection of Modern Chinese History: Selected Works of Jiang Tingfu’s Diplomatic History (Taipei: Xinrui Wenchuang, 2017), pp. 108–09.

[lxiv] Id., p. 163.

[lxv] Id., pp. 323–4.

[lxvi] Feng, John Hsien-hsiang, ‘Different approaches to Sinicization of social science(s): A contrast between Jiang Ting-fu and Xiao Gong-quan’, Bulletin of Academia Historica, 44 (2015), p. 95.

[lxvii] Jiang, Collection of Modern Chinese History, p. 4.

[lxviii] Li, ‘Jiang Tingfu’s perspective’, p. 80.

[lxix] Cai, Le-su and Jin, Fu-jun, ‘Study on the Tsiang T’ing-Fu’s diplomatic thoughts’, Journal of Tsinghua University, 1 (2005), p. 38.

[lxx] Ibid., pp. 138–9.

[lxxi] Yang, Kuo-shu and Wen, Chung-i (eds), Sinicization of Social and Behavioral Science Research in China (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1982).

[lxxii] Kuo-shu Yang and Chung-i Wen, ‘Preface’, in Yang and Wen (eds), Sinicization, pp. i–vii.

[lxxiii] Shiau, Chyuan-Jenq, ‘The indigenization of social sciences in Taiwan’, Political Science Review, 13 (2000), pp. 1–26.

[lxxiv] Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, ‘Structural issues in the Sinicization of sociology: A preliminary study of the paradigm division of labour in the world system’, in Yang and Wen (eds), Sinicization, p. 70.

[lxxv] Hsiao, Hsin-huang Michael, ‘The triple turn of Taiwanese sociology’, Global Dialogue, 3:2 (2013), pp. 19–20.

[lxxvi] Hu, Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Hong Kong: Joint Bookstore HK, 1950).

[lxxvii] Kawasaki, ‘Research on Chinese diplomatic history,’ p. 139.

[lxxviii] Peng, Ming, History of Sino-Soviet Friendship (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1957).

[lxxix] The Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), History of Russia’s Invasion of China (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1978–81).

[lxxx] Feng, John Hsien-hsiang, ‘Political Science’, in Chiang, Howard (ed.), The Making of the Human Sciences in China: Historical and Conceptual Foundations (Leiden: Brill, 2019).

[lxxxi] Feng, ‘Political Science’, p. 382.

[lxxxii] Id., p. 389.

[lxxxiii] Id., p. 348.

[lxxxiv] Id.

[lxxxv] Cited in ibid., p. 391

[lxxxvi] Liu, Philip Hsiaopong, ‘Assembling scholars in the face of the enemy: The prequel to the Institute of International Relations, 1937–1975’, Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, 82 (2013), pp. 147–9.

[lxxxvii] Ibid., pp. 153–4. See also Liao, Wen-shuo, ‘Intelligence and diplomacy: An archival study of Wang Pengsheng and the Institute of International Relations (1937–1946)’, Cheng Kung Journal of Historical Studies, 56 (2019), pp. 91–131.

[lxxxviii] Chen, Titus C., ‘Constructing an inter-subjective imaginality: Analyzing Taiwan’s Institute of International Relations and its China studies during the early Cold War (1953–1975)’, Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy, 28:1 (2016), pp. 61–104Google Scholar; Liu, ‘Assembling scholars’; Liu, Philip Hsiaopong, ‘Gathering scholars to defend the country: The Institute of International Relations before 1975’, Issues & Studies, 50:1 (2014), pp. 55–88.

[lxxxix] Chen, ‘Constructing an inter-subjective imaginality.’

[xc] Cited in Liu, ‘Assembling scholars’, p. 158.

[xci] Id., p. 159

[xcii] Id., pp. 163–4.

[xciii] Chen, Titus C., ‘The Cold War origins of the Sino-American Conference on mainland China: An obscure legacy of Chen-tsai Wu in trans-Pacific China studies’, Issues & Studies, 50:1 (2014), pp. 89–121; Chen, ‘Constructing an inter-subjective imaginality’; Kou, Chien-Wen, ‘The changing role of the Institute of International Relations in Taiwan’s China studies: Trajectories and dynamics’, Issues & Studies, 50:1 (2014), pp. 9–53.

[xciv] Chen, ‘Constructing an inter-subjective imaginality.’

[xcv] Id.

[xcvi] Liu, ‘Assembling scholars’, p. 167.

[xcvii] Chen, ‘Constructing an inter-subjective imaginality.’

[xcviii] The development of International Studies in the PRC has already been extensively discussed in the existing literature. See Qin, Yaqing, ‘Why is there no Chinese International Relations theory?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7:3 (2007), pp. 313–40; Shambaugh, David, ‘International Relations studies in China: History, trends, and prospects’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 11 (2011), pp. 339–72; Shambaugh, David and Wang, Jisi, ‘Research and training in International Studies in the People’s Republic of China’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 17:4 (1984), pp. 6–14; Chan, Gerald, ‘International Studies in China: Origins and development’, Issues & Studies, 33:2 (1997), pp. 40–64.

[xcix] Feng, ‘Political Science’, p. 393.

[c] By 1960, the dispute between the PRC and Soviet Union was made public. China felt the need for numerous theorists who have a better understanding of Marxism-Leninism and could promote its ideology (that is, Maoism), so many universities across the country re-established the Department of Political Science.

[ci] Chen, Yue, ‘Chinese political science from a universal perspective with domestic care’, Teaching and Research, 1 (2009), p. 40.

[cii] The school was briefly merged with the CFAU between 1961 and 1965. In 1983, it was transformed into a comprehensive university and renamed as ‘The University of International Relations’.

[ciii] Zhang, Lili, ‘The construction of and research into the discipline of diplomacy of New China’, Journal of Foreign Affairs College, 3 (2003), pp. 36–43.

[civ] See Xiao, Yang, ‘Zhang Wentian and CFAU’, Foreign Affairs Review, 6 (2005), pp. 101–05; Chen, Xinren, ‘Recall the teachings of Premier Zhou Enlai and several seniors on the teaching issues of the CFAU’, Foreign Affairs Review, 3 (1998), pp. 7–11; Cheng, Zhongyuan, Zhang Wentian Zhuan (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1993); Zhang, Peisen, Zhang Wentian Nianpu (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2000).

[cv] Cheng, Zhang Wentian Zhuan, pp. 623–7.

[cvi] Zhang, Zhang Wentian Nianpu, p. 1011

[cvii] Ibid., p. 1006.

[cviii] Ibid., p. 1015.

[cix] The institute is now called ‘China Institute of International Studies’. See its official website, at: {http://www.ciis.org.cn}.

[cx] In addition to the above-mentioned institutions, there are other channels for training IR experts in PRC. For instance, the PLA has its independent personnel training systems. The People’s Liberation Army Institute of International Relations was established in Nanjing in 1951.

[cxi] Qin, ‘Why is there no Chinese International Relations theory?’, p. 316.

[cxii] Chen, ‘Chinese Political Science’, p. 40.

[cxiii] Pang, ‘Open and independent development’, pp. 24–5.

[cxiv] See Qin, Yaqing, ‘A Chinese school of International Relations theory: Possibility and inevitability’, World Economics and Politics, 3 (2006), pp. 7–13.

[cxv] Pan, Wei, ‘Demonstrating the unique spirit of the Chinese School’, Economic Herald, 11 (2017), pp. 17–19.

[cxvi] Cox, Robert W., ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond International Relations theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126–55.

[cxvii] Leysens, Anthony, The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox. Fugitive or Guru? (London: Palgrave, 2008).

[cxviii] Cox, ‘Social forces’, p. 128

[cxix] Qin, Yaqing, ‘Core problematic of International Relations theory and the construction of a Chinese School’, Social Sciences in China, 3 (2005), p. 168.

[cxx] Turton, Helen Louise and Freire, Lucas G., ‘Peripheral possibilities: Revealing originality and encouraging dialogue through a reconsideration of “marginal” IR scholarship’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 19:4 (2016), pp. 534–57.

[cxxi] Id., p. 552.

.