China in Latin America Then and Now

Remy Maduit | Authors published

China in Latin America Then and Now
A Systemic Constructivist Analysis of China’s Foreign Policy

Chien-Kai Chen is an associate professor of international studies at Rhodes College, USA. 

The rise of China in the international system is one of the most popular research topics in international relations because of China’s rapid economic growth since the late 1970s and the resulting increase in its economic and political presence in each corner of the world. Scholars and diplomats alike are especially interested in the debate about whether China is rising as a “revisionist power” (that tries to challenge the dominant power, the United States, and overthrow the existing international system) or a “status quo power” (that has no intention to destroy the existing international order maintained by the US). China’s growing presence in Latin America is arguably one of the best cases for the study of the rise of China. The region has long been seen as the US “backyard” from a geopolitical perspective. Therefore, if China is rising as a revisionist state, we should find some evidence of China’s revisionist behavior (or at least intention) in Latin America.

The Chinese presence in Latin America is very significant today. China has become the largest trading partner for all the major economies in the region except for Mexico. Overall, China now is the second-largest trading partner for Latin America as a whole, following the US only. Also, among all the regions in the world, Latin America is currently the second-largest destination of China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI), following only China’s home region, Asia. [i] With the growing economic ties between China and Latin America, interactions between China and the countries in the region have expanded. The First China–CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum was held in 2015, and the forum has been held every year since then. [ii] Besides economic cooperation, the China–CELAC Forum also involves such “subforums” as the scientific and technological innovation forum, the think-tanks forum, the young political leaders’ forum, and the people-to-people friendship forum, the political parties’ forum, and so on.

Its growing political influence in the region accompanies China’s growing presence in Latin America. China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has been urging all the countries in the world not to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Latin America (especially Central America and the Caribbean) has long been a “diplomatic battlefield” for China because of Taiwan’s huge effort to maintain its diplomatic ties with countries in the region. Now, there are only nine countries in the region that diplomatically recognize Taiwan. However, because Latin America is still the region where Taiwan has the highest number of diplomatic allies (nine of the fifteen countries recognizing Taiwan are from the region), the conflict between China and Taiwan over the region will continue.

China’s growing presence in Latin America is affecting not only Taiwan but also the US. The US still has significant economic ties with Latin America. Also, the huge political influence that the US has over the region is one of the key reasons Taiwan, which is supported by the US despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the two, can still enjoy small diplomatic recognition in the region (as compared to its diplomatic fiasco in other regions of the world). China’s growing presence in its “backyard” has caught the US’s attention. In September 2018, the US recalled its chief diplomats representing the US in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador (that diplomatically deserted Taiwan for China in June 2017, May 2018, and August 2018, respectively) for a meeting in Washington to discuss “ways in which the United States can support strong, independent, democratic institutions throughout Central America and the Caribbean”. [iii]

So, is China’s growing presence in Latin America showing that China is rising as a revisionist power that is trying to challenge the dominant power of the world (i.e. the US) and overthrow the existing international order? By examining China’s policy towards Latin America, this article shows that, although the guiding doctrine of China’s policy towards Latin America has never changed since the establishment of the Chinese communist regime in 1949 (i.e. “South-South Cooperation” based on the “Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence”), its policy goal towards the region today is much less revisionist than it was before. This phenomenon seems to be inconsistent with the “China threat” argument which, referring to the power transition theory [iv], claims that China (as a dissatisfied rising power) is inclined to challenge the US (as the dominant power in our world) and overthrow the US-dominated international order when the gap between their power narrows. China is still not very satisfied with the existing international system dominated by the US, as well as its status in it. Also, with its growing power, China has the potential to challenge the US-led status quo. That being said, while still dissatisfied, China is much less revisionist now than it was before the late 1970s, even though its power has been significantly growing since then. While China before the late 1970s prioritized using its power to overthrow the international system dominated by the hegemonic US and the Soviet Union, it has since the late 1970s been prioritizing using its growing power to pursue domestic economic development over challenging the US even though it is still not completely satisfied with the existing US-dominated international order. Through a “systemic constructivist” lens, this article shows that the change in the interactions between China and other countries (especially the dominant and major powers), from isolation and confrontation to engagement and interdependence, has changed China’s perceptions of the international system, as well as its identity and interests in the system, which has changed China’s policy goal towards Latin America (and the “Global South”) from a very revolutionary and politically focused one to a less revisionist and economically focused one.

To make my case, I divide the rest of the article into four parts. The first part reviews the literature on Sino–Latin American relations, especially focusing on the debate about the so-called “China threat.” The second part introduces the aforementioned puzzle about China’s less revisionist policy goal toward Latin America since the late 1970s by defining and operationalizing “revisionism.” The third part examines China’s policy towards Latin America since 1949 and compares its very revolutionary and politically focused policy goal before to the less revisionist and economically focused one today. Finally, in the fourth part, a systemic constructivist analysis is conducted to explain the difference in China’s policy goal toward Latin America (and the “Global South”) between then and now.

A Debate on the “China Threat” in the Context of Sino–Latin American Relations

Since 1949, when the Chinese communist regime (i.e. the People’s Republic of China) was established, China’s relations with Latin America have undergone different stages. As Mora [v] observed, the relations moved from “indifference” to “engagement” between the 1950s and the 1990s. In the beginning, with many Latin American countries still having diplomatic ties with Taiwan, China had very limited interactions with them. Then, during the 1960s, when the Sino–Soviet Split emerged, the communist parties in Latin America gradually got involved in the struggle between the two. [vi] Throughout the 1970s, China’s relations with Latin America became “normalized” when many countries in the region broke their diplomatic ties with Taiwan and formed formal diplomatic relations with China. China’s economic reform that began in the late 1970s opened another new page for Sino–Latin American relations when their economic exchanges grew throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. For example, the total trade between the two sides significantly increased from USD 200 million to USD 2 billion from 1975 to 1988, and it continued to grow by over 100 percent from 1989 to 1996. [vii] China’s economic ties with Brazil (i.e. the largest country in the region) expanded so fast during the aforementioned period that China labeled Brazil as its “strategically” beginning in 1995. [viii] China’s relations (especially the economic ones) with Brazil and Latin America were further strengthened over the past two decades because of China’s “going out” policy that was implemented in 1999, which has encouraged many Chinese companies (including both of the state-owned enterprises and the private corporations) to do business all over the world. [ix] During the former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2004 visit to Latin America, the Brazilian president back then, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, openly praised China for the growth of its relations with his country by saying that “we want a partnership that integrates our economies and serves as a paradigm for South-South cooperation”. [x] Today, as mentioned, China is the largest trading partner for all the major economies in the region except for Mexico, and Latin America is the second-largest destination of China’s outward FDI as compared to all the other regions in the world (following only China’s home region, Asia).

With China’s growing presence in Latin America (both politically and economically since the 1970s and the 1980s, respectively), there are more and more studies focusing on Sino–Latin American relations. Many have found that China’s effort to strengthen its relations with Latin America is to satisfy its national interests in three folds: first, increasing its international influence as compared to other major powers around the world and in the developing regions in particular; second, securing foreign markets for China’s exports, as well as the raw materials and other commodities that it needs for domestic development; and, third, isolating Taiwan within the international community based on China’s “One China Principle”. [xi]

While there seems to be a consensus on why China is in Latin America today, there is, however, a severe debate about the impacts of the growing Chinese presence in the region on not only the region itself but also the entire world. Some argue that China is now emerging in Latin America as a threat to the countries of the region. First, it is found that China’s increasing exports of Chinese goods to Latin America and its imports of raw materials from the region are leading to the so-called deindustrialization of Latin American countries (i.e. the “privatization” of exports and the resulting underdevelopment of manufacturing industries, especially those high-value-added ones). [xii] Second, there are concerns about the growing trade imbalance between the two sides in which China enjoys huge trade surpluses, as well as China’s exports to Latin America and other regions competing with Latin American manufacturers’ products in local and foreign markets, respectively. [xiii] Finally, the growing popularity of the “China Model” that promotes rapid economic development orchestrated by an authoritarian regime might erode the values of democracy and human rights in Latin America. [xiv]

There are, however, others arguing that the growing Chinese presence in Latin America is not necessarily a threat to the region. Some scholars believe that the benefits of growing Sino–Latin American economic ties would outweigh the costs if countries in the region could get rid of their anxiety-driven tariffs and other economic restrictions against China and then implement effective “industrial policies” to well use Chinese investment in their countries to promote their industries including both the extractive and the higher value-added ones. [xv] There are also studies showing that the growing Chinese presence in Latin America is not leading to that “deindustrialization” many are concerned about. For example, a case study of Brazil’s imports and exports reveals that Chinese goods in Brazil, though increasing, constitute only a small proportion of total sales of manufactured goods in the country and that Brazil’s aggregate industrial production is not affected too much by its competition with China’s exporters in third countries. [xvi] Some point out that Latin America’s growing economic relations with China helped it avoid the worst of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 that damaged many parts of the world. [xvii] Also, studies show that China and Latin American countries are economically complementary to each other. For example, a case study of the auto parts–automotive chains (AAC) in Mexico and China concludes that the two sides should work together based on their competitive advantages: while the Chinese AAC supported by the state has the technological developments, financial support, and competitive prices, the Mexican AAC has rich experiences of being a supplier to the US and European markets that their Chinese counterpart lacks. [xviii] Finally, some scholars believe that China’s new effort to pursue “sustainable development” would provide a valuable opportunity for Latin American countries to develop or upgrade their industries because of China’s increasing interest in investing in the “green sectors” such as that of renewable energy both domestically and internationally. [xix]

Besides the debate about the “China threat” to Latin American countries, there is also a debate about China becoming a challenger to the US in China’s growing presence in Latin America. Some raise the concern about China as a rising revisionist state and the US as the dominant power in our international system conflicting with each other over the region of Latin America. [xx] It is found that, although China has not yet directly confronted the US in Latin America, it has been doing “soft balancing” against the US to undermine its dominance over the region through such non-military measures as active lending behavior and robust regional institution-building efforts. [xxi] In addition, a survey of Chinese netizens reveals that the idea of using the countries in the US’s “backyard” to counterbalance the US is very popular among the Chinese people at least on the internet. [xxii] Also, some studies of the China–CELAC Forum that began in 2015 show that the forum, though established as a multilateral institution, has turned into a regional “hub-and-spoke” system for China where it can easily seize the leadership role and promote its international agenda vis-à-vis other major powers. [xxiii]

Similar to those who argue that China is no threat to Latin American countries, some people argue that China’s growing presence in Latin America is not posing a threat to the US. A study of the votes cast by Latin American countries in the United Nations (UN) shows that China’s growing economic ties with Latin America are not leading to a significant increase in its political influence over there: while Latin American countries might align with China on economic issues, there is no significant Sino–Latin American alignment on security and humanitarian issues. [xxiv] In addition, it is found that, although China has been seeking to increase its political and economic role in those Latin American countries (like Brazil) that have more trade with and more FDI from China (as compared to the US) and share a similar interest with China in multi-polar global governance (as opposed to American unipolarity), it prefers to do so in a “low-key and non-confrontational manner” vis-à-vis the US [xxv] and prefers to advocate a “liberal economic agenda” in the region that is, to a great extent, promoted by the US as well. [xxvi] Also, according to some research on China’s motivations for increasing its presence in Latin America, the major goal of China is to promote the so-called South-South Cooperation for the development of the Third World and to create a peaceful, China-friendly international environment for its national development, all of which have nothing to do with challenging the US in its “backyard”. [xxvii] Finally, studies suggest that China and the US share more common interests than conflicts of interests in Latin America, and therefore the region could be an ideal place where the two powers can work together. For example, a study of Sino–Cuban relations shows that the strengthening of Sino–Cuban relations is not posing a challenge to the US but providing an opportunity for “trilateral cooperation”: both the US and China favor a more open market in Cuba, and the growing Chinese economic presence over there is helping realize this goal. [xxviii]

A Puzzle about China in Latin America: Same Policy with Different Goals

The above review of the studies on Sino–Latin American relations reveals that, although it is generally agreed that the Chinese presence in Latin America has been rapidly growing, how it impacts the region and even the entire world is still debatable, and as Jenkins [xxix] argues very well, while the optimists seem to overestimate the economic benefits resulting from the growing Chinese presence in Latin America, their pessimist counterparts exaggerate the political risks of the Chinese presence. Here, whether China’s growing presence in Latin America is a threat or not at either the global level or the regional level, there is one interesting puzzle largely ignored by the existing literature on Sino–Latin American relations: while China has never changed the guiding doctrine of its policy towards Latin America (i.e. South-South Cooperation based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”), its policy goal about the region changed.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were first raised by China and India in their negotiation between 1953 and 1954 over Tibet: “mutual respect’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” “mutual non-aggression,” and “non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,” “equality and cooperation for mutual benefit,” and “peaceful coexistence.” The principles were officially accepted by the two sides and formally included in the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India” that was signed by them in April 1954. [xxx] One year later, in April 1955, the principles were incorporated into resolving the Asian–African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia (i.e. the “Bandung Conference”) where China and the other twenty-eight countries from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East—many of which had just become independent from the colonial rule—got together to show their solidarity against colonialism and to promote economic and cultural cooperation among one another. [xxxi] This conference ushered in the South-South Cooperation between the developing countries and, since then, China as a participant in the Bandung Conference has become an active advocate for such cooperation. [xxxii] As a result, South-South Cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has been the guiding doctrine for China’s policy towards developing countries, including those in Latin America. [xxxiii] This doctrine is still reflected in the latest policy paper for Latin America published by the Chinese government in 2016 (i.e. China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean), which points out that “the development of China cannot be possible without the development of other developing countries, including countries in Latin America and the Caribbean” and “sticking to the principle of equality and sincere mutual support is the fundamental premise of the development of relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean”. [xxxiv]

Although there seems to be an obvious consistency in China’s policy toward Latin America, as discussed above, there is a difference in its policy goal between then and now. While its goal was very political and internationally oriented before (as demonstrated by its effort to export communist revolutions to the region), it is now much more economical than political and is domestically oriented to a very great extent. As prior research has revealed, China’s policy goal towards Latin America today is largely about securing the commodity supply of energy and food from the region, as well as the markets over there, to sustain China’s domestic economic growth. [xxxv] By exploring the aforementioned puzzle and examining the evolution of China’s policy goal toward Latin America, we can not only know the change and continuity of Sino–Latin American relations but also understand the development of China’s foreign relations as a rising power in the international system. Analyzing how China has viewed Latin America in its foreign relations and how the region has played a role in China’s foreign policy, this article shows that China since the late 1970s has been much less revisionist in the international system than it was before.

To show that, and to explain why China’s policy goal toward Latin America has been much less revisionist since the last 1970s than it was before, it is important to define and operationalize a “revisionist power” in the international system first. A revisionist power is a country that is dissatisfied with the existing international order and tries to change that order to its advantage. It is the opposite of a “status quo power,” which “is happy with both its status/rank and with the institutions of international society” and “accepts the rules of the game not just for instrumental calculations of self-interest, but ideationally because it accepts the values as valid”. [xxxvi] However, according to Buzan [xxxvii], there are three different revisionist powers based on, first, whether it is happy with its status/rank in the international system and, second, how it responds to the existing international order with which it is not satisfied. A revolutionary revisionist power is extremely unhappy about its status/rank in the international system, contests the formal and informal institutions of the system, and seeks to overthrow the existing order maintained and promoted by the status quo powers. [xxxviii] An orthodox, revisionist power, while still not happy about its status/rank in the international system, has no big problem with the institutions of the system, as well as the existing order, and therefore does not have a strong incentive to overthrow the order. [xxxix] A reformist, revisionist power is something in between. It accepts some institutions of the international system for “a mixture of calculated and instrumental reasons,” but it tries to resist and reform other institutions and change their status/rank in the system. [xl]

Based on the above discussion of a revisionist power, it is important to point out here that while I argue in this article that China’s policy goal towards Latin America has been much less revisionist since the late 1970s than it was before, I do not mean that China now is a “status quo power.” That being said, comparing China’s foreign policy goals toward Latin America then and now, China has changed from a revolutionary revisionist power to a reformist one, if not an orthodox one. Unlike a status quo power, China today wants to change its status/rank in the international system; however, unlike a revolutionary revisionist power (and an orthodox one), China is accepting some formal and informal institutions of the exiting international system (such as those about the market economy promoted by the US and the West) while challenging others (such as those about the US/Western-defined democracy and human rights). [xli]

Here, as Buzan [xlii] argues, China’s foreign relations can be divided into two periods: “the Maoist, revolutionary one, when China was largely alienated from, oppositional to, the US-dominated GIS [Global International Society]; and the one since the late 1970s when China rejoined what was a more globalized, but still US-led GIS.” In the rest of this article, I also divide China’s foreign policy toward Latin America into those two periods of time as suggested by Buzan. I will first compare China’s policy goal toward the region in that “revolutionary” period when China was a revolutionary revisionist power to the goal since the late 1970s when China is more like a reformist, revisionist power. Then, I will explain why its goal since the late 1970s has become much less revisionist than it was before through the lens of systemic constructivism.

Comparing China’s Policy Goals Then and Now

To show that China’s policy goal towards Latin America since the late 1970s has been much less revisionist than it was before, I examine and compare, in this section, China’s words and deeds about Latin America before the late 1970s and those after. Here, China’s official rhetoric on Sino–Latin American relations, as revealed in its official statements about the region, can be a good starting point for researchers to understand its views and intentions towards the region and beyond. As Strauss [xliii] argues, instead of treating China’s rhetoric on its relations with Latin America as just “fluff that conceals a harder reality,” we should take it seriously as a “device of ‘framing and claiming’: a way in which political elites in China interpret the fast-changing, developing world and China’s place in it.”

Policy Goal before the Late 1970s

By comparing China’s earlier official rhetoric on Sino–Latin American relations with its rhetoric today, we can find that China used to situate its relations with Latin America under a very revisionist worldview. China’s official statements about Latin America and the “Third World” between the 1950s and the 1970s reveal China was inclined to challenge the international system with the idea of South-South Cooperation under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence seen by China to resist or even overthrow the international system back then. Simply speaking, South-South Cooperation was regarded by China back then as cooperation between the “Third World” countries to change the world order. It is well reflected in an article entitled “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” published by Lin Piao in 1965, who back then was among the very few powerful political figures inferior to nobody but their supreme leader Mao Zedong only According to Lin, the world back then was largely dominated by the US, and the major “battlefield” against “US imperialism” was in the developing world including Latin America. Following Mao’s theory of “people’s war,” Lin pointed out that a “united front” formed by the developing world was the key to defeating “US imperialism”:

The struggles waged by the different peoples against US imperialism reinforce each other and merge into a torrential worldwide tide of opposition to US imperialism… The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and other regions can destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head and others at its feet… Our (Chinese) support and aid to other revolutionary peoples serve precisely to help their self-reliant struggle. [xliv]

The “Three Worlds Theory” raised by Mao himself in 1974 is another good example of China’s idea of South-South Cooperation against the international order back then. [xlv] According to Mao, the US and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers back then, constituted the “First World” while Japan, Europe, and Canada—as the very few developed places in our world back then alongside those two superpowers—belonged to the “Second World.” The “Third World” comprised the whole developing world, including Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As Mao saw it, members of the Third World, including China, should all work together to fight against the First World’s “imperialism” and “hegemonism.”

Along with its official statements about Latin America (and the “Global South”) like those by Lin and Mao that I have discussed, which encouraged people in Latin America (and the “Global South”) to launch revolutionary wars against imperialism both domestically and internationally, China took some actions to realize those wars in the region. However, it should be pointed out here that, given China’s limited national capabilities back then, it could not provide a large amount of material aid, including arms, for the people in Latin America to start those wars. Therefore, what China did was to create pro-China communist forces and movements in Latin America through the “power of an idea and example,” which China hoped could eventually launch those wars against the “evils” of “imperialism” (i.e. the US) and “revisionism” (i.e. the Soviet Union) not only on China’s behalf but also for themselves. [xlvi]

To achieve its goal, China well used mass media communications to spread its rebellious ideas in Latin America. For example, through the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China began Spanish short-wave radio broadcasts and Portuguese broadcasts over there in 1957 and 1960, respectively.[xlvii] In addition, starting in 1959, China also tried to use films to expand its ideological influences in the region, and the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing published the translated works of Mao including but not limited to his idea of “principal contradiction” between the “oppressed people” in the Third World and the “imperialists” mainly led by the US (with a secondary contradiction with the Soviet “revisionism” or so-called “social imperialism”), as well as his theory of “people’s war” to resolve the “contradiction”. [xlviii] To better promote the aforementioned radio shows, films, and publications in Latin America, China helped establish many “friendship associations” and cultural institutes or societies all over Latin America. [xlix] These associations worked with their Chinese counterpart, the New China News Agency or Xinhua which was also under the supervision of the CCP Propaganda Department, to serve as “centers for the distribution of Chinese propaganda” and “contacts with pro-Chinese parties and movements” in Latin America. [l] Given that China back then had no official diplomatic ties with any country in the region other than Cuba, Xinhua served as the quasi-diplomatic representative of China in Latin America and offered financial aid to “groups having pro-Chinese orientations” over there such as newspapers, magazines publishers, political organizations, social movements, those “friendship associations,” and so on. [li]

On top of the propaganda efforts that I have discussed above, in the mid-1960s, China stepped up its campaign to organize pro-China parties or even guerrillas in Latin America that it could use as its proxies against the US, as well as the Soviets, “imperialism” in the region. [lii] Among those pro-China parties and guerrillas, a Peruvian communist force split from the original Peruvian Communist Party (i.e. the “Red Flag” established in 1964 as well as its offshoot, the “Shining Path” formed in 1969) was the largest and most influential among all. These parties and guerrillas openly supported China’s position against the US and the Soviet Union and prepared to launch a “people’s war” against their governments and other political forces associated with those two superpowers. For example, in the political reports published throughout 1965, the aforementioned pro-China Peruvian communist force explicitly adopted the Chinese view about the “principal contradiction” with the US and promoted the formation of a worldwide united front among the Third World people against US imperialism to achieve the “emancipation from the rule of domestic and foreign oppressors and exploiters” through a “hard and protracted armed struggle”. [liii] In addition, siding with China in the Sino–Soviet Split, it echoed China’s criticism against the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist force, openly saying that “the glorious center propelling the development of Marxism-Leninism has shifted from Europe to Asia, from the Soviet Union to China” and that “this life and death struggle against imperialism and world reaction is led by the Communist Party of China”. [liv] Besides those pro-China parties and guerrillas, China through its propaganda efforts also gained support from various sectors of Latin American societies such as some farmers in Mexico, some college students in Chile, some tin miners in Bolivia, and the radical elements of the socialist force in Uruguay. [lv]

Despite the support from those pro-China groups and people in Latin America, China however did not achieve the goal of overthrowing the US, as well as the Soviet, “imperialism” through its proposed worldwide “people’s war” with Latin America being an integral part of it. That being said, regardless of the outcome, China’s words and deeds related to Latin America that I have examined above significantly reveal that China’s policy goal towards the region back then was extremely revisionist against the international order dominated by the two superpowers.

Policy Goal since the Late 1970s

In contrast to the very revisionist rhetoric in its leaders’ statements between the 1950s and the 1970s about China’s relations with the developing countries including those in Latin America, China’s official rhetoric on its relations with Latin America today reveals that it is no longer a “revolutionary revisionist power” as the idea of South-South Cooperation under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has been seen by China to promote peace and maintain the existing world order. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has published two official policy papers in Latin America. Besides the 2016 policy paper that I have mentioned, there was also an official policy paper published in 2008, which was the first policy paper that China ever published for the region of Latin America. [lvi] In both policy papers, though believing that the developing world is still facing many challenges in today’s world, China emphasizes it will work with Latin American countries to deal with those challenges through the existing institutions in the international system. For example, the 2008 paper points out that:

China stands ready to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to strengthen the role of the United Nations, make the international political and economic order more fair and fair, promote democracy in international relations and uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. [lvii]

Similarly, the 2016 paper says that China and Latin American countries will “jointly safeguard the international order and system with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as its core” and that “China is ready to deepen South-South cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries, consolidate multilateral trading systems, promote global governance reform and build an open world economic system.” Referring to the US implicitly, the 2016 paper states that the cooperation between China and Latin America “does not target or exclude any third party” and that such cooperation:

conforms to the fundamental interests of the two sides and the trends of our times featuring world peace, development, and cooperation, and serves as a shining example of developing countries working together to seek common development, shoulder common responsibilities and cope with common challenges in the new era. [lviii]

The less revisionist rhetoric used in those two policy papers in Latin America is a vivid contrast to the very revisionist one used in Lin’s article and Mao’s “Three Worlds Theory.”

Besides those two official policy papers on Sino–Latin American relations published in 2008 and 2016, respectively, China’s behavior toward Latin America also shows that its policy goal towards the region has moved away from that very revisionist one, which encouraged Latin American countries to work with China to overthrow the “imperialist” international system. Here, China’s having a less revisionist goal toward Latin America does not mean that it no longer has any intention of strengthening its relations with the region and increasing its influence over there. China today is still trying its very best to protect and promote its interests in the region with its growing power. However, the key thing is that China’s interests in, and therefore its policy goal towards Latin America, have changed from very revolutionary and politically focused ones to less revisionist and economically focused ones. While China before the late 1970s made efforts to increase and use its influence over the region to overthrow the hegemonic powers of the international system, since the late 1970s it has been trying to use its growing international power largely for its domestic economic development.

Many observers have found that China’s growing economic ties with Latin America are bringing China stronger, if not dominant, political influence over the region as Latin American countries, especially those in South America, have been siding more and more with China on global issues including not only economic ones like ways of economic development but also political ones like those about sovereignty, non-intervention, and even human rights. [lix] It is also found that China especially likes to use its growing economic muscle as “sticks and/or carrots” to influence Latin American countries’ relations with Taiwan: countries that have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan are facing huge restrictions on their access to the Chinese market and loans. [lx] In addition, on top of its bilateral relations with countries in the region, China has been developing its relations with Latin America in a multilateral way as well. Some observers of Sino–Latin American relations believe that China’s participation in CELAC (which excludes the US) and the establishment of the China–CELAC Forum has “opened a new chapter for China’s strategic engagement in the region”.[lxi] Though designed as a multilateral institution, it is found that the Sino–Latin American dialogue in China–CELAC Forum has been largely occupied by China’s proposals, with Latin American countries interacting with China more like responders to those proposals. [lxii] For example, China officially invited Latin American countries to join its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is a Chinese project to build a vast global network of transportation, energy, and telecommunication infrastructures and, with that network, promote international economic cooperation involving trade and investment, at the Second Ministerial Meeting of China–CELAC Forum in 2018 where China promoted its BRI as a “new platform for mutually beneficial cooperation” between the two sides. [lxiii] As a result, to get the rich infrastructure financing offered by China, Panama became the first country in the region to sign an agreement with China for the BRI, with many other Latin American countries following suit at a later point. [lxiv]

With the aforementioned efforts to strengthen its relations with Latin America, China has been successful in “starting military engagements and sales, extending the reach of the BRI, garnering regional support for One China Policy, internationalizing its currency, and securing investments in strategically important waterways”. [lxv] However, it should be pointed out that these achievements of China in Latin America do not mean that China is having a revisionist goal toward the region. After all, countries, including those “status quo” ones, have all been trying their very best to use their power, big or small, to protect and promote their interests all over the world whenever it is possible. Here, the bottom line is that China today no longer has the revolutionary revisionist goal toward Latin America that it used to pursue. It is no longer trying to export revolutions as it did before the late 1970s. China’s policy goal towards Latin America today is much more economical than political and is more about promoting and sustaining its domestic development than challenging and overthrowing the US hegemon. As many observers have found, “geopolitics” is no longer a major concern for China’s policy towards Latin America, and it is Latin America’s natural resources and markets that are driving China to strengthen its relations with the region today. [lxvi]

Here, if China still has a revolutionary revisionist goal against the hegemonic powers of the international system, we should be able to observe China’s effort to build an anti-US bloc in Latin America like its effort to create an anti-imperialist united front in the region before the late 1970s. The fact, however, is that China has been trying to strengthen its relations with not only the Latin American countries that are not satisfied with the US influence over the region (like Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela) but also those that continue to maintain strong relations with the US (like Chile, Mexico, and Peru). [lxvii] Also, while China has been increasing its ties with the regional organizations that exclude the US (like CELAC), it is still developing links with those that include the US (like the Organisation of American States). [lxviii] Overall, as Buzan’s (2010) study of China as a rising power in the international system reveals, China is still not completely satisfied with the existing US-dominated international system, especially with the issues about US/Western-defined democracy and human rights, as well as its status/rank in the system since the late 1970s it has been largely depending on the US-led international order that provides the political and economic stability benefiting China’s domestic economic development. This observation is consistent with China’s less revisionist and economically focused policy goal towards Latin America since the late 1970s that I have discussed: South-South Cooperation to strengthen China’s relations with Latin American countries for China’s, as well as Latin America’s, development within the existing US-led international order. Simply speaking, as mentioned, China has been trying to interact with as many Latin American countries as possible largely as its economic partners regardless of their political tendency or ideology toward the US. [lxix] This differs from China before the late 1970s which tried to turn Latin America into a revolutionary anti-imperialism ground that could “deal a smashing blow to the rear of its main enemy, the US”. [lxx]

Explaining the Different Policy Goals: A Systemic Constructivist Analysis

The previous two sections demonstrate a puzzle about China’s policy towards Latin America: while the guiding doctrine of its policy has never changed (i.e. South-South Cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), its policy goal was very revisionist before (i.e. South-South Cooperation as a way for developing countries, including China and those in Latin America, to work together to fight against the dominant powers and change the existing world order), as compared to the goal today (i.e. South-South Cooperation as a way for developing countries including China and those in Latin America to work together to gain benefits from the existing world order). So, how to explain this change in China’s policy goal?

Here, as this section will demonstrate, “systemic constructivism” as an international relations theory can well explain it. To know more about this theoretical approach that I take, it is worth comparing it to the two major and most popular approaches in international relations: structural realism (many of those who argue that China is or will become a threat to Latin America and the US take this approach) and neoliberal institutionalism (many of those who argue that China is not necessarily a threat to take this one). Both structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism believe that the international system is an anarchical system and that survival in anarchy is one of the most important interests of states. However, they differ in their understanding of state behavior in the anarchical international system. While the former argues that the anarchical nature of the international system makes states care about relative gains more than absolute gains and therefore do zero-sum power politics to survive and protect other interests of theirs in anarchy, the latter argues that institutions (i.e. international law) and organizations (i.e. international organizations) in anarchy make long-term positive-sum cooperation between self-interested states not only possible but also an effective and efficient way for them to guarantee their survival and protect other interests of theirs in the anarchical international system. Therefore, while structural realism would argue that the change in China’s policy goal towards Latin America is transitional or even pretentious to achieve its ultimate revisionist goal, neoliberal institutionalism is inclined to see the change as a relatively sincere move by China to survive and protect interests through positive-sum institutionalized cooperation instead of zero-sum power politics.

Systemic constructivism, different from the structural realist and the neoliberal institutionalist thoughts that I have discussed, believes that the interactions between states socially constructed international relations and the international system, in particular. As Wendt [lxxi], one of the most renowned systemic constructivists, argues, “anarchy states make of it.” Treating the international system (i.e. anarchy) and the states’ interests in this system as given, structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism both assume that states strategically interact with one another based on their interests formed before their interactions. Treating neither the system nor the interests as given, systemic constructivism argues that actors “act toward the object, including other actors, based on the meaning that the objects have for them” [lxxii] and that “interaction at the systemic level changes state identities and interests”. [lxxiii] While, to structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism, it is the states’ interests in the international system (which is determined by the anarchical nature of the system and/or the international law and organizations associated with that anarchical system) that affect states’ interactions within the system, according to systemic constructivism, it is the interactions between states that shape states’ perceptions about the system, as well as their interests and identities within the system accordingly (which reinforce or reshape their interactions, and the process goes on and on).

My systemic constructivist approach, which focuses on state behavior at the international level, is also different from those that offer explanations based on domestic politics. For example, Buzan [lxxiv], who divides China’s foreign relations into the periods before and after the late 1970s, argues that China’s “reform and opening up” started in the late 1970s is a key factor that transformed its foreign relations, which was driven by “internal developments in China during the late 1970s and early 1980s in which the country underwent a profound change of national identity, strategic culture and definition of its security interests” because of “domestic reactions against the extreme radicalism of the Cultural Revolution years during the mid-to-late 1960s, which not only impoverished the country but also exposed it to serious security threats.” While not denying the importance of domestic factors, I argue based on systemic constructivism that interactions between China and other countries matter. While the role played by China’s decision to pursue “reform and opening up” should not be ignored, it is equally important to examine how other countries, especially those major powers, have responded to such a decision, and how their responses, along with other international interactions involving China, have influenced how China continues to pursue “reform and opening up” as well as other foreign policy goals.

Therefore, based on systemic constructivism, that puzzle about the change of China’s policy goal towards Latin America (and the “Global South”) from a very revolutionary and politically focused one to a less revisionist and economically focused one can be well explained if we examine the change of the interactions between China and other countries from 1949 to the present day. From a systemic constructivist perspective, the interactions between China and other countries would affect China’s perceptions of the international system, which at the same time influences its identity and interests within the perceived system. All of which shape the foreign policy goal China pursues. Following this systemic constructivist point of view, a change in the interactions between China and other countries would change China’s perceptions about the international system, as well as its identity and interests within the system, which reshape its foreign policy goal. The rest of this section will show, in China’s policy toward Latin America, how the change in the interactions between China and other countries (from isolation and confrontation to engagement and interdependence) has resulted in the change in its foreign policy goal (from a very revolutionary and politically focused one to a less revisionist and economically focused one).

Interactions before the 1970s

The interactions between China and other countries from 1949 to the late 1960s, from the Chinese point of view, involved many conflicts, as well as international isolation, against China. Its interactions with the two superpowers back then (the US and the Soviet Union), in particular, are worth close examination. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 was, to a great extent, a war between China supporting the North Korean regime and the US backing South Korea, which as a result made the tension between the two countries suddenly reach an extremely high level in just one year after the establishment of the Chinese communist regime in 1949. Following the war, as part of its effort to contain the expansion of communism in East Asia, the US signed a mutual defense treaty in 1955 with Taiwan, which has been regarded by China since 1949 as a “renegade Chinese province” that it would take back with any means including the use of force if necessary. Conflicts with the US also brought China a high degree of international isolation. With the US influence, many, if not all, of the US allies and non-communist countries (including Latin American ones) refused to diplomatically recognize the Chinese communist regime and continued to maintain their diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China was not even allowed to be a member of the UN with Taiwan, supported by the US, assuming the Chinese seat in the international organization instead. The tension between China and the US, alongside the ideological affinity, brought China and the Soviet Union together as close allies of the communist bloc in the early stage of the Cold War. However, the increasing ideological disputes over communism between the two sides that emerged in the mid-1950s caused the so-called Sino–Soviet Split throughout the 1960s, which eventually reached a point of no return in 1969 when they had a small border war.

From a systemic constructivist perspective, the aforementioned interactions between China and the two superpowers from 1949 to the late 1960s affected China’s perceptions of the international system and its status in it. The perceived hostility from the US because of many conflicts and international isolation, as well as the perceived hostility from the Soviet Union because of that Sino–Soviet Split, made China feel that the international system is a zero-sum system dominated by the two superpowers at the expense of other less-powerful, less-developed countries like China. The interactions between China and the two superpowers, along with the resulting perceptions about the international system, also affected China’s identity and its interests within the system, making China more and more identified with other “Third World” countries outside the Western and the Eastern Blocs led by the US and the Soviet Union, respectively [lxxv], and believe that the perceived repressive international system dominated by those two blocs that caused more harm than good to China should be destroyed. As a result, to China, the most important policy goal of South-South Cooperation between China and Latin America, as well as other developing countries, was to work together to overthrow the perceived unjust international system. It is well reflected in China’s enthusiastic calls for “anti-imperialism revolutions” against the US and the Soviet Union in Latin America (and the “Global South”) until the mid-1970s [lxxvi], as revealed by Lin’s and Mao’s statements, as well as China’s behavior towards Latin America back then, that I have discussed.

Interactions since the 1970s

Several developments throughout the 1970s and thereafter emerged to gradually change China’s perception of the international system and its status in it. With its relentless efforts for two decades, China was eventually allowed to be a member of the UN in 1971, when the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 substituted the Chinese communist regime for Taiwan as the only legitimate Chinese representative in the international organization. Taking the advantage of the Sino–Soviet Split, the US played the “China card” in the early 1970s, which led to the “Sino–US rapprochement” throughout the 1970s and eventually the “normalization” of Sino–US relations in 1979 (i.e. the US forming formal diplomatic ties with China and severing its official relations with Taiwan). Along with China’s UN membership and the improvement of Sino–US relations, many countries shifted their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China as well during and after the 1970s. Also, there was the Sino–Soviet rapprochement emerged in the 1980s, following the Sino–US rapprochement. In the meantime, China’s economic “reform and opening up,” which was started in the late 1970s by the then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping along with the “normalization” of China’s relations with the US, significantly changed the interactions between China and other countries as well. With the “reform and opening up” throughout the 1980s, China developed trade relations with other countries (including the US and other developed major powers as well) and welcome their investment in China. China’s effort to increase its trade with and attract foreign investment from other countries remained throughout the 1990s, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Beginning in 1999, China encouraged Chinese companies to invest abroad with its “going out” policy while continuing to strengthen its trade relations and attract inward foreign investment. In 2001, with support from the US and other major powers, China was admitted to the World Trade Organization and formally integrated into the US/Western-led world economic order. This development, from China’s perspective, exemplifies the overall positive responses from other countries, especially those major powers, to its “reform and opening up” initiated in the late 1970s. Since 2001, China’s economy has continued to grow, and now it is the second-largest economy in the world in terms of its national gross domestic product (GDP), following the US only.

The change in the interactions between China and other countries from isolation and confrontation to engagement and interdependence has altered China’s perceptions of the international system and its status in it. The amazing economic development that China has been enjoying since that change of interactions has made China feel that the international system today is a positive-sum system where, while it is still dominated by the US, less-powerful, less-developed countries like China can still grow without severe tension with the dominant power. It has also changed China’s identity and its interests within the system, making China fewer incentives to rebel against today’s world order (especially the economic one) which, as China perceives, has brought it better than harm and therefore should be largely maintained or even strengthened. As a result, China has changed its attitude towards the US, the dominant power in today’s international system, from a very revolutionary one to a less revisionist one. In terms of China’s growing presence in Latin America, China has openly stated on different occasions that it has no intention to take over the US “backyard”. [lxxvii] For example, in the first-ever official US-China dialogue over Latin America that was held in 2006, China reassured the US it has no hidden plan to challenge the US influences over Latin America with its growing relations with the region. [lxxviii] The same reassurance can be found in China’s first white paper on Latin America published in 2008, as well as its second and latest paper on the region published in 2016. [lxxix] To China today, the most important policy goal of South-South Cooperation between China and Latin America, as well as other developing countries, is to work together to get the “win-win” benefits from the existing international system and to jointly fix the problems concerning the developing countries through the existing institutions in the international system instead of destroying the whole system once and for all. [lxxx]

Here, to a very great extent, the development of Sino–Latin American relations have been based not only on material interests but also on shared values. Among these values, being autonomous from foreign influences, especially those from powerful countries, is very obvious. This is a key element of the so-called Bandung Spirit derived from the Bandung Conference in 1955, where South-South Cooperation was emphasized and China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were included in its resolution. Since then, China has been depicting its relations with Latin America (and the “Global South”) as South-South relations and enthusiastically publicizing their shared memories of being repressed by the colonial/imperialist powers and then fighting their way to becoming independent from those unwanted foreign influences. However, although the two sides are still bound to each other today by that “Bandung Spirit” of South-South cooperation and anti-hegemonic tradition, the meaning of that spirit has changed to China since the late 1970s. While it was about working with each other to overthrow the hegemonic powers-dominated international system before, it is now about working with each other to thrive together in the same international system. More specifically, to China, South-South Cooperation between China and Latin America now refers to a joint effort to help each other find their own (non-Western) ways of economic development in the US/Western-led global market economy (instead of a united armed struggle to destroy the powerful dominant US and other Western countries in the international system once and for all). This less revisionist and economically focused attitude is revealed by the two policy papers on Latin America published by China in 2008 and 2016, as well as China’s behavior towards the region since the late 1970s, which I have discussed.

The systemic constructivist analysis that I have conducted in this section is summarised in Table 1.

Table 1 Systemic Constructivist Analysis of China’s Policy towards Latin America and the Global South.

Conclusion

From 1949 to the present day, with the change in the interactions between China and other countries, which brought about a change in China’s perception of the international system, as well as its identity and interests in the system, China’s policy goal toward Latin American countries (and the “Global South”) has changed from a very revolutionary and politically focused one to a less revisionist and economically focused one. While being rebellious used to be rational to China given its more pessimistic perception of the world because of its interactions with other countries from 1949 to the late 1960s (which involved international isolation and many conflicts), it is no longer rational with its new and more optimistic perception because of its interactions with others throughout the 1970s and thereafter (which has involved engagement and interdependence). Simply speaking, pursuing peace and maintaining the existing world order that has largely benefited China over the past four decades, especially in terms of its economy, has become a key national interest in China today.

Rebutting the findings of this article, those structural realists who believe that China is rising as a revisionist state might argue that China’s seemingly less revisionist policy goal towards Latin America (and the “Global South”) and its reassurance to the US about not challenging it in its “backyard” that I have discussed all involve nothing but a strategy to distract the US’s and others’ attention from China’s ultimate revisionist goal. [lxxxi] The guidance on China’s foreign relations left by Deng to his successors—that China should do “tao guang yang hui” (韬光养晦, staying low key and biding time) [lxxxii]–reveals that, according to the “China threat” theorists, what China calls its “peaceful development” is all but pretentious. Similarly, others might argue that, even if China is much less revisionist now, it will still become a very revisionist state in the future when it grows to a point where it has enough capabilities to protect its interests that it did not have the power to protect before. As a result, it will have more and more incentives and confidence to challenge the US whenever there is a conflict of interests between the two. China’s increasingly assertive behavior on the South China Sea, according to them, is a good example showing that China is moving away from that “peaceful development” to a more revisionist goal. [lxxxiii] If this is the case, China will eventually challenge the US in its “backyard” and beyond.

The aforementioned structural realist counterarguments stating that China is becoming (or will eventually become) more revisionist are not completely unreasonable. After all, a systemic constructivist interpretation of the rise of China (unlike those neoliberal institutionalist arguments that emphasize the role played by international law and organizations in creating, promoting, and maintaining long-term positive-sum cooperation) never rules out the possibility of China turning into a much more revisionist state again. Here, from a systemic constructivist perspective, how the interactions between China and other countries (especially the dominant and other major powers) will evolve is what matters. As my analysis has showed, the change in those interactions has resulted in a change in China’s policy goal toward Latin America (and the “Global South”) from a very revolutionary one to a less revisionist one. Therefore, it is likely that its policy goal might change again if the interactions change again for any reason. Here, how the “China threat” argument would play a role in changing the interactions between China and other countries (e.g. from engagement and interdependence back to isolation and confrontation) is worthy of more studies. As the “China threat” argument seems to become very popular again these days, one key issue worth addressing in a future constructivist analysis of the rise of China is whether the “China threat” will become or is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, not only in the US “backyard” but also all over the world. [lxxxiv]

Here, the Marxist political economy arguments are worth close attention. Marxist scholars of international relations see the international system as a global capitalist system where the “core” countries exploit the “periphery” countries, while the latter depends on the former. In Sino–Latin American relations, as Bernal-Meza [lxxxv] observes, with China importing raw materials and other commodities from Latin America and exporting manufactures and financial capital to the region, Latin America is becoming a “function of Chinese development” and its economic relationship with China is reproducing “similar models of subordinating and dependent complementarity that occurred previously in Latin America—in the nineteenth century with Great Britain and the twentieth century with the United States and other developed capitalist countries (Europe and Japan).” There are more and more debates among scholars and policymakers in Latin America about this issue [lxxxvi]: while some believe that the growing Chinese economic presence in the region is producing “win-win” outcomes as China itself suggests [lxxxvii] or can at least be new leverage for the region to deal with the US [lxxxviii], others argue it is leading to a “third phase of Latin American dependency”. [lxxxix] The US, referring to China, also openly stated in 2018 that “Latin America does not need new imperial powers”. [xc] From a systemic constructivist perspective, how Latin American countries and others view China as a new “core” for Latin America and then interact with it as well as how China responds to the label of neo-colonialism/imperialism and then interacts with others is worth more research. Here, how the inclusion of Latin America into China’s BRI since 2018 has affected (and will continue to influence) the interactions between China and countries inside and outside Latin America is a good topic for future studies.

Also, besides studying China’s relations with Latin America as a whole, more research is needed on China’s relations with individual Latin American countries. Latin America is not an economically or politically homogenous region. For example, in terms of their trade relations with China, as Oviedo [xci] argues, there are “winners” (like Brazil and Chile), “states with trade equilibrium” (like Uruguay), and “loser economies” (like Argentina). There is also an economic difference between Central America and South America: while countries in the former are more dependent on the US market for their exports, those in the latter are more dependent on the Chinese market. [xcii] A similar difference can be found in political issues. While there seems to be no significant alignment on the security and humanitarian issues between China and Latin America as a region [xciii], a study conducted by Strüver [xciv] reveals that countries in South America are much more likely to align themselves with China on these issues as compared to their counterparts in Central America, and among countries in South America, countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela are more likely than others to concur with China’s positions. Here, following the works by scholars like Strüver, it is also important to do more research on different issues with China’s relations with Latin American countries to see if China has more revisionist views and deeds on some issues than others. As mentioned before, according to Buzan [xcv], while China is accepting US/Western-promoted economic liberalism, it is still challenging the promotion of democracy and human rights by the US/West. More studies of how China deals with different economic and political issues in its relations with Latin American countries will give us an even clearer picture of China as a reformist, revisionist power in our world today.

With the suggestions for future research that I have discussed above, there is of course more work to be done on China as a rising power in the context of its relations with Latin America. That being said, as this article has demonstrated, systemic constructivism provides us with a good analytical lens through which to examine the rise of China. As this article has showed, interactions between China and other countries have influenced China’s perception of the international system, as well as its identity and interests in the system, which have affected its macro policy goal toward Latin America (i.e. a change from a very revolutionary and politically focused goal to a less revisionist and economically focused one). This process will go on and evolve as China continues to interact with countries inside and outside Latin America.

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[xvii] Harris, Richard L (2015b) China’s relations with the Latin American and Caribbean countries: a peaceful panda bear instead of a roaring dragon. Latin American Perspectives 42(6): 153–190.

[xviii] Dussel Peters, Enrique (2012) The auto parts-automotive chain in Mexico and China: co-operation potential? The China Quarterly 209: 82–110.doi:10.1017/S0305741011001494.

[xix] Harris, Richard L (2015b) China’s relations with the Latin American and Caribbean countries: a peaceful panda bear instead of a roaring dragon. Latin American Perspectives 42(6): 153–190.

[xx] León-Manríquez, José Luis (2016) Power vacuum or hegemonic continuity? The United States, Latin America, and the “Chinese Factor” after the cold war. World Affairs 179(3): 59–81.

[xxi] Yang, Hee-Yong., Seungho, Lee (2020) China’s engagement with Latin America and its implications for soft balancing against the United States. Asian Perspective 44(4): 587–615.doi:10.1353/apr.2020.0026.

[xxii] Shen, Simon (2012) Online Chinese perceptions of Latin America: how they differ from the official view. The China Quarterly 209: 157–177.doi:10.1017/S0305741011001524.

[xxiii] Jakóbowski, Jakub (2018) Chinese-led regional multilateralism in central and eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America: 16 + 1, FOCAC, and CCF. Journal of Contemporary China 27(113): 659–673.doi:10.1080/10670564.2018.1458055.

[xxiv] Wang, Hongying (2015) The missing link in Sino–Latin American relations. Journal of Contemporary China 24(95): 922–942.doi:10.1080/10670564.2015.1013380.

[xxv] Liang, Wei (2019) Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science 24(3): 433–449.doi:10.1007/s11366-018-09603-w.

[xxvi] Legler, Thomas., Mariano, Turzi,., Eduardo, Tzili-Apango (2020) Advancing autonomy? Chinese influence on regional governance in Latin America. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 27–53.

[xxvii] Harris, Richard L (2015a) Understanding China’s relations with the Latin American and Caribbean countries research. Latin American Perspectives 42(6): 27–41.doi:10.1177/0094582X15596725.
Jiang, Shixue (2006) Recent development of Sino-Latin American relations and its implications. Estudios Internacionales 38(152): 19–41.

[xxviii] Mao, Xianglin., Adrian H, Hearn,., Weiguang, Liu (2015) China and Cuba: 160 years and looking ahead. Latin American Perspectives 42(6): 140–152. Google Scholar | SAGE Journals.

[xxix] Jenkins, Rhys (2010) China’s global expansion and Latin America. Journal of Latin American Studies 42(4): 809–837.doi:10.1017/S0022216X10001379.

[xxx] Ministry of External Affairs, India (1954) Agreement on trade and intercourse with Tibet region. Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7807/Agreement+on+Trade+and+Intercourse+with+Tibet+Region (accessed January 17, 2021).

[xxxi] Office of the Historian, Department of State, US (n.d.) Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference), 1955. Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf (accessed January 17, 2021).

[xxxii] Gao, Charlotte (2017) China promotes human rights “with Chinese characteristics”: ahead of human rights day, China hosted a human rights forum for developing countries. The Diplomat, 12 December. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-promotes-human-rights-with-chinese-characteristics (accessed January 17, 2021)

[xxxiii] Connelly, Marisela (2006) China and Latin America: the economic dimension. In: Sebastian, Bersick., Wim, Stokhof., Paul van der, Velde. (eds.) Multiregionalism and Multilateralism: Asian-European Relations in a Global Context. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 105–130.
Jakóbowski, Jakub (2018) Chinese-led regional multilateralism in central and eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America: 16 + 1, FOCAC, and CCF. Journal of Contemporary China 27(113): 659–673.doi:10.1080/10670564.2018.1458055.
Jiang, Shixue (2006) Recent development of Sino-Latin American relations and its implications. Estudios Internacionales 38(152): 19–41.

[xxxiv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China (2016) China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml (accessed January 17, 2021).

[xxxv] Legler, Thomas., Mariano, Turzi,., Eduardo, Tzili-Apango (2020) Advancing autonomy? Chinese influence on regional governance in Latin America. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 27–53.
Liang, Wei (2019) Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science 24(3): 433–449.doi:10.1007/s11366-018-09603-w.
Wise, Carol, Victoria Chonn, Ching (2018) Conceptualizing China–Latin America relations in the twenty-first century: the boom, the bust, and the aftermath. The Pacific Review 31(5): 553–572.doi:10.1080/09512748.2017.1408675.

[xxxvi] Buzan, Barry (2010) China in international society: is “peaceful rise” possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3(1): 5–36.doi:10.1093/cjip/pop014.

[xxxvii] Iid.
Buzan, Barry (2018) China’s rise in English School perspective. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18: 449–476.

[xxxviii] Buzan, Barry (2010) China in international society: is “peaceful rise” possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3(1): 5–36.doi:10.1093/cjip/pop014.

[xxxix] Id.

[xl] Id., 18.

[xli] Buzan, Barry (2010) China in international society: is “peaceful rise” possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3(1): 5–36.doi:10.1093/cjip/pop014.
Buzan, Barry (2014) The logic and contradictions of “peaceful rise/development” as China’s grand strategy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(4): 381–420.doi:10.1093/cjip/pou032.
Buzan, Barry (2018) China’s rise in English School perspective. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18: 449–476.

[xlii] Id., 451-452.

[xliii] Strauss, Julia C (2012) Framing and claiming: contemporary globalization and “going out” in China’s rhetoric towards Latin America. The China Quarterly 209: 134–156.doi:10.1017/S0305741011001512.

[xliv] Ibid.

[xlv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China (2016) China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml (accessed January 17, 2021)

[xlvi] Johnson, Cecil (1970) Communist China and Latin America, 1959–1967. New York: Columbia University Press.

[xlvii] Id.

[xlviii] Johnson, Cecil (1970) Communist China and Latin America, 1959–1967. New York: Columbia University Press.

[xlix] Id.

[l] Ibid., 25.

[li] Id., 10-11.

[lii] Id.

[liii] Id., 214-215.

[liv] Id., 2216-217.

[lv] Ibid.

[lvi] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China (2016) China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml (accessed January 17, 2021).
USC US-China Institute (2009) China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: https://china.usc.edu/chinas-policy-paper-latin-america-and-caribbean (accessed January 17, 2021).

[lvii] USC US-China Institute (2009) China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: https://china.usc.edu/chinas-policy-paper-latin-america-and-caribbean (accessed January 17, 2021).

[lviii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China (2016) China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml (accessed January 17, 2021).

[lix] Bernal-Meza, Raúl (2020a) Understanding China-Latin America relations as part of the transition of the world order. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 1–26.
Bernal-Meza, Raúl (2020b) China and Latin America in the global political economy: the development of a new core-periphery axis. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 253–272.
Becard, Danielly Ramos., Antonio Carlos, Lessa,., Laura Urrejola, Silveira (2020) One step closer: the politics and the economics of China’s strategy in Brazil and the case of the electric power sector. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 55–81.
Strüver, Georg (2014) “Bereft of friends”? China’s rise and search for political partners in South America. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(1): 117–151.doi:10.1093/cjip/pot018

[lx] Liang, Wei (2019) Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science 24(3): 433–449.doi:10.1007/s11366-018-09603-w.
Yang, Hee-Yong., Seungho, Lee (2020) China’s engagement with Latin America and its implications for soft balancing against the United States. Asian Perspective 44(4): 587–615.doi:10.1353/apr.2020.0026.

[lxi] Id.

[lxii] Bernal-Meza, Raúl (2020b) China and Latin America in the global political economy: the development of a new core-periphery axis. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 253–272.

[lxiii] Liang, Wei (2019) Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science 24(3): 433–449.doi:10.1007/s11366-018-09603-w.

[lxiv] Becard, Danielly Ramos., Antonio Carlos, Lessa,., Laura Urrejola, Silveira (2020) One step closer: the politics and the economics of China’s strategy in Brazil and the case of the electric power sector. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 55–81.
Yang, Hee-Yong., Seungho, Lee (2020) China’s engagement with Latin America and its implications for soft balancing against the United States. Asian Perspective 44(4): 587–615.doi:10.1353/apr.2020.0026.

[lxv] Yang, Hee-Yong., Seungho, Lee (2020) China’s engagement with Latin America and its implications for soft balancing against the United States. Asian Perspective 44(4): 587–615.doi:10.1353/apr.2020.0026.

[lxvi] Legler, Thomas., Mariano, Turzi,., Eduardo, Tzili-Apango (2020) Advancing autonomy? Chinese influence on regional governance in Latin America. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 27–53.
Liang, Wei (2019) Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science 24(3): 433–449.doi:10.1007/s11366-018-09603-w.
Wise, Carol, Victoria Chonn, Ching (2018) Conceptualizing China–Latin America relations in the twenty-first century: the boom, the bust, and the aftermath. The Pacific Review 31(5): 553–572.doi:10.1080/09512748.2017.1408675.

[lxvii] Legler, Thomas., Mariano, Turzi,., Eduardo, Tzili-Apango (2020) Advancing autonomy? Chinese influence on regional governance in Latin America. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 27–53.

[lxviii] Id.

[lxix] Id.

[lxx] Johnson, Cecil (1970) Communist China and Latin America, 1959–1967. New York: Columbia University Press.

[lxxi] Wendt, Alexander (1992) Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization 46(2): 391–425.doi:10.1017/S0020818300027764.

[lxxii] Wendt, Alexander (1992) Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization 46(2): 391–425.doi:10.1017/S0020818300027764.

[lxxiii] Wendt, Alexander (1994) Collective identity formation and the international state. American Political Science Review 88(2): 384–396.doi:10.2307/2944711.

[lxxiv] Buzan, Barry (2010) China in international society: is “peaceful rise” possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3(1): 5–36.doi:10.1093/cjip/pop014.

[lxxv] Mora, Frank O (1997) The People’s Republic of China and Latin America: from indifference to engagement. Asian Affairs: An American Review 24(1): 35–58.doi:10.1080/00927679709602304.

[lxxvi] Ratliff, William E (1972) Communist China and Latin America, 1949-1972. Asian Survey 12(10): 846–863.doi:10.2307/2643063.

[lxxvii] Connelly, Marisela (2006) China and Latin America: the economic dimension. In: Sebastian, Bersick., Wim, Stokhof., Paul van der, Velde. (eds.) Multiregionalism and Multilateralism: Asian-European Relations in a Global Context. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 105–130.

[lxxviii] Paz, Gonzalo Sebastián (2012) China, United States and hegemonic challenge in Latin America: an overview and some lessons from previous instances of hegemonic challenge in the region. The China Quarterly 209: 18–34.doi:10.1017/S0305741011001469.

[lxxix] León-Manríquez, José Luis (2016) Power vacuum or hegemonic continuity? The United States, Latin America, and the “Chinese Factor” after the cold war. World Affairs 179(3): 59–81.

[lxxx] Kurlantzick, Joshua (2006) China’s Latin leap forward. World Policy Journal 23(3): 33–41.doi:10.1162/wopj.2006.23.3.33
Strauss, Julia C (2012) Framing and claiming: contemporary globalization and “going out” in China’s rhetoric towards Latin America. The China Quarterly 209: 134–156.doi:10.1017/S0305741011001512.

[lxxxi] Buzan, Barry (2014) The logic and contradictions of “peaceful rise/development” as China’s grand strategy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(4): 381–420.doi:10.1093/cjip/pou032.

[lxxxii] Zhao, Quansheng (1997) Chinese foreign policy in the post-cold war era. World Affairs 159(3): 114–129.

[lxxxiii] Johnston, Alastair I (2013) How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security 37(4): 7–48.doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00115

[lxxxiv] Paz, Gonzalo Sebastián (2012) China, United States and hegemonic challenge in Latin America: an overview and some lessons from previous instances of hegemonic challenge in the region. The China Quarterly 209: 18–34.doi:10.1017/S0305741011001469.

[lxxxv] Bernal-Meza, Raúl (2020a) Understanding China-Latin America relations as part of the transition of the world order. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 1–26.

[lxxxvi] Bernal-Meza, Raúl (2020b) China and Latin America in the global political economy: the development of a new core-periphery axis. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 253–272.

[lxxxvii] Bernal-Meza, Raúl (2020a) Understanding China-Latin America relations as part of the transition of the world order. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 1–26.

[lxxxviii] Liang, Wei (2019) Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science 24(3): 433–449.doi:10.1007/s11366-018-09603-w.

[lxxxix] Bernal-Meza, Raúl (2020a) Understanding China-Latin America relations as part of the transition to the world order. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 1–26.

[xc] Yang, Hee-Yong., Seungho, Lee (2020) China’s engagement with Latin America and its implications for soft balancing against the United States. Asian Perspective 44(4): 587–615.doi:10.1353/apr.2020.0026.

[xci] Oviedo, Eduardo Daniel (2020) China and Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay: similarities and differences. In: Raúl, Bernal-Meza., Li, Xing. (eds.) China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 193–224.

[xcii] Liang, Wei (2019) Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science 24(3): 433–449.doi:10.1007/s11366-018-09603-w.

[xciii] Wang, Hongying (2015) The missing link in Sino–Latin American relations. Journal of Contemporary China 24(95): 922–942.doi:10.1080/10670564.2015.1013380.

[xciv] Strüver, Georg (2014) “Bereft of friends”? China’s rise and search for political partners in South America. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(1): 117–151.doi:10.1093/cjip/pot018.

[xcv] Buzan, Barry (2014) The logic and contradictions of “peaceful rise/development” as China’s grand strategy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(4): 381–420.doi:10.1093/cjip/pou032.

.