Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Failed

Two weeks ahead of the US military’s planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, events unfolded quickly. On 15 August 2021, [i] the Taliban advanced from the country’s periphery to capture the capital, Kabul. The US and German Federal Army retreated hastily, leaving local collaborators behind. [ii] The Afghan National Army, meanwhile, dissolved as soon as the situation was destabilized. To make sense of how the work of two decades unraveled within days, it is important to understand not just the strategy behind the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) [iii] and Resolute Support, [iv] but why that strategy failed to tie up loose ends.

Winning local hearts and minds

When NATO took over the charge of ISAF from the US in 2003, violence surged as ousted Taliban fighters regrouped. Quashing the escalating insurgency was not possible through blunt military force; it required a new strategy. Against a backdrop of recurring insurgencies, US Military General David Petraeus developed a counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. [v] His was a modern approach to countering insurgents, loosely based on British colonial warfare.

The modern twist of COIN doctrine is that ‘winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous population subserves countering insurgents. It severs the counterinsurgents from their support and resources, in contrast with the indiscriminate crackdown common in colonial-style counterinsurgency.

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The German Federal Army’s central role in Resolute Support [i] was to consult and train Afghan security forces. It also pledged tactical support to the US where needed and to secure and protect German diplomatic and consular representation.

Germany’s involvement was conditional on US presence. [ii] It did not follow a distinct or independent COIN strategy. German military personnel even complained that orders from ISAF HQ were vague, confounded strategy with tactics, and often merely adopted from the US Army’s COIN manual. [iii] Mission goals, including governance and development, seemed elusive not only in the strategic doctrine but also to forces on the ground.

Militaries in too deep, and out of their depth

Indeed, none of the field manuals [iv] or tactical guidelines [v] define defined standards, or even clear indicators, for any goal concerning counterinsurgencies, handover to civilians, or governance. The transition from military-assisted democratization to civilian Afghan authorities is often incoherent and intangible. It is hardly surprising that key institutions, including the Afghan National Army, collapsed as fast as they did. Rather than standing on their own, foreign powers had been propping them up for years.

Through the COIN doctrine, military responsibilities stretched far into civilian domains such as the establishment of the rule of law. This, unfortunately, also came at the expense of building professional military and security forces in Afghanistan. Conversely, civilian democratization efforts continually neglected to connect the dots between military professionalism and democratic consolidation.

The Afghan National Army, much like the underlying Afghan society, has historic ethnic fractures between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and others. These pre-existing fractures eroded internal coherence from the get-go. Western armed forces lacked cultural or historical competencies to appropriately train or establish professionalism in the Afghan army.

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Resolute Support’s final transition from military-assisted state-building and democratization to civilian political agents was unrealistic even before the recent crisis unfolded. No one had sketched out how strengthening police and military forces would ultimately result in a rule of law where young and fragile civilian institutions could keep supremacy over older and more institutionalized military and paramilitary forces.

It was, in the main, foreign military forces which planned and led the stabilization process. Such a process could very well result in the same civil-military imbalances that have underpinned the stubborn democratic deficit across the Middle East since colonial independence.

Joining the dots between military and democracy

“Winning hearts and minds” served only to import Western foreign troops’ goals rather than to grow domestic institutions organically. Understanding the operational environment was a major aspect of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. But it was never truly applied to forge a system of governance that could survive historic legacies and ongoing instability. Instead, Western troops merely used it to combat insurgents more effectively.

Within a matter of days, the work of the last two decades collapsed like a house of cards. This was because nobody knew what type of democratic endgame they needed in Afghanistan to stick, regardless of foreign presence.

A minimal friction transition from foreign militaries to local political agents is hardly possible if the militaries implementing this transition are already struggling to plan concrete steps for a military-to-civilian handover. The US military and its allies had become so deeply entangled in Afghanistan’s stability that they couldn’t leave without the democratic achievements unraveling.

The failure of Resolute Support should concern scholars as much as policymakers. Nation-building, democratization, and military behavior are often studied separately. Likewise, policymakers compartmentalize these issues or focus on one at the expense of the others.

For most former colonies, military behavior—whether of foreign or domestic forces—plays a decisive role in state-building. Recent violent events in Afghanistan show how, ultimately, military behavior is also essential to a nation’s democratic survival.

[i] download-broschuere-afghanistan-data.pdf (bundeswehr.de)

[ii]200218-unterstuetzungsbericht-afghanistan-data.pdf (auswaertiges-amt.de)

[iii] Counterinsurgency‘ in der Bundeswehr: Konzeption, Interpretation und Praxis on JSTOR

[iv] Microsoft Word – FM 3-24 Working Edit.docx (army.mil)

[v] Microsoft Word – FM 3-24.2_20090330-APD Edit.doc (army.mil)

winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous population effectively severs it from support and resources

Notes

[i] Taliban take over Afghanistan: What we know and what’s next (apnews.com)

[ii] Germany’s Afghanistan Dilemma: What To Do With Local Hires? – DER SPIEGEL

[iii] NATO – ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived)

[iv] NATO – Topic: Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015-2021)

[v] How Petraeus changed the U.S. military – CNN