‘Forever Wars’?

Remy Maduit | Authors published

‘Forever wars?’
Patterns of diffusion and consolidation of Jihadism in Africa

Stig Jarle Hansen is a Professor in International Relations at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway.

Since 2001, the number of organizations that have declared allegiance either to Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State has exploded in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, under its former name, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), first had units operating in Mali as early as 2001. The organization swore allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2006, becoming Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The southern offshoot of this organization again merged with three other organizations: Al-Mourabitoun (an offshoot from AQIM); the mainly Tuareg-based Ançar Dine; and the mainly Fulani-based Katiba Macina to form the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), in 2017. Somalia’s Harakat Al Shabab was established in 2006 and declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012, the same year as Kenya’s Al Hijra. Boko Haram emerged in the years 2002–2003 and declared allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. The organization subsequently split into two, of which one part became the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP) in 2016. It absorbed another organization (at least on paper if not operationally), the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, in 2020. The other fraction of Boko Haram was led by the now-late veteran book Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, and its status is now unclear after the Islamic state killed the latter.

The Islamic State declared it had a Central African Province in 2019, displaying reports and photos from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and later in Mozambique. [i] The Allied

Democratic Forces (ADF) in Congo, created in 1995, today have affiliated themselves with the Islamic State, after Musa Baluku, the commander of the organization said that they belonged to the Islamic State in 2019, although this might have led to an internal split, with leaders such as Benjamin Kisokeranio leaving. [ii] Several smaller organizations that declared allegiance to the Islamic State were short-lived, like the Jabha East Africa, or relatively small and unstable, as the Islamic State in Somalia. [iii]

Other entities, such as the Burkinabe Ansarul Islam (announcing its existence in 2016), shared some of the ideological inclinations of the above-listed organizations. However, none of these organizations declared allegiance to either the Islamic State or to Al-Qaeda. Al-Sunnah Wal-Jamâa in Mozambique, created in 2007, today holds a relatively unclear role vs the Islamic State, although we know that the Islamic State takes responsibility for attacks conducted in areas in which it operates. The name itself is controversial amongst researchers, and not used by locals, who refer to the organization as Shabab. The Al-Sunnah Wal-Jamâa name will be used in this article to avoid confusion with the Somali Harakat Al Shabab. [iv]

The above-described developments have changed the landscape of African insurgencies and created many controversies in the research community. After two decades of rapid diffusion by jihadist movements in Africa, it seems timely to take stock of knowledge regarding why jihadism occurs in sub-Saharan Africa and its mechanisms of diffusion. The phenomenon is still ongoing. Understanding the factors promoting jihadism in Africa will thus be important to understand emerging jihadism in relatively new theaters.

The disagreements over sub-Saharan African jihadism are partly influenced by methodological challenges in researching the organizations in question. First, the limited field studies lead to many researchers basing their analysis on secondary source materials, press statements of international press agencies, or recirculating statements from workshops. The establishment of stringent risk assessment regimes increases these problems developed by research institutions that prevent researchers from conducting field studies. Given that researchers now must contend with COVID-19 travel restrictions, we will probably see fewer field studies in conflict zones in the future. [v] The lack of funding also makes field research in conflict zones difficult and statistics are often, as remarked by Jerven, unreliable. [vi] We have also seen so-called ‘conflict zone tourism’, where researchers travel into conflict zones, staying briefly in a safe zone protected by foreign military contingents, shielded from the local population, to say that they ‘ticked a box’. The consequence is that local voices become harder to hear, and the personal links between the organizations become harder to detect.

Second, field studies must be supplemented with a study of documents originating from jihadist organizations either online, through confiscations, through testimonies in courts, and, perhaps more neglected, through the local distribution of propaganda materials. Area-specific researchers have neglected such sources, which results in missed opportunities for source triangulation. An added complication is that some of these documents are in Arabic, a language that is unfamiliar to many Africanists. Of course, exclusive use of such sources presents the opposite challenge to seeing alliances and similarities between groups, where dynamics on the ground may be widely different. Lacking profound insight from fieldwork and/or other types of documents (interrogation reports, court testimonies, etc.) may often result in poor understanding and erroneous conclusions about armed Islamist groups.

We also see a disregard for local news outlets. Indeed, the use of these can be problematic. Local news outlets, even when biased or manipulated, can be used if the type of bias or manipulation is assessed, and/or when the material is triangulated with other sources. Indeed, detecting biased information could prove important. More than anything, recognizing the complexities of African jihadist organizations are often sacrificed at the altar of simplicity. Rather than acknowledging the existence of a situationally and contingently defined interaction of a variety of dynamics that enhance the growth of armed Islamist groups in Africa, researchers often search for a single cause. Rather than recognizing that different factors have different influences during the different phases of an organization’s life cycle, we often presume that the causes of group origins are the causes of a group’s stability, and as suggested by Hents, reducing our investigations to simple binary discussions. [vii]

Still, the academic study of African Jihadists has also seen a plethora of excellent books and articles written by the likes of Thurston, Marchal, Titeca and Vlassenroot, Sandor, and Benjaminsen and Ba, which are rich with nuance and important empirical details. [viii] We have also seen recent examples of excellent historiographical studies that treat sources with dignity and triangulate them, while simultaneously adequately treating ideological links and influences. [ix] Of course, this has not stemmed from disagreements between policymakers and researchers. This article analyses some of those disagreements, arguing that most times, the debate needs to move beyond dichotomous views, and identify commonalities across various sub-Saharan cases. This includes showing how global and local levels interact in the perpetuation of jihadist insurgencies on the continent.

The great debates

Since 2001, we have seen several debates between researchers focusing on sub-Saharan jihadists. In the early years after 2001, the first major debate focused on the likelihood that Al-Qaeda networks would spread to sub-Saharan Africa. Some commentators predicted that such a spread would include Al-Qaeda’s leadership’s displacement to Africa, enabling the group to launch attacks against Europe. [x] Conversely, other scholars argued that the political context of African countries would incur heavy costs that would hinder Al-Qaeda’s movement to the continent. For example, the group could become embroiled in local feuds and because of political pragmatism and shifting, allegiances common to ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state-related dynamics, not be able to manage the organization’s smooth entry into this unfamiliar terrain. [xi]

Both sides of the debate failed to predict the diffusion of Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations (rather than Al-Qaeda itself), and mutations of Al-Qaeda itself. Indeed, local affiliates gained much more importance in the Al-Qaeda network [xii]; sometimes, a global ideology mutated, often incorporating and being changed by local narratives, and being adopted to explain local conflicts and ideologies, and also local instrumental interests. [xiii] The local was essential in this process, which global forces adapted to their local necessities. Sub-Saharan African jihadist groups never attacked western states, although sometimes they argued for such attacks in their propaganda.

The second early debate was a discussion of the ungoverned spaces controlled by jihadist groups. While some researchers highlighted jihadists would establish themselves in spaces where state penetration was low or ‘failing’, [xiv] several other researchers pointed out that such ‘ungoverned spaces’ were seldom ungoverned. As Bøås, Cisse, and Mahamane maintain, distinct entities attempting to govern might rather contest newly arrived jihadist organizations. [xv] Other researchers referred to the cost of establishing jihadist groups in such areas, maintaining (erroneously) that this would deter diffusion. This has simply not been the case. [xvi] Finally, jihadist organizations in areas with a larger state presence, such as in Nigeria, Kenya, or Tanzania, were neglected both by researchers focusing on ungoverned spaces and their opponents, perhaps highlighting the need to study what governance and state governance is, the public provision of goods as personal security, services, and welfare, is it effective dispute resolution? [xvii] The absence of such functions has as suggested by Morten Bøås and Francesco Strazzari, as a hallmark of the Sahelian states, and is a hallmark of many other states as well, and has, as we shall see in the next section, been taken advantage off by jihadists, especially the lack of security for the local rural population. [xviii]

Here, both sides produced important insights: spaces are seldom ungoverned; jihadists can establish themselves in relatively functioning states, yet areas, where the state is weak seem to result in possibilities for these organizations to grow stronger. In this way, two (JNIM and Shabab) out of three of the strongest jihadist organizations in Africa seem to have emerged from civil war zones and areas with weak state control. The argument that these zones have governance structures, often through ethnic and clan-based institutions, is important, but perhaps cannot understand that the weaknesses and fluidity of such institutions might give jihadists an advantage when interacting with them.

While alternative governance structures definitively present challenges for some jihadist organizations, these entities have been able to operate in such circumstances, even embedding themselves into local governance structures. The resulting dynamics are often fluid. Often interactions between traditional governance structures have been limited to statements such as ‘Tribe x (or Indeed clan X, or ethnic group x) support Jihadist group y’. The relationship is more complex and dynamic. Sometimes, clans and tribes have attempted to manipulate a jihadi group, take it over, or employ the group as a tool against other enemies. In other cases, a tribe or group attempts to accommodate the group in question by sending recruits and resources to build goodwill, out of fear and attempts to avoid violence from the group (also gaining influence over the jihadists in the process), or even to gain predictability in daily life. [xix] Clan/tribal identity might overlap with a jihadist identity or may vary in importance in different settings. The social capital created by clan/tribal identity can also gain safety and support completely unrelated to jihadist ideology. [xx] Most times, the jihadists also view clan and tribal structures as unmodern and unreligious, and in need to be demolished but show pragmatism towards these structures since they are hard to eradicate. These various forms of interactions, in combination with the fluidity of clan and tribal governance structures and shifting or multiple allegiances (a person both being loyal to clan/tribe and jihadist organizations), create a dynamic field where changes can surprise observers, and where local knowledge is essential to understand current, but still temporary configurations.

Another great debate focused on the role of economic incentives. Researchers like De-Waal suggested one should follow the money by studying the illicit economic incentives for jihadism and jihadist support. This echoed an older approach to the study of African conflicts encapsulated in the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate of the ‘1990s and early 2000s. [xxi] Such a line of argumentation has its fair share of traps. First, the illegal economy approach does not address how jihadist actors come to legitimize their existence and that their illegal practices amongst local communities, neglecting income generation such as criminal acts to cause change, as practiced by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in the ‘1970s. ‘All about the money approaches’ tend to de-ideologize conflict, and structural and local grievances are left out of the picture. Indeed, those economic practices are anchored in ideological currents, and local traditions are also neglected. The very important dynamics characterizing the religious-ideological dimension, including the jihadist’s claim to overcome corruption and social segmentation (and therefore sustain social mobility), thus becomes neglected or simplified into a mere wish for personal profit.

Even mere instrumentalist jihadists must adhere to certain rules, or at least pretend to adhere to them, to appear as jihadists. In this sense, ideology remains crucial, as it even influences the behaviors of hypocrites and profit-seekers alike. [xxii] Third, as expressed by Lacher in the Malian, such an argument has often been used normatively to tarnish the reputation of jihadist actors, while neglecting the fact that local regimes and clan/tribal networks are involved in similar practices. For Lacher, the role of illicit money flows perhaps is overestimated. [xxiii] Fourthly, ideology and grievances might matter more in an early phase, where an organization exists as a small network and where hopes for a quick victory are stronger than in a phase where the organization is larger and has more income-generating opportunities for aspiring opportunists. Various actors within an organization might also have different motives. For example, if leaders, as well as followers, decide to join. Admittedly, there are many interesting and well-researched focuses on the political economy of jihadist networks, including the works of Briscoe, Bøås, Lacher, Raineri and Strazzari, Hansen, and Ahmad. Such approaches have indeed produced vital insights to better understand and respond to jihadists, but these only improve our understanding when applied in a way that accommodates a critical orientation towards ‘follow the [xxiv] money approaches. [xxv]

The most intensive debate in the study of African jihadists is the local vs. global debate. One side, often based in the terrorism research/ terrorist analysis environment, stresses the phenomenon’s global links, and another side, often based in the Area Studies research community stresses local factors, notably emphasizing structural grievances such as poverty, economic inequality, lack of access to power and security. This dichotomy is artificial, but in some ways can be useful. Interaction with traditional social groups like clans and tribes, and the embeddedness of local politics, was overlooked in global-leaning analysis. This led to simplistic and often inaccurate claims of organizations like Shabab moving into the north of Somalia, or Boko Haram venturing into piracy in the south of Nigeria without considering local dynamics. [xxvi] Given the recruitment patterns of the two organizations, amongst specific clan/tribal groups, and their ties with local grievances, such moves are hard to make and take time, often requiring existing networks in the areas in which the organizations are in question seek to establish a presence. Even when local networks exist, a move can be hard because of variations in the local ethnic composition vs. the initial ethnic composition of the jihadist group in question. Local offshoots often end up being locally recruited, with fewer members from the outside (although such members might hold important positions), creating profound local embeddedness.

There has been a diffusion of jihadist movements across many parts of Africa. Networks have spread, and armed groups have established connections that transcend borders. Some, not all, area experts had enormous problems accepting such links, even though the evidence was rather strong, as, for example, the links between Boko Haram and the Shabab. [xxvii] To a certain extent, the debate hinges on a difference in using sources, with globalists often referring to documents from court testimonies or confiscations, while localists focus on information collected through field studies. These divisions have often, but not always, involved political differences in the background of the researchers themselves. Several scholars have been arguing that the dichotomy itself is false and needs to be transcended. The interaction between local social structures, instrumental interests, grievances, and more global networks, financial flows, and ideas needs to be studied holistically. [xxviii] Marret, for example, convincingly suggested the term ‘Glocal’ to describe the embedded process in which global narratives interact with local histories. [xxix] A way to start such an exploration is to study the entrepreneurship of ideologically conscious individuals who are crucial in establishing local jihadist organizations with the help of external networks. As suggested by Ibrahim, conflict entrepreneurs often take advantage of local conflicts. [xxx] Bøås, Cisse, and Mahamane for example highlight how the Islamic State of West Africa/Greater Sahara integrate into local communities in Tilaberi, partly by employing the ethnic Fulanis inside their organization as a type of ‘ethnic bridge’, by appropriating local grievances and inter-communal conflict through a combination of coercive activities, and by offering basic services such as protection and the establishment of mobile Islamic courts. [xxxi]

It becomes misleading to see these entrepreneurs, as by necessity, being outsiders. The entrepreneurs in question can be locals, like the example of Malam Ibrahim Dicko, former leader of Ansarul Islam. Conversely, figures inspired by global ideological content, like Ibrahim ‘Afghani’ of the Shabab, have traveled out in search of allies. Still, other local leaders inspired by global ideas adapt them to local grievances and conflicts. Indeed, there can be an element of youth rebellion in these processes, with, for example, a local youth rebellion against older religious leaders in specific mosques. This situation has played a central role in both the case of the ADF, or at least its predecessor (having its origins in a youth rebellion in the Nakasero Mosque in Kampala), the founding of Boko Haram (having its origins in a youth rebellion against older religious leaders in the Indimi Mosque in Maiduguri), Kenya’s Al Hijra, (The Pumwani Mosque in Nairobi), and now also in the origins of Mozambique’s Al-Sunnah Wal-Jamâa (originating in a youthful rebellion in a Mosque in Nhacole). [xxxii] In this intersection between local and global currents, transnational channels of preaching and aid interfere, contesting the link between Islam and politics exemplified, for example, through the struggle between jihadist pious ‘warriors’ and more traditional religious authorities; on other times, we can represent it as co-opted by corrupted political authorities, as with both the Pumwani Mosque in Nairobi and the Nakasero Mosque. This struggle also takes the form of a struggle of rigorist, puritan Salafist constellations that occupy the public space, and contest traditional forms of Islam, often Sufists, but also other Salafist religious leaders. These contestations are often peaceful, as illustrated by the rivalries between Sheik Somow (Sufi) and Sheik Umul (Salafi) in Somalia, but as in the examples of the above Mosques, influence the founding of jihadist organizations, as well as jihadist entrepreneurs. In this sense, entrepreneurs might have local origins but are influenced by more global ideas as well. Contacts with other jihadist organizations might, if they occur, come later, or maybe be introduced through more loose networks.

The great debates highlight several points, notably the importance of spatial-temporal conditions and the dangers of reductionism. Factors at the macro-level influence both the environment that enables jihadists to flourish and the organizational dynamics of the organizations in question. The soil must be fertile for jihadists to exist. Networks must be created, and individual incentives to join jihadist organizations need to occur. As suggested by Bøås, Cisse, and Mahamane, an ‘enabling environment’ provides jihadists with advantages and deep-seated grievances will ‘provide the harbingers of such ideologies with emotional entry points’, yet the active ideological agency is also needed, and the such agency is often influenced by ideas transcending borders. [xxxiii]

Fertilizing the soil

There is also a relative consensus on several structural factors that contributes to African jihadism, including the role of civil wars and changes of power in facilitating jihadist territorial expansion, the role of previous tension and lack of security for the local population, and that jihadists can take advantage of these factors, and the historical occurrence of jihadists used as agents for other political actors. For example, perhaps civil war environments are extremely important to understand the inception and early successes of the Ancar Dine, the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali, and the Shabab. A civil war environment seems caused by political transitions, which sometimes opens space for jihadists to gain ground. Such was the case with the military coup in Mali in 2012 when Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted from power, or, as highlighted by Thurston, Idrissa, and Crone, the removal of Blaise Compaoré in neighboring Burkina Faso in 2014. [xxxiv] Perhaps Somalia’s Al Shabab was influenced by a similar transition, where the power of warlords in Mogadishu shifted to the power of the Sharia courts. Bøås, Cisse, and Mahamane suggest that disrupted and collapsing patrimonial networks, a consistent feature of civil war environments, could be to blame for the flourishing of jihadism in the west-African setting. [xxxv] Yet, beyond Mali, Burkina Faso, and possibly Somalia, jihadism has also enjoyed successes in contexts where political transitions and civil war have not been present. Smaller-scale conflicts are often attempted to be manipulated or internalized by a jihadist. [xxxvi] Jihadists have attempted to support specific ethnic groups to ‘jihadize’ ethnic conflict, for example depicting battles between the Kenyan state and Somalis from the Ogaden clan as battles ‘between Muslims and Christians’, or the conflict between Mali’s Dogons and Fulanis in the Mopti region of Mali as a clash of civilizations. [xxxvii] The ‘jihadization’ of ethnic conflict is, however, a complicated process that takes time and is sometimes rejected by the ethnic groups that jihadists attempt to co-opt.

In Burkina Faso and Mali, Congo’s Kivu province, the Borno province of Nigeria, and northern Mozambique, center-periphery tensions also fertilize the soil for jihadism. [xxxviii] Tied into the center-periphery dimension is the exclusionary political and economic governance practices of local or central state institutions. This is even an element that supported the growth of Somalia’s Al Shabab, wherein in 2006, the group was a part of the sharia court alliance, which had been excluded from the political process. The latter examples are important. Center-periphery tensions, exclusionary politics, and small-scale ethnic conflicts need not take place in a civil-war setting. They can take place in a country viewed by many as at peace. ‘Ungoverned spaces’ (which seldom exist) and civil war settings seem to enhance the possibilities for rapid jihadist expansion and territorial control, but they are not sine qua non in the spread of African armed Islamist groups.

A lack of individual security seems to be another factor that has influenced several sub-Saharan African cases. Sometimes, as in Somalia and Mali, jihadists protect civilians in vulnerable situations, while in other cases, the promise of such protection is promised, but never delivered. The lack of local security, both against government oppression, but also against criminal groups, was an important element in Harakat Al Shabab’s rise. Moral rhetoric was extremely important for Boko Haram in its pre-2009 inception, and writers such as Habibe, Forquilha, and Pereira suggest that this was the case for Ansar Al Sunnah’s early phase development in Mozambique as well. [xxxix] A ‘law and order agenda was also important for the Ancar Dine and AQIM in Mali, as well as with the Islamic State in West Africa/Islamic State in Greater Sahara, in border areas between Mali and Niger. These groups consistently offered to protect the local population against banditry and exploitation from the local business community. Ancar Dine, for example, published videos where they did price control.

The very institutions that are supposed to provide it can also deprive of local populations security. Sometimes, as in Nigeria and Kenya, outright police brutality has been claimed to be a major cause of radicalization. Differences between jihadism in Kenya and Ethiopia are, for example, blamed on the indiscriminate use of violence by the Kenyan police. [xl] Yet, claims in the latter case seem erroneous, as human rights groups repeatedly have reported severe repression by the Ethiopian security forces. [xli] Ethiopian ‘success’ in curtailing jihadism before 2019 seems to show that police violence can both work to suppress and be a factor that stimulates a rise in jihadism. Police abuse may be more important as a cause of jihadism in more semi-open societies and is of less importance in civil war contexts or strongly authoritarian countries with traditions of abuse and large-scale state surveillance. As suggested by Nesser and Gråterud, repression varies in its nature. It can target top leaders of jihadist organizations, entire organizations, target ethnic groups from which we presume jihadists to recruit, or police violence could be generalized. Nesser and Gråterud suggest that calibrated repression, basically being hard against the hard-core members of a group while being lenient at the fringes, and this writer might add to avoid targeting entire ethnic groups, is more efficient. [xlii] Regardless, police and security forces are often a major part of the problem and are a part of a larger lack of focus on individual security and insecurity, often in rural areas. It becomes a problem when local security providers see themselves as protecting the state or their positions rather than what their task is to act as service providers to the local population. Unfortunately, this error is often neglected in security and military reform programs. Kinetic operations and winning open battles seem to be a general priority rather than securing the local population.

The soil for jihadism can also be fertilized in more direct ways. Abdalla (2019) and Hansen (2019) demonstrate that states and African elites previously have seen jihadists as a tool for policy and sought to promote them, even promoting local legitimacy. Sudan’s policies towards Al-Qaeda in the early 1990s are a good example, as Sudan’s government used Al-Qaeda beyond a mere ideological agenda to support its strategic allies in the south and to even gain loans. [xliii] Similarly, Mali’s pre-2012 government saw AQIM as a useful block against both Algerian and Tuareg’s influence in northern Mali. [xliv] Although this might seem like a strategy of the past as the post-September 11th global environment focused on such links, this might again happen in the future as global attention changes to the China-US relationship, pandemics, and climate change.

As illustrated by the above discussions, even factors that are creating relative consensuses in the research community, such as the role of civil wars and changes of power, the role of previous tension, lack of security for the local population, and the historical occurrence of jihadists used as agents for other political actors need to be historically contextualized. Such factors could both be underlying causes for the start of a jihadist organization, but also influence its trajectory at later stages in its organizational history. They might have different effects in different stages of a conflict and be of more importance in some contexts compared to other contexts and historical periods.

Sowing the seeds: entrepreneurship

In various areas, several of the above factors have been present, but jihadist violence, as defined in this article, does not develop, like South Sudan and the Central African Republic show. The presence of an active network, or as the smallest denominator, some common global ideas and/or a local attraction towards them are needed for a conflict to see the entry of a jihadist actor. Ibrahim Yahya Ibrahim, for example, explores the ‘Jihadi Entrepreneur’. As argued by Ibrahim, ‘for a jihadist insurgency to emerge, jihadist ideology has to be appropriated by local Muslim activists—or “jihadist entrepreneurs”—who then use it to plan a more pointed discourse that resonates well with the local social and political demands’. [xlv] Sometimes, we see locals that have taken part in wars fought by jihadist organizations outside their state re-settling in their home countries and actively attempting to create new jihadist organizations. Cases include members of JNIM, Shabaab, and Ansarul Islam who also had such returning individuals. [xlvi] Ibrahim Malahim Dicko, the first leader of the Burkinabé Ansarul Islam, had a background in the insurgency in Northern Mal from 2012 to 201313 before he established the jihadist organization in Burkina Faso. [xlvii] Yet, Dicko personifies the complexity of such linkages, as his trajectory was defined by events and inspirations that took place before he left for northern Mali. Dicko launched an ardent critique of both local traditional Fulani leaders, and local religious leaders before he traveled to Mali. Indeed, there was an element of youth rebellion in his actions as he fought against what he saw as archaic interpretations of the Quran and the Hadiths, and unjust power structures, and saw the jihadist actors in Mali as having an answer to how to counter these problems. It is notable how many of sub-Saharan Africa’s jihadist organizations have connections to similar youth rebellions in mosques, where younger activists challenge older, more conservative sheiks. [xlviii]

Ideological paths taken following such events are confusing, and these organizations seldom adopted a fully global perspective. Rather, they merged global ideas of religious wars with local ideas of purity. We should remember that it has taken time for local Jihadist organizations to swear allegiance to external jihadist networks: for Harakat Al Shabab 6 years; for Book Haram, 13 years; for AQIM, 8 years; for Hijra 4 years. These facts should not be taken as proof of a lack of international connections, but as proof of ideological heterogeneity within some of these organizations, even to the extent of combining subgroups with both sympathies for the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and more local affiliations. Sometimes, such conflictual sympathies might even exist within the same person. It does, however, seem that a loose belief in Wahhabi-styled Islamic thought is a common denominator for most of these entrepreneurs. Profit or status might also intervene and motivate action, and even the funding of an organization, as could have been the case with Ancar Dine in Mali.

Some of these entrepreneurs will have old friends in older jihadist organizations and jihadist-inspired networks. Others might seek such connections at later stages, both for prestige and to gain international support. The confirmation of transferring €200,000 to Boko Haram from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in a period where the former organization was pressured can importantly highlight such connections. [xlix] International connections and existing networks were important for many organizations, but these connections are just a part of the history of the organizations in question. The most successful organizations in Africa emerged in a context that favored them and that was reinterpreted and ‘jihadized’ by entrepreneurs.

Watering the plant: explaining ‘joining’

How do these groups grow? How do they attract recruits? In the literature focusing on why individuals join jihadist groups outside the sub-Saharan context, some see members as reclaiming a lost identity in an environment perceived as hostile. [l] John Horgan explores socio-psychological dynamics between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. [li] He also states that emotional vulnerability, dissatisfaction with current political activity, identification with victims of violence, belief that the use of violence is not immoral, a sense of reward, and social ties in the radical group, amongst others, are very important factors for understanding how group members commit to violence. [lii] Ken Reidy highlights how membership in a radical organization can be driven by a positive wish to change the wider society. [liii]

Yet, the local context is different in sub-Saharan Africa, and we need more research on the projects conducted by Botha on recruitment in Kenya and Uganda, by Botha and Abdille in Nigeria and Somalia, as well as Ibrahim in Mali. [liv] Although not based on random sampling, and often drawing upon either defectors or prisoners of war who may be interested in appearing as little influenced by ideology as possible, these works provide insights into rudimentary causes of recruits joining sub-Saharan jihadist organizations. Botha and Abdille highlight the importance of economic incentives in their study of socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment, and poverty), yet their research shows that this was more important with Shabab than in the cases of Boko Haram and the ADF. [lv] This might be, as suggested by Hansen, because of the territorial control wielded by Harakat Al Shabab at the time that provided more income-generating possibilities for the organization, and more economic incentives for its members. [lvi]

The need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging function as important motivators for individuals joining jihadist groups. Importantly, religious motives might also both be influenced by a quest for collective identity, a need for self-esteem, and the beliefs themselves. Botha and Abdile show religious institutions were very important for Boko Haram recruitment, although only 9.24% of the former members claimed religion-motivated religious figures introduced them, and 29% of ADF recruits to the organization. [lvii] religion motivated In Botha and Abdile’s, and as much as 25% by religion in combination with other factors. When religion motivates recruitment, it is often (not always) not a deep and knowledgeable attraction to a specific jihadist creed that provides the strongest attraction. It is rather a loose understanding of ‘Islam’ as something ‘good’ in society, as an identity, as a sense of safety and security for the ‘self’, in a troubled world following the work of Noriss and Ingelhart. [lviii] It is also often a perceived threat to the religion that induces action. [lix] Although left out in Botha and Abdile’s research, it is also important to remember that religious and economic causes might be related, including the jihadist’s claim to overcome corruption and social segmentation, and therefore sustain social mobility also for poorer members of society.

Botha also highlights the desire for revenge, in combination with other factors, as the major factor amongst the recruits she interviewed. Ibrahim also highlights protection as a cause of recruitment, highlighting how individuals flock to jihadists for protection from security threats, often induced by other conflicts. We also see that networks and family are important in channeling recruitment.

Recruitment patterns are, as stated above, contextual and vary from person to person. There have been attempts in the past to create psychological ideal types for different recruits. [lx] Maan et al., for example, present four categories of recruits: identity seekers, justice seekers, significance seekers, and sensation seekers. [lxi] Identity seekers are mainly driven by a quest for social status and a need to belong to a social group, as highlighted by Botha and Abdille in their study of Boko Haram. [lxii] Justice seekers are those individuals who believe their social group is being treated unfairly and is less well off than it deserves, including, as highlighted by Botha, a feeling that their religion is under threat. This might also trigger solidarity with other jihadist groups. Events that counter these perceptions might be important triggers to deradicalize these individuals. Justice seekers may be susceptible to trigger factors, showing the inability of an extremist group to get its goal. A quest to feel personally important, primarily driven by significance seekers, to feel that you are ‘a hero rather than a zero’. Individuals who experience a traumatic event, such as the death of close friends or family, may feel particularly attracted to ideologies, which can provide more substantial meaning to their existence. Sensation seekers are those individuals who actively seek excitement and adventure. Most times where an organization has territorial or semi-territorial control (a situation where the jihadists are inferior militarily to their opponents, but where the latter has abandoned the quest to protect the civilians, leaving them open for sanctions from the jihadists), we might add another category: income seekers. Jihadist organizations can provide stable jobs. For example, when a person worked in Ancar Dine’s organization in Mali in 2012–2013, the latter could provide opportunities for gaining wealth and membership was potentially profitable. Recruits may be safety seekers: jihadist groups can offer protection in a dangerous environment. We have also seen many instances of forced recruitment, where a jihadist organization, or indeed an allied tribal/clan group, forces youth to join under the threat of violence. Last, Botha and Abdille identified a quest for becoming more religiously pious as an element in their study of recruitment to Boko Haram. Religion, which the organizations under study here claim to protect, can create feelings of existential security as expressed by Noriss and Ingelhart, which can create social bonds in conflict zones based on local trust in local religious institutions and their leaders. [lxiii] The same effects can occur in situations of poverty and where other entities, for example, states and tribes, become delegitimized because of exogenous pressures, as shown by De Bruijn and both Mali. [lxiv] Legitimacy can be gained through a generational rationale where organizational ideology becomes a mere excuse for youth rebellion, attracting support and legitimacy from youth who would have engaged in violence and radicalism anyway even without ‘Islam’: the Islamization of radicalism. [lxv]

As shown by existing research, the precise weight of various causes will vary from person to person and country to country. These variables might also vary in importance according to what type of territorial control a jihadist group or network in control wields. Hansen explains how a terrorist network living under the auspices of a stable and hostile state seems to be a less tempting employer than a jihadist organization that has controlled an area for a decade or more (as the Shabab in Middle Juba, Somalia). [lxvi] In this sense, the composition of these causes for joining might vary from cases where these groups exist as clandestine networks, where these groups exist openly with state support (a type that is rare today but has occurred historically), and where they exist as guerrillas, either with territorial control or with semi-territorial control. [lxvii] The above variables serve as a foundation for studying new jihadist insurgencies, such as what we currently see occurring in northern Mozambique.

Facing the drought: resilience

Another interesting fact concerning jihadism as a sub-Saharan phenomenon is its resilience. Contradictory to the early culturalists, who argued that local conditions were unfavorable to jihadists, these groups have proven to be resilient. While some groups have merged with others, or in the face of internal problems even split, most of the entities active 10 years ago are active today, and have been joined by newly emerging armed Islamist groups. The present-day organizations seem more stable than predecessors from the 1990s, for example, Eritrean Islamic Jihad, and Al Ittihad Al Islamiyah. [lxviii] The claims that they have defeated jihadist groups have been many, and erroneous, and false claims of jihadis leaders that have been killed have also been many.

This resilience has been overlooked, with factions being interpreted as more fluid than they were. [lxix] They have also been explained by pointing to the failure of counterterrorism strategies, even to the extent of claiming that such policies are a cause of the growth of such organizations. Wing and Charbonneau show how local dynamics are used to justify interventions to maximize foreign influence in the war’s name on terror, [lxx] or on how ‘the war on terror,’ actually has created many of the problems it set out to curtail, for example by preventing possibilities to negotiate with these groups. Hansen, Lid, and Okwany claim that ‘capacity building’ programs are viewed as a neutral political tool and implemented without taking politics and pluralism into consideration. These institutions become ‘de-politicized by capacity-building technocrats within the United Nations and Western states, and end up becoming institutions with no local legitimacy, or worse, as instruments of oppression that contribute to the growth of jihadism. [lxxi] As argued by Aggarwal, Joseba and Douglass, Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris, Robinson, Winkler and Hansen, and Lid, disengagement and deradicalization are concepts used by totalitarian, or semi-totalitarian, regimes, to address and change political opposition. [lxxii] Beydoun highlights how conceptualizations related to counterterrorism can contribute to anti-Muslim sentiments. [lxxiii] Deradicalization and increased emphasis on policing and military efforts could easily become an excuse to prevent political activism, democracy promotion, political dialogue, or the promotion of minority rights. These schemes can also justify avoiding pursuing deeper societal changes and can be a cause for increased recruitment, as stated in the last section. Yet, there have also been examples of how disengagement and deradicalization programs have been used by marginal voices and opposition forces to gain a voice and to gain influence. [lxxiv] The effects of such programs are often situational and hard to assess without deep knowledge of the local situation in which they operate, and might also depend on the awareness of implementers and donors regarding local problems.

Jihadist resilience is also linked to an overestimation of what military kinetics can achieve by bringing about victors in battles. Hansen highlights how many of the previous expansive phases of sub-Saharan jihadists, when they control large territories, have resulted in foreign interventions, such as the French intervention in Mali in 2013, Chad and other regional countries intervening in Nigeria in 2015, and the Ethiopian (2006), and later Kenyan (2011) and Ethiopian (2012) interventions in Somalia. [lxxv] Such interventions highlight how this changed the territorial control of the jihadist organizations in question, creating retraction and transformation, but never completely vanquished these organizations. It seems like the struggle against these organizations has transformed into ‘forever wars’: never won; just managed. For Hansen, the key to understanding such resilience is the way these interventions failed to take local security, meaning the provision of protection to a local population, into concern, allowing populations to be vulnerable to sanctions and threats from jihadist groups. As a result, local communities have had to accommodate the latter. Rural security for a local population becomes essential in understanding the failures of international interventions. Hoping to minimize causalities, it would strengthen a tendency to concentrate military forces in separate distinct camps or bases, as with Nigerian ‘super camps’ that isolate the army from the population. This base/camp mentality increases the likelihood of a lack of understanding from the military of the need to act as service providers to the general population rather than oppressors. It becomes essential to provide services to a local population, to ‘serve and protect’, for example through crime prevention or security provision, as suggested by Ahmad, Hansen, and others. As Bøås, Cisse, and Mahamane argue, if this is not done, jihadists might even ‘do it for you’ and generate local support from diverse groups (including local business actors) who need protection. [lxxvi] They might also, as suggested by Kilcullen, contribute to stability and predictability appreciated by locals. Sandor convincingly showed this and Campana and Benjaminsen and Ba, in the Malian context where jihadist groups have become protectors for diverse ethnic or clan-based communities. [lxxvii] This view goes beyond a traditional military view of kinetics as the solution to countering such groups, and beyond a traditional focus on development, income generation, and growth as a solution. The last 20 years of ‘War on Terror’ have shown that kinetics don’t work alone, as do the last 72 years of experience that ‘development’, a problematic concept is hard to achieve in the short term with the current strategies as promoted by development agencies internationally. This does not mean that pursuing kinetic military operations or development support should be neglected. Development efforts could, for example, help to reduce friction between social groups fighting over resources. But it suggests that addressing rural violence against civilians, also of the non-jihadist type, should be essential in the quest to stop jihadism in places like northern Mozambique.

At a micro-level, a lack of respect for the local context has led to a transfer of western disengagement theories. Western theories are often based on the North American/European context, often tailored to cause disengagement from small groups or clandestine networks without territorial or semi-territorial control. In this sense, many were ill-adjusted to sub-Saharan Africa and had somewhat mixed results. [lxxviii]

There are also large variations in who implement if it is the private sector, international organizations like the United Nations, or state-based, and the disengagement/exit arena has turned into a marketplace, where many companies and commercial actors strive for profit. The seminal work of Botha’s study of the pan-African efforts, and Vanda Felbab-Browns studying the impact on the interaction between jihadism and territoriality, suggests that Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs might be more valuable tools than western-style disengagement programs. [lxxix] Many of the most active African jihadist organizations have controlled territory over time, and have tools at their disposal that are beyond those of groups adhering to similar ideologies in Western Europe, Oceania, East Asia, and North. DDR programs thus become a more important tool in curtailing these organizations. [lxxx]

Yet DDR programs have been plagued by problems as well. According to Bhandari, security sector reform problems often hinder the DDR. [lxxxi] The DDR discussion is valuable, highlighting very important issues. For example, the need for baseline economic research before starting. Other problems that have been identified are work-programs training combatants for the ‘wrong’ types of civilian work, i.e. training for work that does not exist in the area. Economic advantages might create envy or ‘fake’ combatants who attempt to register for demobilization just to gain advantages. Lack of stable funding, the lack of cross-border mechanisms to handle militias that transcend borders, as well as a focus on output (militias demobilized) rather than outcome (how the combatants fare after the program), have been causing reoccurring problems. A tense security environment might also force DDR implementers to ‘Bunker up’, losing control and monitoring capacity over their projects, including providing security, to the demobilized soldiers, as well as to deradicalize and their families. [lxxxii]

While variations of territoriality and its interaction with the capacities of armed groups increasingly have been studied, the influence of territoriality on disengagement strategies is still understudied despite Felbab-Brown’s excellent article on the topic. We should also remember that not all African jihadists hold territorial or semi-territorial control. Some exist as clandestine networks as well.

Conclusion

So what does the above discussion mean for jihadist groups operating in a place like Mozambique or Tanzania? First, some of the same problems plaguing the study of other jihadist groups will probably plague the study of jihadists in these countries. The lack of proper field research because of security and funding-related issues will cause consequences like increased difficulty in hearing and evaluating local voices, and links between jihadist organizations will be harder to detect. Lacking profound insight from fieldwork and/or a disregard for other types of documents (interrogation reports, court testimonies, etc.) may often result in poor understanding and erroneous conclusions made about these types of groups. We also have to learn to nuance a ‘follow the money approach, to analytically separate between ‘war for profit’, where war is wielded for personal gain, from ‘profit for war’, where an organization invests in business to have access to resources and products for warfare, we also need to go beyond over-estimating the economic profit-seeking element amongst jihadists compared to local allies of the west, and understand that local grievances, ideology, and international networks actually matter, and avoid economic reductionist explanations, as well as understanding that economy and ideology sometimes interact in more complex ways than ideology just being an instrument for profit.

Yet, some lessons from the study of sub-Saharan jihadists should be taken forward, including how mono-causal explanations seldom exist, that jihadist organizations change over time, and that different factors have different influences during different phases of an organization’s life cycle. We often sacrifice the complexities of African jihadist organizations at the altar of simplicity. Analysis of the recent conflict in Mozambique needs to focus on a situationally and contingently defined interaction, considering the specific historical context, including center-periphery dimensions and ethnic tensions (we will probably see a jihadist reinterpretation of these conflict cleavages) but also explores the networks of the leaders of the Ansar Al-Sunnah. We also need to understand jihadist entrepreneurship to understand what makes the Ansar Al Sunnah’s leaders tick, what ideology inspires them, and their networks—including the international interactions affecting this conflict. We also need to acknowledge that religion does matter, but that it can function more than simply ideologically, but as an identity, a tool to gain group membership, and in creating feelings of importance for the ordinary rank and file of an organization. If the grip of the north strengthens, and semi-territorial control is achieved, we should also expect recruits to join for economic reasons, and because of the need for protection from both Mozambican and Tanzanian security forces, or even from the jihadists themselves. Indiscriminate government violence and lack of acknowledgment of the security needs of ordinary northern Mozambique and Tanzanian civilians is the key to the survival of the jihadist insurgency in Mozambique and Tanzania. Neglecting this will inevitably turn Mozambique into one of the ‘forever wars’ of the African continent, similar to the current conflagrations in Mali, and the insurgency in northeast Nigeria, and Somalia. It becomes a problem when local security providers see themselves as protecting the state or their positions rather than what their task is to act as service providers to the local population, and we have seen this already in Mozambique. Indeed, rural security has been neglected in the past.

‘Forever wars’ should not be forgotten. They might have a global as well as a regional and national impact. African jihadists have yet to launch attacks outside Africa. But they take part in global discussions. The continent is of symbolic value on the global jihadist scene, and they launch threats and encourage others to attack targets outside Africa. Civil wars also produce local suffering. The best way to counter this is to provide local solutions that cater to and acknowledge local grievances and interests, and to dismantle international connections. This also goes for the current fighting in Mozambique.

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[i] Hansen, Al Harakat Al Shabaab.

[ii] Candland, Finck, Ingram, Poole, Vidino and Weiss, “The Islamic State in Congo”.

[iii] Id; Morier Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in Mozambique, It should be noted that while ADF as an organization has failed to declare allegiance, we have seen videos of unknown groups in areas close to ADF’s areas of operations declaring allegiance to the Islamic State, as well as the Islamic State claiming attacks in these areas, this should not be taken as a sign of a general ADF allegiance.

[iv] Habibe, Forquilha, and Pereira, “Islamic Radicalization in Northern Mozambique, The Case of Mocímboa da Praia” claim that the term was initially used by the insurgents and rejected by the population. Prominent researchers such as Eric Morier-Genoud (in personal communication with the author) claim to never have encountered anyone calling the insurgents Al-Sunnah Wa Jamaat. Also, today the insurgents call themselves Al-Shabab as well as other more generic terms such as the faithful, mujahedeen.

[v] This development is in part due to research institutions’ fears of liability court cases should researchers be hurt, providing perverse incentives for researchers to conduct field research in dangerous areas during holidays or by allowing non-permanent staff to conduct such research.

[vi] Jerven, poor numbers.

[vii] Hents, «The multidimensional nature».

[viii] See Thurston, Boko Haram; Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War; Titeca and Vlassenroot, “Rebels without borders in the Rwenzori borderland?”; Sandor, “Insecurity, the breakdown of social trust, Benjaminsen and Ba ‘Why do pastoralists in Mali’”

[ix] For example, Bukarti, “The origins of book Haram”.

[x] See for examples see, Block, “Islamic Terrorists Have Found A New Home in South Africa”; Phillips, “Somalia and al-Qaeda: Implications for the War on Terrorism”; and Farah and Shulz, “Al Qaeda’s Growing sanctuary”.

[xi] See Menkhaus, “POLITICAL ISLAM in Somalia”; ICG “Somalia, countering terrorism in a failed state” For a summary of this debate see Hansen, Sahel, Horn and Rift.

[xii] Stenersen, “Thirty Years after its Foundation—Where is al-Qaida Going.”

[xiii] See for example Hansen 2013.

– Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013. 

[xiv] Rabasa. Boraz, Chalk, Cragin, Karasik. Moroney, O’Brien and Peters, “Ungoverned Territories”; Piombo, Terrorism and U.S. counter-terrorism programs in Africa: An overview; Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror”.

[xv] Taylor, “Thoughts on the Nature and Consequences of Ungoverned Spaces”; Bøås, Cisse, & Mahamane,” Explaining violence in Tilaberi, Insurgent Appropriation of Local Grievances”.

[xvi] See, for example, Watts, Shapiro, and Brown, “Al-Qaida’s (mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa”. A more multicausal version of this stand can be found in Newman, “Weak states, state failure and terrorism”.
– Watts, Clint, Jacob Shapiro, and Vahid Brown. Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa. West Point: United States Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center.51-69. 
– Newman, Edward. “Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 4 (2007).463-488. 

[xvii] Keister, The Illusion of Chaos: Why Ungoverned Spaces Aren’t Ungoverned, and Why That Matters.

[xviii] Morten Bøås and Francesco Strazzari, “Governance, Fragility and Insurgency in the Sahel: A Hybrid Political Order in the Making”.

[xix] See, for example Skjelderup, Ainashe & Abdulle, “‘Qare’Militant Islamism and local clan dynamics in Somalia: the expansion of the Islamic Courts Union in Lower Jubba province”; Skjelderup” Skjelderup” Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures: al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia,” 553–571 | Received 5 October 2018, Accepted 26 June 2020, Published online: 9 July 2020.
– Skjelderup, Michael W, Mukhtar Ainashe, and Ahmed Mohamed Abdulle. “Qare” “Militant Islamism and Local Clan Dynamics in Somalia: The Expansion of the Islamic Courts Union in Lower Jubba Province”.” Journal of East African Studies 14, no. 3 (2020).553-571. 
– Skjelderup, Michael W. “Jihadi Governance and Traditional Authority Structures: Al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia 2008-2012.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 31, no. 6 (2020).1174-1195. 

[xx] ICG. 2018. “Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram.” International Crisis Group Report N 241. 

[xxi] De Waal, Alex. “Somalia Synthesis Paper.” Somalia Synthesis Paper (2017).3-25. 

[xxii] Hansen, Stig Jarle, Atle Mesøy, and Tuncay Karadas. Borders of Islam: Exploring Samuel Huntington’s Faultlines, from Al-Andalus to Virtual Ummah. London: Hurst, 2009. 

[xxiii] Lacher, Wolfram. 2013. “Challenging the Myth of the Drug-Terror Nexus in the Sahel.” West Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD) Report. 

[xxiv] Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift, the Fault Lines of African Jihad. London: Hurst, 2019. 

[xxv] Bøås, “Crime, Cooping and Resistance”; Briscoe, “Crime after jihad”; Hansen, “Civil war economies”; Raineri and Strazzari, “State, Secession and Jihad’; and Ahmed, “The security Bazar”.
– Bøås, Morten. “Crime, Coping, and Resistance in the Mali-Sahel Periphery.” African Security 8, no. 41-17. 
– Briscoe, Ivan. 2014. “Crime after Jihad: Illicit Business in Post-conflict Mali.” CRU Report. 
– Hansen, Stig Jarle. 2007. “Civil War Economies, the Hunt for Profit and the Incentives for Peace.” AE Working paper nr 1. 
– Raineri, Luca, and Francesco Strazzari. “State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali.” African Security 8, no. 4 (2015).249-271. 
– Ahmad, Aisha. “The Security Bazaar.” International Security 39, no. 3.89-117 

[xxvi] For examples of such argumentation, see Yara” Somalia’s al Shabaab, squeezed in south, move to Puntland”; Lah and Johnston, “Kidnapped ship’s captain told ransoms may be funneled to Boko Haram”.
– Lah, Kyung, and Kathleen Johnston. 2014. “Kidnapped Ship’s Captain Told Ransoms May Be Funneled to Boko Haram.” CNN, June 25. 

[xxvii] A Link confirmed by many Sources. As a recent interview made by the writer Interview with *Osman’, former sub-leader in Shabaabs international office 1 May 2020 and previous research in hospitals in Mogadishu during the period of Shabaab territorial control. Notably, both Boko Haram and the Shabaab, and the Nigerian and Somali government maintained that these links existed in the past, see Staff writer, “Boko Haram import militias from Somalia”; Staff Writer, “Nigeria says Boko Haram, Al Qaeda link behind UN Attack”; Staff Writer, “All Shabab says it will cooperate with Al Qaeda’s new leader”. For a statement from the Somali police see Bustari, “Boko Haram sought terror training in Somalia, security chief says”.
– Staff Writer. 2011. “Boko Haram Import Militias from Somalia.” The Nigerian Voice, June 6. accessed 1 January 2021. https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/54024/boko-haram-import-militias-from-somalia-vows-fiercer-attack.html 
– Staff Writer. 2011. “Nigeria Says Boko Haram, Al Qaeda-link behind U.N. Attack.” Reuters, August 31.accessed 5 January 2021. http://ndwgnews.blogspot.com/2011/08/nigeria-says-boko-haram-al-qaeda-link.html 
– Staff Writer. 2011. “Al Shabab Says It Will Cooperate with Al Qaeda’s New Leader.” All Africa, July 17. Accessed 3 January 2021 https://allafrica.com/stories/201106171119.html 
– Bukarti, Audu B. “The Origins of Boko Haram-And Why It Matters.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, January (2020).1-53. 

[xxviii] Hents, James J. “The Multidimensional Nature of the Boko Haram Conflict.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 29 (2018): 5–6. 
Bukarti, Audu B. “The Origins of Boko Haram-And Why It Matters.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, January (2020).1-53. 
Marret, Jean-Luc. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A ‘Glocal’ Organization.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 6 (2008).541–52. 
Filiu, Jean-Pierre. “The Local and Global Jihad of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.” Middle East Journal 63 (2009): 2. 

[xxix] Marret, Jean-Luc. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A ‘Glocal’ Organization.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 6 (2008).541–52. 

[xxx] Ibrahim, Ibrahim Y. “The Wave of Jihadi Insurgency in West Africa: Global Ideology, Local Context, Individual Motivations.” Hérodote 172, no. 1 (2019).87-100. 

[xxxi] Bøås, Morten, Abdoul Wakhab Cisse, and Laouali Mahamane. “Explaining Violence in Tilaberi, Insurgent Appropriation of Local Grievances.” The International Spectator 55 (2020): 4. 

[xxxii] Morier-Genoud, Eric. “The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique: Origins, Nature and Beginning.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 14, no. 3 (2020).396-412. 

[xxxiii] Bøås, Morten, Abdoul Wakhab Cisse, and Laouali Mahamane. “Explaining Violence in Tilaberi, Insurgent Appropriation of Local Grievances.” The International Spectator 55 (2020): 4. 

[xxxiv] Thurstone,” Escalating Conflicts in Burkina Faso”;
Idrissa, Thiam. “Tinder to the Fire, Burkina Faso in the Conflict Zone.” RLS Research Papers on Peace and Conflict Studies in West and Central Africa (2019): 2.1-54. 
Crone, Mannie. “The Rise of Jihadi Militancy in Burkina Faso.” In Expanding Jihad: How Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Find New Battlefields, edited by Mona Kanwal Sheikh. Copenhagen: DIIS, 2017.23-35 

[xxxv] Bøås, Morten, Abdoul Wakhab Cisse, and Laouali Mahamane. “Explaining Violence in Tilaberi, Insurgent Appropriation of Local Grievances.” The International Spectator 55 (2020): 4. 

[xxxvi] Bleck, Jaimie, Abdoulaye Dembele, and Sidiki Guindo. “Malian Crisis and the Lingering Problem of Good Governance.” Stability 15, no. 1 (2016).1-18. 
Lackenbauer, Helené, Tham Lindell Magdalena, and Gabriell Ingerstad.2015. “If Our Men Won’t Fight, We Will.” FOI-R 4121-SE. 
ICG. 2016. “The Niger-Mali Border: Subordinating Military Action to a Political Strategy.” International Crisis Group Report N 261. 
Lecoq, Baz, and Georg Klute. “Tuareg Separatism in Mali.” International Journal 68, no. 3 (2013).424-434. 
Raineri, Luca, and Francesco Strazzari. “State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali.” African Security 8, no. 4 (2015).249-271. 
Dowd, Caitriona, and Clionadh Raleigh. “The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel.” African Affairs 112 (2013): 448. 
Benjaminsen, Tor A., and Ba Boubacar. “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups? A Political Ecological Explanation.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 46, no. 1 (2019).1-20. 

[xxxvii] Benjaminsen, Tor A., and Ba Boubacar. “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups? A Political Ecological Explanation.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 46, no. 1 (2019).1-20. 

[xxxviii] De Bruijn, Mirjam, and Jonna Both “Youth between State and Rebel (Dis) Orders: Contesting Legitimacy from below in Sub-Sahara Africa.” 

[xxxix] Habibe, Saide, Salvador Forquilha, and Joa Pereira. 2019. “Islamic Radicalization in Northern Mozambique, the Case of Mocímboa da Praia.” Cadernos IESE nº17/2019. 

[xl] De Montclos, Marc-Antoine P. “A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016).878-895. 

[xli] See for example, Human Rights Watch, “Journalism Is Not a Crime”; Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown”; Human Rights Watch, “Fuel on the Fire”.

[xlii] Nesser, Petter, and Henrik Gråtrud. “When Conflicts Do Not Overspill: The Case of Jordan.” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 15 (2019).492-506. 

[xliii] Hansen, Rift, Sahel, Horn

[xliv] Abdalla, “Fighting the Enemies of God: The Rise of and the Response to Violent Extremism in Sudan” Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift, the Fault Lines of African Jihad. London: Hurst, 2019. 

[xlv] Ibrahim, Ibrahim Y. “The Wave of Jihadi Insurgency in West Africa: Global Ideology, Local Context, Individual Motivations.” Hérodote 172, no. 1 (2019).87-100. 

[xlvi] Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift, the Fault Lines of African Jihad. London: Hurst, 2019. 

[xlvii] Le Roux, Pauline. “Ansaroul Islam: The Rise and Decline of a Militant Islamist Group in the Sahel.” Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 29, July (2019).

[xlviii] Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift, the Fault Lines of African Jihad. London: Hurst, 2019. 

[xlix] Thurston, Alex. Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. 

[l] Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja.2013. “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9.797-814. 

[li] Horgan, John. “Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis.” In Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement, edited by John Horgan and Tore Bjørgo. New York: Routledge, 2008.17–29. 

[lii] Id.

[liii] Reidy, Ken. “Benevolent Radicalization: An Antidote to Terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 4 (2019).1-13. 

[liv] Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. “Reality versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 5 (2019).493- 519. 
Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. 2014. “Radicalization and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia.”, ISS PAPER 266. 
Botha, Anneli. “Radicalization to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: A Political Socialization Perspective.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. No (2015): 5. 
Ibrahim, Ibrahim Y. “The Wave of Jihadi Insurgency in West Africa: Global Ideology, Local Context, Individual Motivations.” Hérodote 172, no. 1 (2019).87-100. 

[lv] Botha and Abdile, “Radicalization and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia’; 27% of their respondents reported that they joined for economic reasons in the case of Somalia; 25 for a combination of religious and economic reasons, in the case of Nigeria, only 15.13% of former fighters reported that poverty played a role, in the case of ADF only 14%; However, in the latter study, the Shabaab percentage is said to be 4%, with an additional 6% claiming that economic reasons were in combination with other reasons.
– Botha, Anneli. “Radicalization to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: A Political Socialization Perspective.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. No (2015): 5. 
– Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. “Reality versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 5 (2019).493- 519. 
– Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. “Reality versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 5 (2019).493- 519. 

[lvi] Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift, the Fault Lines of African Jihad. London: Hurst, 2019. 

[lvii] Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. “Reality versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 5 (2019).493- 519. 

[lviii] Noriss, Pippa, and Ronald Ingelhart. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 

[lix] Botha, Anneli. “Radicalization to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: A Political Socialization Perspective.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. No (2015): 5. 

[lx] MacDougall, Alex I., Jaap van der Veen, Allan R Feddes, Lars Nickolson, and Bertjan Doosje. “Different Strokes for Different Folks: The Role of Psychological Needs and Other Risk Factors in Early Radicalization.” International Journal of Developmental Science 12, no. 1–2 (2018).37-50. 
Venhaus ‘Why youth join al-Qaeda’ 2010;
Nesser, Petter. Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History. London: Hurst, 2015. 
For examples from the right-wing radicalization literature se Willems, Helmut. Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt: Einstellungen Täter Konflikteskalation. Berlin: Leske+Budrich, 1993. 
Willems, Helmut. “Development Patterns and Causes of Violence against Foreigners in Germany: Social and Biographical Characteristics of Perpetrators and the Process of Escalation.” Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 1 (1995).300-312. 

[lxi] Maan, Liesbeth, Lars Nickolson, Allard R. Feddes, Bertjan Doosje, and Fathali M. Moghaddam. “Exploring the Viability of Phase-based Models in (De)radicalization.” In Routledge’s Handbook of Deradicalization and Disengagement, edited by Stig J Hansen and Stian Lid. London: Routledge, 2020.41-54. 

[lxii] Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. 2014. “Radicalization and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia.”, ISS PAPER 266. 

[lxiii] Noriss, Pippa, and Ronald Ingelhart. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 

[lxiv] De Bruijn, Mirjam, and Jonna Both “Youth between State and Rebel (Dis) Orders: Contesting Legitimacy from below in Sub-Sahara Africa.” 

[lxv] Smith, Lee. 2016. “Terror and a Generation of Nihilists, a Conversation with Olivier Roy.” Weekly Standard Online, October 19. 

[lxvi] Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift, the Fault Lines of African Jihad. London: Hurst, 2019.  Rift.

[lxvii] Id.

[lxviii] Id.

[lxix] For example, De Waal,
De Waal, Alex. “Somalia Synthesis Paper.” Somalia Synthesis Paper (2017).3-25. 

[lxx] De Wing, Susanna. “French Intervention in Mali: Strategic Alliances, Long-term Regional Presence?” Small Wars and Insurgencies 27, no. 1.59-80. 
Charbonneau, Bruno. “Intervention in Mali: Building Peace between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 35, no. 4.415-431. 

[lxxi] Hansen, Stig J., Stian Lid, and Clifford Collins Okwany. “Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia and Kenya: Actors and Approaches.” NIBR Working Paper (2019): 106.1-330. 

[lxxii] Aggarwal, Neil K. “Mental Discipline, Punishment and Recidivism: Reading Foucault against Deradicalization Programmes in the War on Terror.” Critical Studies of Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2013).262-278. 
Smyth, Marie Breen, Jeroen Gunning, Jackson Richard, George Kassimeris, and Piers Robinson. “Critical Terrorism Studies – An Introduction.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (2008).1-4. 
Winkler, Carol. In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the post-World War II Era. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 

[lxxiii] Beydoun, Khaled A. American Islamophobia: Understanding the Roots and Rise of Fear. Oakland: University of California Press, 2018. 

[lxxiv] Gelot, Linnea, and Stig J. Hansen. “They are from within Us: CVE Brokerage in South-central Somalia.” Conflict, Security & Development 19 (2019): 6. 
Hansen, Stig J., Stian Lid, and Clifford Collins Okwany. “Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia and Kenya: Actors and Approaches.” NIBR Working Paper (2019): 106.1-330. 

[lxxv] Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift, the Fault Lines of African Jihad. London: Hurst, 2019. 

[lxxvi] Ahmad, Aisha. Jihad & Co, Black Markets and Islamist Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
Bøås, Morten, Abdoul Wakhab Cisse, and Laouali Mahamane. “Explaining Violence in Tilaberi, Insurgent Appropriation of Local Grievances.” The International Spectator 55 (2020): 4. 

[lxxvii] Benjaminsen, Tor A., and Ba Boubacar. “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups? A Political Ecological Explanation.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 46, no. 1 (2019).1-20. 
Sandor, Adam, and Aurelie Campana. “Les groupes djihadistes au Mali, entre violence, recherche de légitimité et politiques locales.” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 53, no. 3.415-430. 
Kilcullen, David. 2013. Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla. Hurst: London. 

[lxxviii] Zeuthen, Marthine. “Disengagement and Preventing/ Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa.” In Routledge’s Handbook of Deradicalization and Disengagement, edited by Stig J Hansen and Stian Lid. London: Routledge, 2020. 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “DDR in the Context of Offensive Military Operations, Counterterrorism, CVE and Non-Permissive Environments Key Questions, Challenges, and Considerations.” In UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? edited by James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, technical report, 2015.36-59 

[lxxix] Id.
Botha, Anneli. “African Union Initiatives to Counter-Terrorism and Develop Deradicalization Strategies.” In Routledge’s Handbook of Deradicalization and Disengagement, edited by Stig J Hansen and Stian Lid. London: Routledge, 2020.1-18. 

[lxxx] Hansen, “Unity in the name of Allah?”

[lxxxi] Bhandari, Pitambar. “Integration Issue of Ex-combatants in Nepal: Provisions and Prospects.” Journal of Conflict and Public Policy 1 (2014): 1. 

[lxxxii] Egeland, Jan, Adele Harmer, and Aby Stoddard. “To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments.” Policy and Studies Series (2011).1-79. 

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