Military integration and intelligence capacity

Remy Maduit | Authors published

Military integration, the combining of state and non-state troops within existing or new state security forces, is a common practice during and after civil wars, and one prompted by international actors. [i] Military integration took place in 34 cases of civil war resolution from 1945 to 1999, after both negotiated settlements and military victories, including in about one-third of cases in the 1990s [ii], and about 40% of the 128 civil war settlements from 1945 to 2006 included military integration provisions. [iii]

A recent examination of military integration’s record in post-civil war peacebuilding concluded that integration is not clearly and systematically linked to preventing conflict recurrence or preventing the emergence of a new war; in cases of military integration ‘success’ where war does not return, concurrent political factors bias toward sustaining peace. [iv] Existing evidence is mixed, and it is unclear if the mechanisms through which we posit military integration to contribute to achieving and maintaining peace are generalizable across conflict settings or hold independent causal power. [v] Resolving this question is a major challenge of the military integration research agenda, but here I highlight one previously under-explored potential effect of military integration that might increase the likelihood of conflict resolution and longer-term peace: improved information and intelligence capacity in integrated forces.

I discuss intelligence and local knowledge’s near-absence from the military integration literature, and I present a theoretical justification for how military integration can improve the intelligence capacity of integrated forces, potentially resulting in faster conflict resolution or a more sustained peace. I argue that military integration of ex-rebels can improve intelligence capacity through gains in three complementary factors: 1) knowledge of human and physical geography; 2) preexisting social ties and potential informants; and 3) knowledge of rebel tactics, government counterinsurgency tactics, and reasons for their success or failure.

I then examine the empirical record of how military integration has improved intelligence capacity in a variety of civil wars and post-civil war environments, with briefcase studies of the Philippines, Uganda, and Rwanda. I focus on cases in which security forces facing intelligence weaknesses in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution efforts could overcome them by integrating ex-rebels. This focus on successful cases is to show the plausibility of the mechanism, but in the discussion and conclusion, I also examine potential negative cases where, rather than yielding improved intelligence capacity, military integration contributed to information leakage or defection.

Military integration is often a component of internationally brokered peace agreements, yet governments also decide on integration as their strategy, independent of international facilitation or pressure. I focus on three cases of ‘autonomous development’ of military integration [vi] to show that integration can lead to improvements in intelligence capacity even in the absence of the external help or supervision of forces that might be seen as necessary to overcome commitment problems. Within these cases, there is variation across regime types and the number of challenges faced by the governments.

The Philippines offers a case of adoption of military integration by a democratically elected government facing multiple simultaneous rebellions and splinters and is also the case examined by the only study of which I know that explicitly discusses in-depth the potential benefits of integration for intelligence and improved counterinsurgency efficacy. [vii] Uganda similarly saw the autonomous and repeated use of the current National Resistance Movement government of military integration across multiple insurgencies. However, this was a government that, in contrast to the Philippines, came to power as victorious rebels and established an authoritarian (and now competitive authoritarian) political system. Uganda is also a case with which I was familiar, and the case study draws on archival research conducted in 2016 at the Centre for Basic Research, the Parliamentary Library, and Makerere University. We selected the Rwandan case as a similar case to Uganda in that the current authoritarian Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government came to power through rebel victory. The RPF government has faced one main rebellion against it, though, and Rwanda is a hard case for the embrace of military integration: the RPF came to power in an intensely violent civil war against government forces committing genocide, who then fled into exile and continued fighting, now as rebels.

From this brief analysis, I inductively derive hypotheses for testing in future studies, outlining directions for a research agenda on military integration’s effects on intelligence capacity and through it on military effectiveness, conflict resolution, and peace duration. Finally, I discuss policy implications, and also information leakage as a serious potential downside of military integration for intelligence capacity.

Existing literature

The comparative literature on the implementation, effects, and effectiveness of military integration after civil wars is providing a broader base of evidence against which to evaluate military integration’s role in peacebuilding and prevention of civil war recurrence. [viii] Cross-national quantitative studies have examined factors affecting military integration’s inclusion in peace agreements [ix]; effects of integration on the likelihood of peace agreement signing and/or implementation to end a civil war [x]; and whether partially or fully implemented agreements produce sustained peace or conflict recurrence. [xi] Military integration is suggested to be especially helpful as a strategy in civil wars in which a government is facing multiple rebel groups, since ending the conflict in one dyad can allow a government to concentrate on combatting remaining rebels [xii], now with increased forces, [xiii] though the peace process itself may lead the integrated group to splinter, with some members joining the state security forces and others returning to the field as insurgents in a fragment of the original group or by joining with other rebel organizations. [xiv]

Comparative case studies have explored military integration’s role in peace agreement implementation and peace duration, offering mixed evidence on when integration improves the chances of conflict resolution and sustaining peace. [xv] Single-case studies have detailed the development and implementation of military integration policies and their relative effectiveness in building peace and constructing more capable militaries. [xvi]

Synthesizing the literature’s lessons, Licklider [xvii] suggests that military integration could prevent civil war recurrence and sustain peace—both avoiding integrated rebel groups rebelling again and reducing the severity or preventing the emergence of other conflicts—through three mechanisms: 1) the presence within the integrated military of individuals or units from different factions increasing the sense of security for factions’ fighters or their popular constituencies; 2) employing and providing financial security to demobilized fighters who might otherwise use or offer their skills as ‘specialists in violence’ to return to war; and 3) offering security to society overall, increasing the likelihood of socioeconomic and political development that can improve state capabilities and reduce incentives to rebel.

Rarely, however, do the works cited above mention intelligence as an aspect or potential benefit of military integration. Krebs and Licklider [xviii] only mention intelligence once, discussing some militaries’ desire to segregate units to isolate newly integrated former enemies from sensitive intelligence roles. [xix] The chapters in Licklider’s [xx] edited volume rarely mention intelligence, and never examine intelligence as a factor significantly affected by military integration. ‘Information’ is primarily discussed as a factor in the commitment problems inherent in reaching and implementing a settlement. [xxi] Other studies similarly do not address the potential effects of military integration on intelligence capacity. [xxii] Driscoll mentions that integration ‘brings soldiers with knowledge of the terrain and tactics,’ but does not explore this point further. [xxiii] Baaz and Verweijen discuss integration’s effects on intelligence capacity, though only in a negative case, where integrees were leaking intelligence. [xxiv] The primary exception to this limited discussion of intelligence as a potential benefit, Santos’s [xxv] study of integrating the Moro National Liberation Front into the national security forces of the Philippines, is discussed in detail below [xxvi], but I now turn to the mechanisms through which military integration may improve intelligence capacity.

Knowledge and networks: intelligence benefits of military integration

Integration of former rebels into the national military offers potential intelligence benefits in three ways. First, rebels bring with them knowledge of the human and physical geography of their areas of operations. Second, and relatedly, rebels have preexisting social networks and access to informants within their areas of operations. Third, rebels possess knowledge of what government tactics succeeded and failed against them and how their tactics of rebellion worked, offering insights for countering other rebel groups. [xxvii] These factors are important as rebellions arise in similar peripheral areas of low state capacity and rough terrain [xxviii], often among populations that have spawned past insurgencies [xxix], and governments frequently face multiple rebel groups at the same time. [xxx] Military integration of ex-rebels may occur while fighting is ongoing against a rebel group or after a peace agreement is signed.

If rebels have been fighting an ‘irregular war’ using guerrilla warfare, the dominant ‘technology of rebellion’ in civil wars since World War II, then they have often developed close relations with the population in their primary areas of operations. [xxxi] Guerrillas should move among the population ‘like a fish in water,’ to paraphrase Mao Tse-Tung. Unless a group can rely on resource wealth or external patronage [xxxii] or is interested solely in central state power and wealth [xxxiii], maintaining good relations with civilians is crucial to ensuring a nascent insurgency is not snuffed out and gains viability. Rebel groups thus form networks of civilian informants and collaborators who can provide information, supplies, shelter, and other help to protect and sustain the group, and try to ensure civilians do not pass information about the rebels to the state. [xxxiv]

The balance of social ties and sentiment is especially likely to disproportionately favor rebels when pro-government or intervening forces have been mechanized or are otherwise less embedded on the ground, inhibiting the development of trust and deeper social networks, which are vital in intelligence gathering. [xxxv] Nepal’s more conventional military forces were seen as distant from the population and lacking trust from the ‘masses,’ something likely to be improved with integrating Maoist former guerrilla forces after the 2006 peace agreement. [xxxvi] Foreign interveners, as outsiders, are at an even greater informational disadvantage, making integration especially valuable for improving intelligence. A US Special Forces officer in Afghanistan’s Mohmand Valley fighting against the Islamic State in 2018 described with distaste a notoriously violent former Taliban fighter-turned-police chief, then acknowledged his usefulness: ‘he had a lot of contacts in the area and we needed his influence’. [xxxvii]

Most times, rebel group members share identities with the civilian population in their main area of operations, identities that government forces may lack. Shared identities can deepen cultural knowledge, social ties, norms of reciprocity, and trust. [xxxviii] Civilians may, for instance, be more willing during wartime to inform against insurgents of security forces that share their ethnic identity. [xxxix] Shared identity, as Lyall notes [xl], provides ‘the ability to access information-rich local networks… closed to outsiders,’ and in counterinsurgency ‘co-ethnic soldiers face lower levels of uncertainty over who the insurgents are,’ permitting more precise ‘persuasion or coercion toward’ individuals and more credible threats.

At higher levels of politics and central command, military officers and government officials cannot ‘properly comprehend the mindset of those involved in insurgency… or the mindset of those who simply live in an area subject to counterinsurgency’ without local social knowledge, argues Souleimanov [xli], making it ‘extremely difficult to expect rebel behavior. Where former or potential rivals are included in the government in interethnic power-sharing agreements, it can lead to a better knowledge of events and satisfaction or discontent in the included actors’ areas of influence or among their ethnic groups, giving warning signs about nascent insurgencies and helping preserve peace in those constituencies. [xlii]

Beyond the human geography of areas of operations, rebels possess knowledge of physical geography often surpassing that of government forces. As noted above, insurgencies often begin in ‘rough terrain’ areas like mountains, forests, swamps, and deserts, where contemporary and historical state presence is limited. Rebels use their territorial knowledge to evade state forces, organize clandestine supply routes, and survive even in harsh conditions. Knowledge is equally useful to counterinsurgents. [xliii]

Over the course of a rebellion, rebels also develop organizational knowledge of the effectiveness of the tactics and practices of their own group and their government opponents. Writing about state relationships with paramilitary ‘proxies,’ Biberman argues that ex-rebels make ideal counterinsurgents because they are ‘skilled fighters] with insider knowledge of the insurgency and its logistics network.’ [xliv] Military integration can assimilate this knowledge and lessons learned, offering opportunities to improve counterinsurgency strategies and tactics and better understand domestic processes of rebel group formation, fighting, and persistence. Counterinsurgency learning and adaptation by government militaries and intelligence agencies are slow and sporadic. [xlv] Successful military integration, however, can offer a shortcut toward developing better counterinsurgency practices, both by incorporating skills and knowledge about rebellion, and also by learning from integrees about state weaknesses and errors that rebels exploited, which government forces can then try to address.

The effects of integration on intelligence capacity likely vary based on three factors: commander support, ex-rebel buy-in, and effective monitoring. Commanders must be receptive to ex-rebel knowledge and skills to benefit from them, a problem identified by Samii in Burundi, where officers kept disdain for integrees. [xlvi] Ex-rebels must also feel well-integrated into their additional force and the government needs effective monitoring in place. Otherwise, intelligence can flow in the other direction, to ex-rebels erstwhile comrades, as occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). [xlvii] Solving these commitment problems and achieving trust between the state and ex-rebels are crucial to the success of integration and to gaining potential intelligence benefits. [xlviii] This requires socialization to break down enmities [xlix], and also efforts to ensure that ex-rebels are treated fairly and offered aid and opportunities to overcome inequities in education. [l] Increasing trust over time can increase confidence in the quality of intelligence provided by ex-rebels, though this may also work in the other direction, with vital intelligence tips helping build trust.

The degrees of integration and monitoring likely vary by different institutional arrangements. Ex-rebels can be integrated into military units or brought onto the government side in separate paramilitary units. Second, if we integrate them into preexisting forces, ex-rebels can either be in fully mixed units with government loyalists or under the same overall command, but in separate subunits. [li]

Comparative evidence

Ideally, a study of the intelligence effects of military integration could provide systematic data and test for a causal linkage between the presence or absence of the three factors proposed to improve intelligence capabilities through integration (rebel geographic and cultural knowledge, social ties, and tactical and strategic knowledge). Yet these types of knowledge and networks are very difficult to code and systematically analyze across an extensive set of cases, since assessing them requires in-depth interviews with military officials, ex-rebel integrees, and community members; ethnographic observation; and/or access to sensitive internal military and government documents. Difficulties of variable operationalization and systematic comparison are problems throughout the military integration literature, especially given that multiple interacting mechanisms can lead from military integration to effects on conflict outcomes or preservation of peace. [lii]

I can, however, present anecdotal evidence for the presence and effectiveness of the three modes of intelligence improvement across a spatially and temporally diverse set of civil wars, and more detailed evidence from the cases of the Philippines, Uganda, and Rwanda. This evidence establishes the importance of considering intelligence capacity in assessing the benefits and drawbacks of military integration, showing how it affected counterinsurgency operations or efforts to prevent conflict after security forces integrated former rebels.

Colonial militaries commonly integrated former rebels, recognizing integration’s intelligence benefits. The British in the 1930s Palestine relied on ex-rebels and local militias who had sometimes opposed British authority to combat Arab revolts. [liii] In the 1950s Kenya, the British found that the ‘pseudo gangs’ comprised former rebels ‘proved to be the most potent weapon tracking down the Mau Mau’, drawing on their local and tactical knowledge. [liv] In Malaya, one British commander ‘began deploying surrendered rebels to evaluate his own companies, a practice that led to significant operational innovations designed to throw off the enemy and exploit its weaknesses;’ British forces increasingly used ‘surrendered enemy personnel’ (SEP) to take advantage of their knowledge of local society and the structures and motivations of the rebels, including creating ‘an interrogation center staffed entirely by former rebels who were adept at convincing recently captured or surrendered cadres to speak’. [lv] French counterinsurgency in Algeria was more successful after creating the Mobile Security Groups (G.M.S.), units of Algerian Muslims, many of them ex-rebels ‘who possessed intimate knowledge of insurgent tactics… and proved invaluable to counterinsurgency operations’. [lvi]

In post-colonial contexts, foreign interveners have also sought to integrate former rebel forces to overcome the ‘invader’s dilemma’ and gain local knowledge and legitimacy, besides military capacity. [lvii] Interveners have then pushed for these local forces’ integration into host state militaries. The United States in Iraq recruited ex-insurgents and militias in Anbar province to act as scouts and provide intelligence, and then formalized the recruits into the ‘Sons of Iraq,’ paramilitary forces that provided crucial local knowledge, intelligence, and fighting power in combatting Al Qaeda in Iraq—though efforts to integrate these fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces have been bumpy. [lviii] In Syria, Russian forces in the Daraa Governorate have helped build the new Fifth Assault Corps in the Syrian Army, including creating the 8th Brigade, a force comprising ex-rebels, which has helped local control and stability thanks to ex-rebels ties to their communities, along with improving fighting capability against continuing rebellions. [lix] Relations with the Syrian government, however, have been prickly, with Russia wanting to keep influence over the 8th Brigade and the Syrian Army unwilling to recognize it, meaning any intelligence benefits are unlikely to last beyond a Russian withdrawal.[lx]

Russian forces in Syria were building on a pattern from home. In Chechnya, the local social knowledge of Chechen units comprising ex-rebels proved crucial to the effectiveness of Russia’s brutally successful counterinsurgency campaign, and these Chechen units outperformed their Russian counterparts argues for the ‘crucial importance of cultural knowledge… of patterns of social organization, persisting value systems, and other related phenomena in the relative success of the eradication of the Chechnya-based insurgency.’ [lxi] Ex-rebel Chechen units’ local knowledge and social networks ‘dramatically increased the amount and quality of intelligence coming from villagers’. [lxii] Lyall notes [lxiii] that the common tactic of kidnapping ‘is an information-intensive form of abuse since it requires not only accurate knowledge of the targeted individual and his family but also his whereabouts,’ and Chechen units, but not Russian ones, had the social networks to identify and then coerce individuals. For former rebels, it is also possible that ‘their past status as insurgents enables [them] to identify, convert, or kill remaining fighters and their supporters with greater efficacy than Russian soldiers’. [lxiv]

Elsewhere, in Northern Mali, the government has found success in counterinsurgency and maintaining local order by forming special Tuareg security units tied to the armed forces, incorporating a good deal of ex-rebels ‘who know the terrain and guerrilla tactics much better than the Malian regular army’. [lxv] Nigeria’s military has similarly integrated local militias in the northeast into the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), using local knowledge of communities and terrain to successfully combat Boko Haram [lxvi], with CJTF leaders recruiting demobilized and reintegrated Boko Haram fighters to incorporate their skills and knowledge. [lxvii] Integration of Maoist ex-rebels in Nepal was argued to increase military capabilities through rebel tactical and social knowledge since the military ‘has been fighting a conventional war and the [rebels] are trained in guerrilla war’. [lxviii]

Military integration and intelligence in the Philippines

Uniquely in the military integration literature, Santos’s case study of integrating Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighters by the Philippines’ national security forces highlights the positive intelligence effects of the integration process, and further literature on the Philippines case supports his findings. [lxix]

They integrated MNLF fighters into the Philippines’ military and police forces following decades of conflict over the ethnopolitical demands of the Muslim Moro people in the Mindanao region of the Christian-majority country [. Cooperation between MNLF units and the military began even before the peace process was finalized, as the government began ‘to exploit the MNLF intelligence network and use its firepower’ to help respond to and resolve ‘critical incidents’ including high-profile kidnappings and hostage-taking by the extremist Abu Sayyaf Group and MNLF dissidents. [lxx] The military eventually integrated 5,750 people from the MNLF, while 1,750 joined the police, [lxxi] though not every integree was an ex-combatant, since some MNLF fighters had their relatives join in their place. [lxxii] Santos states that ‘independent appraisals’ found the 7,000 integrated former MNLF combatants ‘served as a vital and trusted link between the security forces and the community.’ [lxxiii] The military put processes in place to ensure cultural sensitivity to Muslim ex-rebels[lxxiv], and even set up a special office to handle issues between lower-ranking integrees and senior officers, aiming to build trust with the integrated fighters. [lxxv]

Integrees’ community ties and cultural knowledge proved highly valued and useful to military officers as they continued to battle separatist forces in the region. Unit leaders ‘expressed confidence in the intelligence information provided by MNLF integrees, describing it as highly reliable,’ with positive outcomes like weapons seizures, while ‘because of their familiarity with the area, people, and language, integrees are often sent on surveillance missions against enemy targets.’ Meanwhile, ‘the MNLF integrees could be relied upon to liaise with the community and local leaders. Their familiarity with the local people and language improved public relations for the battalion’. [lxxvi] Lara[lxxvii] similarly remarks that integration helped ‘cement… legitimacy at the local level,’ building trust. In another assessment, ‘a top army general said the biggest contribution [of integration] was the build-up of the military intelligence database from integrees… ’ with police in Mindanao ‘during the first two years after MNLF integration… [having] confiscated more illegal firearms, received more rebels returning to the fold of the law and enhanced its public relations with the community’. [lxxviii]

Hall [lxxix] offers support for these findings, emphasizing how the integrated Muslim ex-MNLF forces’ cultural knowledge ‘engendered culturally sensitive military regulations and policies,’ with integrating Muslim fighters ‘expected to enhance its effectiveness in operations in Muslim communities. To the army, the Muslim recruits were critical to the strategy of winning hearts and minds.’ Here, integration was also serving as a symbol of national unity and building trust [lxxx], helping ensure the military did not alienate Muslim communities and thus might be more willing to act as intelligence sources.

Other sources likewise confirm that military integration improved the government’s intelligence capacity, and that this contributed to conflict resolution, counterinsurgency, and the preservation of peace. Local commanders claimed integrated former MNLF fighters were ‘more effective than those from the state army in conducting operations in Mindanao’. [lxxxi] MNLF cooperation and integration helped ensure state success in ‘the identification [and monitoring] of key leaders of the Abu Sayyaf… and the ring-fencing of their camps,’ as well as ‘destroying other armed groups such as the Al Khobar and Pentagon gangs’, ultimately reducing the range of threats faced by the Philippines security forces. [lxxxii]

Military integration of the MNLF provided new fighters for the state, increasing its coercive capacity, but given that one of the state’s main opponents in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), had initially emerged as a splinter from the MNLF, MNLF integration also provided a crucial opportunity for state forces ‘to deepen their knowledge of the MILF’s capabilities, and to deal with the eruption of clan violence that often escalates into wider conflict’. [lxxxiii] This helped the military combat an existing rebellion and better address the conflicts that might metastasize into insurgencies in the future. The intelligence provided by integrees also helped the government combat ‘Abu Sayyaf and regional extremist groups such as the Jemaah Islamiya,’ justifying the United States military aid that further bolstered capabilities. [lxxxiv]

The MNLF never fully demobilized, and several factions were not interested in participating in the peace process or cooperating with the state. [lxxxv] The relative success of integrating ex-MNLF fighters without full implementation of the peace agreement led the Philippines government to adopt military integration more broadly, for instance, integrating into the military 246 members of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army after years of a stalled peace process. [lxxxvi] Even hardline, mano dura President Rodrigo Duterte has been open to integrating former rebels to benefit from their local knowledge. In 2017, he called on not only former MNLF but also on members of the more recalcitrant MILF to join with the government in combatting Islamic State-affiliated rebels in Marawi, Mindanao [lxxxvii], with MILF’s ‘local intelligence and fire support’ aiding the government’s cause. [lxxxviii]

Military integration and intelligence in Uganda and Rwanda

Two militaries that emerged from rebel victories in civil wars have also pursued military integration, finding it helped increase intelligence capacity. The militaries of the contemporary Ugandan and Rwandan regimes, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) [lxxxix] in Rwanda have integrated both soldiers from the militaries of the governments they toppled and ex-rebels who fought in subsequent insurgencies. Victorious rebels can draw on their own experiences opposing the state as they conduct counterinsurgencies, but many groups have only been active in certain regions or among certain segments of the population. Victorious rebels also reorganize their militaries along conventional lines, conforming to international norms and losing touch with irregular tactics and skills that often prove more useful in counterinsurgency contexts. [xc]

Uganda

When the NRA and its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), came to power in Uganda in 1986, multiple other rebel groups and soldiers from the toppled Obote and Okello regime militaries remained armed and active. The NRA responded by trying to integrate many of these groups, a strategy they have continued to pursue over three and a half decades of NRM rule, across multiple amnesties for enemy fighters and battles against sixteen rebel groups and dozens of more small armed groups and dissident organizations. [xci]

Already, while fighting as rebels, the NRA sought to ally with and integrate other rebel forces. The NRA’s leader, current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, had initially been leading a smaller guerrilla force, the People’s Resistance Army, with roots in western regions and the Banyankole ethnic group, but merged with the primary Baganda Uganda Freedom Fighters. This enabled the merged NRA to gain legitimacy, support, and local geographical and social knowledge among the Baganda, the country’s largest ethnic group, who live in the central region surrounding the capital, where fighting was concentrated. [xcii] The Baganda saw the NRA as more inclusive and responsive to their interests, increasing their willingness to supply information. [xciii]

While expanding operations to mountainous western Uganda, the NRA worked to integrate the forces of the Rwenzururu kingdom, which had previously fought against the national government and thus knew the terrain and government operations in the region. After the NRA takeover in 1986, Rwenzururu forces split and the NRA subsequently had difficulties rooting out Zairean rebels who had crossed over the border, lacking intelligence to distinguish between rebels and the local population. [xciv]

Once in power, the new NRM regime almost immediately faced rebellions and the erosion of state capacity under previous regimes, economic collapse, and their opponents’ irregular warfare strategies led the NRA to emphasize integration and prioritize human intelligence. As Minister of State for Internal Affairs Tom Butime stated in a 1991 parliamentary debate, ‘the Security Forces cannot get information from a satellite, they cannot get information from newspapers about where the rebels are, neither can they get information from the telephone. The people in that area can only give information to the forces’. [xcv] The NRA used integration of ex-rebels into the military or local militias to improve this flow of information and to remove competitors from the battlefield, beginning in late 1986 with integrating the Uganda National Resistance Front, which helped maintain peace in West Nile, as former rebel leaders ‘were working actively to ensure that their people supported the new regime’. [xcvi]

In 1986 and 1987, while fighting against the Ugandan People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), ‘as the NRA moved into [the northern region of] Acholiland and UPDA members changed sides, the NRA used ethnic Acholi members to gain the trust of these anti-NRA fighters, encouraging them to form relationships to help integrate new converts into the NRA’. [xcvii] Locals in Acholiland later requested that more integrated ex-UPDA forces be brought back and deployed in the region to combat Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) rebels, ‘as they know the Holy Spirit better’, having operated in similar areas and allied with the HSM, and so we can use this knowledge of guerrilla operations to improve counterinsurgency effectiveness and further build local communities’ trust. [xcviii]

In Teso in eastern Uganda, the Uganda People’s Army (UPA) rebellion quickly grew from

1989–1990, and the NRA, with relatively limited experience and ties in the region, had difficulty responding. By the middle of 1991, however, as more UPA fighters surrendered, ‘often with promises to be absorbed into the NRA military or government, the counterinsurgents gained valuable information about the UPA that enabled more military gains’, relying on these ex-rebels knowledge of geography and population and their former comrades’ operations. [xcix]

Former rebels’ knowledge and networks have proven useful for counterinsurgency when they have taken on political, rather than military, roles as well. [c] Lewis [ci] found that many former rebel leaders integrated into local and regional governments can ‘draw on their network of former footsoldiers in their rebellion to keep appraised [sic] of potential threats emerging in their home area.’ This high level of integration of former enemies has been a key component of the Ugandan government’s military and intelligence apparatus and ex-rebel leaders’ local knowledge has enabled it to deter and detect rebellions, ‘nipping them in the bud’ or fighting relatively effective counterinsurgencies. [cii]

Integration was also crucial in making the military better reflect national demographics, [ciii] improving trust—at least outside of the north—as a symbol of national unity. [civ] Military socialization and political education programs, both within the military and for civilians, helped ensure integrees’ and their constituencies’ loyalty to the state, built commanders’ trust in them, and also created systems of monitoring within the armed forces and in communities. [cv]

Rwanda

Rwanda has also been identified as a highly successful case of military integration and counterinsurgency, despite integration having occurred in a difficult post-genocide, post-rebel victory environment of state collapse and ethnic polarization. [cvi] Ethnic Tutsi Rwandan refugees living in Uganda organized the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) military wing. The core leadership had served in the Ugandan NRA, both as rebels and in the new state military. RPA leaders deserted the NRA and invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, eventually seizing power and ending the ongoing genocide in 1994. Throughout the fight as rebels, the RPA worked to integrate different Tutsi diaspora populations from around the region, gradually also gaining recruits from within Rwanda. [cvii] Around the RPA victory in 1994, large portions of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the deposed regime’s military, fled to the eastern DRC, and with other Hutu refugees and former génocidaires began an insurgent campaign against the new RPF government. The RPA had already begun integrating former enemy personnel during the civil war and continued integrating former government and militia forces after taking power. [cviii]

While they rarely held territory within Rwanda, the insurgent forces, still referred to as the FAR or ex-FAR, enjoyed powerful support in northwestern Rwanda, as ‘most of the insurgents came from the northwest; they knew the terrain and people; and their extended families and friends provided protection,’ food and supplies, and information, as well as joining the insurgents to take part in attacks. [cix] Former government fighters integrated into the RPA had by 1997 been included in counterinsurgency campaigns. [cx]

The RPA had difficulties penetrating insurgent networks and effectively countering the insurgents in the northwest, however, until they began a wider program of integrating ex-FAR insurgents into the new military in 1997–1998. This integration quickly helped the RPA turn the tide against the insurgents in the northwest, ‘as the people realized the army was not the enemy’ and ‘the former insurgents knew all the ‘tricks’ of the EX-FAR, including terrain details’, demonstrating benefits in terms of local knowledge, rebel tactical knowledge, and social ties. [cxi]

The RPA had an intensive ingando socialization process for ex-rebels and the units they were joining, designed to break down barriers between government loyalists and ex-rebels and to forge a new collective military identity, seeking to avoid commitment problems and generate trust during integration. [cxii] The military and its intelligence officers sought to cultivate ties to the population by having integrees return to their home communities after ingando, training, and joint deployments to ‘break down myths and social barriers and to encourage inter-communal trust’. [cxiii]

Overall, 10,500 former FAR officers and soldiers were integrated into the RPA from 1995 to 1997, while 39,200 ex-FAR soldiers, former insurgents, and Hutu militia members were integrated between 1998 and 2002. [cxiv] Hutu ex-rebels were even put into command positions, sending ‘a significant signal to those below’ and increasing trust among integrees and Hutu constituencies. [cxv] The integrated military proved effective in combat both domestically and in a transnational campaign against Hutu insurgents and government forces in the DRC. [cxvi] Integration’s success in building unity and trust among former enemies gave the government greater social knowledge and legitimacy and led communities in the northwest to be more willing to work with the military and the government and provide information to it—through this legitimacy and trust has likely eroded as the government has become more authoritarian.

Hypotheses for further study

Based on the literature review and the evidence presented above, I inductively identify five hypotheses that can be tested as part of a research agenda on the intelligence effects of military integration. I divide these into three categories: organizational, geographic, and political.

Organizationally, I hypothesize that intelligence benefits will be higher and last longer when ex-rebels are integrated into mixed units, rather than kept in separate units, be they subunits within the state military or separate security forces. Separate units may offer built-in unit cohesion for integrees and a greater sense of personal security, which is important for morale, but they decrease opportunities that exist in mixed units to develop ties and loyalty to integrees’ enemies-turned-comrades and the state and also limit ex-rebels communities seeing them operating equally with state forces, factors that were key to successful integration in Rwanda. [cxvii] Separate units can make monitoring more difficult for commanders and increase the potential for defection, though they may be preferred by commanders when trust in integrees is low. [cxviii] The ability to benefit from integrees’ knowledge and networks in either organizational structure will probably also depend on integrees’ socialization into state forces [cxix], and unit and force commanders’ respect for ex-rebels. [cxx]

In terms of geography, in line with the insurgency and counterinsurgency literature [cxxi], I hypothesize that intelligence benefits will be greater when ex-rebels are operating in terrain with which they are familiar and if they are operating among populations with whom they share a salient identity. Politically, I hypothesize that intelligence benefits will vary based on perceptions of the degree to which the peace agreement or other integration arrangement is being upheld and implemented. [cxxii] If ex-rebels believe terms are being violated, they and their communities will be less willing to provide information, while if government commanders believe terms are being violated, they may be suspicious and dismissive of the information they receive from integrated ex-rebels. The MNLF case suggests that intelligence benefits may still accrue even without full implementation of the peace agreement and incomplete integration of forces, but over time, failures of implementation and compliance are likely to erode cooperation. [cxxiii]

Going into a case study or field research with these hypotheses in mind, it may be more workable to interview or find documents that allow for hypothesis testing. Many of the different factors proposed to affect integration and intelligence benefits are likely to vary over time, so tracing particular integration efforts temporally can generate a more fine-grained understanding of what issues matter when, and how the intelligence affects of integration affect counterinsurgency and peacebuilding. Detailed declassified military information may be necessary to test for an independent causal effect of intelligence gains from military integration on counterinsurgency effectiveness or overall peacebuilding in recent cases, but it might also be possible to test these propositions using qualitative or quantified historical data from conflict archives. [cxxiv]

Conclusion

This article has examined a gap in the existing literature on military integration: the potential intelligence benefits of military integration for counterinsurgency operations and preventing future rebel group formation and development. I have highlighted three key ways that integration can improve intelligence capacity: former rebels’ knowledge of human and physical geography, social networks and informants, and knowledge of the effectiveness of rebel and counterinsurgent strategies and tactics. Based on evidence from a variety of historical, political, and geographic contexts, it appears highly plausible that improved intelligence may interact with other factors highlighted in the military integration literature to contribute to more successful counterinsurgency or peacebuilding outcomes. I have also identified a set of hypotheses to test this proposition and the mechanisms underlying it.

Ideally, intelligence capacity improved by military integration would be used for more selective targeting and to restrain and limit violence against civilians, [cxxv] and would also inform nonviolent actions aimed at redressing anti-government grievances. Even defeated rebel groups may keep legitimacy in areas where they held influence, and integrating ex-rebels may be better from a human rights perspective and in costs and effectiveness of governance, instead of violently crushing the rebellion as occurred in Sri Lanka. [cxxvi] At the least, debates and assessments regarding military integration should account for intelligence effects. Highlighting intelligence benefits of integration may also help convince reluctant state security elites to embrace integration and accept ex-rebels, avoiding the problems identified by Samii of military officers rejecting integrees. [cxxvii]

Future research must also consider that the intelligence benefits of integration may not flow solely to the incumbent government: integrated ex-rebels can act as an ‘early warning system’ for their social or political constituencies, leaking information and potentially defecting when they learn of policies or strategic plans of which they disapprove. [cxxviii] For instance, integrated ex-rebels can take signals from the integration process, promotion patterns within the military, and where integrated units are stationed, and can use these to judge government’s intentions toward not only their professional interests but also their broader constituencies. This was the case with the defection and return to the rebellion of integrated former Anya-Nya fighters in Sudan. [cxxix] If there are no careful screening mechanisms, integration can also mean notorious human rights violators joining the military, as occurred in the DRC [cxxx], potentially making civilians less willing to share information. Investigating these and other cases of negative effects of military integration on intelligence capacity can help refine theory and highlight factors that may undermine integration, as well as potentially pointing to junctures or warning signs at which practitioners should rethink military integration. [cxxxi]

Beyond my hypotheses, the potential intelligence benefits of military integration raise several questions for further investigation. How can the potential intelligence benefits of integration be isolated empirically to test their hypothesized effects? How does improved intelligence complement or contradict other proposed mechanisms for military integration’s contribution to peacebuilding or counterinsurgency success? How does taking intelligence capacity into account alter the calculus of bargaining models of civil war resolution incorporating military integration? [cxxxii] For example, if a government realizes it lacks intelligence capacity in a region or among a certain population, this might increase its likelihood of including or accepting integration as a component of a peace agreement. Finally, in all three cases examined in this article, military integration was adopted autonomously, without significant international pressure or supervision, and in Uganda and Rwanda, it occurred after rebel victory. Future research can further investigate similarities or differences in the adoption of military integration and its intelligence effects when it is driven by international actors or when it takes place after government victory or a military stalemate and negotiated settlement.

This extension of the military integration research agenda will provide deeper and more precise theoretical and empirical knowledge to evaluate when, where, and why military integration is a better or worse policy choice. Focusing attention on the intelligence aspect of military integration also reveals further potential linkages between counterinsurgency and peacebuilding research and practice and can provide an opening to convince even conservative government policy elites to consider military integration and reconciliation with former rebels and their civilian constituencies.

---

[i] Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.

[ii] Glassmyer, K., and N. Sambanis. 2008. “Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (3): 365–384.

[iii] Hartzell, C. 2014. “Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 13–28. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
In shorter samples, Ottmann and Vüllers (2015) also found that 41.4% of the 46 negotiated settlements from 1989 to 2006 included military integration provisions and Martin (2017) found such provisions in 54% of signed peace agreements from 1975-2011, while Berg (2020) found that from 1960 to 2012, 38% of years in peace spells after major civil wars feature military integration agreements, and military integration plans were fully implemented in 29% of peace spell-years.-
Ottmann, M., and J. Vüllers. 2015. “The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED): A New Dataset on the Promises and Practices of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Countries.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32 (3): 327–350.
Martin, M. C. 2017. “Into the Fold: Security Fears and Power Sharing, the Credible Commitment of Rebel Military Integration and Durable Peace.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois. 
– Berg, L. A. 2020. “Civil–Military Relations and Civil War Recurrence: Security Forces in Postwar Politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (7–8): 1307–1334.

[iv] Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.

[v] Licklider, R. 2014b. New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Krebs and Licklider (2015, 102) summarize the hypothesized mechanisms leading from military integration to reduced conflict recurrence: ‘by serving as a costly signal and thereby mitigating the security dilemma, by providing security to vulnerable populations, by employing former combatants, and by serving as a symbol of the united nation’ and helping generate trust.

[vi] Licklider, R. 2014b. New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[vii] Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 

[viii] Knight, M. 2009. Security Sector Reform: Post-Conflict Integration. Birmingham: University of Birmingham and GFN-SSR. 
Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.
Licklider, R. 2014a. “Introduction.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 1–12. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[ix] Hartzell, C. 2014. “Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 13–28. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Hartzell, C., and M. Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 

[x] Glassmyer, K., and N. Sambanis. 2008. “Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (3): 365–384.
Hartzell, C., and M. Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Joshi, M., and J. M. Quinn. 2017. “Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict.” British Journal of Political Science 47 (4): 869–892.

[xi] Berg, L. A. 2020. “Civil–Military Relations and Civil War Recurrence: Security Forces in Postwar Politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (7–8): 1307–1334.
Derouen, K., J. Lea, and P. Wallensteen. 2009. “The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26 (4): 367–387.
Hartzell, C., and M. Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Hoddie, M., and C. Hartzell. 2003. “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements.” Journal of Peace Research 40 (3): 303–320.
Jarstad, A. K., and D. Nilsson. 2008. “From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25 (3): 206–223.
Joshi, M., and J. M. Quinn. 2017. “Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict.” British Journal of Political Science 47 (4): 869–892.
Mattes, M., and B. Savun. 2009. “Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (3): 737–759.
Ottmann, M., and J. Vüllers. 2015. “The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED): A New Dataset on the Promises and Practices of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Countries.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32 (3): 327–350.
Quinn, J., M. Joshi, and E. Melander. 2019. “One Dyadic Peace Leads to Another? Conflict Systems, Terminations, and Net Reduction in Fighting Groups.” International Studies Quarterly 63 (4): 863–875.
Toft, M. D. 2009. Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 

[xii] Brandt, C. M. 2020. “Peace Agreements as Counterinsurgency.” PhD dissertation, University California, Berkeley. 

[xiii] See also Ottmann (2020) on ‘extra-agreement violence’ by forces not part of peace agreements.
Ottmann, M. 2020. “Peace for Our Time? Examining the Effect of Power-Sharing on Postwar Rebellions.” Journal of Peace Research 57 (5): 617–631.

[xiv] Johnson, C. 2020. “Power-Sharing, Conflict Resolution, and the Logic of Pre-Emptive Defection.” Journal of Peace Research: forthcoming
Johnson, C. 2021. “Causal Pathways of Rebel Defection from Negotiated Settlements: A Theory of Strategic Alliances.” Perspectives on Politics: forthcoming. 
Quinn, J., M. Joshi, and E. Melander. 2019. “One Dyadic Peace Leads to Another? Conflict Systems, Terminations, and Net Reduction in Fighting Groups.” International Studies Quarterly 63 (4): 863–875.
Reiter, A. G. 2016. Fighting Over Peace: Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Stedman, S. J. 1997. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security 22 (2): 5–53.

[xv] Burgess, S. F. 2008. “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.” African Security 1 (2): 69–91.Gaub, F. 2011. Military Integration after Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. London: Routledge. 
Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.
Møller, B., and G. Cawthra. 2007. “Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States.” In Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, edited by L. Andersen, B. Møller, and F. Stepputat, 177–200. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Wilén, N. 2016. “From Foe to Friend? Army Integration after War in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo.” International Peacekeeping 23 (1): 79–106.

[xvi] Baaz, M. E., and J. Verweijen. 2013. “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-Military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC.” African Affairs 112 (449): 563–582.
Licklider, R. 2014b. New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Neads, A. 2020. “You’re in the Army Now: The Politics of Cohesion During Military Integration in Sierra Leone.” Security Studies 29 (5): 894–926.
Samii, C. 2013. “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi.” American Political Science Review 107 (3): 558–573.
Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 
Warner, L. A. 2013. “Armed-Group Amnesty and Military Integration in South Sudan.” RUSI Journal 158 (6): 40–47.

[xvii] Licklider, R. 2014a. “Introduction.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 1–12. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[xviii] Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.

[xix] Simonsen, S. G. 2007. “Building ‘National’ Armies – Building Nations?: Determinants of Success for Postintervention Integration Efforts.” Armed Forces and Society 33 (4): 571–590.

[xx] Licklider, R. 2014b. New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[xxi] Hartzell, C. 2014. “Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 13–28. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Hoddie, M., and C. Hartzell. 2003. “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements.” Journal of Peace Research 40 (3): 303–320.
Verweijen, J. 2014. “Half-Brewed: The Lukewarm Results of Creating an Integrated Military in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 137–162. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[xxii] Burgess, S. F. 2008. “Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict.” African Security 1 (2): 69–91.
Gaub, F. 2011. Military Integration after Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. London: Routledge. 
Møller, B., and G. Cawthra. 2007. “Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States.” In Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, edited by L. Andersen, B. Møller, and F. Stepputat, 177–200. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Samii, C. 2013. “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi.” American Political Science Review 107 (3): 558–573.
Warner, L. A. 2013. “Armed-Group Amnesty and Military Integration in South Sudan.” RUSI Journal 158 (6): 40–47. Wilén, N. 2016. “From Foe to Friend? Army Integration after War in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo.” International Peacekeeping 23 (1): 79–106.

[xxiii] Driscoll, J. 2012. “Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1): 118–149.

[xxiv] Baaz, M. E., and J. Verweijen. 2013. “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-Military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC.” African Affairs 112 (449): 563–582.

[xxv] Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 

[xxvi] During revisions, I found Brandt’s (2020, 30–31) dissertation, which also briefly discusses the potential for military integration to improve intelligence, and then draws on Santos (2010b) and the MNLF case. We developed our ideas independently and in parallel, so she should also be cited on the potential intelligence effects of integration.
Brandt, C. M. 2020. “Peace Agreements as Counterinsurgency.” Ph.D. dissertation, University California, Berkeley. 

[xxvii] Id.

[xxviii] Fearon, J. D., and D. D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97 (1): 75–90.
Hendrix, C. S. 2011. “Head for the Hills? Rough Terrain, State Capacity, and Civil War Onset.” Civil Wars 13 (4): 345–370.

[xxix] Daly, S. Z. 2012. “Organizational Legacies of Violence: Conditions Favoring Insurgency Onset in Colombia, 1964–1984.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (3): 473–491.

[xxx] Bakke, K. M., K. G. Cunningham, and L. J. M. Seymour. 2012. “A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars.” Perspectives on Politics 10 (2): 265–283.
Christia, F. 2012. Alliance Formation in Civil Wars. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Cunningham, D. E. 2006. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (4): 875–892.
Quinn, J., M. Joshi, and E. Melander. 2019. “One Dyadic Peace Leads to Another? Conflict Systems, Terminations, and Net Reduction in Fighting Groups.” International Studies Quarterly 63 (4): 863–875.

[xxxi] Kalyvas, S. N., and L. Balcells. 2010. “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict.” American Political Science Review 104 (3): 415–429.
Though conventional and symmetric non-conventional civil wars have become more common since the end of the Cold War (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), and belligerents in contemporary African civil wars may focus on patronage and securing a stake in state resources more than relations with civilians (Day and Reno 2014).
Day, C. R., and W. S. Reno. 2014. “In Harm’s Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics.” Civil Wars 16 (2): 105–126.

[xxxii] Weinstein, J. M. 2007. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press

[xxxiii] Day, C. R., and W. S. Reno. 2014. “In Harm’s Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics.” Civil Wars 16 (2): 105–126.
Mkandawire, T. 2002. “The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial ‘Rebel Movements’ in Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence Against the Peasantry.” Journal of Modern African Studies 40 (2): 181–215.

[xxxiv] Kalyvas, S. N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kilcullen, D. 2010. Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, J. I. 2012. “How Rebellion Begins: Insurgent Group Formation and Viability in Uganda.” Ph.D. diss., Department of Government: Harvard University. 

[xxxv] Lyall, J., and I. Wilson. 2009. “Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.” International Organization 63 (1): 67–106.

[xxxvi] Nayak, N. 2009. “PLA Integration Into the Nepal Army: Challenges and Prospects.” Strategic Analysis 33 (5): 730–744.

[xxxvii] Quilty, A. 2018. “The Last Americans Fighting in Afghanistan.” New York Times. (5 October). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/sunday/american-military-afghanistan-islamic-state.html 

[xxxviii] Habyarimana, J., M. Humphreys, D. N. Posner, and J. M. Weinstein. 2009. Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 

[xxxix] Lyall, J., Y. Shiraito, and K. Imai. 2015. “Coethnic Bias and Wartime Informing.” Journal of Politics 77 (3): 833–848

[xl] Lyall, J. 2010. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War.” American Political Science Review 104 (1): 1–20.

[xli] Souleimanov, E. 2015. “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s Policy of Chechenization.” Post-Soviet Affairs 31 (2): 91–114.

[xlii] Roessler, P. 2016. Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

[xliii] Brandt, C. M. 2020. “Peace Agreements as Counterinsurgency.” PhD dissertation, University California, Berkeley. 

[xliv] Biberman, Y. 2018. “Self-Defense Militias, Death Squads, and State Outsourcing of Violence in India and Turkey.” Journal of Strategic Studies 41 (5): 751–781.

[xlv] Gentry, J. A. 2010. “Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars.” Intelligence and National Security 25 (1): 50–75.
Jackson, C. F. 2008. “Defeat in Victory: Organizational Learning Dysfunction in Counterinsurgency.” Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

[xlvi] Samii, C. 2014. “Military Integration in Burundi, 2000–2006.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 195–228. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[xlvii] Baaz, M. E., and J. Verweijen. 2013. “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-Military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC.” African Affairs 112 (449): 563–582.

[xlviii] Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.
Licklider, R. 2014b. New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[xlix] Jowell, M. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2): 278–293.
Neads, A. 2020. “You’re in the Army Now: The Politics of Cohesion During Military Integration in Sierra Leone.” Security Studies 29 (5): 894–926.

[l] Hall, R. A. 2014. “From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine Policy of Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front Combatants Into the Armed Forces.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 103–118. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press
Martin, P. A. 2018. “Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte D’Ivoire.” African Affairs 117 (468): 522–533.

[li] Separate units may preserve cohesion and ex-rebel perceptions of security, though they will be less likely to make security forces a symbol of national unity, or to generate trust, as integration is supposed to do (Licklider 2014b).
Licklider, R. 2014b. New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[lii] Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.

[liii] Hughes, M. 2016. “Palestinian Collaboration with the British: The Peace Bands and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–9.” Journal of Contemporary History 51 (2): 291–315.

[liv] Anderson, D. 2005. Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. New York: WW Norton. 
Lyall, J. 2010. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War.” American Political Science Review 104 (1): 1–20.

[lv] Ucko, D. H. 2010. “The Malayan Emergency: The Legacy and Relevance of a Counter-Insurgency Success Story.” Defence Studies 10 (1–2): 13–39.

[lvi] Clark, D. J. 2006. “Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations.” 

[lvii] Tamm, H. 2020. “The Invader’s Dilemma: Enlisting Rebel Groups.” In The Governor’s Dilemma, edited by K. W. Abbott, P. Genschel, D. Snidal, and B. Zangl, 119–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

[lviii] Rabasa, A., I. V. Gordon, P. Chalk, and A. K. Grant. 2011. From Insurgency to Stability, Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute. 

[lix] Al-Jabassini, A. 2019. From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria. Florence: RSCAS/Middle East Directions, European University Institute. 

[lx] Id.

[lxi] Biberman, Y. 2019. Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lyall, J. 2010. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War.” American Political Science Review 104 (1): 1–20.
Šmíd, T., and M. Mareš. 2015. “‘Kadyrovtsy’: Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Wars of Paramilitary Clans.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38 (5): 650–677.
Souleimanov, E. 2015. “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s Policy of Chechenization.” Post-Soviet Affairs 31 (2): 91–114.

[lxii] Souleimanov, E. 2015. “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s Policy of Chechenization.” Post-Soviet Affairs 31 (2): 91–114.

[lxiii] Lyall, J. 2010. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War.” American Political Science Review 104 (1): 1–20.

[lxiv] Id.

[lxv] Rabasa, A., I. V. Gordon, P. Chalk, and A. K. Grant. 2011. From Insurgency to Stability, Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute. 

[lxvi] Agbiboa, D. E. 2018. “Eyes on the Street: Civilian Joint Task Force and the Surveillance of Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria.” Intelligence and National Security 33 (7): 1022–1039.

[lxvii] ICG. 2021. An Exit from Boko Haram? Assessing Nigeria’s Operation Safe Corridor. Brussels: International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b170-exit-boko-haram-assessing-nigerias-operation-safe-corridor. 

[lxviii] Nayak, N. 2009. “PLA Integration Into the Nepal Army: Challenges and Prospects.” Strategic Analysis 33 (5): 730–744.

[lxix] Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 

[lxx] Lara, F. J. 2012. “Settlement Without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement.” In Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In, edited by A. Giustozzi, 99–112. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 

[lxxi] Caramés Boada, A. 2009. Past, Present and Future in Mindanao. Barcelona: Quaderns de Construcció de Pau, Escola de Cultura de Pau. 
The MNLF had hoped that thousands more fighters would be integrated, but the government negotiated them down (Flores 2019, 145–46). Despite integration not resulting in the employment of large numbers of MNLF fighters, this did not negatively affect the preservation of peace (cf. Krebs and Licklider 2015; Licklider 2014a), as non-integrated MNLF units helped secure their areas by ‘adhering to the Ceasefire Agreement, policing their own ranks, and addressing criminal activities like kidnapping’ (Flores 2019, 217).
– Flores, J. M. 2019. Lessons Learned from a Process of Conflict Resolution between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), as Mediated by Indonesia, from 1993 to 1996. Jakarta: ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. 
– Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.
– Licklider, R. 2014a. “Introduction.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 1–12. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[lxxii] Hall, R. A. 2014. “From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine Policy of Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front Combatants Into the Armed Forces.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 103–118. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

[lxxiii] Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 

[lxxiv] Hall, R. A. 2014. “From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine Policy of Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front Combatants Into the Armed Forces.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 103–118. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press
Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 

[lxxv] Id.

[lxxvi] Id.

[lxxvii] Lara, F. J. 2012. “Settlement Without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement.” In Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In, edited by A. Giustozzi, 99–112. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 

[lxxviii] Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 

[lxxix] Hall, R. A. 2014. “From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine Policy of Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front Combatants Into the Armed Forces.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 103–118. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

[lxxx] Licklider, R. 2014a. “Introduction.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 1–12. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[lxxxi] Laitin, D. D. 2014. “The Industrial Organization of Merged Armies.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 231–244. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[lxxxii] Lara, F. J. 2012. “Settlement Without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement.” In Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In, edited by A. Giustozzi, 99–112. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 

[lxxxiii] Id.

[lxxxiv] Id.

[lxxxv] Hall, R. A. 2014. “From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine Policy of Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front Combatants Into the Armed Forces.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 103–118. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press
Lara, F. J. 2012. “Settlement Without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement.” In Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In, edited by A. Giustozzi, 99–112. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 

[lxxxvi] ICG. 2013. The Philippines: Dismantling Rebel Groups. Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
The military also integrated deserters from the communist New People’s Army (Caramés Boada 2009, 11), though frontline military forces seem less trusting of communist ex-center-seeking rebels than of ethnic separatist rebels like the MNLF (Hall 2012).
–  Caramés Boada, A. 2009. Past, Present and Future in Mindanao. Barcelona: Quaderns de Construcció de Pau, Escola de Cultura de Pau. 
– Hall, R. A. 2012. “Modern Soldiery Interrogated: Cataloguing the Local Military’s Tasks and Their Perception of Local Civilian Actors.” Philippine Political Science Journal 33 (1): 1–21.

[lxxxvii] Xinhua. 2017. “Duterte Invites Muslim Rebels to Join in Fight against ISIS Militants.” Xinhua. (4 June) http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/04/c_136339392.htm. 

[lxxxviii] Brandt, C. M. 2020. “Peace Agreements as Counterinsurgency.” Ph.D. dissertation, University California, Berkeley. 

[lxxxix] The NRA was renamed the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in 1995, while the RPA was renamed the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in 2002, efforts to make them symbols of national unity, in Licklider’s (2014a) framework.
– Licklider, R. 2014a. “Introduction.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 1–12. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[xc] Farrell, T. 1998. “Professionalization and Suicidal Defence Planning by the Irish Army, 1921–1941.” Journal of Strategic Studies 21 (3): 67–85.

[xci] Day, C. R. 2011. “The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda.” Comparative Politics 43 (4): 439–458.
Kiyaga-Nsubuga, J. 1999. “Managing Political Change: Uganda under Museveni.” In Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, edited by T. M. Ali, and R. O. Matthews, 13–34. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Lewis, J. I. 2012. “How Rebellion Begins: Insurgent Group Formation and Viability in Uganda.” Ph.D. diss., Department of Government: Harvard University. 
Lewis, J. I. 2017. “How Does Ethnic Rebellion Start?” Comparative Political Studies 50 (10): 1420–1450.
Ondoga Ori Amaxiiiza, G. 1998. Museveni’s Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman. Kampala: Fountain. 

[xcii] Kasfir, N. 2000. “’Movement’ Democracy, Legitimacy and Power in Uganda.” In No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities, edited by J. Mugaju, and J. Oloka-Onyango, 60–78. Kampala: Fountain. 
Kasfir, N. 2005. “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981–86.” Journal of Modern African Studies 43 (2): 271–296.
Twaddle, M. 1988. “Museveni’s Uganda: Notes Towards an Analysis.” In Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development, edited by H. B. Hansen, and M. Twaddle, 313–335. London: James Currey. 

[xciii] Kasfir, N. 2005. “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981–86.” Journal of Modern African Studies 43 (2): 271–296.

[xciv] Syahuka-Muhindo, A. 1993. “The Rwenzururu Movement and the Democratic Struggle.” In Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements, and Constitutionalism, edited by M. Mamdani, and J. Oloka-Onyango, 273–317. Vienna: JEP.

[xcv] Republic of Uganda. 1991. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Session 1991–1992, Second Meeting, Issue No. 20, 1 August-25 September 1991. Kampala: Republic of Uganda. 

[xcvi] Brett, E. A. 1995. “Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Rôle of the Military in Politics.” Journal of Modern African Studies 33 (1): 129.Twaddle, M. 1988. “Museveni’s Uganda: Notes Towards an Analysis.” In Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development, edited by H. B. Hansen, and M. Twaddle, 313–335. London: James Currey. 

[xcvii] Bell, A. M. 2016. “Military Culture and Restraint toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars.” Security Studies 25 (3): 488–518.

[xcviii] Lamwaka, C. 1988. “Latek Set to Join NRA.” New Vision (27 July): 1, 12. 

[xcix] Lewis, J. I. 2012. “How Rebellion Begins: Insurgent Group Formation and Viability in Uganda.” Ph.D. diss., Department of Government: Harvard University. 

[c] On political integration of former rebels, see Berdal and Ucko (2009) and Matanock (2017).
– Berdal, M., and D. H. Ucko. 2009. Reintegrating Armed Groups after Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition. London: Routledge. 
– Matanock, A. M. 2017. Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

[ci] Lewis, J. I. 2012. “How Rebellion Begins: Insurgent Group Formation and Viability in Uganda.” Ph.D. diss., Department of Government: Harvard University. 

[cii] Brett, E. A. 1995. “Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Rôle of the Military in Politics.” Journal of Modern African Studies 33 (1): 129.
Day, C. R. 2011. “The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda.” Comparative Politics 43 (4): 439–458.
Lewis, J. I. 2020. How Insurgency Begins: Rebel Group Formation in Uganda and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

[ciii] Brett, E. A. 1995. “Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Rôle of the Military in Politics.” Journal of Modern African Studies 33 (1): 129.

[civ] Branch, A. 2005. “Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986–1998.” African Studies Quarterly 8 (2): 1–31. 

[cv] Bell, A. M. 2016. “Military Culture and Restraint toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars.” Security Studies 25 (3): 488–518.
Kabwegyere, T. B. 2000. People’s Choice, People’s Power: Challenges and Prospects of Democracy in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain. 
Lewis, J. I. 2012. “How Rebellion Begins: Insurgent Group Formation and Viability in Uganda.” Ph.D. diss., Department of Government: Harvard University. 

[cvi] Burgess, S. F. 2014. “From Failed Power-Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military Integration.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 87–102. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Mills, G. 2008. “The Boot Is Now on the Other Foot: Rwanda’s Lessons from Both Sides of Insurgency.” RUSI Journal 153 (3): 72–78.
Wilén, N. 2016. “From Foe to Friend? Army Integration after War in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo.” International Peacekeeping 23 (1): 79–106.

[cvii] Jowell, M. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2): 278–293.

[cviii] Burgess, S. F. 2014. “From Failed Power-Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military Integration.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 87–102. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Jowell, M. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2): 278–293.
Rehder, R. B. 2008. “From Guerrillas to Peacekeepers: The Evolution of the Rwandan Defense Forces.” Masters thesis, Marine Corps University. 
Rusagara, F. K. 2011. “Unconventional Challenges and Nontraditional Roles for Armed Forces: The Case for Rwanda.” PRISM 3 (1): 107–120. 

[cix] Orth, R. 2001. “Rwanda’s Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 12 (1): 76–109.

[cx] Burgess, S. F. 2014. “From Failed Power-Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military Integration.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 87–102. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[cxi] Orth, R. 2001. “Rwanda’s Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 12 (1): 76–109.

[cxii] Burgess, S. F. 2014. “From Failed Power-Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military Integration.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 87–102. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Jowell, M. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2): 278–293.
Rusagara, F. K. 2011. “Unconventional Challenges and Nontraditional Roles for Armed Forces: The Case for Rwanda.” PRISM 3 (1): 107–120. 

[cxiii] Jowell, M. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2): 278–293.
See also Rusagara (2011, 114).
Rusagara, F. K. 2011. “Unconventional Challenges and Nontraditional Roles for Armed Forces: The Case for Rwanda.” PRISM 3 (1): 107–120. 

[cxiv] Burgess, S. F. 2014. “From Failed Power-Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military Integration.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 87–102. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Rusagara, F. K. 2011. “Unconventional Challenges and Nontraditional Roles for Armed Forces: The Case for Rwanda.” PRISM 3 (1): 107–120. 

[cxv] Jowell, M. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2): 278–293.
– The integration process, however, has also been criticized by human rights groups (Wilén 2012, 1329–30).
– Wilén, N. 2012. “A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR-DDR in Rwanda?” Third World Quarterly 33 (7): 1323–1336.

[cxvi] Burgess, S. F. 2014. “From Failed Power-Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military Integration.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 87–102. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Rusagara, F. K. 2011. “Unconventional Challenges and Nontraditional Roles for Armed Forces: The Case for Rwanda.” PRISM 3 (1): 107–120. 

[cxvii] Burgess, S. F. 2014. “From Failed Power-Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military Integration.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 87–102. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

Rusagara, F. K. 2011. “Unconventional Challenges and Nontraditional Roles for Armed Forces: The Case for Rwanda.” PRISM 3 (1): 107–120. 

[cxvii] Krebs, R. R., and R. Licklider. 2015. “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” International Security 40 (3): 93–138.
Simonsen, S. G. 2007. “Building ‘National’ Armies – Building Nations?: Determinants of Success for Postintervention Integration Efforts.” Armed Forces and Society 33 (4): 571–590.

[cxix] Jowell, M. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2): 278–293.
Neads, A. 2020. “You’re in the Army Now: The Politics of Cohesion During Military Integration in Sierra Leone.” Security Studies 29 (5): 894–926.

[cxx] Hall, R. A. 2012. “Modern Soldiery Interrogated: Cataloguing the Local Military’s Tasks and Their Perception of Local Civilian Actors.” Philippine Political Science Journal 33 (1): 1–21.
Samii, C. 2014. “Military Integration in Burundi, 2000–2006.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 195–228. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[cxxi] Fearon, J. D., and D. D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97 (1): 75–90.
Kilcullen, D. 2010. Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lyall, J. 2010. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War.” American Political Science Review 104 (1): 1–20.
Lyall, J., Y. Shiraito, and K. Imai. 2015. “Coethnic Bias and Wartime Informing.” Journal of Politics 77 (3): 833–848

[cxxii] Joshi, M., and J. M. Quinn. 2017. “Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict.” British Journal of Political Science 47 (4): 869–892.

[cxxiii] Lara, F. J. 2012. “Settlement Without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement.” In Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In, edited by A. Giustozzi, 99–112. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Santos, S. M. 2010b. “MNLF Integration Into the AFP and the PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation?” In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, edited by D. Rodriguez, 162–184. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 

[cxxiv] Balcells, L., and C. M. Sullivan. 2018. “New Findings from Conflict Archives: An Introduction and Methodological Framework.” Journal of Peace Research 55 (2): 137–146.

[cxxv] Kalyvas, S. N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
– In Chechnya, however, ex-rebels who tried to protect their communities from harsh counterinsurgency operations faced severe punishment (Šmíd and Mareš 2015, 660–61).
– Šmíd, T., and M. Mareš. 2015. “‘Kadyrovtsy’: Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Wars of Paramilitary Clans.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38 (5): 650–677.

[cxxvi] Kubota, Y. 2017. “Imagined Statehood: Wartime Rebel Governance and Post-War Subnational Identity in Sri Lanka.” World Development 90 (2): 199–212.

[cxxvii] Samii, C. 2014. “Military Integration in Burundi, 2000–2006.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 195–228. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[cxxviii] Baaz, M. E., and J. Verweijen. 2013. “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-Military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC.” African Affairs 112 (449): 563–582.

Verweijen, J. 2014. “Half-Brewed: The Lukewarm Results of Creating an Integrated Military in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 137–162. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[cxxix] Johnson, D. H., and G. Prunier. 1993. “The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” In Civil War in the Sudan, edited by M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, 117–141. London: British Academic Press. 

LeRiche, M. 2014. “Sudan, 1972–1983.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 31–48. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

[cxxx] Arnould, V. 2016. “Transitional Justice in Peacebuilding: Dynamics of Contestation in the DRC.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10 (3): 321–338.

[cxxxi] Military integration and political power-sharing could also be trading the risk of renewed civil war for risk of coups—though state leaders’ former allies seem more likely to launch coups than integrees (Roessler 2016; White 2020).
– Roessler, P. 2016. Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

[cxxxii] Hartzell, C. 2014. “Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces ater Civil Wars, edited by R. Licklider, 13–28. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 

.