Security Cooperation as Remote Warfare

Remy Maduit | Authors published

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Security Cooperation as Remote Warfare
The US in the Horn of Africa

Rubrick Biegon is a Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, UK.
Tom Watts is a Teaching Fellow in War and Security at Royal Holloway, University of London, UK.

Speaking in 2007, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates argued that the ‘most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. [1] Consistent with this claim, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations have all engaged in a variety of efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces to address security-related threats. This has required the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral military activities under the rubric of security cooperation. These activities, of which the more widely debated security force assistance is a subset, [2] have been a critical component of contemporary US foreign and counterterrorism policy. [3] They are also integral to the debates on remote warfare. [4] The Pentagon defines security cooperation as all

“[…] interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives.” [5]

This chapter introduces security cooperation as a tool of remote warfare, both in a general sense and in the specific case of US counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa. We argue that there is a twin security/strategic logic to its use: it functions to build the capacity of foreign security forces to deny terrorist organizations safe havens within their borders or region; and to help secure American access to bases, airspace, and foreign security personnel, ‘thicken’ political partnerships with overseas governments and to create new patterns of cooperation, influence, and leverage. [6]

The notion that security cooperation is ‘political’ is not novel. It underpins much of the recent practitioner-oriented literature on the limits of recent Western partner capacity-building efforts. [7] A greater focus on the politics animating the use of security cooperation activities rather than the politics of the agents receiving this assistance, however, provides an alternative calculus for revisiting the debates on their effectiveness. Much of the existing academic-practitioner dialogue on US security cooperation activities in the Horn of Africa has focused on the failures to build capacity in Somali and regional security agents. [8] When the political dimensions of US military assistance are discussed, it is usually within the context of how misalignments in the political interests of the US and recipient have undermined the efficacy of partner-building efforts. We argue that this is problematic because a greater sensitivity to the twin security and strategic logic of security cooperation might help us better understand the apparent puzzle of why these activities have persisted despite their well-documented military failures.

To be clear, we are not arguing that it is only the strategic logic of security cooperation that explains their use, nor are we arguing that the various forms of access to their use generate offsets failing to build partner capacity. We are sensitive to the methodological challenges of documenting the relationship between security cooperation and securing the different access discussed above, aware that there is not necessarily a clear ‘transmission belt’ between the two. As we document through engagement with various primary source material, references to the Cold War-era use of military assistance, and the empirical study of contemporary US counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa, the use of security cooperation as a tool of remote warfare can be understood to have supported the pursuit of wider strategic goals.

Our analysis unfolds in three stages. Section 1 introduces the major trends in post-war military assistance focusing on the Bush, Obama, and Trump presidencies. Section 2 unpacks the twin security and strategic logic of security cooperation as an instrument of remote warfare. We use this framework in the last section of this chapter to examine the role of security cooperation in US counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, our principal case study, has been the center of American security cooperation activities in Africa during the last decade. [9] It is also emblematic of the US support for ‘Fabergé egg militaries’, which are ‘expensive, shiny, and easy to break’. [10] Whilst their use has been greater in Somalia than in military operations elsewhere in Africa, we recognize this case to represent the wider demand for, and use of, security cooperation in fragile states. [11]

Security Cooperation in US Foreign Policy: From the Cold War to Trump

Military assistance, of which security cooperation is one component, has long been a key tool of American foreign policy. [12] We estimate the US to have provided military assistance to over 100 states after 1945. [13] During the Cold War, an estimated $390 billion was spent on military and developmental help. [14] This served multiple strategic purposes. Beyond helping partners defend against communist expansion, it was a key conduit through which the US stabilized access to overseas markets [15] and helped secure access to overseas bases. [16]

As Defence Secretary Robert McNamara told Congress during the 1960s, the US provided military aid because ‘military officers were the coming leaders of their nations. It is beyond the price for the United States to make friends with such men’. [17] Military assistance, he emphasized, generated ‘important economic by-products for our foreign policy concerning the stability and economic progress of the less developed and emerging nations’ and helped secure ‘access to overseas bases and installations’. [18] All three dynamics were apparent in the Horn of Africa. Before the communist coup, which overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, Ethiopia had received $286 million worth of military aid following the Second World War. [19] Thereafter, as the patterns of material support were reordered to reflect the region’s new political landscape, the flow of military help was redirected toward neighboring Somalia. [20] As the Washington Post candidly reported, the US agreed to ‘provide $40 million in weapons in return for the use of Somali airbases and ports’. [21]

Such practices continued after the Cold War. Military assistance has been integral to post-9/11 efforts to deny transnational terrorist organizations safe havens in fragile states. [22] The US and its coalition partners spent billions of dollars training, equipping, and advising tens of thousands of Afghani and Iraqi soldiers as part of the counterinsurgency campaigns in both countries. Whilst these activities have been smaller in scale, military assistance has also been central to what Maria Ryan has coined the ‘War on Terror on the periphery’. [23] Key for counterterrorism operations in Africa were the shifts laid out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review, a highly influential defense planning document that distilled the Pentagon’s developing approach to irregular warfare. [24] It outlined several important adjustments to the US defense strategy, including a shift from larger-scale military interventions toward fighting ‘multiple irregulars, asymmetric operations’. This required: “Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where [US] forces do not traditionally operate. Building and leveraging partner capacity will also be an essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals. Working indirectly with and through others, and denying popular support to the enemy, will help to transform the character of the conflict.” [25]

These commitments remained a core component of Obama’s counterterrorism policies. The 2012 Defence Strategic Review, for example, placed the training, equipping, and advising of foreign security forces at the center of the ongoing war against al-Qaeda. ‘As US forces draw down in Afghanistan’, the document detailed, ‘global counter-terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance’. [26] Speaking of the twin security/strategic logics of Security cooperation, the Obama administration’s influential Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance noted how security cooperation-related activities accomplished more than just strengthening the security and governance capacity of partners. They also worked to ‘promote partner support for US interests’ including ‘military access to airspace and basing rights; improved interoperability and training opportunities; and cooperation on law enforcement, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics‘, amongst other policy areas. [27]

Despite the rollback of some Obama-era restraints on the use of force, the Trump administration has kept security cooperation as a key counterterrorism tool. [28] The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism restated the importance of ‘augment [ing] the capabilities of key foreign partners to conduct critical counterterrorism activities’, which remained an essential component of the military response against transnational terrorist organizations. [29] Institutionalizing a process that can be traced to Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’, the Trump administration has recalibrated the overall strategic direction of US defense policy. According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, China and Russia ‘are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners’. [30]

The (re)emergence of great power competition as an organizing lens for American foreign policy creates new uncertainties, including the trajectory of remote warfare. According to Stephen Tankel [31], with the Trump administration’s focus[ing] more on great power conflict and rogue regimes, security cooperation with, and assistance to, allies and partners will remain critical for achieving global defense objectives.’ Indeed, both the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasize the continued importance of such activities in tackling transnational security challenges in Africa while adding that they also have value in ‘limit[ing] the malign influence of non-African powers’ in the region. [32] Thus, whilst the immediate focus of these activities may be reoriented to reflect the new strategic focus on great power competition, security cooperation will probably remain an important instrument in the American foreign and counterterrorism policy toolbox.

Conceptualizing Security Cooperation as a Tool of Remote Warfare

At the core of the current debate on remote warfare is the trend toward countering security threats at a greater physical, political and strategic distance. The Oxford Research Group defines remote warfare as a ‘term that describes approaches to combat that does not require the deployment of large numbers of your ground troops’. [33] Whilst there has been a ‘pick-and-mix’ approach to the way these have been cataloged, a variety of tactical practices have been studied under this label, including manned and unmanned airpower, military assistance, cyber operations, intelligence sharing, private military security contractors, and special operations forces (SOF). Whilst Western states may conduct direct combat operations against shared security challenges, they do so from the air or with elite SOF units, not their conventional ground forces. The bulk of the fighting is instead delegated to local security agents whose military capacity is strengthened through security cooperation and tailored packages of operational support, often comprising embedded SOF advisors, airpower, and intelligence sharing. [34]

When within this debate, security cooperation offers the attractive prospect of shaping the security situation on the ground, particularly in sites like Somalia where important, but not vital, security interests are threatened. Security cooperation can help build the capacity of partnered security agents to conduct military operations to a standard or scale that surpasses earlier capabilities, thus enabling them to better tackle shared security challenges. [35] This intuitive security logic has two dimensions. On the one hand, it makes up an effort to improve the capacity of some foreign security agents to deny transnational terrorist organizations ungoverned spaces from which to operate. [36] On the other, it provides a means of enabling other foreign security agents to take part in coalition operations alongside or in place of American forces. [37] What binds the security logic of security cooperation as a tool of remote warfare is that in theory if not practiced, it can ‘reduce the need for US troops to do the fighting by improving the ally’s ability to do this themselves’. [38]

This geographical access takes multiple forms and is not restricted to just overseas basing rights. As noted in the wider literature, it can also include access to airspace to conduct aerial reconnaissance and strike operations; foreign military personnel, to build partner capacity, take part in joint counterterrorism raids and provide intelligence; and transit, whether this is intended to conduct military operations in a neighboring state or to resupply US combat forces in theatre. [39] In this way, the strategic logic of security cooperation can help provide the US with territorial access to partner countries, but also technical access to those partnering security agents that, under remote warfare, do most frontline fighting.

To reiterate, the provision of military assistance does not automatically translate into direct influence. [40] As understood through the lens of principal-agent theory, political dynamics are central to the effectiveness of partner-building efforts. [41] Questions of efficacy flow from the substantial agency loss involved in using these programs, as seen in the challenges generated by adverse selection problems, interest asymmetries, and the difficulties in monitoring how military training and equipment are used by recipients (Biddle et al. 2017). In contested sites of security cooperation, such as Somalia, there can also be competition amongst security cooperation providers for influence, further complicating matters. As one interviewee involved with British partner-building efforts in Somalia put it, ‘when you’re there as a team of 15 you don’t have automatic influence […] so you need time to build relationships instead. You’re there competing with other internationals for influence’. [42]

Even in such situations, however, security cooperation activities can help generate the different access outlined above. As Knowles and Watson document, for a comparatively modest investment in human resources and resources, the United Kingdom could secure access into the operations and intelligence room at AMISOM via its partner-building efforts in Somalia: ‘a high level of access—which could lead to more effective partnerships in the future’. [43] Besides the political dynamics intrinsic within the delivery of security cooperation, which affects the effectiveness of associated programs, the political context informing the ‘principal’s’ decision to provide the ‘agent’ with assistance is thus also worthy of consideration.

US Security Cooperation as Remote Warfare in the Horn of Africa

The external training, equipping, and advising of African security forces is not new. European powers relied heavily on locally raised militaries to augment their ground forces throughout the age of empire. [44] During the Cold War, the US government provided military assistance to states across the Horn of Africa. [45] The region was a site of acute East-West competition, with both superpowers active in advancing their respective ideological and geopolitical interests across the region. [46] The provision of military assistance had both security and strategic logic. It was intended to help maintain access to air and naval facilities in Ethiopia and later Somalia; defend the internal stability of partner governments; and maintain the openness of the strategically important Bab-el-Mandeb waterway, a key artery in global trade. [47] This effort to manage security challenges in the Horn of Africa from ‘over the horizon’ was given further impetus by the deaths of eighteen Army Rangers during the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, popularly known as the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident. As Robert Patman has argued, the resultant ‘Somalia Syndrome’ generated a profound skepticism about intervening on the ground in humanitarian crises, shaping later remote warfare campaigns in Africa. [48]

Following the 9/11 attacks, Bush administration officials feared that al-Qaeda’s senior leadership would move to the Horn of Africa following their expulsion from Afghanistan. [49] Based at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was created in October 2002 to coordinate counterterrorism activities throughout the region focusing strongly on building partner capacity and civil-military operations. [50] Following its breakaway from the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 against the backdrop of the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, Al-Shabab emerged as the principal target of CJTF-HOA’s activities. This al-Qaeda-affiliated group has fought an effective insurgency against the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the latter of which was created in 2007 to support the nominal Somali state. Al-Shabab has controlled large swathes of territory in central and southern Somalia, conducted terrorist attacks in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia, and infiltrated Somalia’s security and intelligence services. [51]

Beginning during George W. Bush’s presidency, against the advice of local partners to keep a ‘low profile’ to minimize the risk to peacekeeping contingents [52], successive US administrations have used security cooperation alongside other remote practices of intervention. [5] In 2007, the DOD’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) could conduct airstrikes from manned/unmanned aircraft and conduct ‘kill/capture’ SOF raids against Al-Shabab’s senior leadership. By January 2017, between 3 and 6 covert strikes are reported to have been conducted, with the first drone strike reportedly occurring in June 2011. [53] Whilst disruptive, such strikes formed a small part of a larger package of intervention: ‘American strategy for containing and ultimately defeating Al Shabab relie[d] on AMISOM and the Somali National Army’. [54] This illustrates the centrality of security cooperation in this remote warfare campaign.

According to data provided by the Security Assistance Monitor [55], Somalia was allocated at least $248.6 million in military assistance in the period between FY 2006–2018. [56] In a 2009 diplomatic cable sent from the American embassy in Ethiopia, concerns were expressed about providing military support to the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government without strengthening its capacity to govern and provide public services because such actions ‘raise US involvement in the morass of a Somali civil war in the name of counterterrorism’. [57] In this spirit, it was not until 2013 that the Obama administration lifted restrictions on the provision of defense equipment and services to the Somali army [58], with the effort to build capacity in the Somali National Army (SNA) gaining further momentum following the April 2015 announcement of the Guulwade (Victory) Plan which aimed to create a 10,900 strong person security force capable of facilitating AMISOM’s withdrawal from Somalia. [59]

Despite these efforts, the SNA remained chronically undermanned, poorly led, and badly equipped. [60] It was, in Paul Williams’ assessment, ‘an army in name only, confined to defensive and localized operations, unable to undertake a coherent national campaign, and often reliant on [others] for protection, securing its main supply routes, logistics support, and casualty evacuation’. [61] The Lightning ‘Danab’ advanced infantry company, one of the few comparative successes of US partner building activities, for example, operated separately from the SNA [62] and was reportedly insulated from the influence of some Somali government officials. [63] Reflecting these and a myriad of other political, contextual and operational challenges, the focus of American security cooperation efforts in the Horn of Africa concentrated on AMISOM. [64]

The six AMISOM contributing states listed in Figure 1 received $1.28 billion in military assistance between FY 2006-2018. [65]

State	Year joined AMISOM	Peak AMISOM troop contribution
Burundi	2007	5,400
Djibouti	2011	1,800
Ethiopia	2014	4,400
Kenya	2012	4,300
Sierra Leone	2013	850
Uganda	2007	6,200

Figure 1: AMISOM troop-contributing states. [66]

This assistance was provided both directly to AMISOM contributing states and indirectly via the United Nations Support Office in Somalia. [67] Examples of the first form of assistance include the use of the counterterrorism-oriented Section 1206/Section 3333 program ($730.5 million) and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund ($59 million). [68] As a region, East Africa was also allocated $275.9 million in Counterterrorism Partnership Fund assistance between FY 2015-2016 and $112.2 million in Section 1207 (n) Transitional Authority funds between FY 2012-2014). [69] Beyond this, AMISOM was also allocated at least $2 billion in funding via the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account. [70] According to a 2014 White House factsheet, $512 million had also been committed to supporting AMISOM via ‘pre-deployment training, provision of military equipment, and advisors on the ground’. [71]

State	Total US Military Assistance	Section 1206/Section 3333	Counterterrorism Partnership Fund
Burundi	$53.2	$34.7	–
Djibouti	$77.4	$37.8	–
Ethiopia	$121.5	$67.4	$18.7
Kenya	$628.3	$354.4	$31.4
Sierra Leone	$27.9	$0.1	–
Uganda	$373.8	$236.1	$8.9
Total	$1,282.1	$730.5	$59

Figure 2: US military assistance to AMISOM contributing states FY2006-2018 in millions of $. [72]

Consistent with the use of security cooperation to enable partners to take part in coalition operations, they allocated these funds to plug key gaps in their recipients’ counterterrorism capacity. Section 1207(n) funds, for example, should build the capacity of ‘Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates, and Al Shabab’ (Serafino 2014, 5 FN). Likewise, CTFP funds were requested to improve AMISOM contributors’ intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, counterterrorism interdiction, a counter-improvised explosive device, and command-and-control capabilities. [73] Such a narrow focus on ‘plugging in’ greater tactical competencies without building the institutional and logistical architectures to support them has raised questions about the sustainability of these gains once the funding taps are turned off. [74]

As noted in the wider literature, the efficacy of security cooperation activities is contentious. [75] In Somalia, there has been an overemphasis on building the tactical capability of local security forces at the expense of the political and institutional reforms required for long-term conflict resolution (Williams 2019, 13), as well as inattention to a wider strategy. [76] Compounding these failures of execution are the structural limits of what is possible for security cooperation to accomplish in conditions of state collapse. These result from the misalignment of interests between the US and various local actors. [77] Local partners keep their agency, and Somalia has lacked the political will or incentive to realign its behaviors according to America’s security preferences. According to an unnamed Pentagon official, ‘eliminating Al-Shabab is the simple part; the hard part is getting the institutions of Somalia to work’. [78] These barriers are consistent with the principal-agent issues that characterize the use of this policy tool. The very distance between the donor-as-principal and the recipient-as-agent that enables security cooperation to serve as a means of remote warfare also undermines its efficacy as a security tool. [79]

Notwithstanding these barriers to the conversion of military support into desired political outcomes, an expanded focus on the strategic logic of security cooperation opens up an alternative calculus to qualify the well-documented failures of these activities. Consistent with our earlier conceptualization of the security logic of security cooperation, despite agency losses and aid misappropriation, security cooperation has enabled American policymakers to exert at least some influence on the ground in the region whilst continuing to distance conventional US ground forces from the bulk of frontline fighting. The training and equipment provided through the Section 1206 authority improved the capacity of frontline states such as Ethiopia and Kenya to better police their border and coastal regions before joining AMISOM, helping limit Al-Shabab’s freedom of movement. Security cooperation also motivated and facilitated AMISOM troop contributions to the fight in Somalia itself. Contributing troops to AMISOM enabled the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force to access both US peacekeeping- and counterterrorism-orientated funding, training, and assistance. [80]

Similarly, as a prerequisite for its participation, the Government of Burundi ‘compiled a 20-page list of requests that it considered necessary to join AMISOM, including trucks and bulldozers, aircraft, helicopters and office supplies, sleeping bags, personal equipment, and optical equipment such as night vision goggles’. [81] Whilst other political, institutional, and normative considerations influenced the decision of the six AMISOM contributing states to provide troops to fight in Somalia, increased receipt of US military assistance alongside other avenues of financial support was often, but not always, a motivating factor. [82]

Discussions in leaked embassy cables and public press releases illustrate how security cooperation initiatives thicken political partnerships with key regional states. In 2007, the US ambassador to Kenya discussed ‘synchronizing efforts’ across the Horn of Africa, through a ‘multi-pronged approach involving continued military and security actions’ with other diplomatic and development efforts. He also ‘stressed the need for American officials and contractors to visit Somalia’, as ‘such visits were essential both for operations and to effectively publicize both within Somalia and the region the good work’ the US was carrying out. [83] In Ethiopia, the provision of aircraft maintenance was argued to be ‘critical to continuing a viable (military-military) relationship with a proven partner in the war on terrorism’. [84] Diplomatic staff based in Addis Ababa expressed concern that because of the repeated failures to repair two Ethiopian-operated C-130s military transport aircraft and the expected closure of the US-funded Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College, some within the Ethiopian military were aiming ‘to make China, and to a lesser extent Israel, their major military relationship’. [85] Security cooperation activities also strengthened cooperation between regional partners, including in sensitive areas such as intelligence, and provided the US with technical access to partnering security agents. [86]

In 2016, following the completion of the first annual military-to-military engagement event African Partnership Flight, a US Air Force spokesperson explained that bringing together participants from the Kenyan and Ugandan air forces under US instruction would ‘build enduring relationships with (US) partner countries.’ Speaking about the collaborative spill-over effects of security cooperation, the spokesperson further noted that through such activities the US had ‘ [built] a partnership and friendship that has helped open the door for further engagement, knowledge sharing and interoperability between our forces’. [87] A similar logic punctuates the US Army’s annual Justified Accord Exercise, started in 2017, which functions to improve the capacity of regional forces to support AMISOM and develop intra-personal relationships with and access to local forces. As Lapthe C. Flora, the then US Army Africa deputy put it in 2019: “I cannot overemphasize the importance of exercises like Justified Accord […] They not only contribute to the readiness of African nations and peacekeeping operations, but they also provide valuable opportunities to work together and create professional relationships and friendships.” [88]

Finally, whilst it is difficult to document an exact ‘transmission belt’ between an increase in security cooperation and the production of access, the increase in security cooperation activities to combat Al-Shabab has paralleled the rollout of military installations across the Horn of Africa. Officially, the US operates only one military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. [89] Around this, however, a constellation of smaller ‘cooperative security locations’ orientated around the drone, SOF, and contractor assemblages have been operated, with suspected locations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. [90] With Seychelles, there is evidence to suggest that military help was used to thicken the US’ bilateral partnership with the host government following the basing of a small fleet of unarmed MQ-9 Reapers on the island to conduct anti-piracy and surveillance missions.

During an August 2009 meeting with AFRICOM commander General William Ward, Seychelles President Michel noted his island was an ‘aircraft carrier in the middle of the Indian Ocean without the planes’ and welcomed ‘this resurgence of American military activity in Seychelles’. [91] Following the initial use of these facilities in September 2009, the overall level of US military assistance rose from $251,299 in FY 2010 (an accounting period that began on 1 October 2009) to $893,244 in FY2011. [92] Consistent with General Ward’s expressed commitment to strengthen bilateral military relations and improve the capacity of the islands’ coastguard [93], $535,000 was allocated this year via the State Department Foreign Military Financing program for Metal Shark patrol boats and ‘Secure Video and Data Link equipment’. [94] Following the suspected suspension of drone operations from this base in 2012[95], overall military help to Seychelles declined from $627,580 in FY2012 to $464,555 in FY2013 and $268,224 in FY2014. [96]

Conclusion

Security cooperation offered the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations an attractive means of ‘squaring the circle’ on the use of military force. As a tool of remote warfare, it allows planners to exert limited influence ‘on the ground’ in complex overseas security environments, but without deploying large numbers of their own ‘boots on the ground’ to conduct frontline fighting. The security logic that is foregrounded in much of the study of these activities is an intuitive component of this feature of US military interventionism. However, as we have argued, this sits alongside a parallel set of strategic logic. Security cooperation has helped secure various forms of geographic and technical-political access, including on matters of basing, airspace, and transit rights; thickened political partnership; and helped create patterns of cooperation, influence, and leverage.

In consideration of emerging debates on the effectiveness of remote warfare, we have highlighted the need to account for the dual security and strategic logic of policy tools as security cooperation. The intersecting features of remote warfare, as expressed through its kinetic and non-kinetic dimensions, are illuminated in the recent history of US policy in the Horn of Africa. In Somalia, the US has consistently used security cooperation alongside other remote practices of intervention. The ability of the US to confront Al-Shabab directly or indirectly has been contingent on Washington’s capacity to secure access and partnerships in the region. The significance of security cooperation in a country like Somalia needs to be understood against the backdrop of the conditions that elicited the turn toward remote warfare by the US and other agents. Absent alternatives, security cooperation programs have provided a pathway to continued intervention, the ‘remoteness’ of which applies only to the intervening actor, not the local communities for whom political violence is intimate. This is not to claim that US intervention in the Horn of Africa has been successful or that its failings are fixable using more or different configurations of remote warfare practices. Rather, it is to suggest that the dynamics of remote warfare need to be analyzed holistically, and with the twin security and strategic purposes they serve.

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[1] The authors would like to thank Maria Ryan, Simone Papale, and the reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Any mistakes remain our own.
– Gates, Robert. 2007. Secretary of Defense Speech. US DOD. 26 November. Accessed 16 September 2017. http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199

[2] As explained in the Joint Publication 3–20 security cooperation, security force assistance ‘is the set of DOD [security cooperation] activities that contribute to unified action by the [United States Government] to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of [Foreign Security Forces] and their supporting institutions, whether of a [Partner Nation] or an international organization (e.g., regional security organization), to support US objectives’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017, vii).
– Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2017. Joint Publication 3-20: Security cooperation. Accessed 10 October 2017. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf

[3] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, the small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.
Stokes, Doug, and Kit Waterman. 2017. ‘Beyond balancing? Intrastate conflict and US grand strategy.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(6): 1–26.
Tankel, Stephen. 2018b. With us and Against us: how America’s partners help and hinder the war on terror. New York: Columbia University Press.

[4] Watson, Abigail, and Emily Knowles. 2019. ‘Improving the UK offer in Africa: Lessons from military partnerships on the continent.’ London: Oxford Research Group. Accessed 5 November 2019. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=94a8e650-09a0-408e-bc0d-3c0610c10d5e
Watts, Tom, and Rubrick Biegon. 2017. Defining Remote Warfare: Security cooperation. Accessed 11 May 2019. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/RCP-Security_Cooperation.pdf
Watts. 2019. Conceptualizing Remote Warfare: The Past, Present, and Future. Accessed 26 May 2019. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/conceptualising-remote-warfare-the-past-present-and-future

[5] Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2017. Joint Publication 3-20: Security cooperation. Accessed 10 October 2017. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf

[6] Beyond this, security cooperation activities in Africa can also be theorized as having a political-economy component, see (Stokes  and Waterman 2017, 838–840; Ryan, 2020).
– Stokes, Doug, and Kit Waterman. 2017. ‘Beyond balancing? Intrastate conflict and US grand strategy.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(6): 1–26.
– Ryan, Maria. 2020. ‘” Enormous Opportunities” and “Hot Frontiers”: Sub-Saharan Africa in US Grand Strategy, 2001-Present.’ The International History Review, 42(1): 155–75.

[7] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.
Matisek, Jahara. 2018. ‘The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies.’ Defense and Security Analysis, 34(3), 267–290.
Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.
Tankel, Stephen. 2018b. With us and Against us: how America’s partners help and hinder the war on terror. New York: Columbia University Press.

[8] Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.
Ross, Tommy.. 2018. The Dangers of Incoherent Strategy: Security Assistance in Somalia, 2009–2018. Texas National Security Review. 20 November. Accessed 25 June 2019. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pros-and-cons-of-security-assistance/
Williams, Paul D., 2018. ‘Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union

[9] Ross, Tommy.. 2018. The Dangers of Incoherent Strategy: Security Assistance in Somalia, 2009–2018. Texas National Security Review. 20 November. Accessed 25 June 2019. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pros-and-cons-of-security-assistance/

[10] Matisek, Jahara. 2018. ‘The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies.’ Defense and Security Analysis, 34(3), 267–290.

[11] Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.

[12] For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Security cooperation and the other channels of US military assistance, see (White 2014).
– White, Taylor. 2014. ‘Security cooperation: How It All Fits.’ Joint Forces Quarterly, 72: 106–108.

[13] Kuzmarov, Jeremy. 2017. ‘American Military Assistance Programs Since 1945.’ Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of American History. https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-346

[14] Matisek, Jahara. 2018. ‘The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies.’ Defense and Security Analysis, 34(3), 267–290.

[15] Kolko, Gabriel. 1988. Confronting the third world: United States foreign policy, 1945–1980. New York: Pantheon.

[16] Kuzmarov, Jeremy. 2017. ‘American Military Assistance Programs Since 1945.’ Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of American History. https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-346

[17] House of Representatives. 1963. Foreign operations appropriations for 1964: hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, eighty-eighth Congress, first session. Accessed 15 November 2019. file://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006212313

[18] Id.

[19] Kuzmarov, Jeremy. 2017. ‘American Military Assistance Programs Since 1945.’ Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of American History. https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-346

[20] Oberdorfer, Don. 1977. ‘US Offers Military Aid to Somalia.’ Washington Post. 26 July. Accessed 24 November 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/07/26/us-offers-military-aid-to-somalia/43249aa8-57e5-45d3-a55c-c4eec934da9a/

[21] Ross, Jay. 1981. ‘Kissinger: Confront Soviets in E. Africa Kissinger Advocates More Active Anti-Soviet Role in East Africa.’ Washington Post. 4 January. Accessed 14 November 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/01/04/kissinger-confront-soviets-in-e-africa-kissinger-advocates-more-active-anti-soviet-role-in-east-africa/e6974d2b-82ae-4ab1-ac2a-698c84e14776/

[22] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.
Ryan, Maria. 2019. Full Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Tankel, Stephen. 2018b. With us and Against us: how America’s partners help and hinder the war on terror. New York: Columbia University Press.
Watts, Tom, and Rubrick Biegon. 2017. Defining Remote Warfare: Security cooperation. Accessed 11 May 2019. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/RCP-Security_Cooperation.pdf

[23] Ryan, Maria. 2019. Full Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ryan, Maria. 2020. ‘” Enormous Opportunities” and “Hot Frontiers”: Sub-Saharan Africa in US Grand Strategy, 2001-Present.’ The International History Review, 42(1): 155–75.

[24] Id, 1144-152.

[25] DOD. 2006. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006. Accessed 16 September 2017.  http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf

[26] DOD. 2012. Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defence. Accessed 3 March 2017. http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf

[27] The White House. 2013. ‘Fact Sheet: US Security Sector Assistance Policy.’ Accessed 11 August 2018. from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy

[28] Biegon, Rubrick, and Tom Watts. ‘When ends Trump means: continuity versus change in US counterterrorism policy.’ Global Affairs, 6(1): 37–53.

[29] The White House. 2018. National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America. Accessed 12 January 2019.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf

[30] The White House. 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017. Accessed 11 August 2018.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

[31] Tankel, Stephen. 2018a. ‘Introduction: The Future of Security Assistance.’Texas National Security Review. 20 November. Accessed 25 June 2019. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pros-and-cons-of-security-assistance/

[32] The White House. 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017. Accessed 11 August 2018.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

[33] Knowles, E., and Watson, A. 2018. Remote Warfare: Lessons Learned from Contemporary Theatres. London: Oxford Research Group. Accessed 11 December 2018.  https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=4026f48e-df60-458b-a318-2a3eb4522ae7

[34] Id, 2-3.

[35] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.

[36] Tankel, Stephen. 2018b. With us and Against us: how America’s partners help and hinder the war on terror. New York: Columbia University Press.

[37] Ross, Tommy. 2016. ‘Leveraging Security cooperation as Military Strategy.’The Washington Quarterly, 39(3): 91–103.

[38] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.

[39] Tankel, Stephen. 2018b. With us and Against us: how America’s partners help and hinder the war on terror. New York: Columbia University Press.

[40] Ross, Tommy. 2016. ‘Leveraging Security cooperation as Military Strategy.’The Washington Quarterly, 39(3): 91–103.

[41] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.

[42] Watson, Abigail, and Emily Knowles. 2019. ‘Improving the UK offer in Africa: Lessons from military partnerships on the continent.’ London: Oxford Research Group. Accessed 5 November 2019. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=94a8e650-09a0-408e-bc0d-3c0610c10d5e

[43] Id.

[44] Johnson, Rob. 2017. True to Their Salt: Indigenous Personnel in Western Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[45] Kuzmarov, Jeremy. 2017. ‘American Military Assistance Programs Since 1945.’ Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of American History. https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-346

[46] Makinda, Samuel. M. 1982. ‘Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa.’Third World Quarterly, 4(1): 93–103.

[47] Lewis, William. 1987. ‘US Military Assistance to Africa.’ CSIS Africa Notes 75 (1987): 1-7. Accessed 18 May 2019. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/anotes_0887.pdf

[48] Patman, Robert. 2015. ‘The roots of strategic failure: The Somalia Syndrome and Al-Qaeda’s path to 9/11.’ International Politics, 52(1): 89–109.

[49] Ryan, Maria. 2019. Full Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[50] Id.

[51] Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.

[52] Wikileaks. 2007a. ‘Ethiopian FM Hails Cooperation, But Seeks Lower US Military Profile, In Somalia.’ID:07ADDISABABA89_a. 12 January. Accessed 26 November 2019. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA89_a.html

[53] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2017. ‘Somalia: Reported US covert actions 2001-2016.’ Accessed 10 October 2019. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-covert-actions-2001-2017

[54] Zimmerman, Katherine, Jacqulyn Meyer Kantack, Colin Lahiff, and Jordan Indermuehle. 2017. ‘US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?’ American Enterprise Institute. Accessed 16 September 2017.  https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/us-counterterrorism-objectives-in-somalia-is-mission-failure-likely

[55] Security Assistance Monitor. 2019. Data: Programs FY 06-18. Accessed 25 June 2019. http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/country/2006/2018/all/Global/

[56] This figure has been calculated by subtracting peacekeeping operations funding from the total military assistance allocated to Somalia during this period. As the Security Assistance Monitor notes, whilst ‘the US has historically appropriated Peacekeeping Operations assistance to Somalia with the intent to support both the Somali National Forces and AMISOM […] [the] US Government reports do not provide details about how [Peacekeeping Operations] amounts are divided between the two security providers’ (Chwalisz 2014).
– Chwalisz, Natalie. 2014. ‘United States Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) assistance in Somalia.’ Security Assistance Monitor. 4 April. Accessed 10 October 2017. http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/united-states-peacekeeping-operations-pko-assistance-somalia

[57] Wikileaks.2009a. ‘Ethiopia, Somalia, AMISOM, and the Way Forward.’ ID: 09ADDISABABA1186_a. 19 May. Accessed 26 November 2019. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ADDISABABA1186_a.html

[58] Ross, Tommy.. 2018. The Dangers of Incoherent Strategy: Security Assistance in Somalia, 2009–2018. Texas National Security Review. 20 November. Accessed 25 June 2019. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pros-and-cons-of-security-assistance/

[59] Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.

[60] Matisek, Jahara. 2018. ‘The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies.’ Defense and Security Analysis, 34(3), 267–290.

[61] Williams, Paul D., 2018. ‘Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union

[62] Id.

[63] Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.

[64] Williams, Paul D., 2018. ‘Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union

[65] Security Assistance Monitor. 2019. Data: Programs FY 06-18. Accessed 25 June 2019. http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/country/2006/2018/all/Global/

[66] This table is modified from (Williams 2018, 174).
– Williams, Paul D., 2018. ‘Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union

[67] Ross, Tommy.. 2018. The Dangers of Incoherent Strategy: Security Assistance in Somalia, 2009–2018. Texas National Security Review. 20 November. Accessed 25 June 2019. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pros-and-cons-of-security-assistance/

[68] Before its consolidation into the larger Section 333 authority as part of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the ‘Global Train and Equip Authority was used to build the capacity of foreign military, maritime, and border forces to conduct counterterrorism operations and support US coalition missions. For a more detailed discussion of this authority’s history and purpose, see (Ryan 2019, 153–156). Authorized in the FY2015 NDAA, the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund was intended to build partner capacity principally in frontline states in Africa and the Middle East, with a focus on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, border security, airlift, counter-improvised explosive device capabilities, and peacekeeping (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 2016, 2).
– Ryan, Maria. 2019. Full Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
– Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. 2016. Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund: Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Accessed 16 September 2017. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_CTPF_J-Book.pdf

[69] Security Assistance Monitor. 2019. Data: Programs FY 06-18. Accessed 25 June 2019. http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/country/2006/2018/all/Global/
– The Section 1207(n) Transitional Authority was a three-year transnational authority, attached to the Global Security Contingency Fund in the FY2012 NDAA, which supported counterterrorism operations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. It had two specific goals: ‘enhance the capacity of the national military forces, security agencies serving a similar defense function, and border security forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates, and al Shabaab’ on the one hand, and ‘[t]o enhance the ability of the Yemen Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Forces to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates’ on the other (Serafino 2014, 5 FN).
– Serafino, Nina. 2014. Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview. Library of Congress Congressional Washington DC Research Service. Accessed 3 March 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf

[70] Security Assistance Monitor. 2019. Data: Programs FY 06-18. Accessed 25 June 2019. http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/country/2006/2018/all/Global/

[71] The White House.  2014. ‘Fact Sheet: US Support for Peacekeeping in Africa.’ Accessed 11 August 2018. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa

[72] This table has been generated from data from (Security Assistance Monitor 2019). The total US military assistance figure includes support provided through both Pentagon-managed security cooperation programs and State Department-managed Security Assistance programs.

[73] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. 2016. Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund: Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Accessed 16 September 2017. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_CTPF_J-Book.pdf

[74] Ross, Tommy.. 2018. The Dangers of Incoherent Strategy: Security Assistance in Somalia, 2009–2018. Texas National Security Review. 20 November. Accessed 25 June 2019. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pros-and-cons-of-security-assistance/

[75] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.
Matisek, Jahara. 2018. ‘The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies.’ Defense and Security Analysis, 34(3), 267–290.
Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.

[76] Ross, Tommy.. 2018. The Dangers of Incoherent Strategy: Security Assistance in Somalia, 2009–2018. Texas National Security Review. 20 November. Accessed 25 June 2019. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pros-and-cons-of-security-assistance/

[77] Reno, William. 2018. The politics of security assistance in the horn of Africa. Defense Studies, 18(4): 498–513.
Matisek, Jahara. 2018. ‘The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies.’ Defense and Security Analysis, 34(3), 267–290.

[78] Id.

[79] Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. 2017. ‘Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(2): 89–142.

[80] Williams, Paul D., 2018. ‘Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union

[81] Id, 177.

[82] Williams, Paul D., 2018. ‘Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union

[83] Wikileaks. 2007b. ‘East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), March 16-17.’ ID:07DJIBOUTI425_a. 10 April. Accessed 26 November 2019.  https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07DJIBOUTI425_a.html

[84] Wikileaks. 2007c. ‘Section 1206 Proposal Final Coordination.’ ID:07ADDISABABA852_a. 19 March. Accessed 26 November 2019. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA852_a.html

[85] Wikileaks. 2007d. ‘Ethiopia: Broken Promises, Unmet Expectations — Fixing Mil-To-Mil Relations.’ ID: 07ADDISABABA1535_a. 21 May. Accessed 26 November 2019. from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA1535_a.html

[86] Hurd, Christopher. 2019. ‘East Africa DMI Conference: Information Sharing Through Lasting Relationships.’ AFRICOM. 22 April. Accessed 26 November 2019. https://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/31782/east-africa-dmi-conference-information-sharing-through-lasting-relationships

[87] Chavez, Evelyn. 2016. ‘African Partnership Flight Kenya comes to a close.’ Royal Air Force Mildenhall. 30 June. Accessed 26 November 2019. https://www.mildenhall.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/820775/african-partnership-flight-kenya-comes-to-a-close/

[88] Valley, Ian. 2019. Exercise Justified Accord 2019 concludes. United States Army Africa. https://www.usaraf.army.mil/media-room/article/29275/exercise-justified-accord-2019-concludes#:~:text=

[89] Moore, Adam, and James Walker. ‘Tracing the US military’s presence in Africa.’ Geopolitics, 21(3): 686–716.

[90] Id.

[91] Wikileaks.2009b. ‘Seychelles: General Ward/US Africa Command Visit 19 August Helps Cement New, Closer Relationship.’ ID: 09PORTLOUIS271_a. 8 September. Accessed 26 November 2019.  https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09PORTLOUIS271_a.html

[92] Security Assistance Monitor. 2019. Data: Programs FY 06-18. Accessed 25 June 2019. http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/country/2006/2018/all/Global/

[93] Id.

[94] Department of State. 2014. Report on the Use of Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Peacekeeping Funds. Accessed 15 November 2019.  http://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/Section 7010 Reports as of 6-30-15.pdf

[95] Moore, Adam, and James Walker. ‘Tracing the US military’s presence in Africa.’ Geopolitics, 21(3): 686–716.

[96] Security Assistance Monitor. 2019. Data: Programs FY 06-18. Accessed 25 June 2019. http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/country/2006/2018/all/Global/

.