Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons: A Hedging and Offsetting Strategy to Deter Western Aerospace Forces

Remy Maduit | Authors published

Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons
A Hedging and Offsetting Strategy to Deter Western Aerospace Forces

Jaganath Sankaran is an Assistant Professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin, USA.

Russia tested its Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite missile on November 15, 2021, striking the defunct Tselina-D Russian satellite. [1] The hit-to-kill test rendered the target satellite into over 1,500 pieces of orbital debris. [2] General James Dickinson, head of U.S. Space Command, characterized Russia’s actions as an attempt to get the means to “deny access to and use of space” by the United States and its allies. [3] He further noted that Russia’s counter-space weapon systems “undermine strategic stability”. [4]

Russian military leaders and analysts, however, argue that their anti-satellite and counter-space weapons provide a mechanism to restore strategic stability. Russia’s Defense Minister, Sergey Shoigu, described the test as a routine operation of a “cutting-edge future weapon system” intended to strengthen Russia’s deterrent and defense against America’s attempts to attain “comprehensive military advantage” in space. [5]

November 15, 2021, test was the latest in a staggering variety of anti-satellite weapons capabilities demonstrated by Russa in recent years. In January 2020, for instance, Russia’s Kosmos-2542 and Kosmos-2543 satellites performed coordinated close approach orbital maneuvers near a military reconnaissance satellite, the KH-11. The Kosmos satellites had assumed orbital positions that enabled them to “observe one side of the KH-11” when it first comes into the sunlight. [6] Later, after the KH-11 entered the eclipse, one of the Kosmos satellites had “migrated to the other side” of KH-11. [7] Such orbital maneuvers certainly indicate, if not validate, a mission to observe and report vulnerabilities of the KH-11 to the Russian military. Six months later, in July 2020, the Kosmos-2543 satellite fired a high-velocity projectile into outer space, mimicking a weapon designed to collide with another satellite and incapacitate it quickly. [8]

These demonstrations similarly provoked strong responses from the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), stating these actions pose a “real, serious, and increasing” threat to American and allied satellite systems. [9] The Russian Foreign Ministry refuted the criticisms, calling them “propagandistic information attacks”. [10] It accuses the United States and its allies of being duplicitous and “naturally silent about their own efforts” of testing and developing anti-satellite weapons. [11]

What motivates Russian attempts to develop anti-satellite and other counter-space weapons? Is it driven by a need to deter and defend against perceived American dominance in space? Or is it driven by a desire to dominate space militarily? The two prominent theoretical paradigms on space power—the space control school and the high ground school—offer clues. Both schools of thought suggest that states can seek to dominate space to secure military advantages. However, these two schools of thought do not delve into the details of how adversaries would respond to attempts by one state to dominate space. I posit adversaries will respond asymmetrically to hedge and offset any perceived first-mover advantages. Several publicly available Russian literature intended for audiences within and beyond Russia was studied to test the hypothesis. [12] A detailed review of the Russian military literature suggests that Russia sees itself as hedging and offsetting what it believes are American efforts to dominate space. While the literature review revealed a few dissensions about the need for such hedging and offsetting strategies, a vast majority of Russian national security experts supported those strategies.

Russian analysts and policymakers describe their anti-satellite efforts as an attempt to hedge against American attempts to dominate space. Russian analysts point out that Russia is forced to respond to the unbridled American and allied weaponization of space. They assert that the United States has a robust research and testing program that will enable the deployment of space weapons rapidly during a military crisis. [13] Therefore, they claim that Russia needs to hedge and respond with its research efforts to prevent the United States from springing a significant technological surprise and gaining significant first-mover advantages. Russian leaders suggest Russia is pursuing a “Lego” approach to space weaponry, building and testing the elements of a space weapons architecture, but refraining from assembly and deployment as long as the United States does the same. [14]

A second explanation offered by Russian military analysts speaks of their desire to offset the space-enabled military superiority of U.S. and NATO forces. Russians argue that very limited funding in the late 1980s and early 1990s inhibited the modernization of Russia’s air and space defenses. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies pursued a variety of high-precision strike weaponry and space weapons, creating strategic vulnerabilities for Russia. Russian analysts point out that these U.S. and NATO high-precision aerospace weapons, supported by satellite-based targeting and navigation, can be decisive in future conflicts.[15] Russians assert that recent NATO operations (against Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya) demonstrate that major political-military operations can now be conducted without engaging the adversary’s army, relying instead on high-precision aerospace weapons. [16] They note that satellite systems increased the range and accuracy of American and NATO high-precision strike weapons used in these campaigns while permitting their launch platforms to remain outside the range of air and missile defenses. [17]

‘Several Russian leaders and military analysts now speculate that such campaigns, executed using high-precision weapons, could strike a fatal blow against Russia’. [18] In a speech in 2015, President Putin claimed that the U.S. and NATO forces possess “high-precision long-range non-nuclear weapons comparable in their effect to nuclear weapons” that could be used against Russia. [19] Russian analysts now argue that anti-satellite weapons provide the best means to offset U.S. and NATO high-precision aerospace strike weapons since they would be useless without access to satellite systems.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The following section outlines the various schools of thought in spacepower theory. The section focuses mainly on the space control school and the high ground school of thought to explain recent Russian military space decisions. The third section discusses the Russian assertions that they are assembling the building blocks of a space weapons architecture, mirroring American efforts while refraining from a full-fledged deployment as a hedging strategy. In the fourth section, I explore the Russian perceptions of aerospace threats from the United States and NATO allies and examine how these perceived threats drive Russian anti-satellite efforts and other offsetting strategies. Finally, in the fifth section, I conclude by discussing the limitations of space control and the high-ground schools of space power theory. I then discuss ways to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. satellites unilaterally. I recommend a few cooperative arms control measures while discussing some significant challenges.

Spacepower theory: How does the adversary respond?

A general theory of space power remains elusive despite several recent attempts to develop such theoretical paradigms. [20] Ideally, such a theory would offer insight into how the policymaking bureaucracies of a sovereign state can use space power, either alone or in tandem with other assets, to enforce and accomplish their stated national security agenda. A theory of space power would predict adversaries’ response to real or perceived attempts by one state to dominate outer space.

A 2011 U.S. National Defense University (NDU) project that attempted to synthesize previous efforts at hypothesizing the relationship between spacepower and the pursuit of national security noted after the project’s conclusion that while several studies exist, they “did not add up to a coherent theoretical framework”. [21] The NDU study pointed out that one of the reasons spacepower eludes rigorous theorizing is that “compared to the land, sea, and even airpower, spacepower is a new phenomenon; aspiring spacepower theorists have little empirical evidence to examine. And the nations that exercise spacepower prefer to keep many of their activities cloaked in secrecy, shrinking the already small body of material from which theorists can draw. [22]

However, four schools of thought, drawing from the liberalist and realist traditions of International Relations theory, have been posited to anchor the debate on space militarization and arms control: the space sanctuary school, the space survivability school, the space control school, and the high ground school. The space sanctuary school argues that outer space should be treated as a realm free of military systems. [23] Proponents of the space sanctuary school offer the contemporary international arrangement managing access to the continent of Antarctica as an analogy. These proponents argue that current technological and economic realities prevent significant mining or colonizing in outer space, similar to Antarctica. They also note that the environment of outer space is fragile and requires collaborative international stewardship, proposing very controlled access to outer space similar to the restrictive arrangements currently in place to manage scientific exploration in Antarctica. Some within the space sanctuary school allow for the possibility of limited military-related satellite systems necessary for treaty verification and circumscribed intelligence activities. [24]

The space survivability school, like the space sanctuary school, deemphasizes the militarization of space. However, the space survivability school proponents do so because they believe “space forces are not dependable in crises”. [25] In addition, proponents point out that satellite systems are vulnerable and make easy targets. Therefore, space survivability proponents argue for a limited dependence on satellites for national security missions and recommend developing robust alternatives. [26]

Unfortunately, the space sanctuary and the space survivability school of thought offer little leverage to understand the unfolding competitive dynamics in space. These two frameworks have gained little traction with national security policymakers, particularly in the United States. Instead, policymakers seem to embrace a space control or a high-ground approach.

The space control school argues that spacepower is akin to air, land, or sea power. [27] Proponents of the space control school see the weaponization of space as inevitable. They argue states would be remiss not to prepare to defend against adversarial actions in and through space. Bowen [28] develops developed a theoretical argument that expands upon the space control school but challenges some of its presumptions. He argues that “Earth orbit is a realm for conducting strategic maneuvers to assist the war effort on Earth, and provides a kind of strategic depth to those who can exploit it”. [29] He, however, is skeptical about the inevitability of the weaponization of space or the use of weapons against critical space assets. He writes that space “may be the scene of subtle maneuvers to assist strategies on Earth, rather than a scene destined to witness major conflagrations”. [30]

The high ground school adopts a much stronger disposition than the space control school. [31] The Rumsfeld Commission report best encapsulates the logic of the high-ground school. The 2001 Rumsfeld Commission report noting that the United States relies on its space assets much more than any other country for its military power projection capabilities, claimed that the United States “is an attractive candidate for an inevitable ‘Space Pearl Harbor”. [32] The report reasoned “We know from history that every medium—air, land, and sea—has seen conflict. Reality dictates the space will be no different. Given that virtual certainty, the US must develop the means to deter and defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities. The broad outline of US national space policy is sound, but the US has not yet taken the steps necessary to develop the needed capabilities and to maintain and ensure continuing superiority.” [33]

The report recommended seizing the high ground of space to ensure American dominance. However, as Johnson-Freese [34] writes, “the view that space is the ultimate high ground is analogous to cavalry soldiers holding a hill as the best position to view the surrounding terrain, and if necessary, fight. Similarly, if air superiority is required to win wars, then space is the ultimate high altitude from which to gain a military advantage on Earth… the “high ground” school simply extends a basic principle of military operations to another domain, though the validity of the transference assumptions is limited. [35]

Its proponents have not shown the technological feasibility, economic viability, or geopolitical desirability of executing the recommendations of the high-ground school.

The space control and high ground schools offer little guidance on anticipating the consequences of attempting to dominate space militarily. As Gallagher and Steinbruner [36] observe, the Rumsfeld Commission report “[established] presumptions that would justify the pursuit of dominance—the inevitability of conflict in space and the imperative of securing decisive national advantage before any potential enemy could do so—and to impose the burden of proof on anyone who would question those presumptions.” [37]

However, not much thought was expended on understanding the geopolitical effects. For example, how would near-peer adversaries, such as Russia and China, respond to perceived American attempts to dominate space?

I outline two potential responses, a hedging strategy, and an offsetting strategy. Hedging is a mix of cooperation and confrontation strategies states employ to cope in an anarchic and changing international security environment. [38] Offsetting relies on employing technological capabilities to obtain decisive advantages over an adversary. [39] The concepts of hedging and offsetting have been used to analyze the response of states’ to a variety of threat scenarios. I apply these concepts to explore Russian behavior as a technologically driven national security threat. I argue that in a hedging strategy, adversaries, fearing a military technological surprise, will experiment with military technologies to replicate some capabilities pursued by the dominant power. Such experiments serve to both understand the capabilities of the other and as a lever to force diplomatic initiatives towards a negotiated scaling back. However, in an offsetting strategy, adversaries perceiving a clear military threat will respond with a countervailing military response. If adversaries fear a “use it or lose it” threat to their military capabilities, they should adopt escalatory postures to offset the feared effect. Adversaries should also develop and deploy weapon systems that cancel out the perceived advantages of dominating space. It is entirely conceivable that hedging and offsetting strategies are simultaneously pursued. The following two sections of this paper will test these response strategies by empirically examining the Russian debate on anti-satellite and other counter-space weapons.

Besides the four schools of thought on spacepower, other theoretical paradigms, such as identity politics or bureaucratic politics that challenge the unitary, rational state actor presumptions, might also shed important insights into Russian military space policy. For instance, Eriksson and Privalov [40] adopt a “status-seeking” constructivist identity theory to explain cooperation and competition in a Russian engagement with the United States on space activities. However, further exploring the impact of Russian bureaucratic politics and great power status-seeking efforts on Russia’s military space policy is left to future work.

Russian hedging against American space weaponization

Russians claim that their anti-satellite and counter-space programs are a proportionate reaction to sustained efforts by the U.S. military and its NATO allies to dominate and prosecute war from the high ground of space.

In 2019, the Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, suggested that the U.S. Space Force was created to enable continued American militarization of space. [41] He warned that Russia would have to respond with “mirror and asymmetric measures”. [42]

Russian commentators argue the United States has exhibited an interest in dominating space and denying access to adversaries for many years. [43] In particular, the U.S. Vision for 2020 and Long-Range Plan Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020 is seen as “foundational documents” advocating unrestricted American military dominance in space. [44] The Vision for 2020, published in 1997, argued that space was the “fourth medium of warfare” and outlined a desire to dominate space to ensure an unrestricted ability to apply precision force “from, to, and through space”. [45] The follow-on USSPACECOM Long-Range Plan, published in 1998, noting the lack of a peer competitor to the American military, declared that “now is the time to develop space capabilities” and “concepts of operations for warfighting”. [46] In 2003, Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond, a document published by the Space Command, stated it was chartered “to rapidly obtain and maintain space superiority”. [47] The document further argued that “instead of focusing on the force enhancement role of our space systems and the deterrent role of our nuclear and conventional forces, we must also pursue the ability to apply conventional combat in, from, and through space”. [48]

In 2006, President Bush allowed a significant new National Space Policy mandating “plans and options to ensure [U.S.] freedom of action in space, and if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries”. [49] An article in the Times described the document as treating space as the “51st state of the United States” and “comically proprietary in tone” about America’s right to control space access. [50] The article further noted that the policy document had an “extravagantly unilateral approach” while rejecting “the desire of 160 countries” to discuss arms control in space. [51]

Reviewing some of these policy documents, three Russian analysts—Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Petr Topychkanov—write that the George W. Bush administration was fostering a renewed space arms race. [52] They evaluate the Bush administration’s policies as catalyzing Russian anti-satellite efforts. [53] In its early days, the Obama administration espoused a relatively “less confrontational approach”. [54] However, a more hawkish posture emerged later. [55] The Trump administration reverted to [ an overt space dominance posture. The 2020 National Space Policy document declares that “unfettered access to, and freedom to operate in” space is a vital national goal, and the US would “compel and impose a cost on adversaries” aiming to deny such access.[56] The United States Space Force, established in December 2019, was mandated to “deter aggression in, from, and to space” while retaining American freedom of action. [[57]

Russian military analysts write that the United States has continuously experimented with and demonstrated anti-satellite weapons capabilities in parallel with its aggressive doctrinal postures. For example, General Dvorkin writes that the US, like Russia, has performed extensive experiments under the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Loral Space (ANGELS) program, demonstrating orbital inspection technologies, including ways to inspect and disable satellites. [58] The ANGELS satellite, launched in 2014, demonstrated a capability to orbit near and rendezvous with a Delta IV rocket upper stage in geostationary orbit. [59] The ANGELS program was a follow-on to the Experimental Satellite Systems (XSS). In 2003, the XSS-10 performed a range of orbital maneuvers around the Delta-2 second stage that had placed it into orbit. [60] In 2004, XSS-11 was launched to test rendezvous operations with satellites. [61] The mission goal for XSS-11 was to demonstrate “controlled relative position and approach, close-in co-orbiting circumnavigation of other space objects, and automatic operations”. [62]

Russian analysts also believe that the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle is designed to conduct long-endurance surveillance of satellites and destroy “enemy satellites either by a mechanical blow or by using [explosive] energy”. [63] It has flown on six missions, often carrying classified payloads, and the latest launch occurred in May 2020. [64] Russians also claim it could insert small payloads into outer space and, when necessary, redirect them to ground targets, evading the Russian Federation’s forward-based radar surveillance systems. [65]

In direct response to these American technological demonstrations, Russia appears to have restarted some of its Cold War anti-satellite and counter-space weapons programs to hedge against a technological surprise. As a result, during the last ten years, Russia has demonstrated with increasing frequency a plethora of anti-satellite and other advanced counter-space weapons not seen since the heights of the Cold War.

For example, in 2014, Russia deployed a satellite, Olymp-K or Luch, into geostationary orbit (GEO) that engaged in several orbital rendezvous and proximity operations, demonstrating potential anti-satellite capabilities. [66] Since its deployment, the satellite has occupied 14 different orbital positions in a congested region of the GEO belt, in one instance placing “itself in a narrow window” between two satellites belonging to Intelsat. [67] In another instance, it approached “a bit too closely” the Athena-Fidus satellite, a French-Italian jointly-owned military satellite. [68] Reacting to the incident, French Defense Minister Florence Parly speculated that “it was trying to intercept our communications” and called it an “act of espionage”. [69] Analysts have speculated that the action of the Olymp-K satellite “demonstrates the possibility of placing a dormant co-orbital payload into orbit, and later activating and maneuvering the payload into kill-proximity of a target when needed”. [70]

In 2014, another Russian space object cataloged as Object 2014-28E exhibited erratic behavior leading to concerns that it might have anti-satellite objectives. It was initially presumed to be space debris from the launch of three Russian military communication satellites by a Briz launch vehicle. [71] However, it later maneuvered “towards other Russian space objects” and performed orbital rendezvous with the Briz-KM upper stage.

In October 2017, three Russian satellites—Kosmos-2519, Kosmos-2521, and Kosmos-2523—engaged in high-velocity orbital maneuvers. Kosmos-2519 was launched in June 2017. Two months later, it deployed sub-satellites Kosmos-2521 and Kosmos-2523. US Space Force commander Gen. John Raymond described these orbital experiments as “Russian nesting doll” satellites and claimed they “exhibited characteristics of a weapon system”. [72] Then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Christopher A. Ford, noted that Kosmos-2531 was ejected at a speed of “250 kilometers per hour,” demonstrating the capacity “to position itself near another satellite and fire a projectile” at it. [73] Russian commentators argued the capabilities demonstrated could deter hostile action against Russia using space-based or space-enabled weapons. [74]

The Russian Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile used in the most recent anti-satellite test is designed to fly out at short notice and intercept Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. Russia has tested Nudol many times, with two recent tests reported in April 2020 and December 2020. [75] Some Russian commentators have indicated that Russia is working on a mobile anti-satellite missile system titled Rudolph. [76] There are also reports of a project titled Burevestnik, which may involve fighter aircraft launching small interceptor satellites. [77] In tandem with its anti-satellite weaponry, Russia is also fielding an automated surveillance and strike system to reduce by a factor of 0.4–0.5 the time between tracking to hitting a space-based target. [78]

Russia has deployed a ground-based laser weapon, the Peresvet. [79] While primarily intended for air and missile defense, the Peresvet weapon system is also suspected of having anti-satellite capabilities. President Putin recently noted that Russia was one step ahead of its rivals in laser weaponry. He further declared that “Russia’s capacities for defending itself have multiplied” because of the Peresvet. [80] Russia also is investing in the development of the Sokol-Echelon anti-satellite laser system. The system is considered airborne and designed to disable optical sensors mounted on US reconnaissance satellites.

Besides these space weapons, Russia has fielded a range of ground-based jamming systems capable of disrupting or denying satellite services. [81] The Murmansk-BN is a jammer that might target satellite communications between U.S. and NATO ships and aircraft at a distance of up to 5,000 km. [82] The RB-109A Bylina is electronic warfare (EW) weapon system designed for automated EW operation at the brigade level. 83] Another system under development is the Krasukha-2/4. The Krasukha-2/4 is a radio signal interference and jamming system intended to jam reconnaissance assets, such as the JSTARS and similar space-based radar systems. [84] Russia is also deploying a mobile satellite communication jammer called Tirada-2S. [85]

Russia’s chief of space forces, Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin, defending these programs and experiments, argued, “we don’t want to wage a war in space, we don’t want to gain dominance in space, but we won’t allow any other nation to dominate space. If any country deploys weapons in space, then the laws of warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to appear. [86]

Aerospace wars, anti-satellite weapons, and the Russian offsetting strategy

Russian military leaders posit that a shift in the center of gravity of warfare has been unfolding over the past three decades by introducing high-precision, high-speed strike weaponry enabled by satellite targeting and navigation. [87] The dependence of U.S. and NATO forces on such aerospace weaponry also seems to drive Russian anti-satellite weapons and counter-space efforts.

Russian analysts’ studying American conduct of warfare note that the use of high-precision weaponry in American military operations has progressively increased from 10% of strikes during the Desert Storm (1991) to 40% in Yugoslavia (1999) to 80% in Iraq (2003). [88] Igor Morozov, head of operations at the Russian Space Forces, writes: “During the Second World War, to destroy such a target as a large railway bridge, it was required to make 4,500 sorties and drop 9,000 bombs. In Vietnam, they achieved the destruction of a similar target with 190 bombs and 95 sorties. In the war against Yugoslavia, 1–3 cruise missiles solved the same mission fired from a submarine. [89]

They also point out that the ratio of standoff long-distance cruise missiles to aircraft-launched precision weapons has steadily increased “from 1:10 in Operation Desert Storm to 1:1.5 in Operation Desert Fox to 1:1 in Operation Allied Force to 1.8:1 in Operation Enduring Freedom”. [90]

Russian military scholars examining U.S. and NATO military campaigns have deduced that high-precision aerospace weaponry supported by satellite-enabled data has become indispensable to the American way of war. For instance, Russian military commentators note that the 1991 Gulf War was dramatically untypical of previously used means to engage an adversary. [91] In the war, the United States and its allies did not use their ground forces during the opening phase of the conflict, instead of mounting a 38-day aerospace offensive. [92] Russian commentators point out that the aerospace operation was conducted with a panoply of high-precision munitions delivered by fighter aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles, supported by robust air- and space-based electronic surveillance, targeting, and navigation assets. [93] As a result, the U.S. and allied forces were unimpeded in their ability to selectively and efficiently target critical Iraqi military formations while also striking at vital economic facilities, civilian and military command nodes, and Iraqi society’s life support systems. [94]

Russian analysts point out that Iraq was on the verge of surrender at the end of the aerospace offensive. [95] In the Russian view, it was the first time in the history of modern warfare that a formidable army of half a million troops could not put up any resistance to overriding the aerospace operations mounted by the U.S. and allied forces. [96] Russian writings note that, by the time the Iraqi army met American ground forces, the weeks of aerospace strikes made possible by satellite-enable targeting and navigation had annihilated it. [97]

Similarly, with Yugoslavia, Russian analysts point out that 14 NATO states assembled almost 700 combat aircraft, 64 cruise missile naval carriers, three nuclear submarines, and a host of reconnaissance and surveillance assets, including around 50 satellites, to conduct a massive aerospace campaign. [98] The Russians insist that the assembled forces were quickly unleashed against Yugoslavia once they started the aerospace campaign, achieving tactical and strategic surprise. [99] In the first phase of the campaign, Yugoslavia’s air defense assets, military communication, and command nodes were destroyed using precision standoff aerospace weaponry. The second phase destroyed or disabled combat formations, ammunition depots, other military targets, and industrial facilities in an expanded aerospace campaign. [100] According to the Russians, NATO’s combined aerospace forces made over 30,000 fighter-plane sorties and launched 870 cruise missiles against Yugoslavian targets. [101] They conclude that Yugoslavia’s disintegration was achieved at the end of the months-long aerospace campaign, with no significant force-on-force conflict. Even more concerning for Russian analysts was that the intervention proceeded without the sanction of the UN Security Council, setting a dangerous precedent for the West’s arbitrary use of force against sovereign states and possibly Russia itself. [102]

Russian military analysts believe the Iraq and Yugoslavia campaigns portend the future of warfare. In a 2013 conference attended by several cabinet ministers and members of Russia’s Military-Industrial Commission, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin identified five conflict scenarios that Russia could face in the future. [103] The most prominent scenario involves a non-contact war with a technologically advanced adversary, i.e., the United States and NATO. In this scenario, the United States would strike Russia’s homeland using long-distance aerospace weapons and missiles. Rogozin suggested that such a strike could destroy 80% to 90% of Russia’s strategic arsenal, rendering its nuclear deterrent almost useless. [104]

Those espousing views similar to Rogozin’s declare that future “sixth-generation wars” will be waged primarily in the aerospace domain. [105] They argue that, in past wars, the main burden of any confrontation rested on ground forces tasked to breach the enemy’s forward defense and enter his territory to occupy it. The occupation would coerce political concessions. Future wars, in Russian conceptualization, will not be conducted using the massing of armed troops, and terms such as frontline or rear elements of the army will be irrelevant. [106] Instead, the opening salvo will involve massive air-missile strikes at targets throughout the adversary’s territory. [107]

Russian military analysts regularly write about a future war in which a massive air-missile strike campaign could be mounted against Russia. They believe that conventional hypersonic weapons, developed under the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program, would start an aerospace assault against crucial Russian government command and control (C2) posts and mobile and stationary launchers of nuclear-armed missiles. [108] American missile defense would further degrade Russia’s retaliatory potential. [109] These would be followed up quickly with electronic warfare to suppress Russia’s air and space defense forces. [110] Then, large numbers of standoff high-precision weapons such as cruise missiles, heavy strike UAVs, and other strike forces will destroy military facilities and troops, besides Russian government administration centers, economic assets, energy supply systems, and critical communication nodes. [111] Finally, the standoff strikes would coincide with an information warfare campaign to demoralize the Russian population and collapse the prevailing political order. [112]

Russians point out that while the air-missile strikes will be launched from areas outside the range of Russia’s air-defense radars, these aerospace weapons would singularly depend on satellite-enabled targeting and navigation. [113] The Russians argue that anti-satellite and other counter-space weapons will “deter aggression” by the US and its allies “reliant upon space” to execute such military campaigns. [114] If deterrence fails, these weapons might offer Russian leaders “the ability to control the escalation of a conflict through selective targeting of adversary space system”. [115]

Some Russian commentators question the viability of such massive aerospace attacks. One analyst dismisses the danger of an attack on Russia with many cruise missiles as improbable. [116] The analyst points out that assembling the formations required for such a strike requires lengthy preparations and cannot be done secretly. [117] Most of the attacking missiles would fly for a significant time, making their detection and defeat workable. [118]

Some Russian analysts also describe a successful surprise attack on Russia’s nuclear arsenal using high-speed, high-precision weaponry as science fiction. [119] For example, Vladimir Dvorkin writes that “14 [high-precision] cruise missiles would be required for a strike against a single [Russian] underground missile silo” even without active defense measures. [120] Given the large number of Russian strategic missile sites spread across vast regions of Russia, he argues that “the Pentagon does not have enough cruise missiles to strike all the Russian targets—and likely never will”. [121] Dvorkin and others note that many Russian military command and control centers are hardened to withstand a direct nuclear hit and may not be vulnerable to high-precision conventional weaponry. [122] He states that high-precision strikes can be mitigated using a variety of air and missile defense measures, which would make any aerospace assault on Russia “fantastical” and useless. [123] Finally, Dvorkin and others suggest that the threat of a technologically advanced high-precision aerospace campaign is “eagerly embraced as a new and fascinating domain of seemingly endless competition with a worthy counterpart” by the Russian military-industrial complex to justify large defense budgets. [124]

Notwithstanding these assessments, the vast majority of Russian analysts continue to display a severe “fear of Western technological superiority” and the possibility that a coordinated high-precision aerospace strike “may render their defenses obsolete”. [125] As a result, Russian military exercises are now designed to repel massive strikes by hypersonic weapons and short- and medium-range cruise and ballistic missiles with highly mobile anti-air and anti-space units.[126]

While these fears may reflect an extreme worst-case scenario, many Russian military analysts share them. For example, two Russian analysts write that the combined development of American missile defenses and long-range standoff precision weapons leads to speculation in Russia that these programs “may mutually reinforce one another to generate a cumulative destabilizing effect” in the future. [127] These concerns and speculations will influence Russia’s space weapons and arms-control policies.

Conclusion

The two schools of spacepower—the space control school and the high ground school—argue for American dominance of outer space yet do not expect near-peer adversary responses to such attempts to get and keep military space primacy. I have argued that adversaries will respond with hedging and offsetting strategies to deter and deny any perceived attempts to dominate outer space. The empirical evidence drawn from Russian literature shows that these perceptions of U.S. attempts to dominate space have led to the adoption of hedging and offsetting strategies.

The negative consequences of near-peer adversary responses to the pursuit of space dominance raise serious questions about the validity of space control and the high ground school. Do they serve American interests? Can adversary responses be mitigated? There are unilateral mitigating measures that can be taken to lessen the threats posed to U.S. and allied satellites. An important unilateral mechanism to protect U.S. space assets is developing and deploying monitoring capabilities that can definitively attribute attacks to an aggressor, establishing deterrence by punishment. [128] The United States has launched several experimental geosynchronous space situational awareness (SSA) satellites capable of clearly monitoring space objects and their behavior in geosynchronous orbits. [129] Other U.S. and allied SSA assets can effectively monitor low-earth and medium-earth orbits. The Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) is another mechanism to attribute counter-space actions against U.S. satellites. [130]

Another way to unilaterally secure American and allied satellites is to reduce their vulnerability and increase their resiliency, establishing deterrence by denial. In 2017, General John Hyten, the former chief of U.S. STRATCOM, pointedly noted he was unwilling to support the procurement of “any more fragile, undefendable” legacy satellites that make “large, big, fat, juicy targets” for adversaries. [131] Instead, he advocated for cheaper and more distributed satellite constellations, enabling both dispersions of critical space assets and rapid reconstitution capabilities in the event of an adversary attack. [132] In March 2019, the Space Development Agency (SDA) was established within the Pentagon to foster the development of cheaper and distributed satellites “that would be more resilient to disruptions or attacks than traditional, larger and more expensive military spacecraft”. [133] In October 2020, the SDA awarded contracts for four wide-field-of-view missile tracking satellites priced significantly lower than similar legacy systems. While there may be challenges to completely replacing highly specialized legacy satellites, future SDA satellites might successfully provide basic capabilities at a lower cost. [134] When working in tandem with legacy systems, these SDA satellites can complicate an adversary’s anti-satellite efforts. [135]

However, these measures will not eliminate the vulnerability of American space-based military assets or reduce Russian fears. Dialogue with Russia to institute cooperative behavioral norms and arms control arrangements may be essential to reasonably preserve the military advantages the United States obtains from its space-based assets. Along these lines, the Biden administration, on April 18, 2022, unilaterally committed not to conduct “destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing” and has called for other nations to “make similar commitments and to work together to establish this as a norm”. [136]

The American ASAT test ban commitment portends a positive change. The Russians have often complained that the United States has been disinclined to engage in serious space arms control. In March 2019, the United States blocked adopting a UN consensus report on space security. Russia’s Foreign Ministry reacting to the action, declared that “the US expert blocked its adoption, and with no intelligible explanations of the reasons. Such a scenario was generally expected, considering the US line to ensure its unilateral dominance in space by any means.” [137] Anatoly Antonov, the current Russian ambassador to the United States and a leading actor in the U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations, observes “Of the many factors that predetermine the maintenance of military security, Americans strike to stabilize only strategic nuclear weapons, while decisions regarding [problems] where the advantage is on the side of the United States are drawn out… Under these conditions, further reductions in strategic offensive arms in Russia and the US will serve not to strengthen strategic stability, but the opposite—to undermine it. [138]

The test ban commitment now places the onus on Russia. U.S. willingness to engage in comprehensive space and strategic stability talks may pave the way for bilateral dialogue and political agreements on behavioral norms. In the July 2020 space security exchange between the U.S. and Russian governments to advance, there was an agreement to create “responsible norms of behavior” in outer space. [139] Future dialogues, when they occur, can try to convince Russia to adopt similar ASAT test ban commitments. U.S.-Russia dialogue on space security can communicate “US ‘bright lines’ in space and establish ‘breakers’ too dangerous conflict escalation”. [140] They will also provide an opportunity to understand Russia’s bright lines, which may differ significantly from those of the United States.

Several other ideas have also been proposed for rules of the road norms that major space-faring nations could adopt. [141] Alexei Arbatov suggests an agreement to ban “dedicated anti-satellite (ASAT) systems that threaten the satellites in high orbits that warn each nation of a ballistic missile attack by any state”. [142] Grego [143] has advocated for keeping out zones “that establish how close and under what conditions a satellite may approach” another nation’s satellites. Liemer and Chyba [144] have proposed a test ban on debris-producing anti-satellite weapons. The United States can voluntarily adopt these norms without diluting its national security priorities. Such an action would establish precedents and might help discourage “the consideration of worst-case scenarios” among Russian analysts. [145] It would encourage Russia and China to adopt similar norms.

However, there are limits to what these mitigating measures and voluntary behavioral norms can accomplish. Without mutual restrictions on aerospace combat operations, Russians will continue to argue that the dependence of U.S. and NATO forces on space-based assets is a vulnerability it needs to exploit in a military crisis. [146] The United States continues to test and develop advanced aerospace weapon systems that may exacerbate perceived Russian vulnerabilities. The U.S. Air Force, for example, is investing a lot of resources in the development of the Long-range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles intended to penetrate sophisticated air defense systems. [147] The AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), another highly capable long-range hypersonic missile, is under development. [148] Next-generation unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) that are predicted to possess deep penetration capabilities against advanced air defenses are now in the research and development phase. The US is testing a new unmanned aircraft system, Speed Racer, that can operate in dense air defense environments. [149] DARPA is exploring a new program called LongShot, envisioned as a drone that carries air-to-air weapons and can be deployed from a manned platform from a standoff distance, “extending the range from which the military can defeat adversary defenses while protecting piloted vehicle at a safe distance”. [150] All these programs will raise worries in Moscow and further exacerbate fears of an aerospace attack.

Russia is similarly developing a variety of high-precision weapons, including hypersonic systems. They include the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile, Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile, Poseidon nuclear-powered nuclear-tipped torpedo, and Burevestnik nuclear-powered nuclear-tipped cruise missile. [151] Russia is also developing a hypersonic aircraft-launched missile named Gremlin to defeat modern air defense systems. [152] These weapons will provoke a response from the United States and other NATO states that worry about Russian geopolitical intentions.

Many of these American and Russian systems will also rely on space-based systems for targeting and navigation. Without restricting these aerospace weapons, possibly with an instrument similar to the INF Treaty, threats to satellite systems cannot be meaningfully diminished. Yet, the current political reality seems to operate against such negotiated restrictions. Achieving meaningful future restrictions on these weapons will be the challenge that needs to be faced to achieve space security and strategic stability.

.

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