Uncomfortable Neighbors: NATO, Russia and the Shifting Logic of Military Exercises in the Baltics

Remy Maduit | Authors published

Uncomfortable Neighbors:
NATO, Russia and the Shifting Logic of Military Exercises in the Baltics

Andris Banka is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Baltic Sea Region Research (IFZO) in Greifswald, Germany.
Margit Bussmann is Chair of International Relations and Regional Studies at the University of Greifswald, Germany.

Military exercises can serve several purposes, ranging from tests of interoperability and readiness to geopolitical signaling. States can use such costly signals to reveal their military power and to send signals of resolve to use it, intending to deter potential aggressors but also to reassure alliance partners of their support. Depending on the geopolitical climate and the perception of threat, these signals can be more or less pronounced and their logic can prioritize one purpose over another. In times of relatively harmonious regional cooperation military exercises presumably follow predominantly more peaceful aims such as testing interoperability and building further trust, whereas more conflictual times with high mutual distrust and threat perceptions lend themselves to geopolitical signaling and a deterrent logic while continuing to practice and develop interoperability.

In the past years, military exercises have regained their salience as essential tools of statecraft. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the Baltic Sea region, where both NATO and Russia have organized their largest training events since the end of the Cold War. To further our understanding of the logic and utility of military maneuvers, this paper focuses on NATO’s eastern flank. Specifically, with the help of newly compiled data, we have been able to track two decades of allied military drills in the Baltic states, evaluating their objectives, involved scenarios, and messaging efforts that surround them. The peculiar positioning of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — sitting on a geopolitical fault line — provides us with an ideal opportunity to gain deeper insights into the value of allied military exercises.

Our analysis reveals how, at different periods, exercises have been employed to support various political and military objectives. Mirroring the changing security landscape, the size, complexity, and logic that underpins such exercises have shifted considerably. In the early 2000s, military drills were primarily conceived as a mechanism to modernize Baltic armed forces, ensure their adequacy to NATO membership standards, and prepare personnel for out-of-area operations in the Middle East and Balkans. For a brief time, maritime exercises in the Baltic Sea further served as a rare venue for engaging the Russian senior military leadership. A deteriorating regional security environment, however, elevated military drills on whole another level of importance. Russia’s forceful takeover of territory from its neighbor Ukraine in 2014 was a critical juncture that instantly prompted a change in perceptions about Moscow’s intentions. As a result, the number of military training events across the Baltic republics spiked. We observe it was not only a mere quantitative change that transpired. Upon closer inspection of individual exercises in the Baltics, we identify a clear paradigm shift as to their overall mode of function.

Whereas previously exercises primarily served the purpose of preparing Baltic armed forces for far-flung combat areas, the bulk of military exercises in the post-Crimea era “turned inward.” Having studied the lessons of Ukraine, scenario scripts were flipped over and directed towards the defense of Baltic cities, roads, airfields, and seashores. Allied exercises in the Baltics essentially became an interlocking element between already pre-positioned, but very limited multinational troop deployments in the region, and much larger follow-on forces. In this context, the purpose of practicing and enhancing interoperability and testing new equipment became a central aim of military training, given the increasingly multinational character of NATO’s presence and reinforcement. From the vantage point of NATO, military maneuvers on the alliance’s eastern flank formed a critical facet of the overall deterrence posture as they aimed to convey that, despite Russian advantages in force ratios and geography, the alliance could move fast in a crises situation to support its treaty allies. Stated differently, by organizing exercises based on swift movement of forces, NATO aimed to establish deterrence by reinforcement.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section briefly surveys the theoretical underpinnings of why states exercise. Subsequently, the paper lays out the curious geopolitical context in which the Baltic states find themselves and the impact that this may have had on NATO’s adopted deterrence posture and implemented exercises. Following that, we present our research design, data gathering methods, and used sources. With the help of our data collection, the paper then outlines the general patterns of military drills across the Baltics. Next, the analysis offers a more granular assessment of selected military exercises: Baltops, Saber Strike, and Spring Storm. This allows us to make the case that a substantial shift has taken place not only in terms of overall exercise numbers in the region but also concerning their underlying objectives. The article concludes with a summary of the key findings and the identification of avenues for future research.

Why do states exercise?

Current scholarly literature offers multiple explanations for why actors conduct individual and allied military drills. To begin with, military maneuvers figure prominently in classical works of deterrence, which can be defined as “the use of a threat by one party to convince another party to refrain from some action”.[1] To deter an opponent, an actor must have certain military capabilities. Hard power alone, however, does not deter. Physical capability must be combined with credibility, which in Morgan’s terms [2] is “the quality of being believed.” Simply stated, an opponent must believe that the defender will follow through on its announced threats to use force to protect its interests in question. Signals about foreign policy interests and the willingness to use force are more credible if costs are attached. [3] Financially quite costly military exercises can credibly communicate a resolve to employ force. We can consider joint exercises as one of the foundational elements for reinforcing credibility behind mutual defense commitments. [4]

Military drills can be salient in extended deterrence, a type of deterrence that involves over two parties. In the academic literature, we view extended deterrence as “inherently less credible than direct deterrence”. [5] This is because allied partners are often located “thousands of miles away and often much closer to the territory of the aggressor state”. [6] As Stephen Walt (2021) posits, attempting to deter attacks on one’s soil is by definition more credible, whereas extended deterrence is a more demanding task. In this context, regular military training events with a partner government may be utilized to convey a message to the opponent about one’s willingness to sacrifice their own soldiers to defend an ally under a military threat. In particular, if allies are far away, military exercises can also signal the logistical capabilities to deploy troops quickly over large distances. In their study of various signaling devices that major powers can use to assure support to a protégé, McManus and Nieman [7] identified joint military exercises as the most important signals of support. Military exercises factored before other signal types, such as arms transfers and troop deployment.

The purpose of military exercises, however, goes beyond mere deterrence and assurance efforts and has been linked to other strategic goals. According to Wolfley [8], governments can also start joint military exercises to recruit partners to join multinational war-fighting coalitions. To illustrate this with a concrete example, NATO’s Partnership for Peace program intensified bilateral links between individual nations and NATO while equally preparing them for potential peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and the Middle East. [9] In addition, the undertaking of military exercises can be used as a trust and confidence-building measure among rival powers. Training side by side, proponents claim, holds the promise of lessening uncertainty about each other’s capabilities and intentions, thus helping to steer clear of the classic security dilemma scenario. [10]

Multinational exercises can also help to hone allied interoperability, mutual understanding, and communication. Here, it is worth stressing that even states that belong to the same military organization have distinct command styles, doctrines, and equipment. One important institutional asset of NATO is its multinational integrated military command and the interoperability of its member states’ national militaries. Over the years regularly recurring exercises helped to build up not only specific assets against a Soviet threat but more general assets for decision-making and planning with procedures and structures that could serve other types of missions adding to NATO’s persistence and adaptability to changing security environments. [11] Refining interoperability, however, is an ongoing process. This is particularly the case because of NATO’s absorption of new member states in 2004.

Some of the previous NATO deployments involving troops from multiple countries have brought to the fore issues of incompatible military equipment, lack of adequate English-language proficiency, and cultural complexities. [12] To ease such problems, regular exercises may serve as a means for integrating otherwise diverse military compositions. In addition, multinational exercises are credited for having certain socialization effects whereby common military drills help actors to identify mutual threats and share processes of how to address them. [13]

On the other side of the spectrum, military exercises can also serve as a cover for an invasion. Historically, countries have frequently employed exercises as a disguise for a surprise attack on the enemy. [14] In this context, it is useful to recall that in 2014 Russia first used snap exercises to move its forces near Ukraine’s border, part of which eventually were deployed for the actual invasion of Crimea. [15] A similar scenario played out in February 2022 with Russia starting large and protracted military exercises in Belarus and on the borders of Ukraine. Eventually, the Russian forces that were supposedly on a training mission then switched to attempts to take over and occupy large parts of Ukraine. If perceived as threatening, military exercises can also provoke a reciprocal signal of resolve by the adversary, especially if the exercise is large and takes place in proximity. [16] The potential for conflict escalation, however, is smaller if the maneuvers are conducted within an alliance. [17]

The size, location, and frequency of the exercises vary considerably. Training may be carried out in domains such as land, sea, air, cyber, and space. Such events may be open to international monitors or take place behind a veil of secrecy. It must be stressed that military exercises are not cheap to organize and execute. Even the preparation stage, Lasconjarias [18] submits, can be a time and resource-demanding event. In sum, military exercises fulfill multiple functions and can be applied to buttress many political and strategic objectives. The aims and priorities of military exercises can change over time depending on shifts in the geopolitical order. They can serve the purpose of sharpening interoperability among alliance partners or be used as confidence and trust-building mechanisms among opponents. By the same token, however, exercises can be utilized as a measure of deterrence or coercion.

In this article, we propose that NATO military exercises in the Baltics, while characterized by continuity in their endeavor to practice interoperability, at the same time underwent major changes in their aims. Mirroring the changing geopolitical conditions, they have evolved through two distinct phases. Initially (2000–2014) they supported the goals of modernizing Baltic armed forces and preparing personnel for foreign missions. After 2014, however, allied exercises morphed into a critical tool for making deterrence credible. In particular, they served as a mechanism to show the alliance’s capability to quickly reinforce its enhanced Forward Presence units.

Exercises and deterrence by reinforcement in the Baltics

In this study, we have scrutinized military exercises in the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Why focus on this specific geostrategic area? We posit that this space, because of its proximity between rival actors, lends us an opportunity to gain important insights into the value and utility of allied military exercises. To put it at its simplest, the structural conditions present in the Baltic Sea region make this area an intriguing object for academic inquiry. After all, this is where the Western security architecture (NATO) and the Russian Federation psychically meet each other.

The outer edge of NATO and the Russian western border has long been marked by analysts as a geopolitical fault line. Both Baltic and Russian authorities have regularly expressed their discomfort with being in close physical proximity to each other. In this context, scholars like Ralph Clem[19] have advanced the argument that by ratcheting up the number and size of military exercises, both NATO and Russia are risking greater geopolitical instability. This notion, however, has been countered by the work of Kuo and Blankenship [20] who suggest that exercises that are conducted within military alliances do not create the type of escalatory dynamics that critics have warned about.

As NATO’s easternmost members, the Baltics share considerable borders with what they perceived to be a threatening revanchist power. These countries are almost completely cut off from their NATO peers. Only Lithuania shares a thin stretch of land, commonly referred to as the Suwalki gap, with fellow alliance member Poland. In the view of Riho Terras, a former Estonian Chief of Defense Force, the Baltics are “like an island” because the gap between pro-Moscow Belarus and the Russian enclave Kaliningrad is negligible. [21] Kaliningrad itself poses a significant challenge as it gives the Russian side an additional platform for power projection into the Baltics. [22]

Being sparsely populated, the Baltic republics are not in a position to mount a defense purely by their means. Thus, in strategic matters, they are heavily reliant upon NATO partner governments’ promise to protect them. In this context, academic scholarship abounds regarding the Baltics as the alliance’s most exposed link. Skeptics have even implied that territories in Europe’s deep corner are outright indefensible militarily. In the view of Barry Posen [23], the defense of the Baltics is not a practical matter because of their unfavorable geography. In its immediate neighborhood, the Russian Federation is by far superior in terms of conventional military force and holding an advantage in the geographic set-up. [24] Also, Russian military capabilities are considered to be the most formidable and advanced in its Western Military District. Certain war-gaming simulations have concluded that Russia, in a hypothetical scenario, could overwhelm and overrun the Baltics in a matter of a few days. [25]

In hindsight, with the Russian armed forces struggling tremendously in achieving their war aims in Ukraine despite outnumbering their opponent by a significant margin, analysts have been forced to rethink their baseline assumptions about the “defensibility” of the Baltic states. As put by one of the lead Russian military experts, Michael Kofman, the Ukraine war has proved that the Russian military is not exactly “twelve feet tall.” That, Kofman advises, however, should not lead us to the other extreme whereby we assume it is “four feet tall” and incapable of operational success in a different setting. [26] One ought to remember by their territorial size, population, and a number of active-duty troops, the Baltic states and Ukraine are in entirely different categories.

Tellingly, Baltic officials themselves have also talked about being entrapped in an “uncomfortable geography”. [27] In the words of the former Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “while NATO collectively is far superior to Russia […] there is one corner where Russia enjoys local advantage and that’s the Baltic Sea region”. [28] During a relatively harmonious geopolitical climate, Baltic geographic disadvantages, as well as Russia’s upper hand in local conventional force ratios, have largely been a non-issue. In the immediate aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, however, as the Baltic region became a focal point of tension between Russia and NATO, geographic considerations, in Mattelaer’s [29] telling, “returned with a vengeance.” Similarly, Studemeyer [30] points out that while the Baltic “geographic position on NATO’s eastern periphery was of little concern in a post-9/11 world,” the annexation of Crimea visibly changed the importance that was accorded to NATO’s eastern flank.

The Baltic strategic predicament created a considerable dilemma for NATO. On the one hand, the alliance was unwilling to recreate a Cold War-type of deterrent with massive troop numbers facing each other. The deteriorating security landscape called for a credible deterrence posture on its eastern flank. The solution was found in regular allied military exercises. To begin with, as part of NATO’s effort to bolster its presence in the East, allied governments in 2016 agreed to implement the enhanced Forward Presence model—an innovative force structure comprising a diverse group of nations. While a historical milestone for the alliance, the deployment of roughly 5500 NATO troops in the Baltics and Poland did not, however, appreciably alter the balance of power in the region. Forward-based tripwire forces across the Baltics are not in a position to deny Russia its military objectives.

By any measure, Moscow still keeps notable quantitative and qualitative superiority in the region. Rather, these limited forward-based units in a hypothetical Russian advance scenario would be to buy time and delay its advance until larger NATO forces. [31] As elaborated by the Estonian Defence Minister, the enhanced Forward Presence model should be viewed only as “one piece of the puzzle,” that is connected to the “reinforcement strategy, the goal of which is to ensure the rapid arrival of allied forces in the Baltic states”. [32] In such a set-up, we suspect that regular military exercises after 2014 more distinctly contain core elements that signal the alliance’s capacity for swift movement of forces and reinforcement. We can thus consider such exercises an anchor point for making deterrence credible.

Baltic exercises over time

To capture the key patterns regarding exercises, we collected empirical data covering military drills in the Baltic states between the years 2000–2019. This period includes the years before the Baltic states’ NATO accession and ends before 2020 when major exercises were canceled or notably limited because of the Covid pandemic. As it pertains to data collection on military exercises, one has to acknowledge that it is fraught with challenges. The only available global data collection on joint military exercises [33] that we are aware of ends in 2010. In a comparison of Russian and NATO military maneuvers, a group of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung journalists relied mostly on press releases to assemble a systematic overview. In doing so, the lead author [34] points out that because there are no readily available overviews of such exercises, the “data must be assembled from hundreds of pieces like a mosaic.”

Here, we followed a similar approach by marshaling empirical evidence from the following publicly available sources: Baltic News Service (BNS), annual NATO reports on allied exercises, and the official website of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. We relied on an automated keyword search (“military exercises” and “military maneuvers”) in LexisNexis for the Baltic News Service, the region’s leading news wire, to identify relevant articles which we then screened manually to identify the ongoing maneuvers. Our data collection encompasses 72 military exercises that took place in the Baltics on land, sea, and/or air. This includes exercises that are repeated annually as well as exercises that are nonrecurring. A list of the identified exercises can be found in the online appendix.

We have counted only those military exercises that are multinational. That at a minimum, two NATO members had to be involved in the military drill for it to be included in our analysis. As part of the data-gathering process, we sought to establish the name of the exercise, location, size, taking part in countries as well as estimated troop numbers. For our research purposes, we counted only those events that involved at least 1000 participants. Following the example set by Castillo [35], we chose this cut-off point because an exercise of this magnitude would likely be reported in the press.

To get a better handle on the role that military exercises play in the region, we further fused quantitative data with in-depth qualitative analysis. We have scrutinized public statements and strategic documents by NATO, Russia, and the Baltic states. We have been able to better assess the driving logic behind military exercises in the Baltics. Our presented findings fill a notable void in academic scholarship. While several scholars and policy analysts[36] have made important strides in exploring military exercises in the Baltic Sea region, such studies have focused either on a selection of individual large exercises or have covered a maximum of 8 years of exercises in the region.

To date, no systematic analysis has yet been presented that thoroughly maps and assesses two decades of exercises. Without systematic data collection and in-depth analysis, we risk drawing conclusions that suffer from selection bias. Relying on very few exercises or a short time can be misleading, showing a shift in patterns where there might only be an outlier. Our contribution is to investigate how military exercises in the region evolved and whether key international events had a large and enduring impact on the pattern of joint training. By grounding our analysis in a longer period, we can develop a richer understanding of the role that military drills have played in the Baltic Sea region and how they have changed. Our contribution goes beyond capturing the size and frequency of exercises. We furthermore assess the character and scripts of military exercises and thus add more detail, again in particular, with a focus on how they changed.

In the first step, we present some descriptive patterns of the military exercises in our data collection. Graph 1 reveals that military exercises in the Baltics took a different course after the annexation of Crimea. We can see a clear spike in the frequency and size of military exercises. Graph 1a summarizes the number of joint military maneuvers that were performed in the Baltics per year. Until 2012, we observe typically had one or two military exercises per year, with a certain increase after 2010 to three and even four exercises per year in 2013. In 2014, the number of joint exercises that took place in the Baltics doubled to eight and remained high until 2019.

Graph 1. (a) NATO military exercises in the Baltic states (yearly basis). (b) An average number of troops per military exercise (monthly basis).

Military exercises took not only place more frequently after 2014, but they also increased in size. Graph 1b portrays the average size of a military exercise to take part, troops, every month. Until 2014, they held military drills on a rather regular basis, usually in May or June. The average size of a maneuver in the early years of our period of study was about 3,000 (2,927) ranging from 1,000 (the minimum size to be included in our data collection) to 6,000 taking part soldiers in the Steadfast Jazz exercise in October 2013. After the annexation of Crimea, military exercises took place with far greater frequency, spread over more months in a year, and also increased in size to an average of almost 5,000 (4,798) troops. The largest exercise in our data collection with 18,000 troops is Saber Strike 2018.

In the early 2000s, military exercises in the Baltic states primarily served the purpose of preparing these nations to meet the alliance’s technical standards and readying them for missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. State officials regularly framed exercises with allies as opportunities to modernize forces and gain new skill-sets. Commenting on a multinational exercise Baltic Eagle 2000, Estonian President Lennart Meri stressed that these types of activities help the nation gain “sound and intelligent administrative experience and modern military training”. [37] After the Baltic states’ NATO accession in 2004, our data reveal little change in the pattern of exercises. In 2005, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence emphasized that the guiding aim of exercising with partner governments has been to “develop interoperability among NATO and PfP forces and to improve multinational unit command and control in NATO-led Peace Support Operations”. [38]

The Baltic states were highly concerned with the developments in Georgia in 2008. Relations between Russia and NATO became increasingly strained. NATO reacted to the Russian military invasion in Georgia by suspending military and political cooperation; Russia suspended its participation in military exercises and other cooperation but continued logistical support for NATO’s Afghanistan mission. [39] In the graphs above, the Georgian-Russian war did not leave a pronounced mark on the number and size of military exercises conducted in the Baltic states. The number and size of maneuvers remained relatively stable, with a slight increase after 2009. Russia did not take part in the Baltops exercise in 2009 but already joined again in the military training exercise a year later.

The Ukraine crisis was a clear turning point in NATO-Russia relations. All cooperation was put to an enduring halt. No joint exercises with Russia have been held since. Instead, NATO increased its military presence in the Baltic states and beyond. This includes the military exercises in the Baltics as reflected in the graphs. Already in 2014, NATO officials vowed to “establish an enhanced exercise program with a focus on exercising collective defense”. [40] Concurrently, the alliance’s predominant power, the United States, pledged to increase the number of multilateral exercises in the Baltic region. [41] The presented analysis attests that these promises were translated into tangible action. NATO, as part of its deterrence posture, put a premium on sharpening the ability to move allied troops and equipment across Europe. Military exercises stressed readiness, speed of movement, and compatibility.

From parachute drops into remote areas, and rehearsals of river crossings to moving of combat power via narrow land corridors, the staging of military exercises after 2014 was overhauled into events that foremost, accentuated the alliance’s swift reinforcement capabilities. By probing the character of allied military drills, we find exercises were scripted and implemented in a manner to convey the message that the alliance can act on short notice and that even the most exposed members on its frontier will be defended. As explained by the former NATO assistant secretary-general, the task at hand for the alliance was to show that it can move “forces where they are needed and to move them quickly. And signal a potential adversary that NATO will be ready to defend”. [42] Simply put, by directing its attention toward rehearsing a quick response to a potential crisis in the Baltics, NATO used exercises to establish deterrence by reinforcement.

Beyond communicating that the alliance can rapidly move military fighting power into and within the Baltic operational area, military drills have also helped to sharpen interoperability among multinational deployments in the region. Shortly after the setting up of the enhanced Forward Presence model in 2017, these forces were incorporated into various NATO training schemes, primarily to ensure that multinational battalions can function together as cohesive units under the common alliance’s flag. We find that allied exercises in the Baltics have also served as important feedback channels for lawmakers and military planners. While large-scale exercises had a performative dimension to them—an audience for which they were played out — there was also a very practical and educational side to the regular movement of military equipment and personnel across the European continent. Exercises served as a testing device for identifying one’s deficiencies, thus laying the groundwork for what needs to be rebuilt in the physical infrastructure.

Baltops: from trust-building to confrontational flyovers

In the following, we closely scrutinize selected military exercises—their shifting size and logic. We did so for annually recurring exercises that took place several years before and after 2014 to better show changes. The annual exercises of Spring Storm, Saber Strike, and Baltops that regularly take place in May and June account for half of our observations and doubled roughly in size. We bring out key episodes and inflection points of these exercises and assess the drivers behind them. To begin with, our analytical focus here turns to Baltops, a longstanding annual maritime exercise in the Baltic Sea, led and sponsored by the United States since 1971. Throughout their history, these maritime exercises have served multiple functions.

Graph 2 depicts the yearly Baltops exercises in terms of troop size in the Baltic Sea. While relatively stable until 2011, after a marked drop in Baltops 2012 and 2013, the number of participating sailors as well as participating states increased in 2014 and after. The graph shows that the exercises have been truly multilateral along with a high number of participating countries. Besides the US as the lead nation, the exercises have regularly hosted NATO and non-alliance participants. The regular participants included the NATO members that are littorals of the Baltic Sea, but also other countries of Northern Europe and France, and occasionally Canada. Baltops also regularly included non-NATO members Finland and Sweden and for a few years also Georgia in its training exercises. After 2014, the number of participating NATO states increased, extending to include countries from Southern Europe, such as Italy, Spain, and Turkey.

Graph 2. BALTOPS annual military exercise.

Over the years, the Baltic Sea has served as a rare venue for the military-to-military engagement between NATO and Russia. After a two-year absence because of policy disagreements over the conflict in the Balkans, the Russian navy resumed its participation in Baltops in 2001. The 9/11 terror attacks had a profound effect on the overall NATO-Russia dynamics. A common enemy as transnational terrorism laid the groundwork for a rapprochement between the two sides. In a 2001 meeting between NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the former stressed: For some forty years NATO and Russia sat and glowered at each other, for another ten years we tip-toed around each other but now I believe we are entering an era where substantial and practical cooperation is going to build a unique relationship between us. [43]

Against this backdrop, in 2002, Washington and Moscow produced a joint declaration of a new strategic relationship. Among other policy points, it emphasized the need for “the expansion of joint exercises”. [44] For the next six years, Russia would send its naval forces to conduct drills in the Baltic Sea together with other NATO member countries. In 2003, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson offered an optimistic outlook for NATO–Russia relations by stressing that joint exercises such as Baltops have provided important lessons that contributed to the building of stronger links between the two sides. [45]

That summer, the US Marines, within the framework of Baltops, reached a historical milestone by landing “side-by-side on a beach in Poland with their counterparts from the Russian military”. [46] It was the first instance of US Marines and Russian Naval Infantry taking part in common large-scale military drills. Commenting on the value of Baltops, Vice-admiral of the US Navy Thomas Kilcline emphasized it has been great to see countries that have “historically not gotten along work well together”. [47] We can view these engagements through the lens of confidence-building measures that should ameliorate uncertainty and unpredictability between large military powers.

The shortly-fought war between Russia and Georgia resulted in a temporary one-year suspension of Russian participation in the annual Baltops maneuvers in 2009. The Russian newspaper Pravda even speculated that in the absence of the Russian navy, exercises had now turned into yet “another provocation against Russia”. [48] Moscow did, however, regain its Baltops participant status in 2010. Baltic leaders would later openly air their disappointment regarding the fact that in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian conflict, NATO in its relations with the Kremlin went back to “business as usual” within a couple of months. [49] In the years 2011–2013, Russia even took part alongside participants from Georgia. Just a month before Russia’s eventual takeover of Crimea in 2014, Russian military representatives had conveyed that in the spirit of cooperation, Russian military ships would take part in Baltops exercises. [50] According to Russian Vice-admiral Viktor Kravchuk, the intention was that “the Baltic Fleet will become a center for active international cooperation in 2014”. [51]

After Russia annexed Crimea, NATO’s cooperation with it was fully terminated on several fronts. This included Russian participation in common military maneuvers. The 2014 Ukraine crisis was a major regional rupture with far-reaching consequences. In response to being side-lined from this annual training activity, Russia instantly embarked on individual naval drills in its enclave of Kaliningrad. [52] Once a regular party of Baltops, Russia now felt the need to closely observe and “shadow” naval maneuvers held in the Baltic Sea waters. In 2015, Russian fighter jets overflew ships that were taking part in this exercise. [53] Citing growing tension in the region, the Russian Baltic Fleet’s warships would regularly track and monitor Baltops’ exercises. [54]

Since 2014, Baltops itself underwent a noteworthy reorganization by moving towards a deterrent logic. As French and Dombrowski [55] observe observed, in light of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the curriculum for Baltops shifted from peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts to “naval and amphibious warfare.” Indeed, the official NATO communique now stressed that allied participation in these drills showed “NATO’s resolve to defend the Baltic region”. [56] Similarly, the US Navy leadership reasoned that these exercises took place to deter Russian maritime expansion. [57] Whereas in the early 2000s, this annual event served as a platform for cooperation between NATO and Russia, it had now turned into a mechanism for reassuring regional NATO partners and deterring Russia. [58]

As part of NATO’s reworked deterrence posture, one of the key angles of Baltops drills was to sharpen allied mobility and lines of reinforcement. The 2018 exercise, for instance, involved an amphibious landing operation on the Lithuanian Sea coast. According to the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, the goal of Baltops 2018 was to “ensure appropriate readiness to respond to crises in the Baltic Sea region and ensure rapid reinforcement of the allies and military assistance from sea and air”.[59] The exercise involved scenarios that were aimed at “possible isolation of the Baltic and Nordic countries and ensuring rapid arrival of allied support in case of aggression”. [60] In 2019, multinational troops, in the framework of Baltops, similarly practiced troop landing “on Baltic beaches from two amphibious strike groups”. [61] According to local journalists that observed the exercise, “the scale and speed of such operations had not been seen in the Baltic states before”. [62] The nature of these exercises speaks directly to the high priority that allied partners attached to the need to improve the speed of movement in the Baltic Sea region. In sum, our analysis reveals a change in the size of Baltops exercises after 2014. Simultaneously, the scripts of these exercises moved towards the objective of deterrence, with the Baltops becoming a venue to demonstrate allied reinforcement capabilities, thus aiming to provide a credible signal to deter Russia and assure the Baltic states.

Saber Strike and Spring Storm

Another set of regularly repeating exercises in the Baltic states are Saber Strike and Spring Storm, which started in 2010 and 2013 respectively and continuously increased in size both peaking in 2018 with 18,000 and 15,000 troops. This brought over 33,000 troops to the region in May and June 2018. Given their prominence, we explore them in greater detail.

Graph 3. Saber Strike and Spring Storm are annual military exercises.

Saber Strike is a US Army-led exercise that takes place, in a rotating order, across the three Baltic states. In its initial phase, these exercises primarily served the purpose of preparing Baltic armed forces for deployments to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Baltic senior military staff, as well as defense officials, couched in these exercises as training opportunities tailored for multinational environments outside the Baltics. [63] This was reflected in the training program as it emphasized: “improvised explosive device defeat training” as well as “convoy and patrol operations”. [64] To reach the desired training objectives, military drills stressed those operational scenarios that troops would likely encounter in Afghanistan. [65] According to the Director of Training and Exercises for US Army Europe, Saber Strike was a vehicle for allies to train together before being deployed together abroad. [66] This working assumption held on for several years until 2014.

After 2014, Saber Strike assumed an entirely different shape. Once seen through the lens of deployments abroad, senior Baltic officials now discussed these training opportunities in the terminology of assurance and deterrence. [67] Having reflected on the lessons from Ukraine, where the Russian side had proven its ability to quickly seize the initiative, Saber Strike exercises equally put a premium on rehearsing and showcasing allied capacity to swiftly move assets and personnel to the Baltic states. In 2015, 2016, and 2017, Saber Strike included a parachute drop component whereby US troops, equipment, and resupplies would land on NATO’s eastern flank. [68] Exercise Saber Strike 2016 also involved the rapid amassing of large-scale military force, “from loading pre-positioned equipment from caves in Norway onto a ship to organizing the force” in the Baltic theater. [69]

The 2016 Saber Strike was further combined with a Dragoon Ride, “a vehicle road march” that was started in Germany, made its way across six countries, and concluded in Tapa, Estonia. The working objective, apart from a symbolic demonstration of force and allied solidarity, was to showcase that the alliance is capable of rapid movement of a regiment-size convoy comprising some 400 tactical vehicles. [70] The whole point of this event, according to the Commander of US Army Europe, was to demonstrate to the Russians that the US military, together with allied forces, can move swiftly across great distances, through Eastern European villages and small towns. [71]

Saber Strike 2017 and 2018 further served as a testament to the changed character of military exercises. The 2017 drills emphasized defending the Suwalki Gap, a strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, that many see as a critical node in the overall Baltic logistics scheme. [72] As part of the exercises in 2017, NATO also officially inaugurated Multinational Corps North-East as the alliance’s High Readiness Forces Headquarters. [73] According to alliance representatives, the establishment of this component increased NATO’s ability to act promptly in a crisis. The 2018 Saber Strike exercise similarly stressed the ability to move personnel and assets to the alliance’s eastern edge. [74] The US Army summed up the objective of this training opportunity: “Saber Strike is the platform to validate our collective capability to rapidly respond to and reinforce Allies in a time of crisis”. [75]

Besides the deterrence angle, which figures prominently in nearly all large-scale allied maneuvers, these training events have equally served as a testing device vis-à-vis the region’s physical infrastructure, providing useful feedback on what and how needs to be rebuilt. Stated differently, allied exercises appear to have generated data points about the abilities of both personnel and the infrastructure that support them. As NATO’s report shows: “troop movement in real-time is a clear barometer of changes in mobility, infrastructure, and legal and regulatory barriers”. [76] Regular movement of troops and military hardware created a helpful feedback channel through which military planners and lawmakers received information about various shortcomings and inadequacies in its strategic posture.

According to NATO, running exercises such as Saber Strike allowed for identifying “critical areas of structural deficiency or bureaucratic impediments”. [77] Writing on the reinforcement strategy, the Estonian Defence Minister emphasized that allied governments could not afford “to suddenly realize in a time of crisis that a runway is too short, a bridge too narrow or a tunnel too low”. [78] Regular movements of troops thus allowed to discover previously unanticipated issues. Here, it is important to stress that many of the drills post-2014 were organized and executed in a manner that intentionally pushed armed forces and physical infrastructure to their limits. Those with previous participant experience in multiple Baltops and Saber Strike exercises attested that post-Crimea training “really ramped up the realism and intensity”. [79] In sum, regular exercises, besides the deterrence angle, generated important clues for the decision makers about what and how needs to be implemented or rebuilt to make a military movement across Eastern Europe more time-efficient.

Another prominent and annually run exercise is the Spring Storm. Initially designed as a training opportunity solely for young Estonian military conscripts and reservists, Spring Storm eventually evolved into a NATO-led exercise that brought together allied troops. The exercise reached its peak in 2018 when around 15 thousand uniformed individuals from 15 allied nations took part in it. A core feature of the exercise has been to develop cohesiveness and interoperability between Estonian national troops and the enhanced Forward Presence battalions. As already noted, in 2017, NATO stepped up its presence in the Baltic Sea region by standing up four enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalions in the Baltics and Poland. Subsequently, these multinational allied units were brought into various local military training schemes, such as Saber Strike and Spring Storm.

In a short period, the Baltics had become hosts to unprecedented mini-coalitions that comprised a broad mix of strategic philosophies, military hardware, cultures, and languages. As acknowledged by NATO, in its initial stages, “the deployment of eFP troops created a steep learning curve” for the host nations. [80] The need for common training events further stems from the fact that these battalions are rotational. Considering this, training exercises like they utilized Spring Storm to ease problems that are commonly associated with managing diverse compositions of military deployments. Exercises became instrumental in improving group cohesiveness, interoperability, and setting common expectations. [81]

Also, exercises involving the eFP battalions in the Baltics may have equally brought some side benefits to NATO as an organization through important lessons learned. Due to its novel force formation, the eFP model has essentially served as a multinational laboratory, which allows for assessing the effects of diversity on the overall mission dynamics. As pointed out by the Canadian Ambassador to Latvia, someone who has been deeply involved in the eFP mission in Latvia, that so many nations have been constantly “training, parading and living together” will probably serve as “one of the best tests of NATO as an organization over its existence”. [82] Similarly, Rachel Ellehuus, who held a senior-level position at the US Department of Defense, argues that such unprecedented regular exercises of highly diverse multinational deployments may serve as a blueprint for future NATO missions elsewhere. [83] Simply put, eFP exercises in the Baltics may have yielded important lessons regarding how to best train and organize diverse multinational battalions.

Conclusions

This paper assumed to scrutinize the logic behind allied military exercises in the Baltic states. Military exercises, especially in a multilateral alliance context, serve the purpose of improving interoperability. While practicing joint operations is continuously a core task, the size and scenarios of maneuvers can vary and give priority to additional purposes. Our analysis speaks to the fact that over two decades, the size, tempo, and character of military training activities in this region have manifestly changed. First, we demonstrate that, from 2000 to 2014, allied exercises primarily centered on preparing local militaries for eventual NATO membership and the alliance’s out-of-area missions. For a moment, naval exercises in the Baltic Sea promoted the goal of normalizing relations between Russia and NATO. Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, however, dealt a serious blow to the regional order. Considering this, the alliance underwent a profound strategic paradigm shift, with collective defense once again becoming a key priority. Our data collection on the frequency and size of military training events indicates that the 2014 Ukraine crisis was the primary driver behind the spike in the overall exercise numbers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Our analysis supports the argument that the Crimea annexation had a considerable bearing on the very nature of allied-run military maneuvers. For the Baltic states, the principal lesson from Russia’s offensive in Ukraine was that speed of deployment is of the essence and that adequate force reinforcements in a crisis must arrive on short notice. Reflecting this conceptual notion, their focus on rehearsing the timely movement of assets and personnel can characterize post-2014 exercises in the Baltic states. Reluctant to station tens of thousands of troops along NATO’s eastern frontier, the alliance instead opted for a limited forward presence, but one that, at least in theory, could be swiftly supported by larger follow-up forces.

Here, the credibility of the deterrent was built not solely around stationed multinational battalions in the region, but on the prospect that considerable NATO reinforcements can join them on short notice. As put by Hodges et al. [84], “for deterrence to succeed […] the allies need to have and be able to demonstrate the ability to move large and heavy military units, at speed, to and across Europe.” Our research attests that after 2014, NATO turned its sights on showcasing its ability for a timely response vis-à-vis alliance’s eastern flank. In this context, we can see military exercises as a crucial element to credibly signal capacity and resolve within the concept of deterrence by reinforcement.

However, some have expressed skepticism regarding both the size and speed of NATO’s implemented maneuvers. A long-time Russia observed Edward Lucas, for instance, is of the view that allied exercises in the Baltics have been far “too small, too well scripted, and too devoid of complexity”. [85] Analysis carried out by the Swedish Defence Research Agency equally pinpointed several deficiencies in the alliance’s adopted deterrence-by-reinforcement approach. [86] In this context, it is also worth noting that after Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine in 2022, NATO allies, for the first time in history, activated the NATO Response Force. The multinational force reached Romania in 4 days, which is double the deployment time (48 hours) allied representatives had advertised before. [87] This indicates that NATO officials ought to carry on with the task of sharpening response time in crises.

While a detailed assessment of Russia’s 2022 war in Ukraine is beyond the remit of this article, some limited points regarding the role played by military exercises are in order. Before the breakout of war, the exchange of mutual observers in military exercises was one of the potential stepping stones toward de-escalation and more transparency in the European security architecture. In its initial communique, the Russian side had signaled a willingness to reevaluate military maneuvers and work towards reforming the Vienna Document that governs their transparency. [88] Equally though, the Prime Minister of Estonia had warned against too many concessions about military exercises, given that they are “detrimental to our defense posture”. [89] The all-out assault against Ukraine’s sovereignty in the early hours of February 24, however, instantly put an end to negotiations on this matter.

Considering this, the current military configuration on NATO’s eastern flank is set to be overhauled once again, with a formal decision likely to be announced during the summit in Madrid. [90] Baltic senior officials have argued that because of the devastating war in Ukraine, the alliance ought to move away from the tripwire-based deterrence framework to the deterrence-by-denial approach. The likely addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO will have an important imprint on the overall Baltic Sea region military outlook. As the alliance undergoes another strategic posture change, it will be worthwhile for scholars to return to the question of military exercises and their role in the regional security landscape.

.

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