Special Operations Forces (SOF): The Integrators for Total Defense and Resistance

Remy Maduit | Authors published

Book in English | Livre en français | Synopsis du livre | Articles in English | Articles en français

Special Operations Forces (SOF):
The Integrators for Total Defense and Resistance

Kevin D. Stringer, is the Associate Academic Director and Chair, of the School of Business and Management
at Webster University Geneva, Switzerland.

To prepare for gray zone or conventional warfare conducted by Russian or Chinese adversaries and their proxies, threatened nations can apply a Total Defense approach to safeguard their territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Two key components for any effective Total Defense concept are national special operations forces (SOF) and volunteer, citizen-soldier territorial defense forces (TDF), also known as national guards, defense leagues, or home guards. This paper will first define Total Defense and then highlight the role SOF plays as multi-dimensional, entrepreneurial integrators in such a national defense strategy, focusing on the SOF-TDF relationship. The essay will then examine several options for integrating SOF with territorial defense formations in the mission of national resistance within the occupied territory; an extreme scenario for the Total Defense system.

Total/Comprehensive Defense

Total or comprehensive defense is a national security strategy based upon whole-of-government and whole-of-society involvement in protecting a nation’s sovereignty. In her article ‘From “total” to “comprehensive” national defense: the development of the concept in Europe,’ Dr. Ieva Berzina provided a comprehensive historical perspective on this framework, explained its derivation from the idea of Total War, and offered a differentiation between ‘total defense’, with an emphasis on military components, used primarily by non-aligned states during the Cold War,’ and today’s ‘comprehensive national defense’ that counters both conventional and hybrid threats with both military and non-military means. [i] Simply defined, Total or ‘Comprehensive Defence is an official Government strategy, which encompasses a whole-of-society approach to protecting the nation against potential threats’. [ii]

One of the key challenges in Total Defense is how to direct and harness the wide range of non-military stakeholders to achieve the promulgated national security goals. Unlike the military, which can rely upon a clear chain of command, the Total Defense effort requires cooperation, negotiation, and consensus-building among stakeholders to achieve alignment of activities. Since current and historical models for interagency operations are problematic, the conduct of effective interagency operations requires new mechanisms and approaches. This assessment holds for Total Defense initiatives. In fact, for success, Total Defense requires the elusive but essential unity of effort. Unity of effort—the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not part of the same command or organization—is the product of successful unified action. The special operations community can best facilitate this unity in its integrator role. As Canadian Brigadier General Steve Hunter noted, Notwithstanding the high demand for SOF in their traditional realms, SOF recognizes they will be asked to play a significant role in strategic competition. However, SOF will probably not be in the lead, but support larger whole-of-government efforts. SOF’s ability to integrate with military and national security partners will become paramount and dependent on its partnerships and operating relationships with Joint Force elements, other governmental departments (OGDs), and allies. [iii] This practitioner’s assertion is substantiated by academic research that demonstrates that the SOF serves as a connector between diverse units within the military and assorted organizations outside of it. As Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari wrote in their article ‘The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization, Boundary Spanning, and Military Autonomy,’ SOF exhibit a variety of boundary-spanning roles within a plethora of ‘alliances, coalitions, ad hoc formations, and temporary organizational structures’. [iv]

The SOF Integration Role

In this light, SOF serves an increasingly valuable role as multi-dimensional integrators at both the operational and strategic levels. Integration is understood as ‘the arrangement of forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole’. [v] SOF can place itself at the nexus for connecting joint, conventional, multinational, and interagency actions in a great power competition (GPC) context. Given the SOF’s unconventional mindset and approach, cross-cultural capabilities, and long experience gained in working with multinational and civilian entities during the decades-long counter-violent extremist organization (C-VEO) campaigns, SOF is well suited to convene a wide range of stakeholders to address great power adversary challenges. These same qualities make SOF a significant integrator in Total Defense.

In most countries, SOF is inherently joint by nature, internally combining the national land, air, and maritime special operations components within the special operations command construct and then connecting it to the wider joint force. For example, the joint Canadian Special Operations Forces Command cannot operate effectively without collaborating with the other Services, and therefore it naturally relies on the Air Force and Navy for strategic mobility, deployment, and insertion capabilities while operating closely with Army-provided enablers. [vi] Similarly, for the United States, SOF is associated with the wider joint force for both operational purposes and service support and sustainment in areas like personnel management, logistics, and maintenance.

Broadly speaking, successful military contributions to irregular warfare require a deliberate and sustained integration of special operations and conventional capabilities. [vii] Equally, against peer adversaries, future military operations will require even closer cooperation between SOF and conventional forces for victory. SOF Commands contribute to this critical requirement through habitual liaison and coordination with conventional forces. [viii] This author, in the article ‘Force Integration in Resistance Operations: Dutch Jedburghs and U.S. Alamo Scouts,’ closely examined the SOF’s role as an integrator with conventional forces, highlighting obstacles to attaining this goal, while also providing two World War II vignettes that demonstrated success in achieving this objective. [ix]

Similarly, SOF frequently enables multinational and interagency action beyond their mandated remit. In the illustration, the Baltic SOF Intelligence Fusion Cell (BSIFC) is a Lithuanian-led intelligence center being stood up in Vilnius that is a joint project among Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the United States. [x] Tasked with providing synthesized intelligence and analysis on Russian threats, the BSIFC is a Ministry of Defense level effort encompassing several significant interagency stakeholders from the relevant countries. [xi] Interestingly, pertinent SOF organizations were the catalysts to convene the stakeholders to establish this unique organization, which goes far beyond a traditional SOF mission or task. Here, SOF moves into an integrator-entrepreneur role, where ‘the entrepreneur responds to perceived threats and opportunities, seeking to change the organization (or the environment) to create new alignments between organizational capabilities and environmental opportunities’. [xii] This SOF behavior applies well to the complex theme of national resistance and integrating territorial defense forces on such an unconventional warfare mission.

The SOF and TDF Symbiosis in National Resistance

As noted in the article, ‘Survival in the Russian-Occupied Zone: Command and Organization in Resistance Underground Operations,’ ‘resistance capabilities provide a sovereign nation an additional element of national defense that contributes to deterrence against an adversary, imposes real costs on an occupier, and sets conditions for the liberation of occupied national territory’. [xiii] The co-published Swedish National Defence University/U.S. Special Operations Command Europe Resistance Operating Concept describes resistance as ‘a nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power’.[xiv] Viewing integration through the lens of national resistance and, according to a Lithuanian Vice Minister of Defence, ‘SOF is the shaping function for the entire national resilience and resistance discussion’. [xv]

SOF and volunteer citizen-soldier territorial defense forces have a symbiotic relationship with this complex national defense mission. As noted, SOF is potentially the superglue that can bind the various interagency organizations and components in a Total Defense framework. Guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage are the core activities of resistance, and SOF can provide these capabilities or advise TDF in such activities. Finally, SOF serves a force multiplier function – for example, a single, 12-person U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment A (ODA) is by doctrine capable of training, advising, and assisting an entire irregular or territorial defense force battalion. This ability amplifies the effect of a few special forces units across a TDF enterprise. Conversely, while SOF has the expertise for resistance as part of their unconventional warfare capabilities and experience in integrating the interagency, particularly law enforcement and intelligence organizations for this mission, they lack both mass and nationwide presence to effectively lead and conduct overall national resistance operations. This limitation is where the TDF relationship proves synergistic.

National TDF possesses three indispensable attributes that make them an ideal resistance force. First, the TDFs’ dual civil and military role provides an essential linkage to the civilian population, which serves as the source for the resistance underground and auxiliary as well as offers potential for directed social mobilization for non-violent resistance measures. Not only do citizens assume fighter, enabler, or amplifier roles in national resistance, but the civilian population also provides the critical intelligence screen that surrounds and protects the resistance. [xvi] In essence, TDF is a cross-cutting contributor to all the classic resistance components — underground, auxiliary, and guerrillas.

Second, territorial force geographical dispersion ensures presence throughout the nation and in [xvii] all county or municipality jurisdictions, providing excellent knowledge of the population and close relationships with local leaders and communities. This comprehensive national presence empowers the TDF as local sensors that can detect imperceptible or clandestine gray zone operations at the community level. These adversary activities could range from the establishment of nefarious but legal motorcycle and airsoft clubs to the infiltration of church organizations and associations. Third, TDF is a voluntary organization of patriots who are motivated to serve and even defend the nation and local community, and they bring a broad base of civilian experience and skills that may be relevant in resistance situations. Pertinent skills could include experience in medicine, engineering, cyber security, and information technology.

SOF and TDF Collaboration Models

Given the interdependent nature of special operations formations and their territorial defense force counterparts in resistance operations, a critical planning factor is the structuring of the collaboration between the two entities in a Total Defense construct based upon existing military organization and culture, as well as assigned legal authorities in peacetime, crisis, and during the occupation. This essay proposes three theoretical models of collaboration between SOF and TDF for the national resistance mission — the force provider (FP) option, the training and doctrine (TRADOC) option, and the advice, assist, and accompany (AAA) option. These possibilities are reference points for starting a discussion; they are not mutually exclusive nor comprehensive and can be tailored according to national frameworks.

Force Provider Option: In peacetime, the TDF organization recruits and prepares trained and ready forces to conduct and/or support resistance operations. The resistance-specific training occurs in-house within TDF training facilities with the expertise derived from foreign partners and/or seconded SOF personnel. During a crisis or in occupation scenarios, these formations and personnel are provisioned to and subordinated under another lead operational command, potentially even the national SOF command. In this model, the TDF headquarters serves a service or depot-like function as a force provider.

TRADOC Option: In peacetime, special forces units under the national SOF command develop resistance doctrine and train territorial defense forces in this framework to develop the skills for these missions. During crisis or occupation, partial or full, TDF units remain under TDF command and control and operate under the regional TDF headquarters. These forces would coordinate with SOF based on battle-space requirements.

AAA Option: The SOF command treats territorial defense units as domestic “irregular” forces and assigns dedicated special forces units to develop resistance irregular warfare capabilities in these formations through ‘advice and assist’ activities. In case of crisis or occupation, the dedicated SOF units accompany the territorial defense forces in resistance operations until liberation. The national command authority can assign these hybrid organizations to any relevant command node based on the evolving operational situation.

While not conclusive, the aforementioned models serve as starting points for several countries that are establishing or expanding their existing territorial defense or national guard forces for the national resistance mission. Georgia, Ukraine, Poland, Taiwan, Mongolia, and others can evaluate the FB, TRADOC, and AAA theoretical models as they apply to their national situation and adjust accordingly.

Conclusion/Recommendations

Special operations forces take on significant integrator roles in total or comprehensive defense. They provide connection across joint, interagency, and multinational organizational boundaries, and are both the connector and symbiotic partners with territorial defense forces, particularly in the complex mission of national resistance during crisis and occupation. An important planning step for any country confronted by the threat of aggression with resultant full or partial occupation is to delineate the cooperation model and command-and-control relationships between national SOF and TDF in peacetime. While three potential models are offered in this essay, there may be more options to explore. This important step avoids ad hoc and sub-optimal organizational arrangements established during an actual crisis. In retrospect, Winston Churchill’s words from May 19, 1940, are still relevant today: ‘Arm yourselves, and be ye men of valor, and be in readiness for the conflict; for it is better for us to perish in battle than to look upon the outrage of our nation […]’. [xviii]

---

[i] Berzina, Ieva. (2020) ‘From “total” to “comprehensive” national defense: the development of the concept in Europe’, Journal on Baltic Security 6 (2), 2020, p. 1-9.

[ii] NATO Special Operations Headquarters. (2020) Comprehensive Defence Handbook, Edition A, Version 1. Mons: NATO Special Operations Headquarters.

[iii] Hunter, Steve (2021). ‘CANSOFCOM: A Leader’s Perspective on Great Power Competition and SOF’, Consortium on International Security Insights, Vol. 1, Issue 7, November 2021.

[iv] Shamir, Eitan and Eyal Ben-Ari. (2018) ‘The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization, Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 41:3, 2018, p. 335-371

[v] Joint Publication (JP) 1. (2017) Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017.

[vi] Hunter, Steve (2021). ‘CANSOFCOM: A Leader’s Perspective on Great Power Competition and SOF’, Consortium on International Security Insights, Vol. 1, Issue 7, November 2021.

[vii] U.S. Department of Defense. (2020) Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense.

[viii] Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.5. (2019) Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, ed. B, version 1, Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, August 7, 2019.

[ix] Stringer, Kevin D. (2021a) ‘Force Integration in Resistance Operations: Dutch Jedburghs and U.S. Alamo Scouts’, Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ no. 102, 2021, p. 90-95.

[x] Kamiński, Mariusz and Marcel Hadeed, Monika Sus, Brett Swaney, Amelie Theussen. (2021) Baltics Left of Bang: The Southern Shore. INSS Strategic Forum, Washington, DC: National Defense University, p. 1-20.

[xi] The Economist. (2019) ‘How the Baltic States Spot the Kremlin’s Agents’, The Economist, 1 August 2019. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/08/01/how-the-baltic-states-spot-the-kremlins-agents, (Accessed: 29 November 2021).

[xii] Bullis, Craig, Andrew Hill, and Lou Yuengert. (2012) The Roles of a Strategic Leader: Mintzberg’s Framework, Faculty Paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

[xiii] Stringer, Kevin D. (2021b) ‘Survival in the Russian Occupied Zone: Command and Organization in Resistance Underground Operations’, Military Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, July-August 2021, p. 125-132.

[xiv] Fiala, Otto C. (ed.). (2019) Resistance Operating Concept, Stockholm: Swedish Defence University.

[xv] Abukevicius , Margiris. (2021) Lithuanian Vice Minister of Defense, Civil-Military Resistance and Resilience, Presentation, 2021 Hungary Resilience and Resistance Conference, Budapest, November 18, 2021.

[xvi] Lindsay, Franklin. (1993) Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito’s Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

 

[xviii] Churchill, Winston. (1940) Be Ye Men of Valour Speech, London, May 19, 1940.

.